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ABSTRACT 
This study is an effort to view events in the Ancient Near East, 
especially Palestine, during the Late Bronze and Early Iron Age from a 
somewhat different angle. In a first instance, it will try to move away 
from concentrating on the movement of ethnic entities. Emphasis will be 
on the social groupings involved, bandits and nomads being singled out 
especially as they behave and evolve in a highland environment. Chapter I 
assesses whether or not ancient Palestine in particular offers conditions 
appropriate for the rise of banditry. chapter 2 will analyze behavioral 
patterns among bandits and stress that they can function as wielders of 
important political and military power. Chapter 3 introduces nomads 
especially as they are perceived by the sedentary and urban groups, but 
also as they stand in relation to bandits. Chapter 4 will use these 
findings to present a picture of the Palestinian highlands as an 
autonomous hinterland. chapter 5 will treat the Late Bronze-Iron Age 
transition more directly. It will point out how these same highlands 
became an attractive area of refuge during the time of the late Egyptian 
takeover, the arrival of the Sea Peoples, and, finally, the collapse of 
the empire. Chapter 6 will move onto the processes of state-formation 
after that collapse. It will present the capacities of bandits and nomads 
to develop stronger polities from a sociological point of view, before 
the concluding chapter 7 takes a close look at first the written, then 
the epigraphical and archaeological material relevant to the particular 
Palestinian highland situation, especially treating the question of the 
power and size of any polity that would have arisen under the given 
conditions. 
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Introduction 
The "history of Israel" appears to us to be the Holy Grail of 
biblical scholarship. The quest for it has led us through equally obscure 
paths, has presented equally enormous obstacles, and although some have 
come closer than others it has as yet to be achieved. If this would 
finally be achieved, so many other things would hopefully fall in place 
more easily'. As of now, however, the major achievements of the quest 
appear to be the realization that the "history of Israel" is wrapped in a 
setting equally legendary to the Arthurian world surrounding the quest 
for the Holy Grail. These realizations have taken a long time to come, 
and even now they cannot be seen as unanimously accepted, although 
progress is being made. Thus within less than a decade we are able to 
witness a change of position from "to write a history of ancient Judah 
and Israel must depend primarily on the biblical record" (Miller and 
Hayes; 1986 : 19]2 to a position reflected by this recent statement by 
Davies: "I am construing "ancient Israel" as a scholarly construct" 
[1992: 161. 
Legends3 are set in literature, and the case of Israel is no 
different. Thus dramatic shifts, which have led to a number of monographs 
in the latter half of the past decade, are much indebted to work and 
research into the sphere of Hebrew literature [Davies; 1992: 13]. After 
all if we are to drive a "thick wedge between the literary and the 
'We would arrive at the stage where "instead of asking how the 
history can be explained from the literature, we must ask how the 
literature can be explained from the history. " [Davies; 1987: 3-4]. 
2 Davies in fact considers Miller and Hayes' A Histor_y of Ancient Israel 
and judah to be "the end of the road for the genre of 'biblical 
history'" [Davies; 1987: 4]. 
3 How we treat the biblical material in relation to legends and the like 
will be made clearer in the final chapter. 
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historical 'Israel'" [Davies; 1992: 1551, it must be pointed out that the 
realization of this, owes as much to the findings of scholars engaged in 
the literary approach as to the historian. Through the studies of Gunn 
(1984], Alter [and Kermode; 1989] and others, it has transpired that the 
biblical text should be appreciated as literature proper and that its 
nature is that of a story rather than that of a historical record. The 
writing of the history of Israel thus had to change accordingly and move 
away from the old ways of rewriting "the biblical story with a mildly 
rationalistic tone" [Davies; 1992: 25]. 
Not surprisingly, reliance on the biblical text for historical 
reconstruction has come under heavy criticism during the last decade 
[Coote and Whitelam; 1988: 21. As it has become increasingly clear that 
underlying the early stories of the Hebrew Bible are the political and 
religious realities of a later period, most probably exilic or 
postexilic, the actual history-writing concerning the so-called pre- 
history, in particular the emergence of Israel, but also, as we shall 
claim, the period of the monarchy, has grown more and more independent of 
this textual evidence. This move away from the biblical text has opened 
the door to a new range of alternative sources, changing the face of 
what, for so long, has been called biblical historiography. Archaeology 
and the social sciences, especially sociology and anthropology4, have 
accordingly caught the interest of biblical scholarship. 
Archaeology is no newcomer to the world of biblical scholarship, 
but for long archaeology had, next to exclusively, been used to 
substantiate given theories as opposed to having been free to speak for 
itself. Although Alt made practically no use of archaeology, Albright 
4As Davies states: "I am unable to find an agreed or satisfactory 
distinction. Where, for example, sociology is understood as the 
anthropology of industrialized societies', and in view of the 
existence of social anthropology, it is hard to see that there is any 
substantive demarcation. Indeed even sociology, tends to be defined 
differently in British and North American cultures" (Davies; 1992: 11- 
12; fn. 1]. 
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found little difficulty in integrating archaeological material into his 
"conquest" model. For too long it has been judged appropriate to let the 
biblical text dictate the interpretations of the archaeological record. 
At its extreme this has been taken so far as to make of archaeology 
little more than an extra validation for the historicity of the biblical 
narrative. Unfortunately the situation has been going on for so long that 
in many circles it is still a respected process. This is best illustrated 
in general historical or even archaeological guide books, where not only 
the results obtained but the method itself seem to be uncritically taken 
for granted. Thus Benesch, after emphasizing the importance as well as 
political implications attached to archaeology in Israel, follows up by 
saying: 
Aber noch eine zweite Aufgabe ist der Archäologie in diesem 
Land gestellt: die in der Bibel niedergeschriebenen 
Ereignisse durch Grabungen zu bestätigen. Zu verkünden, dass 
die Verheissung des Landes Israel, dem »vom Gott 
auserwählten Volk«, keine Legende ist, sondern eine 
Realität, die in jeder Messerklinge, jeder Befestigungsmauer 
sichtbar wird. [Benesch; 1979: 117]5 
Fortunately this situation is beginning to change, as it has become 
evident that in many instances archaeology raises serious questions about 
the narratives. This is especially so where Israel's origins outside the 
land are concerned. The historicity of the conquest narratives, in 
particular, was undermined when it was discovered that many of the cities 
claimed to be destroyed under Joshua had indeed been uninhabited at the 
time. Another important issue at stake is Israel's ceramic as well as 
sMany books which propose to present a comparative and cross- 
cultural view of world history or archaeology, in itself a very 
laudable effort, unfortunately take too much of what is said about the 
biblical world too uncritically, using only very limited reading 
material, most of which is beginning to be dated. See for example 
Manley's chapter on Meggiddo [1993: 64-70] and Hayden on Jericho [1993: 
373]. 
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architectural culture, for the discovery of an alien culture is believed 
to point to a new ethnic unit, a newcomer onto the scene. Here also it is 
the text which for long has dominated archaeology-and dictated 
interpretation. Indeed, if it was not for the text, it is doubtful that 
the label "Israelite" itself would be applied to any archaeological 
findings. For when we speak of Israelite culture, it is only due to the 
biblical text that certain pots, jars or housetypes found in the 
excavations in the Palestinian highlands are qualified as "Israelite". If 
it was not for the text setting the geographical confines for the 
location of "Israelite" pottery, this pottery would probably be labeled 
as "Canaanite". Unfortunately for too long scholars have tried to find 
"Israelites" where the Bible suggested they should be found, and for too 
long they were happy to find them just there [cf Whitelam; 1993: 20]. 
Nowadays, however, it has become increasingly clear that the 
highland culture does not point to a newcomer on the scene, definitely 
not a new ethnic unit. over the years interpretation of the 
archaeological remains has moved away from a distinct Israelite culture 
and emphasized the indigenous nature of both ceramic and architectural 
features. Though recognizing variations in the Late Bronze Age urban 
assemblage and that of the Iron Age highland occupation, these are traced 
back to socio-economic adaptations rather than ethnic differences. By 
emphasizing the similarities rather than the differences, it has become 
obvious that both the highland housetypes and ceramic heritage have 
developed out of the previously dominant "Canaanite" culture'. Variations 
that there are, are dependent on the new environment and generally poorer 
conditions with reduced possibilities for production. There are thus few, 
if any indications, in the archaeological records that would point to an 
external entry of land-hungry nomads, as both the conquest and the 
6 Note here a warning by Aurenche: "Llarch6ologue retiendra aussi 
que 11introduction de nouveaux types architecturaux sur un site ne 
doit pas n6cessairement slexpliquer par des changements brutaux de 
civilizations, du A des conflits" (1984: 14-15]. Cribb presents the 
same argument especially as related to "the arrival of a new wave of 
nomads" (1991: 661. 
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infiltration models would have it [Coote and Whitelam; 1988: 5 ]7. 
Nonetheless there are still those which speak of a definable Israelite 
culture. Finkelstein's monograph, for example, although a revolutionary 
study in the archaeological field and as Whitelam says prone to dominate 
research into the history of Israel for a long period, itself suffers 
from this deeply rooted fault (cf Whitelam; 1993: 3-5]0. 
But the direction of archaeological research has nonetheless 
undergone rapid changes. Regional excavation surveys have for example 
come to replace the former method of digging up major sites that found 
mention in the biblical text (Lemche; 1990: 83]. one of the outcomes is 
that our geographical horizon has thus broadened considerably. It is now 
possible to compare the results of highland excavations, to view 
culture(s) in its diversity and unity, in order to draw conclusions 
relevant to the understanding of both the urban areas, their rural 
hinterland, their point of contacts, and the shifts which might occur 
between them. What becomes clear is that one of the major changes which 
has effected biblical historiography and its use of archaeology is a 
7 Cribb alludes to the near impossibility of distinguishing nomadic 
and village cultures on this basis: *The traveller in the more 
isolated parts of the Near East should not be surprised to see groups 
of migrating nomads passing through villages whose inhabitants dress 
in the same manner as the nomads, speak the same dialect, employ the 
same range of household utensils, possess the same species of domestic 
animals and, in some cases, claim the same tribal affiliation. 
Differences there certainly are, but these are often ideological, 
organizational and economic rather than 'cultural, " (Cribb; 1991: 65, 
also 75]. 
0 This matter and the use of labels such as "Israelite" and 
"Canaanite" will be discussed in more detail below. The attempt to 
determine ethnic groups by their ceramic and architectural culture has 
come under heavy criticism [cf Kramer; 1977: 91,108-109; Kamp and 
Yoffee; 1980: 89,95; Renfrew; 1982: 2; Whitelam; 1993: 8]. Hayden also 
insists at different times on "the basic view that technolog-V and 
culture emerged as adaptations to stresses in the environment" 
(1993: 143, also 148-150] and that "Necessity is the Mother of 
invention" [1993: 223; Hyams; 1976: 82]. 
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trend to move towards a history of Palestine or even greater Syria- 
Palestine and away from a *history of Israel"9 [Dever; 1987: 218-219]. The 
widening of the archaeological zone of interest is but one of the results 
of the realization that a shortsighted "history of Israel" is not only 
impossible but also of limited use. Israel has to be seen with the wider 
spectrum of Palestinian history in mind. In fact, in our opinion, it 
forms but a part of such a broader history. Consequently, it is the long- 
term history of the whole of Palestine which should be seen as a 
predominant factor in the historical events of the Late Bronze Age in the 
highland regions, events "in which Israel is little more than an 
inevitable result of movements and developments over which she has no 
control" [Mayes; 1989: 101; cf Whitelam; 1993: 2]. 
Yet this also indicates that archaeology on its own will not tell 
us the whole story. For archaeology by itself, as some have pointed out, 
is mute or silent, and with the refutal of the biblical text as 
historical evidence, people have turned to the social sciences as the new 
partner to work in consort with archaeology [Dever; 1987: 219]. The 
biblical scholarly world is neither the first nor the only to use 
anthropology to evaluate the archaeological findings". In fact 
archaeology, as a social science itself, has at times been seen as a sub- 
topic of the wider anthropological arena. Especially in its main aims and 
methods, Hayden's recent guide book to archaeology, for example, has a 
deeply rooted anthropological undertone, especially as he comes to expose 
and explain the concept of models for reconstructing the evolution of 
humanity and society [Hayden; esp. 1993: 23-26,74-95,97-130; cf Hauer; 
1987: 16]". No wonder that the likes of sociology and anthropology have 
9 An "obsolete genre" as Davies maintains [1992: 11]. 
10 An increase of the use of social sciences, in particular 
anthropology and ethnoarchaeology, as well as theories on state 
evolution, have thus come to influence a number of scholars in the 
fields of Assyriology and Egyptology, for example (cf Yoffee; 1979; 
Watson; 1980; Yoffee and Kamp; 1980; Brown; 1986]. 
IlIt is also reflected by titles like Anthropology for 
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provided biblical historiography with methodology, models, and patterns 
appropriate for the study of Palestinian Late Bronze Age society, 
especially in their ability to render a setting within which to place and 
interpret the archaeological record. Although he is highly critical of 
the objectivity that can in fact be reached by such methods'2, Mayes 
states: 
The biblical record is dismissed as deriving from 
individualistic bias and prejudice, with no significance for 
the historical and sociological analysis of ancient Israel, 
while reliable objective knowledge can be found in 
sociological models, archaeological and other non-biblical 
sources which are thought to yield objective data for 
historical and sociological description. [in Mayes; 1989: 120] 
Mayes describes the use of the sociological approach in biblical 
scholarship from Levi-Strauss onwards, giving ample evaluations of the 
important work of Weber and Durkheim. The interest in sociology and 
anthropology is thus neither new nor restricted to the field of history- 
writing. Mayes' monograph (1989; also 1988], but also Lang's collection 
of essays (1985], are witness not only to the longstanding belief in the 
utility of anthropological research, but also to the variety of its 
applications. Yet its applicability in the historical field has itself 
caused a rich debate about appropriateness and choice of methodology, 
especially as the variety and complexity of the subject has entered 
religious scholarship ever deeper. It is especially the utility of models 
and comparative analogies which at times fail to gain approval of a 
number of scholars [cf Hauer; 1987: 171. Although some advocate the use of 
cross-cultural analogy over space and time, warnings for caution are 
voiced by others, while some seriously doubt their usefulness and 
applicability. Similarly the appropriateness of the use of models and 
Archaeologists (Orme; 19811 or Nomads in Archaeology [Cribb; 1991]. 
12 Hayden devotes a whole passage to "The Myth of objectivity" 
[1993: 28-32; also Orme; 1981: 27]. 
9 
systematic approaches is cast into doubt by a number of scholars [cf 
Gilbert; 1975; Watson; 1980: 57,59; Davies; 1992: 14]. However, the 
historian of the Ancient Near East is confronted by the fact that in the 
absence of proper textual evidence, so often the case, the 
anthropological tools of comparison and model are the only way of making 
progress. So, although the limits of all systems must be reckoned with, 
it is equally important to stress the necessity and validity of such an 
anthropological approach [cf Herion; 1986: 7-81. 
one of the major drawbacks of the method is the fact that both 
analogy and models are heavily theoretical [Hayes; 1987: 8-9]. 
Consequently, the findings will be hypothetical. often it is the case 
that the best result possible is to draw up the most plausible 
hypothesis, which again will be left to others not only to study or work 
upon, but hopefully to correct and improve. Hauer says that history 
writing is cumulative in nature, whereas Knauf rightly claims that the 
best we can expect is a number of competing histories, "eine Mehrzahl zur 
Diskussion gestellter Hypothesen" [Knauf; 1988: 170; 1991: 27; Hauer; 
1987: 15; also Hayes; 1987: 6]. Ultimately such a view not only permits us 
to look positively as well as expectantly into the future, but helps us 
to appreciate the long standing works of major scholars such as Alt, 
Albright and Mendenhall. Ironically enough, although Albright was a 
pioneer in the advocating the use archaeology and Mendenhall the 
revolutionary force behind the use of sociological tools, the new 
archaeological approach with its insistence on anthropology often 
advocates refinements, often substantial, to Alt's theory of peaceful 
settlement. 
Mendenhall's contribution introduced the most noticeable change if 
not in methodology then in interest. Furthermore, his monograph [1973] 
opened an outlook which still is predominant not only in Israelite 
history writing, but also in general in the field of the social sciences. 
This is the view that history moves in cycles. Mendenhall advocated the 
importance of such a view, when in the title of his monograph, he 
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emphasized the role of The Tenth Generation. Cyclical processes, such as 
those of nomadisation and sedentarisation, decline and collapse, rise and 
fall of trade, the change in settlement patterns, feature highly on the 
agenda of both the anthropologist and the historian. Already exposed by 
Braudel's and the school of annales concept of la longue dur6e, this 
outlook leads us to look for the recurrent and the regular, rather than 
the unique and the sudden. It represents probably the most practical 
application of the saying that history repeats itself. 
The outcome is a widening not only of the geographical but also of 
the temporal sphere which ultimately helps us to bring the Late Bronze- 
Early Iron Age situation in Palestine into a proper setting, thus 
defining the choice of appropriate comparative material. For on top of 
the geographical and ecological environment, it is possible to take into 
account particular political situations and their effects on economic and 
social phenomena, as well as observing the behaviourial patterns of the 
particular social agents involved or the economic adaptations and 
physical movements undertaken on their part under given circumstances. 
The aim is to arrive at a situation where it is possible to operate a 
model tracing the developments according to a regular pattern. 
No doubt the method might at first appear far too mathematical, and 
it has accordingly been labeled as deterministic and criticized for 
leaving little space for individualistic choice, omitting that one 
important factor in history, man [cf Herion; 1986: 8]. After all if *man's 
success is due to lack of specialization, to being able to change habit 
and diet when occasion demands" [McEvedy; 1967: 18], it seems unreasonable 
to confine this changing animal within a set of theoretical rules. Mayes 
has given this some thought and promptly asked for an understanding of 
the individual, the inclusion of "psychoanalytic theory" as a part of an 
"adequate sociology" (1989: 125-1281 13 . Having defined determinism as "a 
13 Davies view has also to be considered. He claims: "First, it is 
meaningful to talk about societies and not merely collections of 
individuals ... One cannot predict an individual's behaviour, but can 
predict that of a group, as the social sciences regularly show. This 
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tendency to think that human values, choices and actions are determined 
by certain variables in the social and cultural environment" [1989: 120], 
he is, nonetheless, able to maintain: 
Historv is made bv men, but it is made in response to given 
environmental conditions and through the medium of 
contemporary conventions. This should not be understood to 
imply only that some charismatic personalities are great and 
strong enough to break through their social structures 
(Herrmann: 1984; 267f. ); rather, for all individuals their 
relationships to their social and environmental context is 
one of response to given conditions through the convention of 
their age. [1989: 1291 (emph. added)" 
Salzman, earlier analysis of change [1980a] adopts a similar 
attitude. Change is here viewed as a set of alternatives available to 
individuals and society. Such alternatives however are given, not 
entirely new, spontaneous and ad hoc concepts, so as to be recorded as a 
sudden break, but are normative and regulated processes that have been 
tried before and are a part of the customs of the given society. As there 
is, however, a whole set and the possibilities of a variety of 
combinations between the different variants, human choice and 
individualistic differences are still given enough room so as to leave a 
considerable amount of freedom in the proceedings. 
Again this analysis highlights some of the major aspects which will 
dictate our study: it shows that change is definitely not necessarily, 
and indeed quite seldom, a complete break. It is rather a protracted 
poses a philosophical paradox, but it is true that people as groups 
behave differently to people as individuals: here is a-kind of social- 
scientific quantum theory" (Davies; 1992: 14]. 
14 Similarly Knauf claims in his epilogue: "Aber Menschen erleiden 
nicht nur Geschichte, sie machen sie auch; zwar selten aus freie 
Stücken. aber immer selbst" [1988: 170) (emph. added). 
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process. Similarly the regular aspect of change, the development 
according to a repetitive pattern shines through. As society is seen to 
change through a range of worked out and tried alternatives, it becomes 
clear that similar situations will be met with similar solutions. 
Adaptation is therefore not at every moment a totally new event, it is a 
phenomenon following a recurrent pattern and normative regulations. 
obviously new trends will emerge, be it because of technological 
innovation or not, but again the impact of such originalities will be 
absorbed in the quasi-unnoticeable due to the longevity of the 
proceedings. That change is also seen to be working in two directions, 
i. e. being reversible, validates the point that processes can be seen as 
operating in cycles. If change works both forwards and backwards and on 
the other hand operates through a set of regulated alternatives, it can 
only follow that the same or very similar phenomena will and do reappear 
periodically. 
Change viewed in such anthropological terms has been very 
influential in the writing of Palestinian history. Not surprisingly, a 
trend away from such discernible one-time events as conquest and revolt 
is noticeable. Rather the talk is now about shifts, transformation, and 
realignment. The search as such is not any more for one society replacing 
another, but about one and the same society developing from one thing 
into another. At this point a certain degree of consensus seems to have 
been reached. Yet it is also showing that the way in which such change 
happened is still presented under many forms, as demonstrated by Gnuse's 
claim: 
out of the discussions involving the three models, especially 
the third internal revolution theory, a new set of 
perceptions is beginning to arise. Inspired by archaeological 
work, this new position might be called the peaceful internal 
model. It has several variations. Stiebing (159-165) has 
proposed an excellent initial typology for, and a very useful 
response to these new models, which he categorizes as hybrid: 
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the frontier society model of Joseph Callaway, the symbiosis 
or internal nomadic settlement model of Volkmar Fritz and 
Israel Finkelstein. I propose a slightly more complex 
typology of peaceful withdrawal (Stiebings first category), 
internal nomadism, peaceful transition, and peaceful 
transformation. [Gnuse; 1991: 591 
Into this spectrum of transformation and transition we place this 
study, in which we will concentrate on two sets of social actors, bandits 
and nomads, especially as they evolve politically in a highland 
enviro=ent's. It might be said that we thus advocate the importance of 
these groups as well as this particular environment a priori. It is also 
easily perceptible that when we talk of highlands what we have in raind is 
to a great extent the central hillcountry of Palestine, and thus the area 
whose settlement in the Late Bronze-Iron Age transition is closely 
associated with the emergence of Israel. Are we thus still being led by 
the biblical text and thus reaffirming its historical value, as some 
would probably point out at this point? Is not our choice of geographical 
setting and of social actors primarily dependent on Israel's occupation 
of Palestine, its nomadic antecedents, and the bandit nature of Jephtah 
and David, as they are seen in the Hebrew Bible [cf. Miller; 1991b: esp. 
94-961? 
Not so, we claim, mostly because in fact our study should not be 
seen as describing the emergence of Israel as such. Our aim is to look at 
the behaviourial patterns of specific groupings that have existed and 
played a major part in the political setting of New Kingdom dominated 
Palestine, and furthermore at their reaction and adaptation as this 
empire began to crumble". Considering bandit and nomad groups has not so 
"We thus work, according to Braudel, on two levels of history, 
*man in his relationship to the environment" and "the history of 
groups and groupings" (1992: xiv]. 
"This is not to say that we make them a cause of that collapse; in 
fact any causal relationship in the discussion will go in the opposite 
direction. Nor do we want to play down the importance of other groups 
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much to do with biblical claims as with the appearance of the groups in 
external textual evidence and data of historical and anthropological 
nature emphasizing their role especially in highland environments. 
Finally the change of objective clarifies that we are attempting to 
reconstruct a history of Palestinian bandits and nomads, not the 
prehistory of Israelite forerunners. 
This also raises a question of unease with even the most recent 
monographs, that is, the continued use of the name of Israel in 
historical research in Palestine around the Late Bronze-Iron Age 
transition. Miller's criticism on this point is most appropriate. He 
singles out Finkelstein's definition for its circular argumentation, and 
objects: "Finkelstein calls them 'Israelites', not Iron I people" 
(Miller; 1991b: 99; cf Whitelam; 1993: 3] 17 . Though not using the term "Iron 
I people", we are however keen to heed Miller's warning. If our 
historical reconstruction's are to be independent of the biblical text 
and all its underlying assumptions, we also have to be independent of the 
use of the labels of Israel and Israelites, "however much they may be 
qualified or however much we may try and encode our uncertainties with 
quotation marks" [Whitelam; 1993: 211, although this might in the end mean 
to loose the old "star item" [Davies; 1992: 62]. If the history to be 
written has moved towards the history of ancient Palestine, it seems 
clear that our main protagonists will have to be not early, proto or pre- 
Israelites, but ancient Palestinians". 
or geographical locations. As the study goes on it will in fact become 
clearer that nomads and bandits can only be viewed in relation to 
other groups, such as the peasants and the urban 61ite, highlands only 
in relation to the surrounding plains, deserts, even seas. 
17 Finkelstein has in fact already changed his stance on this issue 
in a more recent article (1991: 52-53]. 
19 Neither should we in fact call them "Canaanitesm: This label also 
has too many biblical connotations, and, on the other hand, is a very 
vague term, that cannot be considered to denote any exactly defined 
ethnos or nation [cf Lemche; 19911. Beyond the more direct Palestinian 
problem, the whole notion of applying modern labels of the national 
kind to ancient societies is being challenged in a number of ways. 
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We prefer not to give any precise label to our social actors. 
Notions such as "Iron I people" seriously restrict our freedom in time, 
whereas "hillcountry settlers" not only limits the geographical outlook, 
but also refers to an activity which as yet has still to be proven to 
have taken place. We have preferred to stick to the terms 'bandits, and 
, nomads', and to discuss their actions and locations. A further term is 
necessary, which is that of "highlander" (or hill people), and which 
needs an accompanying explanation. Use of the terminology from Near 
Eastern texts only emphasizes the difficulties in terminology when 
referring to bandit or nomad. First of all, a problem arises because 
ancient, classical, and medieval scribes and/or historians have never 
really caught onto this differentiation, working with an anthropological 
concept of the world that only knew two categories, the sedentary- 
agricultural mode and all others, including nomadism, pastoralism, 
hunter-gathering, brigandage, raiding etc. Seldom politically 
disinterested, but biased ideologically, these records also portray only 
one view, that of the urbanite or even imperialist onlooker rather than 
that of the rural agents actually involved". One might add to this the 
fact that no word for "nomad" exists in the Ancient Near Eastern 
languages [Cribb; 1991: 101. Thus the problem of terminology will be a 
main feature of our study. It will be addressed in most chapters, 
questioning not only the validity of ancient terminology, but also our 
own not dissimilar use of modern constructed categories [cf Knauf; 
Eph'al finds it inappropriate for example to talk of the Egyptian 
realm as an empire like that of the Assyrians or Babylonians; others 
claim that even the Roman empire was not a nation-state as such 
[Peters; 1978: 3151. Merrillees [1986] on the other hand maintains that 
Egypt of the New Kingdom, unlike the Hittites and Mitanni, approached 
the status of a nation-state. For discussions on the general problem 
of ethnicity, see Kamp and Yoffee (1980]. 
19 Curiously enough Davies seems to accuse biblical scholarship of 
something similar when he says: "... biblical scholarship is guilty of 
retrojective imperialism, which displaces an otherwise unknown and 
uncared-for population in the interests of an ideological construct" 
[1992: 311. 
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1985: 41]. It is important to try to learn from other periods in history, 
how to look for the realities behind the language; these findings will 
help us to follow the social transformations that both groups underwent 
in the period under review. 
The discussion on nomads has nonetheless a longer history and the 
biblical scholar will by now be aware of the many debates which have 
centred around nomads, pastoralists, semi-nomads, transhumants, etc. 
Nomads have always been at the centre of the discussion of the historical 
processes around the transition to the Iron Age, and at least since 
Gottwald [1979] everybody should be fully aware of the ensuing 
complications. Banditry, "an ill-defined word if ever there was onem 
[Braudel; 1992: 64], on the other hand, has not always been at the core of 
this discussion. The main discussion on its character will obviously 
follow but it is important to describe shortly the type of bandit under 
consideration. We are not here talking of a mere robber, somebody who 
takes what he needs, then disappears till the need to rob arises again. 
The bandits that are at the heart of this discussion are to be seen as an 
integrative part of a wider political spectrum. They are engaged in the 
machinations of control and power; most importantly they are a social 
entity with considerable military might, thus highly influential in the 
socio-political scenario. 
Finally one might sui=arize the aim of our undertaking in the words 
of Davies, who insists on the importance of historical research, but 
redefines it in the following terms: 
... Or we can abandon ourselves to our own curiosity, and 
wonder just who it was that did live in these central 
Palestinian highlands, and who they thought they were, and 
where they got their identity from. We could say that we had 
found ourselves a subject to study, and set ourselves a 
programme of research. But where would we pursue this 
research? Among the pages of the Bible or among the mountains 
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of Palestine? Having already decided that the Bible is 
talking about some other society, we had better leave it 
alone. We shall have to write our history of this unknown 
population without it, at least in the first instance. 
[Davies; 1992: 28] 
What is presented then is a history not of a powerful nation in the 
making, but the history of the ups and downs of the people of largely 
unimportant and disgarded areas, people that at most times seemed so 
insignificant that they escaped accurate social categorization [cf 
Marfoe; 1979: 3,35]. Thus at the center of the investigation is a 
population which has been disregarded for so long that it has remained 
largely unknown. To an extent, it is therefore a relatively new quest, 
with little known prerequisites other than sparse archaeological and 
textual evidence that awaits reinterpretation. The aim is to emphasize 
what minor developments and minor polities have been missed, because for 
too long efforts have been concentrated on finding major disruptions or 
the magnificent achievements of perceived peoples and nations. 
The only large-scale achievements that will be kept in mind are 
those recorded for the major forces of the time such as Egypt, the 
Hitties, and to some extent the Sea Peoples. Even then this study 
questions the political circumstances that presupposedly reigned during 
the period in question. Bandits and nomads will be viewed as they reacted 
to such conditions, as they changed along with them. The study thus 
concentrates on responses that took place in the interior of the highland 
region, as the wider world around about took different forms. These 
conditions and responses are considered to represent some of "the 
processes at work in the settlement shift which took place during the 
Late Bronze-Iron Age transition" [Whitelam; 1993: 16]. As already alluded 
to above, it is the military and political sphere that will be of most 
interest. Here it can be seen how the extent of military might of the 
social agents influenced how they can came to be politically dominated or 
dominant, dependent or autonomous. on the other hand, it will also show 
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how this was dependent on the military and political might of outside 
forces. Ultimately the development of highland polities will be traced 
back to the ways in which highlanders could profit from the ebb and flow 
of political power of outside societies. 
The aim of the study thus remains socio-political in nature. It 
does not claim to trace origins of a people or nation, but rather points 
towards how a society can develop and how it can take more concrete 
political forms. It is in this way that we will try to rediscover that 
"unknown and uncared-for population" (Davies; 1992: 311, by analyzing 
those social groupings, which even their contemporaries tried largely to 
ignore. 
19 
Chapter I 
Palestinian Banditry: potential and likely candidates 
A major problem in analyzing the role of bandits in ancient 
Palestine of the New Kingdom period lies with the fact that there is 
little concrete evidence for massive activity by such groups for this 
given period. Although it is obviously very important to look at the 
textual evidence, this chapter will at first try to endorse a rather 
different approach. With the help of the anthropological material on 
bandits and their behaviour, we will try to determine whether the Ancient 
Near East presented the right circumstances for banditry to arise. A 
number of topics will be touched upon in the process, such as the 
geographical and topographical features particularly of ancient 
Palestine, the political circumstances and the possibilities of 
recruitment for bandit groups. Only in a second step will we then 
concentrate on the textual evidence where it will our task to identify 
the social role played by the lapiru groups in particular. The plan is to 
trace parallel developments in their activities and those we have 
associated with bandit-groups beforehand. 
It also will be interesting to see whether ancient Palestine 
presents a history of bandit activity as Coote and Whitelam hold 
[1987: 921. First of all we must state that banditry itself is not a 
recent invention. As Shaw has demonstrated, it presented the Roman empire 
with an acute problem. Numerous references to bandits and pirates prove 
that at least within this period of the ancient world banditry existed 
widely and, given the right circumstances, even flourished [Shaw; 1984]. 
it would thus be unsound to assume that other empires, such as the 
Egyptian or Hittite ones, did not face similar problems. It is therefore 
safe to conclude that banditry does not represent a modern invention, but 
formed an integral part of the ancient world. 
Evidence for bandit activity in the Ancient Near East and more 
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precisely ancient Palestine in Roman times is abundantly found in the 
records of the Jewish historian Josephus. In these records Josephus 
describes the activities of a multitude of bandit groups, gives precise 
numbers which turn out to be quite impressive at certain peaks of bandit 
activity, and locates most of their hideaways and refuges in the hill 
country. His records have widely been used by Horsley and Hanson [1985; 
Horsley; 1981; 19861 in their reconstruction of the Jewish revolt, where 
ample importance has been given to the role of bandit groups. They leave 
no doubt that in ancient Palestine and more particularly the hillcountry, 
the importance of bandit groups increases under the right political 
circumstances. Thus, at least from the environmental point of view, 
Palestine would appear to be able to support the presence of bandits. 
An important factor in analyzing the potential of a given territory 
for banditry is the possibility of recruitment. This begs the question of 
whether or not the territory yields enough people either willing to take 
up or likely to be forced into banditry. We will first draw attention to 
the form of society we are facing. The Ancient Near East is basically an 
agrarian society under the rule of the urban 61ite of various city- 
states, a society where a vast majority of peasants does the bulk of the 
work to the profit of a minority of tax-collecting 61ite-members. Within 
such a society banditry is inherent, but Hobsbawm makes it clear that it 
never represents more than a small percentage of the rural society. With 
gangs generally amounting to no more than 10 to 20 men, he considers 0.1% 
to be an nultra-generous estimate" [Hobsbawm; 1969: 16]. It is therefore 
not surprising that our evidence for bandit activity in the Ancient Near 
East is so slight. 
A first source of recruitment would accordingly stem from the 
dissatisfied peasant population itself. For the majority of peasants who 
will patiently and passively carry their burden, there exists a minority 
who will stand up and fight their oppressors. Again it has to be stressed 
that it is but a minority, a minority of individuals who voluntarily 
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choose resistance and out-of-the-law activity rather than passive 
acceptance. These individuals are the exception which proves the rule 
[Hobsbawm; 1969: 28-30; Gamst; 1974: 48]. Hobsbawm rightfully claims that 
ffbanditry is freedom, but in a peasant society few can be free" 
[1969: 24]. What hinders a peasant to be free is his immobility. If a 
peasant is to rise up he has to abandon his land which is his only means 
of survival. Furthermore he will leave behind him a family equally 
dependent on that same land as on the presence of the head of the family. 
The peasant is too deeply rooted in his land and his family to just go 
ahead and disappear in the woodlands of the bandit. Again, Hobsbawm 
states: 
once a man is married and on his holding, he is tied. The 
fields must be sown and harvested: even peasant rebellions 
must stop for getting in of crops ... The peasant's back 
is 
bent socially, because it must generally be bent in physical 
labour on his field. (1969: 24] 
Although it must be said that only few peasants turn into bandits 
through the process of rising up against their oppressors, peasant 
society has amongst it elements who can afford to do so. Among those are 
the youth of the peasant population, young males who are so-to-say in 
their rebellious age, evidently due to the advantage of lacking full 
family responsibilities. Although they might be harmless enough in 
isolation, Hobsbawm claims that when they band together it is possible 
that they turn towards banditry [1969: 25-26]. However it is doubtful if 
this form of banditry, apart from the odd exception, represents more than 
a temporary escape from boredom. Most of the youth probably return to 
home and family as well as the normal peasant life after a relatively 
short while. 
However a peasant society does not only include those who are tied 
to their own land-holdings, be this as owners or tenants. The more mobile 
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margin of peasant society yields a number of farm-hands and day-labourers 
or other migrant workers, which have no such attachments (see: Browm; 
1990: 262]. The formation of this so-called rural proletariat is often 
caused by rural surplus population, which results in certain members of 
the peasant society being landless. Especially where there exists a 
mountainous hinterland, its inhabitants are at times highly interested in 
part-time work on the plains. similarly one has to include a certain 
number of nomads to seek work among the sedentary communities'. Although 
they may he needed badly at peak-times of the peasant-calendar, such as 
the harvest, they might go unemployed for relatively long periods of 
time. Survival in these times calls for alternative options. In 
Hobsbawm's eyes banditry is a natural source of income for these elements 
of the rural society [1969: 25]. It is a near impossible task to prove 
that ancient Palestine faced such a problem of surplus population, but it 
must be said that the form of society has all the necessary potential for 
the creation of this mobile part of the peasant's world [cf Coote; 
1990: 18]. 
Similarly the sort of governmental system, which has of ten been 
termed as feudal, most certainly resulted in a number of people who were 
forced to leave their normal peasant lifestyle behind themselves. Among 
them we must count escaped serfs and slaves, peasants ruined by debts, 
and many others who for some reason or another had to escape from state 
and authorities. Rather than voluntarily following the path of 
resistance, these were people forced into marginality where banditry 
presented a viable means for surviving [Hobsbawm; 1969: 27]. 
Another important source of recruitment is the military sector of a 
society. Banditry is in many senses a paramilitary activity, and it is 
therefore not surprising that those with such skills are the most likely 
'often highland territory is inhabited by pastoralist nomads. In 
this case the part-time workers from the highlands and those from the 
nomadic sector are quasi-identical. 
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to turn towards banditry. 
Among such marginals, soldiers, deserters and ex-servicemen 
played a significant part... Men who come back from afar, 
masterless and landless, are a danger to the stability of the 
social hierarchy. Ex-servicemen like deserters are natural 
material for banditry. (Hobsbawm; 1969: 27] 
The case of the deserter seems obvious. Not only is he militarily 
skilled, he is also a fugitive. His step into banditry is not only 
viable, but often his one and only choice. Returning peasant soldiers do 
have a chance to rejoin family and village as well as their former 
lifestyle. Yet Hobsbawm claims that, although temporarily, they are 
entirely outside the usual village economy and that many of them will 
choose another path [1969: 28]. The knowledge of military skills, 
discipline, training and also tactics can often raise these people above 
the average village peasant [Gamst; 1974: 45-46]. Although this might 
profit the person to become a respected member of his community, the 
monotonous and hard routine of peasant labour presents little attraction 
to him. These soldiers are likely to go back to a more warlike 
occupation. A number of such jobs are provided within rural society, such 
as armed men in the service of a richer land-owner or fieldguards, but 
the alternative of becoming a smuggler or bandit is equally attractive 
[Hobsbawm; 1969: 281. 
What is described here is what could be called the fate of the 
professional soldier. Mercenaries are certainly the professional soldiers 
of the ancient world, offering their military skills wherever they are 
needed. The situation in the Ancient Near East with constant rivalries 
between city-states and on a larger scale, the fight for supremacy 
between the opposing empires, however provides ample demand for such men 
and their services. Problems arise mainly when such demand drops in more 
peaceful times and mercenaries are basically out of a job. With their 
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warlike tendencies these professionals know little other way to survive 
than through war and plunder and the transgression into banditry is but a 
small and easy step. From plundering soldiers they turn into marauding 
bands taking whatever they need wherever they find it; indeed the 
dividing line between mercenary, and as far as this goes also fieldguards 
and the like, and bandit seems to lie in nothing more than the fact that 
the one group is employed and the other one works on its own behalf. 
Circumstances of political instability add a great deal to this 
process of soldiers becoming bandits, especially in that they often lead 
automatically to the transformation of whole soldier-groups, be it 
regular troops or mercenaries, into marauding gangs of bandits. Shaw has 
demonstrated that in situations of usurpation and revolt in the Roman 
empire, whole legions could come to be regarded as bandits. 
In the case where one of these local potentates managed to 
assert his supremacy as emperor, large numbers of soldiers 
and whole regions of requisition immediately became 
illegitimate. Whole army units could find themselves 
classified as deserters, then bandits, and so cut off from 
legitimate sources of pay and provision. Unless such soldiers 
were willing to become civilians and recycle through the 
social system, they were compelled to a life of brigandage. 
The process can be observed on a large scale during any 
period of so-called "civil war" in the Roman state, but the 
plain fact is that it was happening in miniature all the time 
and in every region. [Shaw; 1984: 30) 
Again the more or less constant city-rivalries of the Ancient Near 
East invite us to think that such a process must have been well attested 
in the period of the New Kingdom. 
Another group which has to be treated independently, is that of the 
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shepherds. This is especially so as there is no doubt that the Ancient 
Near East, where economic sufficiency often depended on a combination of 
agriculture and husbandry, yielded many of these figures. We do, in this 
instance, distinguish shepherds from nomads, although these do evidently 
act as shepherds especially in the Ancient Near East where sheep-nomadism 
was the most widespread. Shepherds here refers to those people who take 
the live-stock of villages, richer land-owners or even the state to the 
pasture-lands. They can either be a member of the community owning the 
live-stock or in its employ or that of the land-owner or the state. A 
minimum amount of horizontal or vertical migration should be involved so 
that there is a considerable distance between the pasture-lands and the 
domocile of those owning the live-stock. Shepherds are suitable material 
for banditry not only because of their superior mobility, but also 
because of their relative isolation caused by the nature of the territory 
they normally work in. It is to this special sort of territory that we 
shall turn now as it increases the shepherds' likelihood to engage in 
brigandage. 
Hobsbawm, has pointed out that certain geographical features are 
particularly suitable for bandit activity. Mountain ranges or dense 
forests or a combination of the two, are especially attractive to bandits 
for a number of reasons [Hobsbawm; 1969: 28]. First of all they present 
the gangs with the necessary hideout refuges, without which no outlaw 
group stands a minimum chance of survival. Natural defenses and the 
numerous possibilities of runaway tracks within a territory that the 
bandit in the end had gotten so much more accustomed to than eventual 
pursuers are vital to the prolonged activity of any bandit group. This is 
even more so the case when, as in the Ancient Near East, the claim to 
superiority by regular state troops was heavily based on their use of 
military means devised for warfare on the plains, but highly ineffective 
on more difficult terrain. Bandit activity is similar enough to guerilla 
warfare for the bandit to prefer terrains where the mobility of the small 
and light group works at its best and the heavy military machinery 
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encounters most hindrances. Needless to say that a territory which has 
been referred to as the "Highlands of Canaan" (Hopkins; 1985] presents a 
rather suitable environment for bandits [cf Rowton; 1976a: 29]. 
Yet geography is not the only factor which leads the bandit in the 
choice of his territory; equally important are the questions of economic 
and political marginality of the given regior?. Although these two 
characteristics are somewhat dependent on the geographical factor, they 
have to be viewed independently as well. A given territory slips into 
marginality often not only because of the difficulty of the terrain per 
se, but rather because the state in charge decides that it would be 
economically unviable to engage in surmounting these difficulties in 
order to exploit it. 
Economic and political marginality of a given territory thus go 
hand in hand, in so far as a state only attributes minor importance to 
the political control of a territory, the economic exploitation of which 
would only yield minor fruits. A state restricts itself to maintain 
control over its most important breadbasket especially in times of 
political instability. Arid or even only semi-arid regions, where 
economic exploitation and political control meet higher difficulties and 
costs than the resulting benefits, are thus being isolated and 
transformed into what is called a "frontier zone". 
*Frontier zones" often exist through a combination of harsh 
geography, economic inviability, and political marginality. This is, 
however, not to say that they are not inhabited or exploited whatsoever. 
There might be isolated villages, temporary or permanent minor 
settlements, where people live on a limited yet self-sufficient economic 
basis. Yet often they are used as pasturelands for flocks, a way of 
keeping economic exploitation down to a minimum investment. It is here 
2 This combination is what Rowton refers generally to as the 
-topological factor" (cf 1965; 1976a] 
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that we find shepherds: minimum political and military control within 
their territory adds not only to their mobility, but also a certain 
freedom of action often leading them to a live on the ma rgin of legality, 
raiding and looting being a viable second occupation to them. "Frontier 
zones" are those mountainous regions where, according to Hobsbawm, 
"bandits meet shepherds and shepherds consider becoming. bandits" 
[Hobsbawm; 1969: 281. 
"Frontier zones" are thus natural centres for banditry in many 
ways. They attract bandit groups, because here they can escape tight 
political and military control, but also they provide bandit groups with 
the sort of mobile and relatively free people that can easily he 
recruited. others have at times claimed that the harsh life in frontier 
zones naturally raises a breed of more belligerent people, thus a people 
more readily apt to take up arms for plunder and pillage: 
Finally, the low population density, the abundance of wild 
cattle in the early colonial period, and the absence of an 
organization that had a monopoly on violence attracted 
criminals and vagrants to frontier areas, as Gongora 
observes. Adept in the rough skills of cattle raising, which 
as we shall see, were very similar to those of premodern 
warfare, these men could easily make a living by plundering 
and by smuggling cattle; they are another source of 
continuous turmoil of these regions. [Baretta and Markoff; 
1978: 592; also: 5881 
To a certain extent the parallel to the inhabitants of the 
highlands of Palestine seems justified. Harsh terrain naturally trains 
and roughens people and the lack of any other military control invites 
them to create some of their own'. The shepherds, like the Latin-American 
cattle-raisers, have to be skilled in the sort of military expertise 
3 Chapter 3 will address this problem more directly. 
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adapted to their environment, be it only to defend themselves against the 
neighbouring nomads or even other bandit groups [again cf: Baretta and 
Markoff; 1978: 593]. This often results in raiding others or establishing 
control in a protection racket system, which after all is nothing else 
but bandit activity. 
Finally it is not possible to omit nomads from the question of 
bandit recruitment. Some nomads, like their peasant counterparts have 
been seen to form bandit groups (Rowton; 1976a: 29; 1976b: 14]. Brown 
[1990: 262] indeed claims that in Modern Egypt most bandit groups were of 
nomadic stock, although peasants were accepted into such groups. 
Furthermore there are many instances in which nomads act as mercenaries. 
These people are thus similar to other mercenaries. There is no reason 
why reintegration into the nomadic-pastoralist life should be any easier 
than that into a peasant-village environment. This sector of society 
would thus represent another important pool of potential bandits4. 
Chaney [1983] has tried to adopt the frontier model suggested 
initially by-Lenski (1980] in his analysis of the emergence of Israel, 
and others have followed him lately (Gottwald; 1983; Coote; 1991: 45; 
similarly: Halpern; 1983: 78]. We think that he has carefully identified 
the hill-country as a frontier zone where bandit activity could easily 
spread. In fact the hill-country formed the hinterland to the coastal 
plains of Palestine, which were the main breadbasket for city-states and 
captivated the major attention of the presiding empires. The mountainous 
hinterland presented little economic interest and the costs to maintain a 
strict politico-military control over it were generally too high in 
4 The deeper problems involved in the nomad-bandit relationship and 
also the claims made about frontier people a little further above will 
be addressed in Chapter 3. In relation to shepherds it is interesting 
to pay attention to the following claim by Knauf: "Wie andere kulturen 
zeigen, stellen Hirten dank der Freizügigkeit ihrer Lebensweise einen 
beachtlichen Anteil von Räuberpopulationen. Die Ubergange zwischen der 
Lebensweise eines shasu und der eines lapiru waren also nach beiden 
Seiten fliessend" [1988: 109, fn 498). 
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comparison to expected returns. It was left open for pasturage, becoming 
the home of shepherds and nomads and attracting marauding bands in search 
of refuge and hideouts. These groups associated or battled with each 
other for control in the absence of regular military surveillance in the 
territory. 
It thus seems that ancient Palestine and its hinterland hillcountry 
in fact present a suitable environment for the development of banditry. 
It certainly holds the potential for recruitment with deprived and 
exploited peasants, marauding groups of mercenaries and veterans and 
shepherds living on the margins of society. It, especially the hinterland 
itself, also is characterized by the right topographical features, being 
a difficult mountainous terrain, where bandits can dwell away from strong 
military control. Political instability adds to the remoteness of the 
region when the lowland military 61ite is busy trying to keep a grip on 
the fertile plains. Finally we have seen that the highlands are actually 
to be seen as forming a "frontier zone", where banditry has high chances 
of developing, surviving and flourishing. There are therefore multiple 
reasons to believe that bandits played a major role within ancient 
Palestinian society. 
It remains to be seen if bandits are detectable in the textual 
record too. A first candidate are the habbatu, which indeed have been 
seen as being thieves and robbers. They were also referred to by the 
ideogram SA. GAZ., which links them immediately to another group of 
people, which has attracted far more interests, the 'apiru [cf already: 
Knudtzon; 1964: 1136; Loretz; 1984: 60; Ahlstr6m; 1986: 131. A long debate 
ensued as to the precise meaning of these 'apiru. Some progress had been 
$Interest arose primarily because many came to see in them the 
precursors, if not the ancestors, of the Israelites, as links were 
drawn between the lapiru mentioned in the Amarna letters from 
Jerusalem and the later 11bri (Hebrews). Much ink has been spilled on 
this subject. The most extensive study is that by Loretz [1984; see 
also Lemche; 1979; Nalaman; 1986]. 
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made early on, such as whether the term refers to an ethnic or a social 
grouping. As such Knudtzon could still maintain: 
Von den Habiru und den (Sa. ) Gaz-leuten ist oben als sicher 
angenommen, dass auch sie eingedrungene Fremdlinge sind; wir 
wissen aber gar nicht, wo sie hergekommen sind. Nun ist ja 
auch angenommen worden, dass wir es in jenen beiden Fällen 
bloss mit appellativischen Bezeichnungen zu tun haben. Dies 
darf aber als ausgeschlossen gelten; ... [Knudtzon; 1964: 46] 
. But what Knudtzon stated to be ausgeschlossen was soon adopted as 
an adequate explanation for the use of the term lapiru. Sustained by the 
availability of more textual material from the Hittite sources as well as 
from Mari, Nuzi, Alalakh and Ugarit, other scholars were able to point to 
the fact that the lapiru made their presence felt over a vast period of 
time as well as operating in many various locations [cf Halligan; 
1983: 21]. Thus they moved away from the ethnic interpretation and more 
and more agreed on the appellatative nature of the term [Stiebing; 
1983: 9]. Yet, although one question was answered in such a way, it soon 
raised many others. Having established that the term referred to a social 
grouping, it was not so easy to say where within the strata of a society 
the grouping is to be found; and, although a lot of material has been 
written on the topic, one is nonetheless left with rather broad and 
general terms, such as social outcasts or refugees, without any further 
detailed explanations. There is still only little known about the history 
and main activity of the lapiru. 
In some ways the fact that we are dealing with an appellative 
creates many of the problems itself. As every other appellative the term 
lapiru is open to much subjective interpretation. This obviously 
complicates the researcher's work. At times it will distract from the 
actual meaning to be attached to the given term. Furthermore did the term 
lapiru always refer to the same thing at all times? As we look back on 
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the textual evidence at hand, it shows that at times it was used quite 
differently. To assume an exact meaning of the term for the Amarna 
period, for example, is near impossible. It is doubly complicated because 
the development of the meaning in the periods beforehand is extremely 
hard to follow. 
on the other hand, although the lapiru occur many times in the El 
Amarna Letters, only very little information can be gathered about them 
even for that period. We are told that they are most closely associated 
with Abdi-Ashirta and his sons, and Lablayu, and that they are considered 
to be a military threat by Rib-Addi and Abdi-khepa amongst others. From 
this we may assume that Abdi-Ashirta, his sons, and Lablayu used them as 
military servicemen. But this is to a great extent as far as it goes. 
Nothing is said about what the lapiru were up to when they were not 
engaged in the petty warfare of city-state kinglets. Neither is there any 
mentioning of where they come from, nor how they came to be in the 
service of Abdi-Ashirta. Did he merely hire marauding armed gangs or did 
he raise them in a levee. Again, did he describe these troops as lapiru, 
or was this just Rib-Addi's subjective view of these people? 
Under these circumstances, it seems not very promising to us to 
assess the nature of the lapiru by concentrating on the Amarna period 
alone. In fact we think that more light can be shed on their history and 
activities by having a look at some other material than that in which 
they are so preeminently present. They already figure in the campaigns 
undertaken at the beginning of the New Kingdom period. The following 
extract stems from the record of Amen-Hotep II's Asiatic campaigning: 
.... List of the plunder which his majesty carried off: 
princes of Retenu: 127; brothers of princes: 179; Apiru: 
3,600; living Shasu: 15,200; Kharu: 36,300; living Neges: 
15,070; the adherents thereof: 30,652; total: 89,600 men; 
CANET; 2471 
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It might be concluded that in this case the 'apiru were inimical 
forces that figure in the military context of a campaign, consequently 
enemy military personnel. Their status appears quite elevated, as they 
are mentioned straight after the "brothers of princes". Cazelles would 
thus like to see them as a military 61ite (1973: 12]. Furthermore, as they 
are mentioned in such numbers, "it is quite clear that the Egyptians 
recognized the Apiru as a distinct entity from other peoples, clearly 
countable" (ANET; 247: fn. 47]. That they still remained a military threat 
to the New Kingdom Egyptians even at much later times can be gathered 
from the following information taken from the Beth-Shan stela. However it 
appears that they are here viewed as a rather inferior entity: 
... The Apiru of Mount 
Yarmuta, with Teyer.... [have arilsen 
in attack upon the Asiatics of Rehem. Then [his majesty] 
said: How can these wretched Asiatics think [of taking] their 
[arms] for further disorder? ... [ANET: 255] 
We can thus hardly deny the importance of military activity for 
lapiru groupings. Even earlier than Amen-Hotep II's campaign such a role 
seems to be attested for lapiru bands in the Mari documents. Here they 
serve as readily available mercenaries, often swopping allegiance and 
apparently of considerable importance as one of the bands reached the 
number of 2,000 members [cf Cazelles, 1973: 8; Jagersma; 1982: 11]: 
The next day word of the enemy came as follows: "Yapah-Adad 
has made ready the settlement Zallul on this side on the bank 
of then Euphrates River, and with two thousand troops of the 
Hapiru. of the land is dwelling in that city. " [ANET; 483] 
They are clearly a distintive entity at Mari distinguishable from 
the normal populace. Their military and mercenary nature is furthermore 
substantiated by further texts from Hatti, Alalakh and Nuzi [Cazelles; 
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1973: 8-9; Jagersma; 1982: 111. Jagersmals overview of lapiru-activity has 
thus led him to the following conclusion: 
First of all, attention should be drawn to the militant 
attitude which the 'Apiru seem so often to display. 
Furthermore they are almost everywhere, and apparently settle 
as aliens of unknown origin. Next we should note the 
phenomenon that these 'Apiru are often in the service of a 
king, the state or a person - perhaps as prisoners. Finally 
we should note the fact that the 'Apiru are very widely 
distributed not only geographically, but also 
chronologically. [Jagersma; 1982: 11] 
Unfortunately there seems to be no chronological order in the use 
of the term, so that we would be able to trace back a development going 
from one meaning to another. Rather the term appears to be used in 
reference to different groups at different times. As such, from the 19th 
till the 13th centuries B. C., they make their appearance as prisoners, 
workmen, soldiers, and mercenaries. interestingly there seems to be a 
differentiation to be made in the 'aPiru's social status, dependent on 
whether they perform military activities, especially on the authorities, 
side, or whether they are engaged in different activities. When the 
former pertains their place on the social scale seems to be high. Other 
duties are also performed against payment, and even when prisoners they 
are able to buy themselves out of that situation even if a drop in status 
is often noticeable (Jagersma; 1982: 10-11]. At times they are compared to 
fishermen, carpenters, thiefs, and evildoers, even horses and sometimes 
also seen as inferior to slaves (Cazelles; 1973: 9,11,141. Yet at Nuzi 
they are differentiated from the slave (wardu), although they can sink to 
this level. Even then they are seen to enter this condition freely. 
Cazelles gives the following commentary: 
The Habiru are not slaves, although their masters exercise 
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lordship (ewerutu) over them ... sometimes the master has to 
pay a price to acquire the right of lordship over them. 
[1973: 101 
There might be an explanation for this double stance in the 
records; a mercenary, although he might be despised as a foreign element 
who sells the use of force for cash, is nonetheless a force to be 
reckoned with. The close association between military power and political 
power makes the mercenary a powerful agent, which comes to be reflected 
in his position on the social scale. on the other hand, if the lapiru is 
not engaged in military activity, his major characteristic is that of a 
foreign element. Although retaining more power over his own private life 
than a slave, he does not wield any important political power. As alien 
hired labour his social status does not exceed that of a peasant or a 
day-labourer; further his alien nature makes him naturally untrustworthy. 
How, however, are we to attest for that alien nature of the lapiru? 
We have already seen that they are in a way differentiated from the 
normal populace; it is not so easy to explain why this is so. An ethnic 
explanation has been excluded. Mendenhall has stated that only little 
associates the lapiru with extensive constant movement, and thus excluded 
them from being true nomads (1973: 129]. Further the presence of other 
terms employed to designate nomads or bedouins, such as shasu or sutu, 
points to the fact that the lapiru are to be differentiated from them [cf 
coote and Whitelam; 1986: 1081'. 
Such restrictions on available explanations have led a number of 
scholars to look for alternatives and it is within these alternatives 
that we find the appearance of terms like outcasts, outlaws, and 
refugees, "various persons and groups on the fringes of society" [Miller 
and Hayes; 1986: 67] used to describe the situation of the lapiru. 
Mendenhall added the notion of loss of status as being at the basis of a 
6 But again see the discussion in Chapter 3. 
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person's entering the condition of 'aPiru- 13Y loss of status he mainly 
referred to a person's exclusion from, or, as far as this case goes, 
refusal to, being controlled by a given authority. This means that the 
person is exempt from the legal obligations and duties normally imposed 
on the populace. At the same time he also looses the protection and 
privileges such authorities are normally supposed to offer their subjects 
[Mendenhall; 1973; 131-132; McCafferty; 1988: 236]. 
The way in which people can escape such control by authorities is 
mainly by withdrawal, be it to another approximate state or to more 
peripheral areas within a given state's boundaries. The receiving state 
of such refugees naturally sees such incomers as foreigners and 
intruders, not part of the normal populace and therefore not easy to 
integrate on the social ladder. They are not slaves, yet they do not have 
their proper place among the indigenous populace. As such the situation 
of the lapiru seems to be controlled by the view of that state, which 
does not know how to deal with them or where to situate them within their 
society. Although it can integrate them in as much as employing them for 
statework or military activities as mercenaries, it nevertheless isolates 
them as a group; thus the 'apiru will always be regarded as an alien 
element, whose status might well vary with the need of a given state for 
such extra labour or military force. They become increasingly 
untrustworthy and dangerous, when they are not employed and, in order to 
survive, they turn their military prowess against the state by swopping 
allegiances or by engaging in selfinterested raiding and marauding. 
If, however, these people wanting to escape control do so by taking 
refuge in the more peripheral areas of a given state's boundaries, the 
situation is somewhat different. For here the state theoretically still 
has control over these people, although practically it might prove 
impossible for it to exercise such control in any consistent or even 
relevant manner. In times of political turmoil or upheaval this situation 
rapidly deteriorates; in order to protect at least its central and more 
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important or viable areas, the state looses more and more of its ability 
to exercise power in peripheral areas. As control decreases, the state 
will be forced to abandon enforcing civil duties or taxes upon such 
areas, and its inhabitants become regarded as freed from the legal 
obligations towards the state, as 'out law', thus in the same situation 
as the lapiru. 
Within such peripheral areas control is even harder for the state 
to exercise, if these people do not opt for a settled occupation. Some 
actually might settle down as peasants, where the area seems sufficiently 
out of the reach of the state's power. others, especially in areas where 
agricultural exploitation of the soil is hindered by the nature of the 
terrain, might well opt for additional security in taking up a more 
mobile occupation. Peripheral areas offer a number of such occupations: 
one might become a travelling day-labourer or a shepherd guarding the 
herds of a village or a wealthier landlord. Again there is the attraction 
of self-interested marauding bands which can take the form of either 
mercenaries or bandi tS7. 
Mercenaries and bandits are of particular interest to us, as both 
groups, each in its own way, can be seen to share some of the 
characteristics of the lapiru. They represent an alien and yet partly 
integrated element within a society. We have already associated the 
lapiru with mercenary activities and stressed their position, in which 
they might serve a given state, but still are differentiated from that 
state's regular troops and not always seen as particularly outstanding in 
loyalty. Bandits, who formerly might have been peasants, do maintain 
relations with the rural population, yet they are seen as a particular 
entity, at least so by the state, whose control they escape. Both groups 
have to be reckoned with by the authorities because of their military 
power. They are thus isolated entities, yet have to be dealt with, which 
7A person can also seek tribal affiliation with nomads, who 
themselves can engage in any of the mentioned activities. 
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means that to some degree they have to be integrated. Finally bandits 
often offer their services as mercenaries, especially when agreements 
with authorities have been struck. Similarly mercenaries, who eventually 
run out of wars, easily are able to engage in bandit activities. It thus 
becomes extremely difficult to differentiate between bandits who act as 
mercenaries and mercenaries who behave like bandits; both might well come 
to be referred to by the same term, which in this case would be lapiru. 
Finally we would like to draw attention to a study by Shaw on the 
same problem in the Roman Empire, the outcome of which gives witness to a 
similar development of the latin term latro from the meaning of mercenary 
towards that of bandit. Reflecting on the legal situation of bandits in 
the Roman Empire, Shaw sees them "as men apart" [1984; 21], who, like 
pirates, had "no 'state, recognition" [1984; 22]. He goes on to make 
observations about their relation to legal obligations, which are 
reminiscent of those we have made earlier about the 'aPiru, when he 
states: 
There existed quite separate definitions of them that placed 
. bandits 
in a penumbral category between persons within the 
scope of the law (criminal and civil, largely overlapping) 
and enemies of the state. They were, quite literally, out- 
law,. ... It 
(= Roman law) denies to bandits all legal rights 
of citizens, even those normally retained by criminal 
defendants. [Shaw; 1984: 22] 
What thus links the Roman latro, to the 'aPiru is their standing 
outside the legal norms which pertain for the normal populace. In 
Mendenhall's words they have experienced a 'loss of status', with all it 
entails as far as their legal obligations and privileges are concerned. 
It is thus worth noting that uses of the word latro are reminiscent of 
the different meanings to be attached to the term 'apiru. There exists 
considerable overlapping especially as far as occupational patterns are 
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concerned. 
Shaw first draws our attention to the fact that, at least in the 
etymology of the Greek lesteia and lestes, the terms did not at first 
carry the pejorative meaning associated with brigandage. They rather 
referred to plundering and raiding as one means of survival amongst 
others, intimately related with the institution of warfare (Shaw; 
1984: 24]8. He then stresses that further Greek terms of the same *LATR 
root as the Roman latro and latrocinium did not bear any relation to 
bandits. They are rather associated with hired labourers, as well as 
denoting the status of inferiority generally to be connected with such 
duties. He also mentions the importance of connotations such as 
wage/labour, hire/employment implied in the meaning of the terms (Shaw; 
1984: 26]. These Greek latreia are thus very similar to some of the 
, apiru, especially where they perform labour services for payment. Both 
groups have little to do with banditry. 
Turning more precisely to the Latin words, Shaw notes that in the 
earliest instances they refer to "military labour or service given for 
pay" [1984: 26]. Such is, of course, the situation of the mercenary. Shaw 
goes into detail about the ideological reasons which lie behind the Roman 
citizen's military activity, reasons which may not pertain in the Ancient 
Near East in that form. Nevertheless the situation is still very similar. 
The bulk of the army of an Ancient Near Eastern state is made up by the 
peasant inhabitants. They make up the regular troops and they are unpaid: 
this is their corv6e-duty in return for the protection they enjoy on the 
part of the state. Specialized forces, the maryannu chariot troops, are 
formed by the aristocracy, proud nobles who excel in the art of war. Wage 
is the major distinctive factor between these state-soldiers and the 
mercenary, as it is between the Roman miles and latro. Again the 
*Hobsbawm has also noticed this problem of distinguishing between 
legalized raiding or razzia and unlawful bandit plundering (1969]. 
Again this issue will be the main concern of chapter 3. 
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situation of the latro reflects that of the lapiru, and Shaw points to 
the same principal characteristics for this mercenary-type: 
... he was a man who 'belonged' to a state via the mediating 
factors of violence, legitimation, receiving pay for 
fighting, and being an outsider to the community of the state 
that employed him. [Shaw; 1984: 27) 
Attention is also paid to the attitude reigning toward the 
mercenary. Shaw stresses that the mercenary was despised as an outsider 
with no ideological attachment to the state and conmunity. A pejorative 
undertone is to be found quite early in the use of the Roman latro; some 
of the texts lead us to think that the same is true for the lapiru- 
mercenary. Shaw relates the increase in this pejorative attitude towards 
the mercenary to the eventual transformation of the Roman citizen army 
itself into a professional army. Such a development did not only lead to 
a less differentiated role between the miles and the latro, but also to 
the gradual overtaking of the latro's job by the miles, which lead so far 
as to leave the latro unemployed; where the regular troops turn 
professional, the use of paid outsiders is not only despised, but also 
becomes rather more unnecessary. 
The niajor difference between the miles and the latro was the 
remaining fact that the latro was an outsider. Nevertheless he also 
remained a man of violence, a power whose legitimation remained in the 
hands of the state. It thus becomes easy to see that bands of armed 
latrones, which the state gradually refused to employ, came to be 
regarded as illegitimate. Their use of armed force, once legitimate 
through their service to the state, now turned unlawful, like that of 
bandits. The development is indeed inherent to the occupation and 
behaviour of mercenaries and to the problem of sanction by the state for 
such activities. Mendenhall has detected this problem of the illegitimate 
use of force with the 'apiru. 
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Professional soldiers and mercenaries hang around in encampments or 
maraud in armed bands. They often provide for themselves by plundering 
especially in times of war. It represents a legitimized activity as long 
as this happens under the umbrella of the sanction of the state. The 
peasant victims are probably not too happy about either group behaving 
that way, but the alien mercenary is doubly despised. once he exits the 
service of the state, he enters into illegitimate activity though his 
activities themselves have not changed. Shaw states: 
Increasingly, therefore, there was little except the sanction 
of the state that separated the roles of regular soldier, 
and mercenary' or latro. At the other end of the spectrum 
any private person who had access to, or actually resorted 
to, instruments of force was a potential bandit. In this case 
too state sanction made all the difference. [Shaw; 1984: 281 
Again, deprived of their usual job, mercenaries, similar to 
veterans and deserters, are often unlikely to give up their violent 
activities [Hobsbawm; 1969; Shaw; 1984: 291. Furthermore, as they are now 
unemployed and therefore unpaid, their survival becomes more dependent on 
plundering, so that the difference between their activities and 
brigandage vanishes. Thus the latro-mercenary slips more and more into 
the role of the bandit. 
Given the connections we have established between mercenaries and 
bandits in general and the parallels we have stressed between the role of 
the Roman latro and the lapiru, it seems to us reasonable to suggest that 
a similar shift in the use of the term might have occurred in the Ancient 
Near East. The stateless lapiru refugees, especially when in military 
service, came to be regarded as an illegitimate violent group, once a 
given state found no more use for them. The 'apiru once mercenaries were 
now seen as engaging in brigandage. The groups were still referred to by 
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the original term 'apiru, but this now came to be associated with their 
new occupation of banditry. Eventually this secondary meaning may have 
taken over, so that all bandits came to be called lapiru. 
A connection between the 'apiru and the bandits has been suggested 
by chaney [19831 as well as Coote and Whitelam (1987]. It is not possible 
on the basis of the current textual evidence to confirm that such a shift 
took place in the Ancient Near East. We assume that, if it did, it was a 
slow process rather than sharp and drastic. Yet it is impossible to 
determine when exactly we are facing an actual lapiru-bandit as opposed 
to an lapiru-mercenary. Too often the pejorative attitude that textual 
records hold against all sorts of alien forces and the fear that they 
express when unknown armed men approach blurr the actual picture. Any 
kinglet of the Amarna. period would, for example, describe any group that 
caused him a nuisance as IaPiru. It is unknown, however, whether these 
groups are bandits or mercenary troops, albeit in the service of a rival 
kinglet. 
Our most extensive evidence, the El Amarna Letters, are thus no 
clearer. Rib-Addi clearly refers to various groups in highly pejorative 
terms. For him they are to be despised and none should associate with 
them as his opponents do. But his view is not the only one [cf Halligan; 
1983: 211. one other city-king Biryawaza writes to the Pharaoh that he 
will meet his troops with "my Habiru" (EA: 195). In this letter the lapiru 
still appear as a group, whose services could be legitimately required 
and used, thus as mercenaries rather than bandits. 
However Rib-Addi's pejorative use of the terra must be accounted for 
by more than just his negative attitude he had of thera because they 
represented his enemies. His use of the term as a metaphor for describing 
Abdi-Ashirta and Aziru, are clearly meant to bring his political 
opponents into disrepute at the Egyptian court. For this reason it seems 
that there was something inherent in the term, which meant that one did 
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not want to be equated to a lapiru. This would suggest that it is a 
pejorative term which does not refer to mercenaries alone. Rib-Addi's 
accusation that Abdi-Ashirta is like the lapiru makes little sense, if 
. Iapiru refers merely to mercenaries, who, though 
despised, were in common 
use. The term must carry something more, if it is to be useful as a 
political weapon in rhethoric. 
In this situation the meaning of bandit seems to make more sense. 
He preys and plunders, lives outside the law, is a constant factor of 
disorder and disruption. Rhethorically it carries more weight accusing 
Abdi-Ashirta to be a bandit than a mercenary. Furthermore, the political 
use of the bandit-metaphor is widely attested, unlike that of the 
mercenary. Shaw discerns exactly the same use of the term latro in Roman 
political oratory: 
it became a powerful metaphor in itself, used deliberately to 
cast doubt on hostile persons, principally political enemies. 
As a weapon of accusation it appears fully developed in the 
writings of Cicero and Sallust in the late Republic, coming 
into particularly intense usage during times of political 
stress and upheaval in the central state. [Shaw; 1984: 23] 
It is only in this way that Rib-Addi's accusations make sense to 
us, if they were to influence Pharaoh's judgement upon Abdi-Ashirta. 
Mendenhall also sustains our view of Rib-Addi's use of the term as a 
metaphor, drawn from the "real" lapiru, which he sees as appearing in the 
letters EA 185 and 186. His own description of these plunderers leaves no 
doubt that this is a reference to bandits engaged in illegitimate use of 
force (Mendenhall; 1973: 135). Mendenhall furthermore acknowledges that 
even within the letters the meaning of the term varies somewhat due to 
different backgrounds involved [1973: 123]. 
We thus feel justified in relating the activities of the lapiru in 
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the El Armana period to that of bandits and confident that their 
identification is to be held on the grounds of Rib-Addi's political use 
of the term. This, however, does not necessarily mean that Abdi-Ashirtals 
men were bandits; the same political accusation could have been launched 
by Rib-Addi against Abdi-Ashirtals servicemen as against the man himself. 
On the other hand, neither does it exclude that the 'apiru mentioned were 
actual lapiru-bandits performing mercenary service on behalf of Abdi- 
Ashirta. That matter itself cannot as yet be resolved. our main argument, 
however remains that the political use of the term calls for an entity 
standing behind the metaphor, which is to be equated with bandit groups. 
This same entity makes its appearance in other letters, clearly active as 
bandits and also referred to as lapiru. Thus the two points of 
outstanding importance for our study are the fact that bandits were 
present in Syria-Palestine at the El Armana period and that they were 
known by the appellative lapiru. The complexity of the problem, however, 
will be the subject of the following chapters. 
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Chapter 2 
Bandits: image and reality 
The most important study of banditry done so far is that by EJ 
Hobsbawm [1969). Unfortunately, it is now dated and in need of revision. 
Several scholars, however, have expressed some valuable criticisms on 
some of Hobsbawm's views in smaller articles. This chapter will try to 
reconsider some of Hobsbawm's arguments in the light of recent criticisms 
in order to see their implications for understanding Ancient Near Eastern 
social structures. 
One of the major problems with Hobsbawmls study lies in the fact 
that he is concerned mainly with "social banditry" in Europe. This, 
however, is an ideal type. He has constructed this ideal type on the 
basis of popular tales and mythology. It emphasizes the attachment that 
the bandit has for the populace, especially the impoverished peasant 
world. He is often seen as originating from the peasant community and 
wages war against the injustices that this community and himself have 
suffered. Although Hobsbawm, admits that reality might differ from the 
myth [1969: 12, passim], his study is nonetheless heavily dependent on 
the ideal type he has created. We, however, have no right to assume that 
it was this particular form of banditry which persisted in the Ancient 
Near East'. Also, as Hobsbawm has pointed out himself [1969: 13-141, the 
theoretical distinction he draws between the social bandit and other less 
morally inclined criminals is not always as clear in reality. We are 
inclined to think that the types are much more intermingled than 
Hobsbawm's study would lead us to think [cf Shaw; 1984: 4-5, fn. 4-71 and 
that the peasant-bandit relationship only very seldomly took this ideal 
form. Shaw has pointed out that the peasants can easily be mistaken in 
'out of interest it might be noted here that as early as the period 
of Roman hegemony in Palestine, Horsley is able to identify actual 
terrorists in the sicarii (1979]. 
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their judgement about the bandits [1984: 5]. His view is rather similar to 
that of Blok, when he says: 
Behind the mirage of the good thief', he argues, lies a 
reality dominated by violent anti-social men who are either 
wholly secessionist or who actively prey on the peasant 
populace whose interests they are supposed (in popular myth) 
to protect. (Shaw; 1984: 4] 
Coote and Whitelam express the same sort of thinking, when they 
maintain that bandits do not always act as the protectors of the poor, 
but might even exploit the peasantry in much the same way as a ruling 
61ite would [1987: 93]. They justifiably compare the bandits to a rural 
military 61itel, whose political and military power parallels that of the 
urban 61ite [Coote and Whitelam; 1987: 92]. Shaw again stresses the 
integration of bandits into society, which draws them closer to the rich 
and the 61ite, a factor which he claims Hobsbawm has not given enough 
attention (1984: 30-341. Such descriptions provide a rather different 
image of the bandit. It has little to do with the Robin Hood of popular 
tales; it is rather reminiscent of the situation portrayed in such films 
as "The Seven Samuraim or "The Magnificent Seven". Bandit activities must 
therefore not only be more widespread, but also considerably more 
complex. Brown describes existing relationships as such: 
Egyptian peasants had to confront three plagues: bandits, 
rulers and occupiers. They cannot be considered to have been 
represented by any of them, and perhaps there was little 
difference among them for the peasants. All of them 
represented external coercion, appropriation, and control. 
Bandits, rulers, and occupiers were rivals in many ways, but 
symbiotic relationships developed among them. (Brown; 
1990: 2801 
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It is interesting to note here that with the lapiru as bandits, the 
Palestinian kinglets as rulers, and the New Kindom Egyptians as 
occupiers, the socio-political situation of ancient Palestine reflects 
that exposed by Brown. Stressing the integrative and exploitative sides 
of banditry leaves a picture which sees a person engaging in banditry not 
so much because of his rebelliousness as his conscious striving for 
economical advantage. Although this certainly has not escaped Hobsbawmls 
study, it is nevertheless not taken fully into account. There is little 
in his study which would be indicative of the fact that the economical 
advantage is more determinative in a person's choice to become a bandit 
than his rebellious character or his preoccupation with justice. Nor is 
there any concrete reflection on the fact that such economically 
orientated thinking might come to determine a bandit's career much more 
than his solidarity with the peasant population. This chapter will thus 
address two questions: whether groups such as the lapiru can be qualified 
as social peasant bandits or whether they represent something different. 
we must reexamine the relationship between these groups and the 
peasantry, as well as with the 61ite. 
First it must be Pointed out that the equation of the 'apiru with 
social bandits, undertaken by Chaney [1983: 77-78], has to be seen in the 
light of the fact that it was meant to lend support to the view of the 
emergence of Israel by ways of a peasant revolt3 [Mendenhall; 1962,1973; 
Gottwald; 19791. Chaney, however, shares with Mendenhall and Gottwald a 
certain idealism concerning the revolutionary intentions of the 
2 Let it be said here that peasants are not normally inclined 
towards revolt; they generally are rather conservative and passive. 
His disinclination towards revolt springs from the same reasons that 
make him a poor recruit for banditry. He does not enjoy the necessary 
mobility, is too much tied to land and work [Hobsbawm; 1969: 24; Wolf; 
1971: 264]. Even in times of severe conditions his first thought will be 
that of survival, and accordingly his actions will not be dictated by 
plans of resistance. Rather will he attempt to rely on retreat into 
subsistence production [Wolf; 1971: 265; Halligan; 1983: 17]. 
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impoverished part of mankind'. He therefore works with that sort of ideal 
type of bandit as a rebel eager for justice and all too ready to take the 
side of his fellow peasants in the event of a revolt. That this can be 
the case is effectively demonstrated for instance by the case of Pancho 
Villa, yet in Chaney's case the argument is weak. Too often do bandits 
operate in the ways we have alluded to, a side which has been ignored by 
Chaney. 
In fact there is little about the lapiru, which would allow us to 
categorize them as social bandits and even less that points to them as 
revolutionary activists. They might well be opposing a number of city- 
rulers, as well as representing an important military force, but this 
does not prove that they are to be seen as revolutionary guerilleros with 
a social programme [vs Chaney; 1983: 81 ]4- Nor does the fact that these 
3 In fact Scott has demonstrated that a number of opposition 
techniques, which might be classified as passive resistance [Shanin; 
1971: 2591, are at the disposal of the peasant population [Scott; 
19871. When compared to overt violent resistance, they prove much less 
risky as far as subsequent retaliation goes (Scott; 1987: 421,447]. He 
thus claims: *By itself, the peasantry's most conunon and durable 
weapon is an everyday resistance that stops short of the more 
dangerous forms of overt protest and confrontation. By itself, the 
peasantry has been less concerned with formal, legal changes in the 
arrangements governing, say, property and taxation, than with attempts 
to defeat, block, escape, and mitigate the most harmful effects of 
those arrangements. Typically lacking the institutional access 
necessary to influence legislation and administrative regulation, the 
peasantry defends its interests at the enforcement stage. If social 
movements, in the strict sense, are rarely found among peasants, this 
is in large part the result of a prudent, calculated, and historically 
tested choice favouring other strategies more attuned to the 
particular social structure, strengths, and defensive capacities of 
this class" (Scott; 1987: 421-422]. 
4 Hobsbawm himself argues that banditry only rarely turns into or 
participates in open revolt (also Horsley; 1981: 412; Horsley and 
Hanson; 1985: 771. Bandits, he says, may be a sign of social upheaval, 
but they are not proper revolutionaries. They might be seen as 
avenging injustice, but even then they are reactionary, keepers of the 
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lapiru might have been composed of refugees or other kinds of 
impoverished peasants pushed into banditry (in Hobsbawmls terms social 
peasant bandits) ultimately lead to the conclusion that they were mainly 
concerned about regaining their land or overthrowing a feudal system [vs 
Liverani; 1979: 1715. In fact, we are rather inclined to reverse Chaney's 
statement that in the Amarna period different sorts of bandits "were 
propelled into social banditry" [1983: 79] and claim that any banditry, 
which might have started as social banditry, profited from the reigning 
conditions to ensure its own self-interests. 
Nonetheless we have to approach the often made claim that at times 
groups of peasants and even whole cities were said to "become lapiru" 
[Mendenhall; 1973: 125-126; Chaney; 1983: 78]. Mendenhall maintains that 
this should be equated with a joining up with the revolutionary elements 
and accounts for the swelling of the 'apiru-groups [1973: 1261. But the 
transition of a hupsu towards an lapiru can be explained differently and 
so can any potential increase in the numbers of the lapiru. 
"To become an lapiru" can be related to the element of state- 
sanction rather than having to do with actual revolutionary activity by 
good old ways, rather than people with a new social Plan such as an 
"agrarian reform". They do not want to overthrow their overlords, but 
are happy to restore the times, when a peasant could peacefully work 
his fields and keep enough for himself to survive. As such they are 
traditionalists rather than revolutionaries (Hobsbawm; 1969: 20-21]. 
'This is another shortcoming with the revolt hypothesis. It is 
indeed doubtful that the system of Palestine was as feudal and 
intolerable as has at times been presumed. Redford [1992], amongst 
others, emphasizes that most of these cities were really nothing more 
than villages, the kinglets nothing more than headmen or mayors. In no 
way can Redford agree with Mendenhall's view of these village headmen 
as an exploitative, feudal aristocracy. He in fact pictures them as 
relatively destitute, military weak, and, especially the further one 
moves away from the plains, never the clearly dominant party. Little 
thus points to "a peasants' revolt against the network of interlocking 
Canaanite city-states" [Mendenhall; 1962: 107). 
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those so qualified. It has been noted frequently that especially Rib-Addi 
uses the term lapiru rather loosely (Mendenhall; 1973; Liverani; 1979; 
Chaney; 1983] and it seems that not everybody who was qualified as a 
lapiru by Rib-Addi had to be involved in any direct lapiru-activity. The 
fact that peasants defected from him in order to escape famine does not 
mean that they all engaged in revolutionary or even military activity. 
For Rib-Addi, however, these people had now escaped his controlled area 
and found themselves in territory controlled by groups which he clearly 
considered to be illegitimate. At this moment we can see processes at 
work as we have described them in Chapter 1, namely that Rib-Addi equated 
those people with the illegitimate groups, as they also were outside his 
own legitimating power. Furthermore he also came to see them as enemies, 
as they, at least territorially, were on the side of his opponents. These 
defectors thus did not meet any longer with the sanction of Rib-Addils 
authority; to him they were all 'apiru. How much these people really 
acted as or like lapiru and whether they themselves, or in this case also 
Abdi-Ashirta, saw themselves as such remains more or less unknown. Shaw 
has noted the same process for the Latin latro: 
The fact is that once bandits had been defined as men who 
stood in a peculiar relation to the state, the label latro 
was available to be passed on any Idestated' person. (Shaw; 
1984: 231 
"To become lapiru", as such, does not necessarily mean that a hupsu 
became a bandit or a rebellious guerrillero, but only that this person 
came to experience a loss of status in relation to Rib-Addi's state 
sanction, just like bandits do. It is thus doubtful that the mass of the 
peasants who went over to Abdi-Ashirta's side, did so in order to take up 
arms on his behalf; probably most just went, because there was food on 
his side. 
swelling of the actual lapiru-groups might nonetheless be 
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possible, but again it would have little to do with clearly socially 
orientated revolutionary activity. In his study Shaw has pointed towards 
"the deliberate creation of banditry by the landowning classes" (Shaw; 
1984: 4016. We think that partially at least this also holds true for the 
lapiru and Abdi-Ashirta. Deliberate creation of banditry means using the 
pool of potential bandits to a far greater extent than under normal 
circumstances. People who otherwise would have turned to different 
occupations, are encouraged to join bandit groups by the opportunity of 
anarchic situations such as civil war. Again state sanction is a very 
important factor in this process, which Shaw describes as such: 
During any period of upheaval such as civil war the whole 
process whereby legitimacy flowed downwards through the 
political system by a process of state definition, finally to 
be invested in the hands of the individual soldier, could be 
reversed. In periods of the near total collapse of central 
state authority it could theoretically be reversed all the 
way back up the system. In practice the reversal could be 
made deliberately and consciously by the state in cases where 
it extended legitimacy to men whom it would otherwise have 
defined as outlaws. (Shaw; 1984: 34] 
In such a situation there was a definite need for military forces 
by certain authority-holders. They thus encourage peasants who are 
potential bandits to take up arms. The conditions being promising for 
accumulation of booty and power and the protection of at least one 
patron, i. e. some sort of legitimacy, being guaranteed, it is easy to see 
that potential bandits are more readily persuaded to engage in such 
activity than under normal circumstances. The fact that neither Abdi- 
Ashirta nor Aziru ever refer to their troops as 'apiru [Mendenhall; 
61t is interesting to note that Coote claims that ancient Palestine 
witnessed endemic gang warfares, and that often they were fostered by 
patrons (1990: 22-23). 
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1973: 1231 seems to support the argument that they at least considered 
them to be legitimate troops. 
Shaw also points out that the Roman landlords especially made use 
of their slave-shepherds as freelance bandits [Shaw; 1984: 31,40]. If 
Liverani is correct in his assumption that Abdi-Ashirta controlled an 
area with less of an agricultural base, but dominated by pastoralism 
(Liverani; 1979: 14], this would explain why he made ample use of the 
lapiru. If the assumption is correct that many of the refugees who fled 
to the mountains engaged in mobile occupations such as shepherds, the 
argument that Abdi-Ashirta could easily also use them in his military 
activities becomes even more solid. 
The association between shepherds and bandits is an old one; it has 
already been noted by Hobsbawm and he would certainly agree that "the 
equation 'shepherd equals bandit, comes close to being one that is true 
for all antiquity" [Hobsbawm; 1969: 28; Shaw; 1984: 31]. Like the 
association between mercenary and bandits it creates many problems. We 
again face the problem of having to differentiate between quasi- 
legitimate raiding as one means of survival and unlawful bandit- 
pillaging. The whole process of legitimation again enters the debate. 
Shaw stresses that authorities had great difficulties in dealing with 
such slave-shepherd-bandits, as in theory they were still attached to a 
dominus, thus had to be treated as slaves rather than bandits [Shaw; 
1984: 40, fn. 1101. The same problem seems to be reflected in EA 185 and 
186, where Amanthabi, a city-ruler, is acting as patron to some lapiru 
and is therefore held responsible for their activities [Mendenhall; 
1973: 1351, although nothing else but raiding and looting is involved. 
Again we can see why Rib-Addi could refer to some groups as lapiru, 
whereas his opponents did not, nor do we know if anybody else did. 
What the case points to is that in the Ancient Near East there was 
a high percentage of integrated banditry. The lapiru we have looked at 
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are rarely seen in any real connection with the peasantry, but on the 
contrary are related to the 61ite, in whose service they fight and raid. 
They seem to be motivated less by social protest and more by self- 
interest. There is of course no further evidence available as to what the 
lapiru were up to when they did not perform military services for some 
kind of lord, but as far as our evidence goes there appears to be no 
reason why, in more peaceful times, they should have been less 
opportunist than their Roman equivalents, the latrones. The evidence 
rather shows that where there is a possibility they attach themselves to 
the powerful. Their motivation thus being far less ideal than Hobsbawm 
would have us believe, their relation to the peasantry must also differ 
from his ideal model. 
As in many other societies the captain of an 'aPiru-band has to 
strike a balance between opposition to and cooperation with the existent 
authorities, if his gang is to survive. In this way the importance of the 
bandit's relation with the power stratum exceeds that of his ties to the 
rural peasant population. Against this assumption it has been said that 
the bandit rarely robs the peasants. Yet this is a weak argument. In a 
first instance the situation stems more from the simple truth that the 
peasant has but little of high value to offer than from any friendly 
arrangement between the two parties. Secondly it often can be seen simply 
not to be true. Shaw comments thus on the Roman latrones: 
Whereas it is true that bandits are found attacking the house 
and villas of the wealthy and powerful, both in historical 
and fictional accounts of their activities, the real Problem 
is to assess the value of using the mention of these targets 
in isolation as a measure of the bandit's social motivation. 
Bandits would naturally direct some of their attacks on 
accretion of wealth in a mode similar, at least on some 
planes of behaviour, to common criminals. 
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He goes on to conclude: 
Thus it does not seem that reports of attacks on centres of 
wealth are to be taken as such -as touchstones of social 
protest- especially when the raiding activities of bandits so 
vividly portrayed in the novelists mix such targets together 
with the killing and pillaging of ordinary co=oners as part 
of the same process. [Shaw; 1984: 41] 
Shaw does not deny that bandits do have some support in the rural 
areas, especially when they themselves are from that area. He constantly 
refers to the difficulties the Roman law encountered in dealing with 
receptatores or collaborators [Shaw; 1984: 14,36-37], thus admitting that 
the phenomenon existed. Yet he insists that the bandits preferred the 
protection of the powerful and wealthy to the support of the weak and 
poor [1984: 36). Although the Roman law for example mentions the role of 
kinship ties within their system of punishing the collaborators, there 
seem to be nonetheless a greater number of laws in which these are 
identified as the wealthy and powerful (Shaw; 1984: 32,371. 
The ambiguous position which the bandit thus held, in that, 
although he might in the first instance actually be recruited from the 
poor, he inevitably was drawn more and more into the world of the rich 
(Hobsbawm; 1969: 761, seems to indicate that his concerns for the poor 
lessened considerably with time. Ultimately it was his own accumulation 
of wealth and power that interested him most and to achieve this his 
dealings with the rich were more important, be it by arrangements or by 
accepting patronage. Popular support might however not disappear 
altogether, but it must not be seen as based on an intimate and permanent 
attachment of the peasants to their "bandit-champions". 
Any relationship thus must arise out of far from noble 
considerations and for a bandit-captain one way to ensure his own success 
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and survival is to gain some sort of control over territory and 
inhabitants of the area in which he operates. To achieve this he has 
several options, all of which include relations with existing authorities 
to some degree or another. At the one end of the spectrum non- 
interference, or at least little and ineffective interference, on the 
part of the state is the minimum requirement for a bandit group to he 
able to claim control over a territory. Again we have to talk about the 
same sort of territories as described in the preceding chapter. 
Mountainous regions with difficult access, economically unviable areas, 
frontier zones, where the costs of control exceed its benefits, leave the 
authorities uninterested and, thus, the bandits able to establish 
themselves. 
Such a situation is conducive to the establishment of protection- 
rackets. Although we know the terminology of protection-money mostly from 
within an urban context, as linked to Mafia-like organizations, there is 
no reason to believe that similar proceedings do not occur in a rural 
context (Brown; 1990: 258,263]. The clever bandit-captain will soon 
enough realize that a regular income is more advantageous to his gang 
than sporadic and irregular pillaging. As a steady food supply probably 
is of foremost interest to the bandits, their primary target must be the 
food producing peasants. 
A relationship is thus established between the two parties, which 
has little to do with friendship and admiration, but is mainly based on 
the economical needs of the bandits. These guarantee for themselves a 
permanent food supply and possibly shelter, especially for the winter 
months when bandit activity is at its lowest. Whatever else riches they 
need, they obtain from their dealings with the powerful and wealthy, who, 
unlike the peasants, have use for their booty [Hobsbawm; 1969: 25,72]. In 
return, they offer their protection to the peasant community. Especially 
in remote areas the population might stick with the local bandits, not sc) 
much, because these are particularly favourable to them, but because it 
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proves in the end more viable even to the peasants. Hobsbawm himself has 
mentioned the preference of remote populations to deal with local bandits 
than with the authorities [Hobsbawm; 1969: 77-78]. A certain animosity 
between city and rural society, central authorities and remote 
populations probably also holds true as does the fact that dealing with 
bandits is more common than relying on authorities which are often an 
alien and unpredictable element to the rural population. 
Protection in this case though is a term to be used fairly loosely, 
as often it is not primarily directed against any third party, but is 
mostly a promise by the bandits not to prey indiscriminately on the 
village concerned. Protection is thus hardly more than another tax 
imposed on the peasants by a militarily stronger entity. Bandits, as 
such, start to act like any other military 61ite. This is all the more so 
if we consider that states are expected to guarantee protection in return 
for taxes. 
Conversely one of the reasons why peasants would enter such a 
relationship also lies within the range of the connection between 
taxation and protection. For it is true to say that where states are 
unable to maintain control, they must also be unable to offer adequate 
protection to potential tax-payers. Ironically in such a situation the 
peasant often ends up buying protection from predators, such as bandits, 
from which the state is supposed to protect the peasant in the first 
place. Although basically the peasant again suffers exploitation, certain 
advantages result if he chooses to agree to such an arrangement. one of 
these is obviously damage-limitation; indiscriminate pillaging and 
plundering often is accompanied by some destruction of housing and 
fields, eventually even rape and murder. Regular payment of tribute does 
away with these side-effects. If not always friendly, at least 
proceedings will be peaceful, ensuring that the peasant can go back to 
his work after a short while without having to invest in heavy repairs. 
The saying "Better to feed them than that they should steal! " [Hobsbawm; 
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1969: 39] thus has little to do with amical ties between bandits and 
peasants, nor does it indicate that the peasant could not morally bear to 
see a bandit actually stealing. It simply means that he will do so 
anyway, but this time leaving behind him destruction, maybe, death. 
Furthermore, where in remote areas bandits maintain a nearly 
permanent presence, arrangements with them simply prove more practical 
than those with state authorities. Where, as was the case in the ancient 
world, the major policing force of a state is the army itself [Shaw; 
1984: 18], providing protection against bandits to the hinterland 
population, mainly takes the form of pursuits or even maybe campaigns 
aimed ideally at the annihilation of operating bandit groups. The 
presence of effective state protection thus is sporadic and in this form 
it is costly to the peasant, as there is yet another added marauding 
group, which needs feeding and tramples the fields (Hobsbawm; 1969: 77]. 
The bandit, however, is ever present, and after the troops have gone, 
especially if they fell short of their goal, he will be back, with a 
vengeance. Even if one group has been successfully exterminated, another 
one will most certainly fill the vacuum and the whole process is 
repeated. 
it is not surprising that under such conditions the peasant should 
choose to reach an arrangement with nearby bandits rather than to rely on 
faraway state authorities. Such arrangements make sure that things will 
go by peacefully and silently. Recourse to state authorities, however, 
not only bring upon the wrath of the bandit groups, but lead to hectic 
activities among the fleeing and the pursuers. Not only do the peasant's 
fields and crops suffer damage, but his working routine gets hampered in 
these times of violence, which in the end-are exactly what the peasant 
wants to avoid and be protected from. Peasant support of bandits against 
the state stems from this desire for stability, when some sort of tax 
will have to be paid to one group or another anyway and, in the end, it 
proves more viable to lodge and feed bandits. After all they do not build 
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temples and palaces or expect corv6e duties. 
Nor should it be forgotten that strong bandit groups are in fact 
capable of providing adequate protection against eventual third parties. 
These would include other bandit groups, nomadic raiders, or even 
inimical outside village communities. Again, the fact that the bandit is 
more or less constantly present make him a better choice than state 
authorities. It is, however, interesting to see how much the state itself 
can act as a third party in this case. The question arises whether bandit 
groups can effectively hold off the official tax-collectors, if they can 
afford to do so, and what the state is going to do about it. 
it is surely possible, and it has been known, that very remote 
areas never knew the implementation of taxation (Hobsbawm; 1969: 70] and 
it might well be possible that bandit groups here managed to frighten off 
the tax-collectors altogether. However, this is highly dependent on the 
degree of remoteness of the territory, on the state's interest in the 
territory, and finally on whether the state involved is weak or strong. 
Whereas the bandit may be able to withstand official power in the very 
inaccessible hinterland, on the fringes the state will begin to assert 
its claims. The least we can expect in such a situation is that villages 
in the region are subject to a double taxation, from the state and the 
bandits. Yet the stronger the state, the more able it is to push these 
fringes further back into the hinterland. The interests of bandits and 
authorities now clash heavily and it is here that their involvments with 
each other take more expressive forms. 
It must be stated here that where the state is in fact strong 
enough, it will not enter into alliances with the bandits, but rather 
seek to extinguish banditry and maintain control with appropriate forces 
of its own. Against a strong state, banditry cannot assert control over 
large territories and often will be reduced to pillaging and highway 
robbery. It is only where the state is relatively weak and faces further 
58 
problems, such as civil wars or other political turmoil, that it will try 
to reach agreements with bandits and use them to its own advantage. 
A popular tactic is to use bandits as a policing force. It has long 
been known that in the absence of a strong army contingent local 
authorities have little official armed personel to deal with banditry: 
Apart from the occasional recourse to special army commands 
in the case of serious large-scale outbreaks of banditry, all 
evidence points to the conclusion that governors of unarmed 
provinces were at the mercy of whatever local support they 
could muster in the repression of outlaws. [Shaw; 1984: 19] 
Such an absence of any official provincial and local policing force 
leads to the creation of what we might best call "vigilantes". What this 
group however represents is nothing more than yet another marauding armed 
force in the rural regions. The fact that they mostly are drafted from 
the same part of the population as bandits makes them a highly 
conspicuous entity. one such group called diogmitai has been described as 
"somewhere between a posse of vigilantes and professional enforcers and 
regulators - as such they were very close to the bandits themselves as a 
category" [Shaw; 1984: 18; fn. 35]. Indeed the difference between 
vigilantes and bandits again seems to lie mainly with the fact that the 
latter enjoy no legal sanction while the former do. This is made even 
clearer when vigilantes and bandits simply become interchangeable, as in 
the case of the Greek azmatoles and klephts. The constant flux from one 
group into the other is thus described: 
The klephts and armatoles were the product of insecurity of 
life and property, conquest, foreign rule, and a terrain and 
economy that favoured lawlessness in general and brigandage 
in particular ... The armatoles were former outlaws who had 
been amnestied and employed to suppress banditry. Setting a 
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thief to catch a thief, a ploy ever used since rulers sought 
to protect their exposed territories and frontiers without 
keeping standing armies, was common practice. Armatoles were 
charged with the safety of mountain passes and maintenance of 
law and order in the districts of their jurisdictions, the 
armatoliks ... The klephts were mainly fugitives, debtors, 
outlaws, misfits, adventurers, men not attached to the land 
by property or other obligations, who took to the hills and 
became brigands ... As members of a band of outlaws, klephts 
were driven by two primary considerations: survival, which 
was no easy matter, and amnesty, which often entailed 
enlistment in a band of armatoles ... once amnestied and 
invested with authority to keep the law, they used all means 
at their disposal to stay in power; when deposed, as most 
ultimately were, they reverted to brigandage and tried 
through violence and guile to re-emerge as armatoles. 
[Koliopoulos; 1989: 194-196] 
As with mercenaries, we find groups of violent and armed men who 
can easily switch from a pro- towards an anti-authority stance. Their 
allegiance is at best tangential and, although they might fulfill their 
part of the bargain as long as their inmediate interests are thereby 
served, there is little doubt that when opportunity knocks, they will 
follow their own pursuit of power. 
As long as this process takes place on a local scale, there will be 
no real long-term consequences for the state-apparatus. In the end it is 
nothing more than another aspect of the protection market, with the 
difference that the buyer is to be placed within the realm of official 
authority (Baretta and Markoff; 1978: 5931. The higher authority-holders 
of the state often need to know little about the actual details of the 
arrangement. often such agreements are born out of the local official's 
desire to render a picture of peaceful existence within his jurisdiction 
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to the central government, which, on the other hand, cares little about 
who collects taxes and keeps the peace as long as it is done (cf Brown; 
1990: 263]. Local officials only need to be clever enough to play 
different bandit groups against each other, by employing the one and 
deposing the other, to make sure that no particular group gains too much 
power or that groups ally. Furthermore the narrow scale of local areas 
should keep vigilantes of one locality busy enough keeping at bay their 
counterparts of the neighbouring one. As a last resort, if things get out 
of hand, local authorities can still call upon the state and the army, 
although they might somewhat discredit themselves in doing so. 
On a larger scale and with the knowledge and approval of the state 
itself, things might turn out quite differently. When large regions are 
deliberately left in the control of such bandits turned law-enforcer 
because of the weakness of the state, their captains instead of having 
close connections with local officials, become evermore independent from 
such authorities. If the situation goes on long enough, lower authorities 
become unimportant in the process, and contact will be maintained only at 
the highest level, i. e. between the captain and the state. In fact the 
captain himself might claim quite rightly to be the highest authority in 
the region. Finally, if the state fails to assert its claims over such a 
territory in any convincing manner, in the very long run the region will 
try to detach itself from that state and achieve, if not total 
independence, at least autonomy. Shaw describes the process within the 
Roman empire: 
During the metamorphosis of Roman state structure in the mid- 
third century A. D. when the power and authority of the 
central state came most into question, local men of power who 
otherwise would have been stigmatized as bandits usurped 
aspects of state power (for example, the ideology and imagery 
of strength, protection, beneficence, and dispensation of 
justice) and gradually entered the realm of formal state 
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authority. (Shaw; 1984: 35-36] 
Again the process does take place with most ease in those 
territories where state control has always been the weakest. Where 
frontier zones are left alone long enough some people will eventually 
realize the possibilities in setting up their own internal political 
organization, which will steadily grow less dependent on the adjacent, 
original state power. From being frontier zones, entire regions thus 
develop into at least autonomous enclaves with a quasi state-like status. 
Bandits are involved in this process in that they stand a high chance of 
making up the military strata of these new political entities; this is 
even more so where they formerly had been employed as law-enforcers, as 
they are already a politically recognized power. Although it is possible 
for them to do so, bandit-captains do not need to be at the very head of 
such happenings. Former local men of power often have their hand in such 
proceedings; they use the bandits, who thus graduate from a policing 
force into the personal armies of state pretenders. 
We see on this occasion the development not so much of overt revolt 
in the face of foreign rule, but of opportunistic secession, which takes 
place comparatively peacefully. We call such societies in the first 
instance autonomous, in so far as, although for all practical purposes 
they might be independent, technically speaking the authorities still 
consider them to part of the state. Shaw points to a dichotomy which 
exists between state and society, stressing that they, at least in the 
Roman case, never fully coincide. As such the central state 
administration lays a political claim on territories and its inhabitants, 
which, however, are never fully integrated into its society [Shaw; 
1984: 41-42, also Hobsbawm; 1969: 701. 
on the other hand, as our former definition of frontier zones has 
demonstrated, it must be admitted that such zones are by their nature 
open to dissidence and prone to breed as well as attract banditry 
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[Baretta and Markoff; 1978: 592]. It seems plausible enough to assume the 
involvment of strong-bandit groups as part of the rural military 61ite, 
wherever such enclaves manage to hold out against a state wanting to 
superimpose its grip. But there are also cases where the process is one 
of gradual evolution and here bandits might well be seen as the main 
instigators: 
However, very large bandit gangs that were able to operate 
for long periods within the empire itself could, given the 
appropriate conjuncture of forces, approximate to the 
"Haiduk" type in their institutionalization of their own 
power. Such were the large bandit gangs in Judaea in the 
middle decades of the first century A. D., the Saturiani and 
Subafrenses of the late empire, and the Ma-ratocupreni raiders 
of northern Syria. [Shaw; 1984: 43] 
Indeed Hobsbawm devotes Chapter 5 of his study to this particular 
group of bandits, which he chooses to call the Haiduks. It is interesting 
to note that some of their characteristics are reminiscent not only of 
what Shaw has said about the Roman latrones, but also of the behaviour 
and organization of the lapiru. The geographical location for Haiduk and 
, apiru alike is that of mountains and empty plains, the less densely 
populated areas [Hobsbawm; 1969: 61]; Shaw has furthermore identified the 
bandit gangs of Judea of the 1st century A. D. with Haiduk-like groups 
[Shaw; 1984: 431. Yet the geographical location is not the most striking 
parallel between the Haiduk and the lapiru, after all many non-Haiduk- 
bandits chose similar locations for their activities. A number of 
characteristics for both groups can however be isolated from this 
description by Hobsbawm: 
What made this collection of the socially marginal, the men 
who chose not so much freedom as against serfdom, but robbery 
as against poverty, into a quasi-political movement, was a 
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powerful tradition, a recognized collective social function. 
As we have seen, their motives for going into the mountains 
were mainly economic, but the traditional term for becoming a 
haiduk was to rebel', and the haiduk was by definition an 
insurrectionary. He joined a recognized social group. 
[Hobsbawm; 1969: 641 
We first notice that like the 'apiru the Haiduk are seen as a 
classifiable social entity of a marginal character. Their origins are 
similar too, both groups stemming from outcasts, escaped serfs and alike, 
who chose to take up arms and organize themselves in groups or gangs 
[Hobsbawm; 1969: 611. Both lapiru and Raiduk also organize themselves 
along the lines of the brotherhood (Redford; 1992; Hobsbawm; 1969]. it is 
also interesting to see that they are mainly a collective form, isolated 
leaders are seldomly mentioned [Hobsbawm; 1969: 61,64-651. Mendenhall has 
made exactly the same remarks about the 'apiru (1973: 124; Albright; 
1975: 115]. only two occurrences refer to Abdi-Ashirta and Aziru (EA 91: 3; 
67: 17), and here it should be seen as being applied metaphorically by 
Rib-Addi, so as to stress the trouble that they are causing him. But both 
leaders do represent an overlord to which the lapiru attached themselves, 
a usual procedure also for the Haiduk. Again both groups do so with a 
certain degree of disloyalty [cf Hobsbawm; 1969: 62]. It is also worth 
noting that the Haiduk attach themselves to a lord in return for being 
given the status of free men [Hobsbawm; 1969: 611. We have seen that 
something similar existed with the 'apiru, who accepted lordship, yet 
were superior to slaves. Finally where the Haiduk attached themselves to 
the emperor himself, land was given to them in compensation [Hobsbawm; 
1969: 61-621. The mention of the land of the lapiru in some texts and 
their staying in their own encampments under the orders of their own 
leaders seems to reflect a similar situation [cf Halligan; 1983: 21]. 
Haiduk also kept their own chieftains and were generally formally 
structured under leaders [Hobsbawm; 1969: 62,66]. 
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Given these parallels it is interesting to note that the motivation 
to become a Haiduk was not mainly ideological, but strictly economical. 
"... with luck, brigandage was a better financial position than peasant 
life* says Hobsbawm [1969: 62-63]. Even for Hobsbawm they represent a much 
less ideal type of bandit and connections with the peasants are said to 
be extremely loose. Their victims are not only the wealthy, but anyone 
they could get their hands on. During their Haiduk-career they were often 
separated from their kin. Their limited relationship with peasants 
Hobsbawm also sees arising from the fact that most of them were herdsmen 
or at least of some semi-migratory nature (Hobsbawm; 1969: 63-64]. 
Nevertheless they were not totally without support. They also managed to 
pass the wintertime in some friendly village; they were even able to 
return to their kin [Hobsbawm; 1969: 69]. 
The picture of the Haiduk's motivation, lifestyle and relation with 
the peasant population is thus far more reminiscent of the picture of 
banditry discussed above than is Hobsbawm's ideal social bandit. Contact 
with village communities is tangential, in the campaigning season hardly 
existing and certainly not altogether friendly. Haiduk seem much more 
organized like bands of soldiers and it is arguable that like them they 
preyed on the villages for food when campaigning. Hobsbawm insists that 
they represent a much more institutionalized and permanent challenge to 
official authority [Hobsbawm; 1969: 62,661. But that is not to say that 
they were much inclined towards social revolution7- As Hobsbawm himself 
states: 
7 Again we must heed the warning given by Hobsbawmi: "For banditry 
itself thus to become the revolutionary movement and to dominate it, 
is unusual. As we have seen (pp. 19-21) limitations, both technical 
and ideological, are such as to make it unsuitable for more than 
momentary operations of more than a few dozen men, and its internal 
organization provides no model which can be generalized to be that of 
an entire society... Banditry is therefore more likely to come into 
peasant revolutions as one aspect of a multiple mobilization, and 
knowing itself to be a subordinate aspect, except in one sense: it 
provides fighting men and fighting leaders" (Hobsbawm; 1969: 86]. In 
most cases such mobilization is, however, very hard to achieve. 
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We need not suppose that they spent all their time fighting, 
let alone trying to overthrow, the oppressors. The very 
existence of bands of free men, or of those patches of rock 
or reed beyond the reach of any administration, was 
sufficient achievement. [Hobsbawm; 1969: 701 
This statement we consider to be of major importance when we come 
to analyze the role of bandits within the scope of the emergence of 
highland polities. It shows that these groups were quite capable, given 
the right conditions, of institutionalizing power of their own in areas 
where state-control was lacking. Shaw has identified a number of 
"barbaric entities" with the Haiduk and pointed to the fact that they 
represented "foreign enclaves within the Roman state". If these enclaves 
manage to constantly escape state control, they eventually come to 
achieve a quasi-state status for themselves [Shaw; 1984: 42, also 43). 
This means that considerably large territories, which permanently and 
effectively refute attempts by the state to regain control, might after a 
while obtain the recognition of being an independent region by that same 
state. 
The role of groups like the Haiduk, in our case the 'apiru, would 
be important as they certainly represent the most uncontrollable group, 
as well as being the fiercest opposition to the state's claims of 
authority over the region. Furthermore being the military and therefore 
political power of the area, they are the ones the state has to deal 
with. This assumption gains support from the fact that the Haiduk are 
often seen as a "military strata sprung from the free peasantry- to be 
compared with what Coote and Whitelam call the "rural military glite". 
Their importance in keeping control over a region, while also holding off 
that of central state authorities, cannot be overestimated. Nor does 
their role end with the gain of some sort of relative independence, but 
we will follow their activities also as related to the formation of 
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state-like societies. Thompson has followed the movements of another 
brigand-group of antiquity, the Bacaudae, and concluded: 
If Aclianus and Amandus had been able to win permanent 
independence for Armarica, they would not have been able to 
introduce any fundamental change into the class structure of 
their society. They would merely have started afresh that 
process which had caused the ownership of vast areas of land 
to concentrate into a few hands and which had brought about 
in Roman society the very state of affairs against which they 
themselves had revolted in the first place. [Thompson; 
1952: 20; compare Mendenhall; 1983: 1011 
It is our belief that it is possible to assume that the lapiru of 
the Ancient Near East were similar to the Haiduk type and that the 
operations of Abdi-Ashirta and Aziru in Amurru were part of such 
proceedings. It is after all especially in the Amarna period that much 
, apiru-activity is not to be attached to the social phenomenon of robbing 
from the rich, but is clearly linked to the political machinations of the 
different city-rulers. Mendenhall himself has made it clear that those 
who, like Abdi-Ashirta and Aziru, required the services of the lapiru, 
were deriving their authority primarily from their having been put into 
power by Egypt (Mendenhall; 1973: 125]. They would have had little desire 
to trigger a social revolution; their interests lay in extending their 
territories and power, not in improving the lot of their peasant 
population. Liverani maintains that Abdi-Ashirta is of a different kind 
than the surrounding city-rulers, in that he did not control an 
agriculturally based region and did not have a capital. He thus claims 
that he is more of a nomadic chieftain leader-type and, given this social 
background, might have offered a more egalitarian view of society to the 
peasants inhabitants of other areas, as we can detect in his "social 
programme" (cf esp. EA 74) [1979: 15,18-191. Yet even he admits: 
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It is obvious that the promise of 'peace' has a strong 
utopian overtone; also under Abdi-Asirta the villages would 
have 'mayors', and the economic situation would not be 
substantially altered. Thus the promise of peace has a 
clearly propagandistic character, having the function of 
raising hopes and of accentuating the social contrasts, while 
it would have had hardly any real implementation. [Liverani; 
197 9: 191 0 
Abdi-Ashirtals promise of peace was little more than a political 
manoeuvre cast to draw the peasants of a given city-state onto his side, 
an opportunity which the peasants, besieged and threatened by famine, 
were all too ready to take. Yet beyond the restoration of a more peaceful 
state of affairs, enabling the peasantry to return to their crops, the 
"pax Abdi-Ashirta" had little to offer to the rural population. Nor is 
there anything indicative of the lapiru being more inclined to revolution 
than was their leader. It is arguable that they might have been 
themselves convinced by Abdi-Ashirta's propaganda, but beyond that little 
can be added to the argument. It is on the other hand also possible that 
the apiru took the opportunity of the strong leadership of Abdi-Ashirta 
in order to come out of their remote highland strongholds and accumulate 
power and wealth. 
$Abi-Asirta's promises and his position as a leader are 
nevertheless interesting, for leaders and an ideology which can unite 
the diversified peasant elements are essential for a peasant revolt to 
happen. Leaders and ideology, however, mostly do not originate from 
the peasant mass itself, they are often made up for the peasants by 
people from an altogether different class [Jenkins; 1982: 512]. In the 
words of Shanin what is needed is "guided political action", where an 
"external uniting power-61ite" provides an "exogenous organizing 
factor" which can move the whole of the peasant mass into action. 
Danger arises when the peasant mass, like the urban mobs, is used by 
various richer elements to support their political struggles rather 
than "led to achieve its own aims" [Shanin; 1971: 257-258; cf also 
coote and Whitelam; 1987: 60-611. This, however, seems to be what is 
happening in the case of Abdi-Asirta and the lapiru. 
Tr 
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Abdi-Ashirta's case will in the first instance serve as a guide- 
line, as it represents, at least quantitatively, the best illustrated 
case. Still there is much guesswork to be done concerning this 
personnality, especially as to what role he played before he is mentioned 
in the El Amarna. letters. It is thus impossible for us to know whether he 
started off as a successful bandit-captain, or whether he always had some 
sort of official power and influence and only attached himself to lapiru- 
forces somewhat later. We cannot conclude whether Abdi-Ashirta started 
his career in the control of protection-rackets, a power for which he 
then managed to gain official recognition, or whether he began as a local 
official, who rose to greater power by using lapiru as a vigilante and 
mercenary force. 
By the time he makes his appearance in the El Amarna letters it 
seems that his authority, as his contacts with the Egyptian court prove, 
is officially recognized, and that his policing of his territory with the 
help of the apiru finds no real objection at the court itself. Hachmann 
describes the relation between Abdi-Ashirta and the Egyptian government 
as such: 
Abdiasirta und sein Sohn Aziru hielten sich zwar gelegentlich 
längere Zeit in Sumur auf, doch nicht mit einer mit der Stadt 
verbundenen offiziellen Funktion. Es hat indes den Anschein, 
dass Abdiasirta den Auftrag hatte, die Stadt Sumur und deren 
Umgebung, d. h. das ganze Land Amurru, zu schützen (EA 60,21- 
28). In diese Position scheint er regelrecht eingesetzt zu 
wesen zu sein (EA 101,30f. ). Er war aber dennoch in dieser 
Aufgabe vom Stadthalter in Sumur abhängig (EA 60,20) ... 
Abdiasirta scheint praktisch aber der Herr des ganzen Landes 
Amurru geblieben zu sein, und er konnte sich dort halten und 
sogar noch seine Macht erweitern, weil er offenbar dem Pharao 
keinen Anlass gab, an seiner Loyalität zu zweifeln (EA 65,7). 
, Aý , 
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[Hachmann; 1982: 25-261 
It is made clear in this description that Abdi-Asirta holds much 
more of an official position than Rib-Addi's correspondence would have us 
believe, yet it also points to the fact that Abdi-Asirta enjoys 
considerable freedom in his actions. His dependence on the governor of 
Sumur seems for all practicality, to be nonexistent once he leaves the 
city-walls; furthermore, his powerbase does not really lie with the city, 
but with his mobile military contingents, the lapiru. Liverani has 
stressed that Abdi-Asirta differentiates himself in that he has no 
capital city, no court and no bureaucracy; as such he gives the 
impression of a chief rather than an urban city-ruler [Liverani; 
1979: 151. 
Abdi-Asirta thus resembles both, the Oparasocial leader", and the 
"dimorphic chief" as they are described by Rowton. He displays 
characteristics of the parasocial leader in that he is heavily associated 
with the uprooted element of the Ancient Near East, the lapiru [Rowton; 
1976b: 17 and passim; 1977: 182,190 and passim], an element which is 
similar to Haiduk-type bandits. His activities, however, can be related 
to that of some dimorphic chiefs, as he maintains links with a city, yet 
himself does not live there, but leads a non-sedentary live in the 
countryside, where his power seems little restricted [Rowton; 1973: 209- 
2101. 
it is this blend of outsider and official recognition, relative 
freedom of action and ties with the authorities, that make Abdi-Asirta 
such an interesting case. Although not a city-ruler, Egyptian authority 
chooses to acclaim his political power, and the role of his lapiru as the 
military 61ite in the open countryside. Conversely, he remains less 
controllable exactly because his powerbase is mobile and not contracted 
in a city, but nevertheless organized enough to engage in more than 
isolated raiding and pillaging. Such organization among outside forces 
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is, however, to be found primarily with the Haiduk-bandits. As we have 
seen, compared to other forms of banditry these groups appear to be of a 
more permanent existence and a far more institutionalized presence of 
power, a quasi-political movement. Also noticeable are their formalized 
structures, mostly on a military basis (cf Hobsbawm; 1969: 64-66]. 
Hobsbawm gives different reasons why this may be so: 
It is not easy to say whether this was so because certain 
geographical or political conditions made possible such 
permanent and formalized banditry, and therefore 
automatically made it potentially more 'political,, or 
whether it was certain political situations (e. g. foreign 
conquest or certain types of social conflict) which 
encouraged unusually 'conscious' forms of banditry and thus 
structured it more firmly and permanently. [Hobsbawm; 
1969: 661 
In Abdi-Asirtals and his 'apiru's case it seems to us that a major 
role is played by both geographical and political conditions, in that 
they engender the necessary freedom of action, which leaves formerly 
disorganized and isolated bandit-groups to develop into the more formally 
structured Raiduk-units. Geographically this is not only a classic 
frontier zone, but also a buffer zone between the Hittite and the 
Egyptian empires. This, however, represents exactly such an area, where 
Haiduk often sell their services to protect military frontiers [Hobsbawm; 
1969: 61-621, and, on the other hand, it is here that vigilantes and 
bandits are most interchangeable (Koliopoulos; 1989: 217]*. Politically, 
the very fact that Egypt employs these 'apiru as their vigilante border 
troops, institutionalizes them as a political power; for in doing so 
Egypt recognizes them as a legitimate military 61ite in control of their 
area of jurisdiction. It is thus not so much the case of the Raiduk being 
9 One might further notice that Hobsbawm classifies the klephts as 
bandits of the Haiduk-type [Hobsbawm; 1969: 611. 
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a "military strata sprung from the free peasantry", as Hobsbawm would 
have it (1969: 61; also Koliopoulos; 1989: 1931, but rather is such a 
stratum set up by the responsible authorities, wherever they cannot 
afford to put up one of their own. 
Such cost-reduction, however, can backfire on the state, when such 
groups, already confident of their newly gained political freedom and 
power, are left alone long enough to develop political aims of their own. 
Judging from Egypt's reluctance to send troops against him, it seems most 
obvious that Abdi-Asirta enjoys enough freedom for a long enough time to 
increase his political influence; in fact the constraints placed on him 
by Egypt seem so slight, that we cannot view his decisions and actions to 
be any other than that of a considerably autonomous chief. 
Egypt must have seen his actions as being little more than 
ambitions towards expanding the territory falling under his jurisdiction, 
and as long as he performs his duties well, this is no real reason to 
depose him. Her interests lie in having her border zones correctly 
patroled and protected, less with who does it [compare Hyams; 1976: 189- 
1921. It is also reasonable to presuppose that Abdi-Asirta was interested 
in increasing his autonomy at the same time. Liverani has stressed the 
utopian character of his promises, their propagandist nature and the very 
low chance of any real implementation of social changes (Liverani; 
1979: 191. By promising peace, what Abdi-Asirta really emphasizes is 
stability under his protection, the very same stability and protection 
which generally are the responsibility of the state. Abdi-Asirta thus 
bears clear similarities to "men of power" usurping "aspects of state 
power (for example, the ideology and imagery of strength, protection, 
beneficence, and the dispensation of justice)" and thus clearly wanting 
to enter the realm of state authority [Shaw; 1984: 35-361. 
Abdi-Asirta's success might have been partial only, but at least 
under Aziru and his brothers, some of their dreams must have come true, 
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as a changed relationship between Egypt and Amurru seems to prove 
[Hachmann; 1982: 391. The fact that Egypt sees no more point in 
establishing a governor in Sumur speaks for the degree of autonomy that 
Amurru has reached under Aziru [Hachmann; 1982: 271. Hachmannn speaks 
furthermore of Amurruls independence, which goes so far as to offer 
protection to the political enemies of Egypt [1982: 40]. Nonetheless 
political relations with Egypt are maintained, but they are subject to 
Amurruls special status and also treatment (=besondere Stellung; 
Sonderbehandlung), when compared to other districts of the Egyptian 
empire [Hachmann; 1982: 41-42). It would appear that Amurru's autonomy has 
considerably increased, and the former Egyptian province has developed 
into a quasi independent state-like enclave within the territory of the 
Egyptian empire. Hachmann's final description of the developments in 
Amurru is as follows: 
Sumur war im wesentlichen Verwaltungszentrum der syrischen 
Küste. Die Zuständigkeit des Statthalters von Sumur reichte 
im Süden über Byblos hinaus und schloss im Norden 
ursprünglich Amurru mit ein. Als Abdiasirta als Herrscher in 
Amurru an Bedeutung gewann, begann der Einfluss des 
Statthalters von Sumur zu schwinden. Nach dem Tode des 
Abdiasirta mag dieser wieder für kurze Zeit an Bedeutung 
gewonnen haben, bis Aziru die Stadt Sumur eroberte. Damit 
löste sich da= der Verwaltungsbezirk auf, da der Pharaoh 
davon absah, einen neuen Statthalter zu ernennen, und so die 
Rolle, die der Aziru übernommen hatte, stillschweigend 
anerkannte. [Hachmann; 1982: 46) 
Abdi-Asirta, Aziru, and Amurru present a classic case of a former 
province, being for all practicable purposes lost to an empire because 
men of power at the head of Haiduk-type bandits, were left to operate 
freely long enough to develop their own state-like ambitions. When Aziru 
finally took over Sumur, Egypt and Pharaoh still did not react. This only 
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adds to the picture of great autonomy that he enjoyed in his activities". 
Most interesting is that none of this represented anything vastly 
extraordinary. There is no violence which exceeds that normally expected 
of such a situation where city-states exist in constant rivalry; there 
most certainly is nothing which we could compare to a revolt or a 
nationwide uprising. The whole process runs by rather unnoticed, at the 
top of the social level, where one ruling strata is replaced by another, 
the irony being that the latter are the long-time employees of the 
former. Rather than associating the Haiduk with insurrection, as Hobsbawm 
does, we prefer to link the 'apiru from Amurru to this process of 
peaceful secession, which takes place within the permissible limits of a 
social interaction, where the wielding of power at the outside of society 
easily allows for admittance into the realm of official recognition by 
that same society. 
We have used Abdi-Asirta's and Aziruls case as an illustration. 
Needless to say the same process did not take place everywhere where 
, apiru were present. However the flight of several officials, such as 
Amanhatbi ( EA 185; 186) to the 'apiru or even "the land of the lapiru", 
the fact that land is given to the 'apiru (EA 289), points to the fact, 
that in these cases also, similar enclaves achieved at least enough 
autonomy to be able to offer protection to such refuge-seekers. 1drimi's 
case is most illuminating, as he had to flee his country, yet after years 
'DIt is here interesting to note that Bott6ro made the following 
claim about the lapiru: "... nous les voyons combattre pour un. certain 
ordre politique, et jouer de ce fait un. r6le capital, puisqu, ils 
semblent avoir pris la t6te, en Syrie et en Palestine, de la 
r6sistance A la domination 6trang6re du Pharaon, et du mouvement pour 
1-autonomie du pays" [Bott6ro; 1980: 210]. He then says that they are 
not really brigands-habbatu, a claim that can be paralleled by that of 
Rowton that for the lapiru "genuine banditry is not as yet attested" 
[1965: 3861. The lengthy discussion above should put this into a new 
perspectve. In fact, it points towards the fact that the difference 
habbatu-'apiru is similar to that between simple bandit and Raiduk. 
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of refuge made himself King of Alalakh. He gives the following 
description of a period of his hiding years: 
I stayed in Ammia in the land of Canaan; in Ammia. lived 
(also) natives of Halab, of the country Mukishkhi, of the 
country Nil and also warriors from the country Amale. They 
discovered that I was the son of their overlord and gathered 
around me. There I grew up and stayed for a long time. For 
seven years I lived among the Habiru-people... [ANET; 557] 
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Chapter 3 
Brigands, Nomads, and Barbarians 
Within our discussion on bandits and parasocial elements we now 
have reached the point where the phenomenon of banditry definitely enters 
the much wider socio-political arena. It is at this point that Hobsbawm 
alluded to a problem when he argued to omit from his discussion of 
,, social banditry" those communities for which raiding forms a part of 
their normal life, such as for instance for the Bedouin [1969: 14; cf 
Rowton; 1977: 186]. We have so far tried to treat in isolation the 
shepherd and the nomad in their relationship to banditry, yet at this 
point shepherds, bandits and nomads meet and become highly confused. For 
Hobsbawm went on to say that some pastoralist groupings can in fact yield 
a rather large number of bandits. Noteworthy is also that especially the 
Haiduk, with whom we have identified the lapiru, came from a background 
of "herdsmen and drovers, i. e. semi-migratory men whose links with the 
settlements are intermittent or tenuous" [Hobsbawm; 1969: 64]. Thus 
Hobsbawm iterated the following warning: 
In studying such regions it is hard to say at precisely what 
point the practice of raiding and feuding passes into social 
banditry, whether in the form of resistance to the rich, to 
foreign conquerors or oppressors, or to other forces 
destroying the traditional order of things --all of which may 
be linked in the minds of bandits, and indeed in reality. 
[1969: 151 
It is as such also the point where topology enters the debate in a 
far more decisive manner, for here the geographical environment comes to 
determine activities, influence characterisation, and finally define the 
political panorama. At this point Shaw [19841 introduced the notion of 
barbaric entities and Minor (1979] began to speak of robber-tribes. 
Ultimately at this point it becomes quasi impossible to treat the bandit 
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separately from the nomad. Both come to be seen as a depraved mode of 
existence and feared as a barbaric threat. 
Knauf (1985] and Staubli [1991] detected something similar, but 
approached the whole problem from the opposite angle. They insisted that 
among nomadic elements one has to count merchants, artisans, gypsies and 
not least bandits (Knauf; 1985: 42; Staubli; 1991: 34; cf also Dyson- 
Hudson; 1972: 24; Rowton; 1976b: 15; Betts; 1989]. All these people lead a 
way of wandering -and constant movement, they are thus technically 
speaking nomadic. Nomads are thus not only pastoralists, although this is 
how they usually figure in our imaginations. To be nomadic involves 
movement and as such marauding bandit bands are to be classed as nomadic. 
The problem now arises that it becomes very difficult to differentiate 
the two groups. It is especially hard to know when one faces a nomad 
raiding activity or proper banditry. Not surprisingly the record holders 
of ancient empires were not altogether meticulous when deciding which 
appellative to use. In any case both entities appeared to them as highly 
barbaric. The French historian Briant has contributed two major studies 
to this phenomenon [1976; 19821'. Although he concentrates mainly on the 
Persian, Macedonian, and Greco-Roman periods, he has pointed out that 
most empires of the ancient world shared this worldview. As for the 
Ancient Near Eastern case, he insists: 
il capparait assez rapidement que llethnographie 
m4sopotainienne, hittite ou ggyptienne fonctionne sur des 
prgsuppos6s qui ne diffärent que par le d4tail de ceux de 
llethnographie grgco-romaine. [Briant; 1982: 35] 
Not surprisingly Briant puts the Shasu and the lapiru, both of whom 
he finds to be associated with pillage and brigandage, into the same 
category as the above mentioned "barbarians". This argument gains support 
'He has concentrated his study largely on a reinterpretation of the 
records by classical historians, such as Strabo, Herodotus, Hieronymus and 
Diodorus. 
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from a recent study by Staubli, who concentrates on the representation of 
nomads in the iconography of "Israel"Is sedentary neighbours. He claims 
that they present a picture "die nur ihre stadtische, oft imperiale oder 
koloniale Sichtweise wiedergeben" (1991: 6; cf Kamp and Yoffee; 1980: 89]. 
As such they would also be subject to a political situation very similar 
to the ones that Briant proposes himself to find behind the ideological 
language of the classical writers (cf 1982: 38-39]. Such findings help to 
shed new light on the relations between hinterland populations and the 
institutions of central government in Egyptian dominated Syria-Palestine, 
and may alter our view on the events of the resettlement of the 
Palestinian highlands. 
Two antitheses are regarded by Briant as lying at the base of the 
labelling in his classical sources. First, geographically there exists 
the opposition between plain/lowlands and mountains/highlands. The second 
concerns the way of live of the agents involved. The right way of life is 
usually located within the sedentary mode, agriculture and cultivation of 
lands being singled out and associated with city-life. Opposed to this 
are other forms of subsistence, such as hunting and gathering, 
pastoralism and pillaging or brigandage 
2. As such, it is easy to see that 
mountainous regions with difficult access caused by rocky terrain and 
dense forests, inhabited mostly by nomads and/or bandits, mainly qualify 
for such labelling. In fact an equation "highlander, " = 
nbarbarian/brigand" can be discovered in much classical imperialistic 
historiography. But again one must insist that much Of this labelling is 
part of an accepted "general theory", based itself on a certain 
2A remote example can be taken from Weissleder, who analyzes the 
situation in Eastern Ethiopia. He claims: "As far as the sedentary farmer 
is concerned, be he peasant or lord, there is "a kind of social crime" 
(Lattimore; 1962: 417) associated with being a nomad, a disparagement of the 
nomadic way of life, balanced, it seems, to me, only by the nomad's own 
profound distaste and contempt for all those who commit agriculture" 
[Weissleder; 1978: 2773. 
3We will here use the term "highlander* to roughly translate Briant's 
"montagnard". It enables us to speak of all the inhabitants of mountainous 
regions without having to qualify them either as villagers, nomads or 
bandits. Unfortunately it does not fully render the pejorative undertone of 
the french term. Another term to use could be "hill people", or even, 
hill-billies" [cf Briant; 19761. 
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geographical determinism, by which the degree of civilisation of a people 
varied with the altitude at which it lived. Briant never fails to point 
out that a critical analysis is needed; according to him, it will present 
a rather different and far more complex picture of reality (1982: 67]. 
What else lies behind such qualifications is the fact that the 
conquering empires encounter considerable difficulties in subduing these 
particular regions. In the 'end, the inhabitants are mainly considered 
barbarians because they manage to escape integration into the "civilised" 
society of the conquerors. That these regions are mainly the mountain- 
ranges only stems from the fact that these represent the worst hindrances 
to heavy armies, unacquainted with the terrain and not trained for 
mountain warfare. The statement made by many ancient writers that hill- 
people are naturally aggressive and bellicose must be associated with the 
fact that, unlike people living in the plain, they are offered a 
possibility of resistance by their terrain and appropriate techniques of 
warfare. 
We are dealing with a form of urban paranoia4, be it warranted or 
not, and a certain degree of reality concerning the independence of 
highland populations. At the base of it is nothing other than the fear of 
the unknown. Lowland people, used to the confines of what they conceive 
of as civilisation, basically the sedentary-agricultural mode of life, 
tend to view everything outside this confine as not only hostile and 
barbaric, but essentially unorderly or chaotic. Within the parameters of 
such unorderly forces, unexplored and/or unsubdued mountain ranges are to 
be included alongside forests and desert areas [cf Briant; 1976: 172, 
174). Staubli summarises the Egyptian position on this matter as such: 
4 Briant uses the terms "paranoia obsidionale". We have found the 
following definitions: "(lat. obsidionalis, m. s., de obsidere, assi6ger). 
Qui concerne le sibge d1une ville.... r(rt Fi6vre obsidionale, nom donn6 
parfois A la mentalit6 d1une population assi6g6e" (Dictionnaire 
Encyclop6dique Quillet; 1975: 4668]. In this case it must be related to the 
fact that plain and urban people found themselves to be surrounded and 
taken under siege by chaotic and inimical forces from the mountains and/or 
the deserts. 
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Kurz: Die Schasu-Nomaden gehören in den Bereich der 
unkontrollierbaren und dämonischen Chaosmächte, zu denen ja 
die Wüste überhaupt gehört, und die zu jeder Zeit mit Worten 
und Taten unerbittlich bekämpft werden müssen, aber auch nie 
ganz besiegt werden können.... [1991: 37; also: 69) 
our second point is already presented here, the fact that, as 
mentioned above, such regions and its inhabitants are not easily 
vanquished, and then seldom completely. A vicious cycle of argumentation 
can be detected here. Mountain and desert are being regarded as barbaric 
and unorderly by self-declared agents of civilisation and order, 
precisely on the grounds that these entities prove too difficult to be 
integrated into the orderly world. As no conqueror has managed to bring 
order to these areas, they remain widely unexplored and therefore 
unknown; the unknown however is again held in fear. Moreover the 
resistance presented to any would-be conqueror by the population, in 
itself often nothing but an act of defence, is viewed as aggression and 
barbarism. 
Thus nomads have often been seen as possessing an inherent 
bellicosity. In fact the notion sometimes appears as having been adopted 
straight from our ancient and classical, as well as medieval and 
colonial, records where nomads and tribal organisations appear as 
barbaric warriors and invaders. Yet it must be stressed that this is in 
many ways only an accident of transmission. The documents themselves are 
all too often interested in military activities, and accordingly the 
nomads involved are described as engaged 
in military performance. 
Furthermore a tendency can often be detected by which it is the unusual 
rather than the usual which catches the interest of the scribal 
transmitter. Consequently the belligerent nature which emerges is heavily 
emphasised and exaggerated. 
otherwise it must not be forgotten, especially in the scope of this 
80 
study, that we are here not dealing with the camel-riding bedouin!, or 
the horse-raising hordeS6 of later times. We are here talking of sheep- 
nomads, capable of only limited and, most importantly, comparatively slow 
migrations. This hinders the military potential of the nomads in two 
aspects. First there is, of course, their reduced mobility, not having 
the luxury of an effective transport and riding animal. secondly, on the 
battlefield itself such a mobile platform is the equivalent of a 
specialised weapon which translates itself into a serious advantage. But 
one has to wait for some time to detect such a weapon on the arena of the 
battlefield. Even with the domestication of the camel this situation is 
not reached. Knauf insists that it is not before the appropriate saddle, 
such as the sadad-saddle (1988: 11], was invented, that the use of the 
camel became highly efficient for military use [cf Knauf; 1988: 10-12; 
Lemche; 1985: 1321. We cannot speak about a meharist tradition for the 
period under review, nor of its application and effectiveness in the 
military sphere. Furthermore, even the presence of the domesticated camel 
would not have changed the situation in the highlands. Camels are not 
only militarily ineffective in a mountain environment [Lemche; 1985: 2001, 
but also find it hard to survive without appropriate vegetation. 
Yet, although on the one hand we seriously undermine the military 
superiority of the sheep-nomads, it is not as clear on the other that we 
sKnauf [esp. 19881 admits that a primary domestication of the camel was 
undertaken during the 3rd millennium B. C., yet insists that this was done 
by a sedentary culture, which remained largely independent of the camel. 
During the 2nd millennium the phenomenon would have spread into East- and 
West Arabia. He is even willing to argue for the appearance of camel 
caravans along the Mediterranean coast of southern Palestine in the final 
stages of the Bronze Age. However he goes on to say: "Das heisst jedoch 
nicht, dass wir zu dieser Zeit schon mit Beduinen zu rechnen hätten. 
Beduinen sind reiterkriegerische Kamelnomaden. In der Entwicklung des 
Beduinentums lassen sich eine protobeduinische Phase in der ersten Hälfte 
des 1. Jahrtausends v. Chr. und eine frühbeduinische seit der zweiten Hälfte 
des 2. Jahrtausends v. Chr. von der vollbeduinischen seit dem 2. /3. 
Jahrhundert n. Chr. unterscheiden" [1988: 10). Of the shasu, he claims that 
it is wein Begriff, dessen Ubersetzung mit uNomadenn leicht falsche 
Vorstellungen erzeugt ( ... ) und dessen hin und wieder anzutreffende 
Wiedergabe als "Beduinenn schlicht falsch ist" [1988: 1021. 
6 The camel and the horse have elsewhere been singled out for being the 
only animals to make a notable contribution to warfare (Orme; 1981: 173]. It 
is also worth mentioning that the first real use of cavalry occurred under 
Tukulti-Ninurta 11 (890-884 B. C. ) (Burney; 1977: 4). 
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can render them as simply not belligerent. Lemche insists that there is 
no reason to assume that sheep-nomads are anymore pacifistically inclined 
than camel or horse riding nomads. Although they might be militarily 
inferior to such groupings, they in turn are still superior to peasants 
for example, who because of their lack of mobility are vulnerable to 
attack (Lemche; 1985: 132-133,153,200; also Thiel; 1980: 251. Again, as 
our period does not show the presence of bedouin-like tribes, sheep- 
nomads consequently range rather high on the military 6chelon. 
However, a second look at nomad bellicosity is appropriate. Bearing 
in mind what has already been said about the way nomadic military 
activity has been reported throughout history a further warning has been 
given by anthropologists. Not all types of military activity can in fact 
be equated. There is an important difference between inter- and/or inner- 
tribal feuds, occasional attacks and raids and large scale military 
activity as practised by warring nations or states. Although nomads, of 
any nature, might be the absolute masters of the first, this does not 
automatically mean that they are equally adept at, or even interested, in 
the second. Bulliet, on nomadic warlike instincts, thus states: 
Numerous objections may be raised to this theory, but perhaps 
its greatest weakness is that it assumes an equivalency 
between intertribal raiding for the seizure of livestock or 
satisfaction of bloodfeuds on the one hand and organised 
military campaigns in distant countries on the other. Insofar 
as the sketchy history of pre-Islamic Arabia shows any 
natural inclination toward violence on the part of the Arab 
nomads, it is violence of the former type restricted, by 
tribal customs and usages and clearly related to the social 
and economic framework of nomadic existence. While the 
violence of organised conquest --particularly when it was 
successful-- may indeed have provided a certain pleasurable 
experience for some of the warriors or at least have 
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contributed to the tribe's store of tales praising the 
bravery of its members, it really differed completely from 
the first-mentioned type of violence. The Arabic historians 
unconsciously reflect this difference when they term the pre- 
islamic "battles" (often involving only a handful of men) 
ayyam aEcarah, the days of the Arabs, as opposed to the 
futuh, or "conquests" of Islam [Bulliet; 1980: 37-38] 
nomad's warfare is that of minor and shortlived skirmishes, of 
fast hit and run attacks; these are the characteristics and essentials of 
both feuds and raids. Both forms of engagement are often amongst the 
nomads themselves. After all the prime aim of raids is livestock, easily 
transportable and the prime carrier of capital and prestige among nomads 
[Parker; 1987: 481. No wonder other nomadic groups are an attractive 
victim. Feuds on the other hand are often the result or the answer to a 
previous raid. Mostly the ensuing battle, if it can in fact he called a 
battle, remains on a limited scale involving no more than the numbers of 
exactly what is needed for a raiding party. Although sometimes blood 
relatives or whole descent groups might become involved, we do not have 
here operations at the scale of army movements (Goldschmidt; 1980: 50-51]. 
Nor should it be forgotten that some of these proceedings of 
warlike engagements are quasi institutionalised and a matter of prestige 
rather than the outcomes of any real intentions for war [orme; 1981: 194- 
199]. Raiding and pillaging is not only a recognised mode of survival in 
the thinking of the classics, but amongst nomads a part of the lifecycle. 
Youth go on raids and cover themselves with honour and glory as well as 
gaining livestock capital and it is an equally important honourful duty 
for the victimised party to respond [Parker; 1987: 48 ]7. Yet, although 
some of the skirmishes might become rather violent and bloody, this is 
not full-scale warfare. 
7 Goldschmidt in fact qualifies aggressive raiding as "semisportive" 
[1980: 521. 
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Indeed this might provide the nomad with some fighting training, 
yet it is of a limited nature as he fights with other nomads within their 
own and common environment. He does not stand in front of a fortified 
city or face a charging chariot attack. Neither does raiding isolated 
peasant communities or attacking a merchant caravan provide the same kind 
of challenge. Villages are not fortified cities nor are they defended by 
trained military personal, and caravans will be attacked at chosen points 
playing to the advantage of the attacker. Again we face nothing but local 
skirmishes, which often end to the advantage of the more mobile nomad. 
Thus, although one might agree that a nomad is a man who knows his 
ways, belligerent if one insists, it is made equally clear that he is not 
automatically a superior warrior all the same'. Nonetheless one cannot 
ignore that many of our records show the nomad, sheep or camel, mountain 
or steppe, as quasi-invincible. But again an accident of transmission, a 
distortion springing from the "language of conquest", is mostly 
responsible for this notion. Nomads are in fact not as such invincible, 
but rather unconquerable in their own territories. Aided by their terrain 
and mobility, nomads are the absolute masters of defensive warfare. It is 
true especially of mountain nomads that they not only have the 
possibility to retreat till the pursuing troops give up, but possess the 
necessary natural bastions to make long and tiring stances". 
We can thus see nomadic military superiority in a new light. Being 
'Even the more developed warfare by the Arabs in Roman times is 
described as such: "The nomadic Arabs, on the other hand, relied on speed, 
surprise, and missile weapons; they 
lacked any siege equipment but could 
raid the caravans, herds, and unfortified settlements of the frontier. Most 
incursions were probably small-scale plundering raids that could be met 
with limited forces" (Parker; 1987: 48]. 
9 This, despite the fact, that some of them, like the Yarahmadzai of 
Baluchistan actually "prided themselves on hardiness in response to their 
harsh environment and fierceness in opposition to surrounding people" 
(Salzman; 1980b: 981. 
10 Salzman also insists: "In addition to nomadism, the mobility of the 
tribesmen was a defensive stance that could be activated in the face of 
attack, reducing vulnerability through retreat" (1980b: 98; also Asad; 
1973: 711. 
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in his own territory, he plays this to his full advantage, drawing 
pursuing troops or invading armies to fight at his own level in a first 
instance. The ensuing skirmishes, at which he is a master, result not 
only in the loss of human lives, but in a severe sinking of morale on the 
behalf of the pursuers. It is furthermore made impossible for the 
pursuers to fight a final all-deciding battle as the nomads are usually 
able to flee and start all over again. If pushed to the limit, however, 
nomads will hide away in inpenetrable natural fortresses [Goldschmidt; 
1980: 521. To dislodge them from here will again be costly. Not only is it 
militarily very difficult to do so, but the pursuers have to be nourished 
and maintained. Nomads will survive: Briant has shown that when pushed 
back to these refuges they transform themselves into cave dwellers and 
hunter-gatherers. The following army will have more difficulties not 
being naturally disposed to such a lifestyle. Even if at some stage the 
army might prove itself the greater power, it will be impossible for it 
to have a final, all encompassing victory. First of all, it will be 
impossible for it to dislodge all the nomads from all their hideouts. The 
nature of the terrain and the possibility for the nomads to disperse 
argue against this. Secondly, short of genocide nothing can prevent the 
nomads from refornUng. After all, the army has to go, while the nomads 
will stay. 
The classical historiographers however seriously misunderstood this 
situation and drove their theory of geographical determinism ad absurdum. 
They insisted that the more remote an area, the less known it is, the 
more barbaric and savage their inhabitants are likely to appear. That a 
number of sociological misrepresentations thus found their way into their 
reports is not surprising, given the little they actually really knew 
about mountain societies, and the ideological premises with which they 
worked. A prime example is the troglodyte lifestyle, an adaptation by 
mountain-nomads alluded to above. For the classical historiographers the 
degree of civilisation of the different populations conveniently 
diminishes with the increase in altitude and the change of lifestyle 
85 
(Briant, 1976: 169; 1982: 28]. They thus argued that travelling highest, 
one encounters people living in caves and reduced to the state of 
gatherers and hunters. They went on to sharply distinguish between three 
entities, the sedentaries, the nomads, and the troglodytes, and thought 
of them as different ethnicities. 
Reality, as we have seen proves to he rather different. In fact the 
mountains do not contain two different groups, one of them pastoral 
nomads, the others hunters and gatherers. Nor does the first group live 
in tents, while the second uses caves. Finally there are no ethnic 
distinctions as such. Quite to the contrary, it is often one and the same 
group which switches from one lifestyle and habitat to the other (see 
also Digard; 1979: 381. Although their main occupation might be 
pastoralism, highland inhabitants make extensive use of caves as a refuge 
in times of trouble, trouble often being conquest by a would-be civilise 
[Goldschmidt; 1980: 521. They represent their last strongholds offering 
both shelter for the families and possibilities of defence. Survival in 
these rough regions, however, depends on adopting the ancient ways of 
gathering plants and hunting animals. 
This example, however, shows the profound inability of classical 
scribes to understand the full range of activity of their subjects. 
Rather than acknowledging the many ways of adaptation of mountain people, 
they opted for the easier solution to split them into different entities, 
which they then proceeded to qualify as increasingly more barbaric and 
savage. Most of all, they fail to accurately portray the fact that it was 
many of their own armies' activities in or around a certain area which 
forced highland populations into a number of adaptive strategies. 
It becomes more and more obvious that the Greco-Roman 
historiographers were speaking in typologies. These typologies were in 
some way founded on a belief in a certain geographical conditioning of 
population groups. Any geographical location had attached to it different 
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expectations of economic achievement. Again, as agricultural land was 
used as the referent, it makes sense that rocky mountain terrains appear 
as precondition for a life in poverty. People living in the mountains are 
considered to be poor as it is not possible for their land to be 
ploughed. Affluence and agriculture go together and they lie in the 
plain; the mountains, however, offer no decent lifestyle. 
Logic seems to take the classical historiographers further, and 
poverty is swiftly linked to both nomadism and brigandage. Strabo is an 
especially stern proposer of such deterministic anthropologies. For him, 
as nomads do not possess cultivated lands, their territories must be 
poor; there is little valid interpretation of the actual ecological 
setting, the link is rather quasi-mechanic [Briant; 1982: 271. Brigandage 
is equally traced back to the origins of poverty and made into a 
necessary outcome of life in the highland regions; highlanders must raid, 
pillage, steal and plunder for survival, as their own soil does not grow 
them any food (Briant; 1976: 169; 1982: 26-28]. Evidently in this case, the 
stages of the pastoral mode is somewhat bypassed, or not deemed capable 
of providing for a man's and his society's survival. This is not 
surprising; in fact the classical sources only know of two life-styles, 
the agricultural one, and, opposed to it, all other modes of subsistence. 
Nomadism and brigandage are thus grouped together under the second 
heading. Both are of little value, nothing but a degradated existence, 
both a necessity of poor soil and climate. The highlander's fate is thus 
sealed for him by an outsider. As a non-agriculturalist, he stands 
outside civilisation; his habitat confirms this position. Both combined 
make up for a life in poverty; the next step is seemingly obvious. Briant 
states: 
Wou cette division que llon rencontre chez tous les peuples 
d'Asie vus par les auteurs classiques: paysans et brigands. 
Wautre part, si, A llorigine, les peuples brigands ne sont 
pas rendus responsables de leur condition, il est clair que 
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leur milieu naturel et leur mode de vie transforment leur 
nature mgme: ce n'est plus leur existence qui est sauvage, 
clest eux qui le sont. [1976: 170) 
We thus see the development of the equation mountaineer or 
highlander equates barbarian or brigand. The persistence of the image is 
immense. More than 2000 years later it is said that the inhabitants of 
France referred to the "'evil disposition' of the mountain-dwellers, to 
their 'insubordination' and 'treacherousness'" [Berc6; 1990: 2991. Baretta 
and Markoff again find the same "image of the barbarian" in Latin- 
American cattle-frontiers [Baretta and Markoff; 1978: 597 & passim]". Most 
interestingly the picture was not created by the classical authors. A few 
centuries earlier, and about the same numbers of centuries later than 
where our concern mainly lies, the Neo-Assyrian perception of mountainous 
countryside betrays a very close notion of geographical typology: 
Ce terme de montagne est certes une indication g6ographique, 
mais elle se colore en outre de toutes les 6vocations 
mythologigues et litt6raires qui, de tout temps, en ont fait, 
pour les Assyriens, un lieu tr6s particulier. L'opposition 
montagne-pays enemi et plat pays-pays civilis6 plonge ses 
racines au plus profond de la tradition akkadienne. [Malbran- 
Labat; 1980: 191 
staubli's view is similar; he exposes several negative connotations 
that are associated with mountains and deserts in the ancient 
Mesopotamian perspective [1991: 68-69]. He also does not fail to stress 
that the Assyrian wars against the Arabs, not to speak of the aggressive 
image of them, are mainly the outcome of the fear of the unknown and the 
strange (1991: 73,1391. He furthermore interprets the reliefs featured on 
the "white obelisk", dated as far back as the 10th century B. C., as 
11 The title of their article indicates even further how closely related 
the problem is to our findings: "Civilization and Barbarism: Cattle 
Frontiers in Latin America". 
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depicting nomads as more closely related to the wild animals of the 
steppe than to other civilised and urbanised enemies of Assyria. A 
similar image emerges from the representation of the Arab wars under 
Assurbannipal. Staubli insists that the massacre of the inhabitants of a 
nomad tent-village indicates that the nomads are not only seen but also 
treated like animals (1991: 74,93-94,97; also Malbran-Labat; 1980: 21, 
24-25]. This latter realisation gives us another interesting parallel 
with the classical texts, where fighting the highlander is not actually 
considered as war, but as a "hunt", which, after all, cannot convey 
anything else but portrayal as an animal (Briant; 1976: 172-173,1982: 20- 
221. 
Given such parallels it seems more than obvious that the classical 
and the Assyrian sources were in fact speaking about the same entities. 
Yet it is striking that the classical writers often did not consider the 
pastoral mode as an alternative for the mountain dweller, but only speak 
of him as a brigand, at most a cave dweller in the hunter-gatherer stage. 
Not that being a nomad would have shown him in any better light. As 
mentioned above nomadism and brigandage are of the one and same kind, but 
this must not draw us away from the fact that the classical sources 
actually prefer to use the epithet brigand, not nomad, for highlanders. 
The importance of this will show when, in a first instance, we will 
now turn back to the Assyrian sources. As has been pointed out by a 
number of scholars, there is in fact no ancient Near Eastern, and this 
includes Akkadian, equivalent for the word nomad. So, as to find the 
ancient Near Eastern "nomad", we are left to look for "<<quelque chose 
comme un nomade>>, un type humain dont nombre de charact6ristiques sont 
celles du nomade" (Malbran-Labat; 1980: 121. The characteristics that 
Malbran-Labat then presents are however nothing else than the description 
of people living by the means of raiding and pillaging, people seen as 
barbaric and hostile, inhabitants of distant and remote areas and thereby 
invincible and unsubduable (Malbran-Labat; 1980: 18-22). In fact, we are 
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faced with the same type of barbaric enemy that the Greeks and Romans 
described as a brigand; admittably the Assyrian sources do not really 
describe a pastoralist nomad, but a warlike brigand. The notions of 
pastoralism and nomadism are in fact as much inferred by Staubli and 
Malbran-Labat as they are by Briant. 
There seems to be two reasons for identifying what is described as 
brigands with pastoralists, perceptible in the interpretation of both the 
Assyrian and the Greco-Roman period. First of all there is the 
association of these people with animal livestock, traceable through the 
written evidence recording forms of tribute, as well as through the 
iconographical evidence. Yet the connection between mountain dwellers and 
pastoralism also arises from the description that is given of those 
entities who clearly appear as nomads in the written records, the camel- 
riding Arabs and also the Scythes. These are, to follow Briant's 
terminology, "des nomades proprement dits" [1982: 30]. 
That the nomad is generally cast in pejorative terms, and that he 
inhabits the same kind of disorderly country, has already been seen. Yet 
it cannot be stressed enough how parallel the terminology concerning 
mountaineers and nomads runs. Both Briant and Malbran-Labat clearly show 
that the nomad is portrayed as the same ferocious, savage and barbaric 
enemy as the mountaineer. Nor do nomads escape the final outcome of 
poverty, the shift to brigandage. The epithets lestai or habbatu, 
continually used for the highlander, appear in the nomadic context with 
comparable frequency [Malbran-Labat; 1980: 27-28, Briant; 1982: 30-32]. 
most interestingly, under the Assyrians, there is no real attestation of 
pastoralism for these nomades proprement dits either: 
Il est charact6ristique que la seule de leur activit6s AL 6tre 
mentionn6e soit le pillage; aucune allusion nlest faite A une 
possible 6conomie pastorale; aucune particularit6 de leur 
mode de vie nlest relev6e. Les chameaux, si charact6ristiques 
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du nomadisme arabe, ne sont citgs que dans la liste du lourd 
butin rapport6 par Assurbanipal. [Malbran-Labat; 1980: 29] 
What really links so-called mountain brigands with pastoralism 
thus is the fact that known pastoralists such as the Arabs are often 
themselves qualified as brigands. It follows that if known pastoralists 
are most frequently qualified as brigands, those who are similarly 
qualified can indeed be pastoralists themselves. It is necessary to 
consider carefully the development of the image of low esteem attached to 
both the mountaineer and the nomad. A lot is due again to a combination 
of language and accident of transmission. Apart from the general negative 
attitude towards nomads and mountain people, it has to be said that most 
texts are interested in military activities of war and conquest. Briant 
has therefore used the terms "language of conquest". It is clear that 
such language throws a particular a priori perspective on the records. 
These texts concentrate on the warlike activities of mountain people or 
desert nomads not only because war is their main concern, but to 
legitimate the actions undertaken against such groups, as well as the 
often intended conquest of their region of habitat. 
Another outcome of the intensive use of this "language of conquest" 
is that many interpretations have indeed insisted on the fact that all 
nomads fight. Yet this situation only pertains, when the nomads are 
forced to take extreme measures to defend their very-own existence as 
illustrated earlier on. An example taken from Briant's study will help to 
illustrate the point. In fact Briant (1976: 178] has noted that among the 
Mardians women as well as men are involved in the fighting, claiming that 
women wear a hairband that alternatively can be used as a sling. Although 
we do not contest the conclusion that a woman will use her hairband with 
some effectiveness for defensive purposes, it is the case that the same 
woman will not be found among a raiding group or a vendetta war party. 
Again it is possible that the circumstances of defensive warfare are more 
responsible for this warlike appearance of the Mardian women than any 
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full-time association with the military occupation. Pushed back and under 
attack, it is but understandable that the women lend a hand, not only 
because hidden on high plateaus, protected by rocks, it is relatively 
easily done, but because it becomes a necessity of survival for the whole 
group. 
Yet is it possible to extend the argument to the male population as 
well? Is the fact that many of our witnesses seem to consider the whole 
male part of a tribe as engaged in military warfare comparable to the 
case of the Mardian women? Again the fact that often it is only the 
military activity of the nomads that has been recorded is responsible or 
the false assumption that the whole tribe is involved in warfare. 
Organised along their clan and lineage affinities when fighting, it is 
normal that to many this could represent nothing else but a militia 
organised along the lines of the nomadic society and therefore comprising 
the entire nomadic community in arms. But is this really the case? 
More recently such a notion has been challenged. The levying of 
troops among the population, the "all fight" phenomenon has in fact been 
seen as a characteristic of peasant rather than nomad communities. Nomads 
on the other hand are seen to prefer to operate with a soldier-cadre. 
Especially for aggressive operations, such as raiding, it is not the mass 
of all able-bodied men, but rather, for example 
like the Sebei, a 
selected age-group which partakes in the operations" [cf Goldschmidt; 
1980: 52-531. These are quite simply people not only at the best age for 
fighting purposes, but also, assuming they are drawn amongst the young 
adults, eager for adventure and needing to secure honour and capital. But 
again this is not full-scale war and these are not professional soldiers. 
Nor does their range of performance ask them to be so. They are not 
equivalent to a trained and expert military element. In fact they are 
pushed into this warrior role by natural circumstances rather than by 
12 conversely after sedentarisation previous nomadic communities are seen 
to adopt the peasant system involving all men in fighting operations, which 
is not the "traditional Nilotic military organization" [Goldschmidt; 
1980: 531. 
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their military aptitude. They are no better fighters than the rest of the 
nomadic mass except for their youthful energy. For the immediate needs of ýI 
.ýI a nomadic society, however, these methods are highly effective. I 
Yet beyond the selected age-group it is at times possible to detect 
other elements who form a nomadic co=unity's soldier-cadre or 
paramilitary sector. The role of out-of-kin groups should be emphasised. 
Rosenfeld for example has noticed the use of "manumitted slaves and 
mercenaries" in the role of body-guards and shocktroops [1965; see also 
Rowton; 1977: 187,190-191,1941. It is important at this point that 
bandits must also be seen amongst such out-of-kin groups. In fact, the 
relationship that we assume to exist between mercenaries and bandits 
would validate the proposition. Interestingly Redford claims that 
membership in the clans of the shasu-nomads was not at all exclusive, but 
that "outcasts and neler-do-wells" could in fact be integrated 
[1992: 278]. It is thus possible that 'apiru-bandits gained admittance 
into shasu-communities as a military force. As such they would have the 
principle responsibility for raiding, pillage and war, due to their full- 
time expertise. other shasu-nomads could meanwhile concentrate on other 
productive means, such as herding. As a consequence, the lapiru-element 
of a shasu-conmunity would appear in the textual record far more often, 
if, indeed, Briant's "language of conquest" theory proves correct. For 
then the ancient scribes would be more inclined to report warlike and 
brigand activities rather than the day-to-day routine of herding duties. 
The opposite phenomenon is equally possible. As we have seen, 
nomads can become proper bandits (Peters; 1978: 3181". Rowton has studied 
this occurence among tribal societies. It is part of nomadic tactics for 
the splintering off of unwanted elements. Such tribal disintegration has 
not always profited from the same sort of attention given to its 
sedentary and urban counterpart. Yet Rowton has clearly shown its 
13 Remember Knauf: "Die Ubergänge zwischen der Lebensweise eines shasu 
und und der eines 'apiru waren also nach beiden Seiten fliessendu 
[1988: 109, fn. 4981. 
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existence as well as its importance. As such, he has also identified at 
least part of the lapiru phenomenon as not solely related to sedentary 
state societies but to a similar phenomenon within the tribal sector 
[Rowton; esp. 1976b and 1977; cf Asad; 1973: 66; Anbar; 1991: 106]. In fact 
Rowton is most insistent on the phenomenon that nomads adopt brigand 
attitudes, claiming that: "the probability that many of the uprooted and 
destitute among the detribalised would opt for that mode of life is 
almost self-evident" [1977: 186]. Thus we can understand how Coote and 
Whitelam. come to view tribal and bandit leaders as "not necessarily 
different persons. " 
It can happen on, the individual level, but it is equally possible 
that whole subgroups come to be splintered off. With it comes the loss of 
tribal rights, such as the access to pasture or the right to protection, 
both commonly held responsibilities in the nomadic tribal sector. We are 
thus confronted with something more important than the timely sloughing 
off of individual households who, due to a lack of animal capital, do not 
see the nomadic-pastoralist lifestyle as viable anymore. For the victims 
of such tribal disintegration are not only economically at risk, but 
their survival is also threatened socially and politically due to a lack 
of an appropriate place in society. After all their loss is that of 
common capital and rights. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that 
at least some of these tribal outcasts follow the way of their peasant 
counterparts and take up a life of marauding and brigandage. In fact they 
are very likely to do so, as the loss of pasturage has to be made up for 
on the economical sphere. But, as pasturage has become forbidden 
territory, its appropriation can only be assured by the means of 
violence. What tribal disintegration thus creates is a sector of 
subunits, in which the necessity for raiding activities and military 
strength is much higher [cf Rowton; 1977: 193]. 
The problem lies in how far these units are still to be considered 
to form a part of the tribal nomad-pastoralist world. After all, these 
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are tribal groupings rather than isolated marauding bandit bands, and it 
is at least their desire to remain organised along tribal lines. Rowton 
claims that, even when joined by similar outcasts from the sedentary 
sector, they tend to form "tribal splinter groups" [1976b: 14]. Some 
groupings might be adopted by a different tribe. others might in time 
resume viability and power and be reintegrated into the old or a new 
tribe. It is also possible for several of these groupings to come 
together and form a new, quite important, tribe of their own (Rowton; 
1977: 185]. Harsh competition can however arise with these societies, 
where entire new tribes are created. For the sloughing off of groups 
reduces the labour pool, but it cannot increase pasturage. As such, if 
splinter groups do not decide to enter the sedentary peasant sector, or 
otherwise move into the service of state societies, conflict over 
available land will arise. It is, however, very likely that the newly 
formed tribe in fact has the upper hand in terms of military development, 
having had to exist from raiding and brigandage for a considerable time. 
In this case, the old order might be heavily disturbed in that the new 
tribe will come to paramount importance. 
This begs the question of whether some of these groupings will 
remain predatory in nature over the long term. Such a phenomenon is to be 
detected when there is talk of "Raubnomaden" (Dus; 19911, "tribus 
pillardes" [Briant; 1982] or robber-tribes (Minor; 19791. It seems 
unlikely, nevertheless, that a tribe, including families and livestock, 
can effectively lead a predatory life on anything more than a temporary 
or sporadic basis. For both families and livestock seriously reduce the 
mobility and above all the speed which would be essential to a group 
constantly engaged in raiding activity [cf Asad; 1973: 71]. They would be 
exposed constantly to the threat of retaliation in regions habitated and 
dominated by other nomadic groups. Similarly, constant raiding activity 
by one and the same tribe opens the way to more precisely aimed reprisals 
by sedentary forces. If, on the other hand, the predatory activity is 
only sporadic, it is difficult to see any real point of differentiation 
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between a robber-tribe and any other nomadic tribe. 
Conversely, if families and livestock are omitted from the group, 
can we in reality still speak of a tribe? It must be admitted that any 
such group, which in fact only includes the raiding warrior element is 
more closely related to a band or a gang, as such more of a bandit 
grouping than a nomadic tribe. It is, furthermore, doubtful that the 
group in question will he able to maintain itself in sufficient numbers 
to be classified as a tribe. What is true for such bandit groups must 
also be true for nomadic outcasts turned brigands, namely that the 
predatory lifestyle is a viability only and as long as membership in the 
group is limited in numbers. At the most one might expect an organisation 
along the lines of a brotherhood of companions. Although this notion 
carries a somewhat tribal undertone, it is, however, not possible to view 
such a community as the equivalent of a tribe. 
There remains the possibility that the predatory nature of the 
group is in fact a temporary (rather than sporadic) phenomenon. In this 
case, however, it would seem logical to compare the whole phenomenon with 
the processes discussed above. With only a slight variation on the theme 
it is conceivable that such groupings can exist as a sub-unit of a tribe 
or even a sub-tribe of considerable importance within a tribal 
confederation, as opposed to existing in isolation. It is difficult, 
indeed, to draw any clear and sharp distinction from what has been 
described above. Such sub-units or tribes are more or less tolerated on 
the fringes of the larger society as possessing particularly predatory 
inclinations. The Danakil present such a case; other nomads consider them 
to be cruel bandits (Thesiger; 1993]. They are thus less accepted than 
strong groups which come to supplement the already existent tribe, yet 
probably enough to be sure of their loyalty in times of need. Tribes like 
these could, of course, rise to prominence if they were able to realise 
their full potential". 
14 Compare Rowton's view: "Speaking of the process of tribal aggregation, 
Barth focuses mainly on splinter groups leaving one tribe for another. But 
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Why should the phenomenon of robber-tribes then catch the attention 
of anthropologists and historians at all? Again it is possible to 
consider the phenomenon as the creation of a subjective classification in 
our ancient records. Minor's and Dus' studies point to this conclusion. 
Raubnomaden cannot be interpreted to be anything other than simply those 
nomads who do not serve the state or responsible central authority [Dus; 
1991: 31,34]. As for the situation in Isauria, nomads that at most times 
behave quite peacefully suddenly take to brigandage when the Roman 
interest is redirected towards subduing their territories. It is at this 
stage that Minor speaks of these so-called bands of brigands as robber- 
tribes. With all that has been said before, we should now be aware of how 
unreliable such qualifications are. 
It would be interesting to know whether nomads themselves know of 
such distinctions. Finally there is the possibility that nomads describe 
rival tribal groupings as predatory organisations as readily as rival 
petty kinglets accuse each other of rebellion and banditry. Briant has 
pointed out that Zagros highlanders accused "des tribus pillardes" of not 
having followed their heedings and attacked Alexander's city. In fact, at 
times they can find it advantageous to qualify other fellow tribalists as 
robbers. First of all, it leads to a certain dispersal of responsibility. 
It is always a good policy to be able to blame groups on the periphery. 
one avoids punishment and generally draws attention away from oneself. It 
is also job-creative, as the presence of robber-elements makes policing 
necessary. The robber-tribe phenomenon, whether the creation of 
I also have to reckon with a different process. Splinter groups of this 
kind, together with the parasocial element on the fringe of tribal society, 
form into entirely new tribes. That is the subject I am mainly concerned 
with in the present article. For this process of tribal reintegration would 
have had the effect of obscuring the significance of tribal disintegration. 
When a tribe disintegrated not all the detribalized would disperse among 
urban society. Many would revert to tribal life, new tribes taking the 
place of old ones. But during their formative period, for at least a few 
generations, these newcomers would hardly amount to genuine tribes. At 
their inception most would be little more than a band, often a predatory 
band, the larger groups a tribal rabble of heterogeneous splinter groups 
and individual families. During this phase a new tribe of that kind would 
belong to the parasocial element, rather than with the tribal society" 
[Rowton; 1977: 184]. 
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terminology alone or partly reality, may function as an excuse and 
pretext vis-&-vis the sedentary forces. Dus reports such a situation: 
Die Nomaden aber wissen, wie wichtig und geradezu 
unentbehrlich sie für den König als billige und treue Krieger 
sein werden. Abgesehen davon, dass der von ihnen geforderte 
Naturalzins nicht bedeutungslos ist, werden sie das 
Territorium des Stadtstaates vor allen Raubnomaden 
verteidigen, wodurch sie das Prestige des Königs sowohl in 
der Wüste als auch im Kulturland festigen werden. In dieser 
Funktion können sie weder durch die Kriegshelden des Königs 
(cf. 3. ) noch durch irgendwelche Söldner ersetzt werden. 
[1991: 341 
The interpretation of this situation would seem to be that a chosen 
group of nomads comes to protect state territory from other nomads. In 
reality, the latter are probably no more of a robber-tribe than the 
former. As with bandits and mercenaries, the difference lies mainly in 
the fact that the first exercise legislated power, while the second work 
primarily on their own. This is an essential part of the relationship 
existing between state and tribe; the state employs nomads as an 
auxiliary military force, either fully integrated in the state's army or 
left behind as a policing force. In a first instance, it must be said 
that the state presents both a threat to and a magnet for predatory 
activity. Yet in the long run it will make little sense for nomads to 
risk their whole populace through predatory and ensuing protective 
activities, as it makes little sense to state societies to constantly 
launch their armies against an unconquerable enemy. Neither party is 
interested in such continual warfare. It is in the interests of both 
groups to develop a paramilitary sector of nomadic origin. The state will 
not only acquire cheap warriors, but gain a certain degree of control 
over them, whereas the nomadic tribe can continue to use most of its 
population for normal herding activities, while at the same time reducing 
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the labour pool. It must not be forgotten that such arrangements will 
most certainly take place at the top of the social ladder, where military 
experts play a far more pre-eminent role. 
The whole phenomenon thus gives rise to further points of 
confusion. Is it more appropriate for example to qualify such a marauding 
group as brigands, insisting on their predatory activities, or as nomads, 
and thus emphasising their tribal origins? Conversely, do we characterise 
bandit groups who find employ and acceptance with nomads as nomads or 
bandits; and what if the bandits were of tribal origin in the first 
place? most of all it proves impossible to us to know how the ancient and 
classical record-holders approached this problem. And if indeed the 
nomads themselves started to distinguish among themselves rather 
arbitrarily as to who was a bandit and what groupings were to be seen as 
robber-tribes, the matter of confusion is reinforced even further. It 
becomes almost impossible to draw the lines of distinction especially, as 
we have seen, when banditry itself is after all a nomadic activity. 
Let us illustrate the point with one last example. Although the 
service of nomads seems at first sight to be of a more voluntarily nature 
than for example the levy of peasant armies, malcontents do exist and no 
doubt there are tribal deserters [cf Anbar; 1991: 148], as of course there 
are veterans of tribal origin. There is, however, no reason to assume 
that reintegration into normal nomadic sheep-herding life is any easier 
than reintegration of peasant soldiers into the peasant life. It is more 
than probable that some of these elements will at first join bands and 
groupings of the parasocial world. Ironically as such they rejoin a world 
in which they can be reinstated as mercenaries or police forces by the 
state (as seen in chapter 2), or be reinstigated as an expert military 
force among tribal nomads (as seen above). Again, how can we be sure 
which of these forces to qualify as of nomadic as opposed to bandit 
stock? 
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Thus a new perspective from which to view shasu, lapiru, and the 
hill-countries of Syria-Palestine emerges. We have seen that the 
Egyptians share the Assyrian and classical concept of mountains, deserts, 
and ultimately of their inhabitants, and pointed out further points of 
confusion. Thus it is possible to reinterprete this statement by Lemche: 
In geographical terms the sutu-sasu seem to be associated 
with regions which cannot be held to be habiru territory; 
thus we are forced to seek them in the marginal areas in the 
south and to the east .... Nor is there anything to indicate 
the presence of a nomadic population element in the 
mountainous regions in the central parts of the country. 
There is no reason for amazement in this connection since 
this region was heavily forested and thus a suitable home for 
bands of outlaws; it must have been rather uninviting to 
nomads. [1985: 4221 
This assumption must now be seen in a different light. The previous 
discussion has shown that often the nomadic-pastoralist inhabitants of 
highland regions are qualified as brigands or barbarians. In the 
Palestinian case sutulshasu are called 'apirulSa. Gaz. Thus it is not 
possible to simply exclude the sutulshasu elements from amongst the 
inhabitants of highland regions as Lemche maintains". As in the Assyrian 
and Greek case, the pastoralist occupation of the highlander is omitted 
only so as to stress the barbaric brigand nature 16 . Nalaman [1982) had 
already realized that the Egyptians at times confused lapiru and shasu 
1sContra Lemche, Knauf maintains that the Egyptians knew of shasu «im 
zentralpalästinischen Bergland" [1988: 102]. Earlier he states of the ShaSu: 
Ich stelle mir darum, ohne dies hier näher begründen zu können, die 
onomadischen Bevölkerung Palästinas vor der Landnahme nach dem Modell der 
Sawawi von Uman vor: kleine bis kleinste Gruppen von Viehzüchtern in 
mit kleinem bis kleinstem "Streifgebiet", und ohne 
Übergreifende Stammesverfassung [1985: 44-45) (emph. added). 
16 Rowton, who defends the presence of woodland in mountainous areas in 
the Bronze Age, in fact insists that this accounts for the presence of good 
grazing land. Thus, although he insists that the mountainous hinterland 
remained attractive to "uprooted social elements, the hapira", he also 
emphasizes the presence of nomads and tribesmen, as well as the 
independence they would have enjoyed in the Bronze Age [1967: 263,277]. 
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elements. He maintained that the Egyptians themselves often used the 
appellative shasu to describe the troublesome elements that in Palestine 
would have been qualified as lapiru (1982: 30-31]. This chapter, however, 
would emphasise that the process also worked in the opposite direction. 
Indeed our findings stress that at times shasu-nomads may well have been 
classified as 'apiru. 
Textually speaking there is thus little reason to maintain that, 
because the highlands were 'apiru territory, there were no nomad 
pastoralists present. Interestingly Staubli's interpretation of the 
iconographical record often makes a case for the fact that defeated shasu 
retreated onto a "Fliehfelsen" (1991: for example 50,51]. Such tactics 
have been described at length above. They are applied by nomadic people 
all over the world. It also indicates however that shasu-nomads were at 
home in the mountains and acquainted enough with highland territory to be 
able to seek refuge here. The iconographical record would thus point 
towards the association of shasu-elements with mountainous areas. 
staubli's translation of the text accompanying the relief called 
"Einnahme von Kanaan" (1991: Abb. 31: 50-581 reinforces such a notion: 
Die Hügel der Rebellen konnte [man) nicht überqueren wegen 
den Schasu-Feinden [Text 11; 11-13: 52) 
Die Schasu-Feinde zetteln einen Aufstand an, ihre 
Stanmesführer versammelten sich an einem Ort auf den Hügel 
der Charu [Text IV; 4-6: 541 (emph. added) 
Thus we can see the difficulty in attributing clear-cut labels and 
activities to the lapiruISA. GAZ and the shasulsutu, as well as the 
habbatu. We see a prime example of the phenomenon in the Amarna Letters 
where Dagantakala announces: 
"Aus der Hand der Sa. Ga. Az-Leute, der Räuber-Leute, der Sutu- 
Leute ja rette ini[ch), grosser König, mei[nl Herr! " [EA 
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318: 10-15; in Knudtzon; 1915: 923] 
number of deductions on the role of the lapiru have been based on 
this passage. We will look at two of them before adding our own 
conmentary. Albright used Dagantakala's statement to claim that the 
lapiru were neither sutu/"bedouin" or habbatu/"bandits", but indeed 
somewhere in between, sharing however characteristics with both groups 
[1975: 1121. A second conclusion, somewhat dependent on the first, claims 
that their parallel use in the same document at least attests to the fact 
that the terms are not synonymous and that we are indeed faced with 
different entities [Coote and Whitelam; 1987: 108]. 
We are here in fact not contesting the conclusions drawn by 
Albright or Coote and Whitelam, but would like to add to it. We accept 
that the sutu are different from the lapiru, and these probably not 
entirely similar to the habbatu. Whether all three groups were, however, 
in reality oppressing Dakantakala is another question. In view of all 
that has been exposed above, it is possible that in fact only one group 
was at the heart of his miseries, but that he simply could not tell in 
all certainty which one it actually was. Although it is not possible in a 
definite manner that this was the case, he could simply have listed three 
of the groups which he associated with marauding activities". Nalaman 
gives a similar interpretation of EA 297: 11-16 and EA 299: 17-26, although 
here only the sutu and the lapiru are mentioned, stating: "It is 
reasonable to assume that the same group was intended by this double 
name" [Nalaman; 1982: 29]. IT'l 
This would not even deny the actual existence in the Amarna times 
of the three different groupings (as they are all three mentioned)", yet 
17 compare this to the many different descriptions that are given of the 
strongman Aqiili Agha in Ottoman Galilee as either brigand or tribal 
leader, or government official indeed [Zenner; 1972]. 
Again see Nalaman: "It should be emphasized that the tribally 
organized groups (Shosu, Sutu) and the splinter groups which were organized 
as independent bands ('Apiru) were not identical" (1982: 301. 
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it shows that they were not always clearly identifiable even to their 
contemporaries. The passage thus illustrates our point, that we have to 
remain highly suspicious of the use of the Ancient Near Eastern labels 
and appellatives, when "the Amarna scribes did not take the trouble to 
specify the precise name of the trouble-makers from among the various 
social groups then living in the Land of Canaan" (Nalaman; 1982: 29-30]. 
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Chapter 4 
The Palestinian highlands in the Late Bronze Age 
The previous chapter has shown how the ideological undertone of 
what Briant has called the "langage de conqu6te" can seriously mask a 
given actual political situation. Numerous authors warn us against taking 
ancient and classical records too much at face value [Clavel-Lev&que; 
1976; Wolski; 1976: 281-282; Kotula; 1976: 337; cf Liverani; 1983], 
especially where whole populations are regarded as engaged in brigandage. 
It is important to remain alert in trying to read between the lines and 
discover the reality behind such negative attitudes and pejorative terms. 
Far from being the poverty-driven brigands that the authors would like us 
to see, Briant draws a picture of mountain dwellers who have taken full 
advantage of the potential that their territory has to offer. Far from 
portraying cave dwellers in arid mountainous zones, Briant stresses the J 
importance of intermontane valleys with conditions open to both pastoral 
and at least limited agricultural exploitation. Thus instead of warlike 
and aggressive barbarians in the need of civilization, Briant stresses a 
f direct i it d lack h lf f th i b aggress veness on y an o a o e ve prosper e comparat 
hill-tribes. Both realizations considerably affect Briant's view of the 
relationship of these highlanders with the existing authorities. 
It is important to consider Briant's findings in order to provide a 
different perspective on the actions of and against shasu and lapiru 
groupings in the period of Egyptian hegemony in Syria-Palestine. We have 
seen that the Egyptians held a similar view of deserts, mountains, and 
their inhabitants to that of the Assyrians and classical sources. 
Consequently we have extended the meaning of 'apiru to cover the notions 
of highlander and barbarian as well as those of bandit or brigand. it 
will now be interesting to portray an actual political situation 
comparable to that described by Briant for the Zagros highlanders under 
the hegemony of the Assyrians, Persians, and Greeks. 
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The previous chapter has also alluded to the fact that there is one 
point at which reality and the much described urban paranoia of remote 
elements meet. At this point stands the so-called "invincibility" of 
nomad and highland populations. We have seen how this notion of 
invincibility stems from the advantage provided by the terrain of desert 
and highland territories. Secondly, given the numerous possibilities of 
finding refuge in various hideouts, it is virtually impossible to 
completely vanquish such a highland population. Victories by outside 
forces represent normally only temporary setbacks to mountain 
inhabitants. Their forces and numbers will regenerate soon enough, and 
people will regain their normal zones of habitat and resettle in their 
normal routine of life as soon as the armies of the would-be conquerors 
leave the mountain areas. 
Ultimately, it must be admitted that mountainous regions present 
major obstacles to would-be conquerors. Although this does not mean that 
they are predominantly populated by barbarians and of a hostile 
disposition, they nonetheless form a major problem for proper 
integration. often it is said that such remote hinterland can only come 
under "nominal control" by aspiring state authorities [cf Bates; 
1971: 117-118]'. Briant chooses to call them "pockets of resistance" 
poches de r6sistance)'. We think that he thus proposes a valid 
alternative to Rowton's notion of nomadic enclaves. The topological 
factor, so often stressed by Rowton, is maintained, the particular 
terrain of the highlands giving rise to the particular political 
situation pertaining [Rowton; 1973a; 1973b: 247]. Although we thus see 
some straightforward similarities between Rowton and Briant, it is not 
1A comparison can be drawn from the situation in and attitude taken by 
India and Iran towards Baluchistan. Salzman portrays: "(Baluchistan) was a 
large, unattractive frontier area inhabited by wild, uncivilized and 
recalcritant savages. Not much was to be gained by control of such an area, 
and considerable expense would be expended in any attempt at control. In 
general, containment was the main goal of Baluchistan's developed 
neighbours; occasionally, mechanisms of indirect rule were instituted for 
limited areas of Baluchistan, but these tended to be short-lived" 
[1980b: 971. 
2 Another expression, used by Kotula, is milots de r6sistance" 
[1976: 3451. 
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evident that Rowton's important idea of "enclosed nomadism" is 
necessarily to be equated with Briant's analysis [Rowton; esp. 1974). 
Briant's "pockets of resistance" function in relative isolation. In fact, 
as mountainous areas, they are set apart from the adjacent plains, the 
effective realm of control of the state. The plains however present the 
actual sedentary zone, and it is debatable to what degree one has to view 
the Palestinian nomadic enclaves to be set within this zone [Rowton; 
1974 : 1] 3. 
Indeed relative isolation, or better only partial integration, lie 
at the heart of the autonomy enjoyed by mountain people. It cannot be 
stressed enough in this matter that it is not only inability, but a 
considerable degree of disinterest that leads to this situation. This can 
be seen by the ultimately poor efforts of so-called civilization 
undertaken by Alexander the Great. If the ultimate mode of civilization 
is considered to be urbanization, then attempts to "civilize" the Zagros 
mountains was a failure. In fact Alexander did nothing but pass through 
the areas, dealing with opposition mainly on the way to greater things, 
the sack of Persepolis and eventually the conquest of India. He did 
precious little to totally subdue or reduce the military potential of the 
regions he passed through. Nor is there indeed much evidence that he had 
a plan of urbanization for the regions. on the contrary, where urban 
sites were established their purpose was to surround and delimit 
mountainous areas rather than to urbanize them [cf Kotula; 1976: 346]. 
Briant insists that Alexander hardly changed the situation which 
prevailed in the Persian period. Cities were present on the outskirts of 
mountain territory in order to control and protect against their 
populations. According to Briant, this was a true "limes of 
civilization", a product of the politics of exclusion as much as of the 
guarantee of autonomy to the mountain people. 
3 Rowton however is very insistent on this aspect: "Here, instead, 
emphasis is on pastoral enclaves within the sedentary regions. The dominant 
factor is not the peripheral tribe, but the tribe within the sedentary 
zone. it constituted an autonomous polity inside firmly established states" 
[1974: 171. 
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It is interesting then to note that the situation in Palestine of 
the New Kingdom period was very similar. The situation within the hill 
country centering around lapiru activities and the two contestants of 
power, Lablayu and Abdi-khepa, is illuminating. Yet, however we are to 
view the situation of the central Palestinian highlands of the time, it 
must be stressed that it is neither new, nor about to change drastically 
in the near future, or at least not as far as the Amarna documentation 
goes. it follows that the political status of both the Lab'ayu and the 
Shechem region and Abdi-khepa and the Jerusalem region are accepted by 
the Egyptian authorities. Redford [1992: 269-2701 argues that in Shechem 
with Lablayu they recognized and upheld the local dynasty, leaving 
it 
with the responsibility over of a considerable area, encompassing the 
Jordan caravan-crossing to Gezer and then reaching northward all the way 
to Megiddo. The case of the Jerusalem area is somewhat different in that 
here the Egyptians intervened to bypass primogeniture, and brought to 
power Abdi-khepa, who being Egyptianized, was conceivably more to their 
liking. 
The Amarna. Letters do not themselves indicate how this state of 
affairs was reached; yet as they are set within the reigns mainly of 
Amenhotep III and Akhenaten, who both engaged in little campaigning of 
their own, it is a reasonable assumption that it must have existed at 
least prior to their advent, possibly in the early periods of the 
formation of the New Kingdom Empire. It is obviously difficult to state 
an exact period, but it would appear that the establishment of proper 
Egyptian domination with Tuthmosis III cannot be too far off the mark 
[Leonard; 1989: 13]. But like Alexander's passage in the Zagros mountains, 
Tuthmosis, passage in the highlands must share the characteristics of a 
byproduct on the march to greater things. Subduing remote and secluded 
hill people cannot have been Tuthmosis' prime target. The major objective 
was to secure sources of timber, thus to guarantee a firm hold on the 
Phoenician coast and to maintain it by creating a buffer zone [Nalaman; 
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1981: 181; Strange; 1987: 5]. Indeed, for a long time the Palestinian 
highlands especially profited from the fact that the real struggle took 
place further to the north. 
Though Tuthmosis in his dealings with the Palestinian hill people 
was first of all intent on showing his might and potential punitive 
capacity, he or one of his more immediate successors nonetheless realized 
that some form of control needed to be imposed. But there was little 
interest in direct domination, accompanied no doubt by the realization 
that, for all the reasons mentioned in chapter 3, and especially with 
things still heating up in the north, effective subduing and consequent 
policing was an impossible task". The best result would 
have been to keep 
the hill people at bay. This was achieved first of all by granting a 
certain degree of autonomy to chosen local strongmen under the condition 
that they control their own territory; in the Amarna period these local 
representatives were Lablayu for the north, and Abdi-khepa for the m&tat 
u. rsaiim, "lands of Jerusalem" [Redford; 1992: 269] to the south. 
Beyond this desire to keep relative peace in the highland area, 
Egypt felt apparently little inclined to force, or even want, further 
integration of people who were in their eyes impoverished barbarians with 
few riches to plunder, or to put it diplomatically, to submit to taxation 
[cf Irons; 1979: 3721. Accordingly Egyptian civilization somewhat bypassed 
the hill country. This is most noticeable in the lack of urbanization 
that the truly mountainous hinterland underwent. Lemaire thus noticed 
that the Amarna Letters, apart from Shechem itself, mention no city 
between Jerusalem and the Shephelah settlements of Gezer and Aijalon to 
the south, and the Dothan and Jezreel valleys to the north [1990: 219; cf 
Ahlstr6m; 1991a: 291. He then turns to Egyptian toponym lists covering the 
4 This is a common shortcoming in the building of empires. Stability all 
around is needed, before the authorities turn towards the mountainous 
subregions. Again compare the Roman situation 
in the Taurus mountains: "The 
campaigns of Servilius Isauricus (78-79) 
lay the foundations for Roman 
dominion in southern Asia Minor but the Third Mithradatic War and the 
prolonged Roman civil wars prevented the full subjugation of the region 
until the reign of Augustus (30 B. C. -14 A. D. P [Minor; 1979: 119]. 
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period from Thutmosis III to Ramesses III, to come to the same 
conclusion: 
on notera aussi que, ä la diffgrence de celle de Sh4shonq 
ler, ces listes ne mentionnent g4ngralement aucune ville de 
la montagne d'Ephraim ou du territoire de Manassg, sauf 
ýwentuellement celles qui sont, en limite de la plaine de 
Yizrgel: Ibleam, Burquna, Taanak, Beth-Shgan, Pella... 
[1990: 2201 
In the south, it is striking that Judah, or the m&tat Ursalim of 
Amarna times, undergoes a similar fate. Apart from Jerusalem, the major 
settlements of Gezer, Lachish and Aijalon are not in the hillcountry, but 
are mainly situated in the Shephelah. One might add as a last instance 
Megiddo in the north, again situated on the fringes of the Carmel range 
rather than within hillcountry territory per se, to confirm the 
impression that the Egyptians deliberately left the highlands surrounded 
by settlements, whilst at the same time doing nothing to promote 
urbanization within it. This is highly reminiscent of a limes of 
civilization, imposed not solely by barbaric refusal, but also as a 
result of lack of interest in the area beyond the upkeep of a state of 
law and order. 
Thus the Egyptian central authorities probably took a double 
political stance. They made efforts towards partial integration of the 
highland regions, probably aimed foremostly at keeping the dominant 
military forces on their side. on the other hand, they pushed no further, 
thus leaving the highlands somewhat excluded, in accordance, in our 
opinion, with existing city-state policies. It is difficult to see how 
deliberately Egypt maintained this policy, although it is possible to 
point to some advantages that spring from it for an ad hoc system of 
dominance. By not "civilizing", or not fully integrating the remote 
highlands into an urban network, they profited from the urban paranoia, 
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in that leaving a "barbaric entity" in existence, kept the city-states 
reduced military might oriented towards the mountain enemy rather than 
against Egyptian occupation and, as the Amarna Letters indicate, left 
them partly dependent on Egyptian military support. It also prevented 
closer associations taking place between mountain and plain polities to 
produce a united front. As such, it appears to be a very intelligent 
alternative to or even a sub-policy of the more commonly advocated 
"divide and rule" theory [cf Weinstein; 1981: 16; Leonard; 1989: 20]. 
Finally, and this will be discussed later, the presence of a "barbaric 
entity" always guarantees a good reason for military intervention. 
It should be clear by now that the Palestinian highlands could be 
classed in Briant's terms as a "pocket of resistance". The previous 
chapter has shown that the population are viewed as "barbarians", while 
the Amarna. letters suggest that the surrounding political configuration 
and climate were appropriate. In the Amarna. period, as Redford observes, 
neither Egypt nor the city-states to the west had a firm hold on the 
highlands, but "the lapiru and nomadic dissidents always had the upper 
hand" [1992: 268; Chaney; 1986: 66]. This state of affairs was, however, 
regarded differently by these two entitiess. Whereas the petty kings of 
Palestine complained bitterly, Egypt seems to have been perfectly happy 
with the situation. This would offer a different perspective on both 
lapiru activity and Egyptian failure to give heed to the plights of the 
rulers of the city-states, which should come under the rubric of 
"regulated hostility" [cf Briant = hostilit6 r6glement6e]. 
It has recently become clear that the New Kingdom did not suffer 
from a serious decline in the Amarna. period, as has previously often been 
5 See Thompson's interpretation: "The tendentious function of many of 
the Amarna letters (namely to get money, supplies, troops, or moral support 
from the Egyptians) should cause us to hesitate before we read them as 
direct reflections of reality. Authorities in the best of times feel 
harassed by enemies and brigands. When they shout loudly as they have in 
the Amarna. letters, we are not warranted on the strength of these shouts 
alone to conclude that the sky was falling, only that they wished to 
convince someone that such disaster was imminent" [Thompson; 1992b: 207, 
fn. 1111. 
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assumed, precisely because of the relative inactivity of Egyptian 
pharaohs at the time [cf Leonard; 1989: 17,20; Lemche; 1990: 87; Thompson; 
1992b: 2071. Four problems find frequent mention in the Amarna corpus. 
Three of these (the inter-city disputes, the lapiru turmoil and 
bureaucratic corruption and neglect) are not at all unique to the period, 
but widely attested phenomena in the Ancient Near East. The fourth 
(interruptions in trade and co=erce) is judged to only have caused minor 
and occasional disruptions [Weinstein; 1981: 15]. The Amarna period is 
thus increasingly being viewed as representing "the normal state of 
affairs" (Weinstein; 1981: 16]. Na'aman says the following: 
Recent studies on the Amarna correspondence have made it 
clear that the archive reflects no breakdown in the Egyptian 
rule of Canaan. Rather the letters portray a situation of 
"business as usual", one in which the Egyptians were strong 
enough to maintain their rule over their Asiatic provinces. 
From an Egyptian point of view, the Habiru were regarded more 
as a disturbing element than as a real threat to their rule 
in Asia. For the rulers of the city-states, on the other 
hand, the Habiru may have been a direct threat, and the 
Amarna. letters supply many indications of this. (Nalaman; 
1986: 276) 
Thus from the Egyptian point of view there was simply no need to 
intervene. If the Palestinian state of affairs was indeed "normaln, it 
goes without saying that such 'aPiru activities were not only an expected 
occurrence but had been going on before. We can thus postulate that under 
the 18th dynasty we witness in Palestine a "long pass6 dl<<hostilit6 
r6glement6e>>" (Digard; 1979). It is appropriate at this point to comment 
on the rather disproportionate view that Egyptians and city-states had on 
this subject. The city-states being in the immediate firing line saw the 
, apiru as mighty enemies and highly dangerous to themselves. The Egyptian 
court however was not only remote, but had a broader imperialistic 
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outlook, and to them the important thing was that highland lapiru 
activity was simply not endangering the normal functioning of the empire 
[Ahlstr6m; 1991: 29]. The fact is that both outlooks are in their own way 
reflective of the true situation. There is thus no need to consider the 
documented lapiru activity as gross exaggeration on the one side, or 
Egyptian inactivity as negligence on the other; the apparently 
paradoxical attitudes are merely the result of the differing political 
spectra in the minds of the two parties concerned. 
Again a similar situation can be detected in the Greek records. 
Here, however it is the need to legitimate Alexander's actions that leads 
to a differentiation between the Greek and Achaemenid interpretation of 
the situation. Having depicted the highlanders as barbaric brigands, it 
is clear that the image of state-highland relations will itself be cast 
in negative terms. With an emphasis on pillage and plunder, the Greek 
sources are indeed inclined to show a situation of permanent hostility 
between the highland tribes and any state apparatus involved. In their 
eagerness to justify the conquests of Alexander and to promote the 
advantages of civilization, they readily bypass the fact that within the 
Achaeminid empire relations were dictated by a network of regulations 
that both sides approved of and that had functioned for a long time. 
Their records are thus not only biased towards the mountain people but 
blatantly overlook the political prowess of the Achaeminids who are 
pictured simply as having failed to incorporate and pacify their highland 
hinterlands. Briant clearly disapproves and proceeds to show, first of 
all, how untenable the statement is. He then also exposes the 
shortcomings of Alexander's politics of civilization. The exercise is 
thus not solely to rectify the errors of transmission but to show the 
notions of incorporation as well as pacification and civilization in an 
entirely new perspective. 
The Greek historians have misunderstood the way the Achaemenids 
handled the people populating their mountainous enclaves. In some cases 
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they misinterpreted the situation to such a degree as to present an 
explanation of the events quite contrary to actual reality. In fact it is 
maintained on several occasions that the Achaemenids were themselves 
paying tribute to the hill tribes, where these found themselves in 
control of a route de passage (Briant; 1982: 82]. Looking closer at what 
is here being said, one recognizes that the Greek historians thought not 
only that a state of permanent hostility existed between Achaemenids and 
hill people, but that the latter were indeed the stronger of the two 
protagonists. This Briant finds hard to believe; nor is he convinced that 
the Achaemenids should have failed, where Alexander would have later 
succeeded. He observes: 
Si llon veut bien admettre que les Ach6m6nides nl6taient ni 
des laches, ni des incapables, ni des imb6ciles, on doit 
admettre aussi que le choix de la route des Coss6ens ou des 
Ouxiens 6tait d6lib6r6 et volontaire. [1982: 84) 
He reverses the situation insisting that, had the Achaemenids 
really wanted to, they could indeed have subjugated the hill people to a 
greater extent. That they did not do so and yet persisted in using this 
route only shows that they are in fact assuming a deliberate political 
stance. But he also insists that the choice of passing through hill 
people territory is an annual event only, shortening, and therefore 
facilitating the Great King's pilgrimage in the hot summer months. other 
routes, longer and troublesome, but commonly used, are indeed available, 
and consequently, if the king chooses the alternative route once a year, 
he does so not arbitrarily, but most likely because it makes good sense. 
Indeed where the classical historians saw the hill-tribes subjecting the 
Great King to pay tribute, a sort of p6age or droit de passage, Briant, 
on the contrary, perceives the king as leaving behind the stamp of his 
authority. 
Briant in fact does not contest the fact that the hill tribes are 
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indeed being offered considerable riches in return for safe passage but 
around this event he construes an entirely different political framework. 
It is important to see these offerings not as a tribute paid by the 
weaker party, but as a donation from the stronger and richer, to the 
weaker. Briant thus introduces the politics surrounding the act of 
giving, politics which he su nma rizes under the heading of "don et contre- 
don". The idea is in fact not entirely new; Hayden also has identified 
the power of the gift and how it can be manipulated [Hayden; 1993: 169]'. 
In this instance, it is most important to notice that the initiative lies 
with the Great King, as this-radically alters the situation. For what 
before looked like the collecting of protection money at the best or at 
the worst, outright robbery of the ambush type, hostile actions of 
brigandage directed against the king, appears as a quasi ceremonial 
affirmation of friendly relations that the Great King initiates by the 
deliberate offering of a gift. 
Thus far it might still be argued that nothing has really changed. 
After all the king still does little else but buy peace in his realm. But 
the fact is that by initiating the process the king also initiates the 
flow of dependency. Thus by voluntarily seeking the route of the hills 
and offering gifts, he secures the favor and alliance of the hill tribes, 
who feel themselves in the need to return the gift as well as to adopt an 
attitude of friendship. A relationship is then established which on the 
one hand leaves the hill tribes with a considerable degree of autonomy, 
yet as surely establishes that the dependency is in fact that of the 
tribes towards the king. Assured of the friendship of the hill people, 
the king can indeed spare them a great amount of freedom. The hill people 
are equally aware that the relationship is relatively fragile. The king's 
territory is now to be considered "terres amies". Any acts of aggression, 
'Hayden traces the phenomenon as far back as the hunter-gatherer stage, 
thus explaining its natural aspect: "The act of giving something that 
someone wants or likes has a strong emotional effect on the recipient. The 
recipient immediately becomes favorably disposed toward the giver, adopts 
an attitude of friendship and sympathy, and also experiences feelings of 
indebtedness. This, too, appears to be a fundamental part of our emotional 
makeup, part of human nature" [1993: 169ffl. 
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such as pillaging, will, at times, easily be interpreted as an act of 
war. As the inferior in the relationship, this is something they can 
hardly risk. 
To an extent it is obviously possible to disagree with Briant and 
emphasize for example that the Achaemenid's perception was itself 
dominated by the desire to present themselves in the best possible light. 
Naturally the Achaemenid court would not have admitted that it needed to 
buy off hinterland tribes with presents. Nonetheless, it shows that they 
were perfectly happy with the situation whereas the Greek onlookers 
stressed the anarchic side of the story. 
The New Kingdom situation was little different. A second closer 
look at the lapiru activity involved is thus appropriate. Let us at least 
define the main agents. First of all we have Lablayu, who seems to be 
involved in much of the trouble, though he himself confesses his loyalty 
(EA 252-254). Working with him are Milkilu and Suwardatu, though later on 
they apparently are reinstated in Pharaoh's service (cf EA 267-271). All 
three are mainly accused by Abdi-khepa of Jerusalem (cf EA 285-291), yet 
he himself is later considered the main trouble-maker, ironically by the 
now reinstated Suwardatu (EA 280). Another stern accuser of Lablayu is 
Biridija of Meggiddo (EA 242-246), and in the Shephelah Gezer is at one 
stage accused of provisioning the lapiru, at another itself suffering 
from danger arising in the mountains (EA 292). We are thus faced with the 
usual interplay of accusation, counter-accusation and reaffirmation, that 
are part of the normal build-up of the Amarna. documents, and must be 
fully aware that little of it can be taken at face-value. 
What is noticeable, however, is that the main trouble is centered 
in or around the highlands and the major protagonists to be watched are 
Lab'ayu and Abdi-khepa, who have been instated by Egypt. Much of the 
turmoil was apparently concerned with a struggle over the expanding 
powers of jurisdiction that must have lead to their confrontation. 
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Furthermore, most of the activity can have been little more than local 
skirmishes and raids, given not only Egyptian reluctance to intervene, 
but also because of what little was at stake. As Redford has pointed out 
the Amarna Letters do not only exaggerate the forces at work, but give a 
false impression of the importance of the "cities" that the lapiru were 
apparently taking. Gonen claims indeed that the majority of the cities 
lacked serious fortifications [1984: 62,69; also Thompson; 1992b: 209]. 
The Amarna Letters themselves hint at such minor importance, when rarely 
more than 50-100 troops are being asked for protection [Marfoe; 1979: 15). 
The active lapiru cannot have been particularly numerous. All these 
factors combine to lead us to look for a different explanation of why 
cities, territories, and people were described as going over to the 
lapiru. 
It is advisable at this point to turn back to the politics of 
giving and view the advantages that spring from such a relationship for 
the central power. In the Achaemenid case, the king is obviously cleared 
of the duty to police the mountainous areas, a duty which he has now 
relegated to the responsible hinterland 61ites. To these, however, this 
represents the price, but also the guarantee of their autonomy. The king 
at the same time creates a frontier police as the position of such 
mountainous areas often transforms them into useful buffers. Still within 
the military sphere he is now able to profit from contingents of mountain 
origin. Finally the return gift, often produce of pastoral nature, makes 
a welcome substitute for tribute, although as we shall see below, its 
importance should not be exaggerated. 
It appears that this is in line with what is often claimed to 
dominate relationships of trade and exchange between sedentary states and 
nomadic tribes. At this point it is thus appropriate to look at such 
relationships for a short while. Exchange is used mainly as a synonym for 
trade, that is the swapping of one object for another, or for some 
monetary value-item. This begs the question of how far pastoral nomads 
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are involved in such trade. Klengel maintains that in the ancient world, 
the nomadic involvement in trade was somewhat minimal [1977: 167,169]. 
similarly Khazanov claims that market-oriented pastoralism is a rather 
recent development in nomadic societies. Although the pastoral economy 
generally strives towards capital accumulation, this seems to be a 
strategy of survival and security rather than to be directed at the 
production of surplus for the market [1984: 71,2051'. 
To this one might add that in any case pastoral produce is a 
relative luxury for the sedentary agriculturally-based world. 
Agricultural produce, on the other hand, is a necessity to the nomad 
[Khazanov; 1984: 82, also 202-206]. As such one starts to wonder what sort 
of exchange might take place between ancient state and tribal nomads. The 
solution seems to be that nomads are mostly engaged in the exchange of 
services, that is, in payment for much needed agricultural products, they 
offer their services in a variety of ways [cf Klengel; 1977: 167]. 
Guidance and protection of caravans are often cited as among the 
occupations taken over by nomads. They are also able to rent out 
transport animals or become entirely responsible for the transport of 
sedentary merchandise. Also they are, as professional pastoralists, 
sometimes called on to look after or take into their care the flocks of 
sedentaries. Such services are of course related to trade, yet the 
nomad's involvement is tangential, in that it is mostly his labour that 
he sells, not his produce. 
But the most important service that the nomad offers is on the 
military plane (cf Rowton; 1976c: 2421. The nomads are most important to 
the authorities as an extra intake of armed men, as seen, either by 
direct integration into the army or by relying on them for policing. The 
two functions might of course overlap. It is also noteworthy that the 
need of the state for soldiers quite distinctively creates or at least 
7 One might also quote Knauf who claims: "Fernhandel in 
altorientalischer Zeit war Staatshandel, Nomaden kamen in ihm nur 
als Störfaktoren vor" [1985: 17). 
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largely increases the military component of the nomadic tribes under 
their influence. It is very doubtful that the same high number of 
individuals would engage in a military career if this was not the case. 
Under normal circumstances, the organisation of a tribal territory simply 
does not need nor has it the room for such an exaggerated amount of 
military specialists. In the end, in a case like this, it is the 
influence as well as need of the state which leads to the creation of or 
the increase in the paramilitary sector among tribalists. 
The sedentary state conversely has good reason to turn towards the 
nomads for recruiting special forces. Turning to Eph'alls discussion of 
military engagement in the Ancient Near East, we note that one of the 
weaknesses of ancient state army systems is the fact that they rely too 
much on the strength of their chariot specialists for superiority [1984). 
These, however, are few, and not able to effectively control vast areas. 
For war in the ancient world was done by seasons and battles were not 
only difficult but also slow to stage. An army, and especially its 
chariots, had to be moved over long distances to reach the point where 
the battle was held. This was easy enough in the situation of 
campaigning, when the whole army was on the move and heading towards 
areas of confrontation. Yet it proved extremely difficult to realize in 
the case of frontier defense and revolts. In a vast empire it is near 
impossible to move one's specialist forces to dispersed zones of danger 
over a short period. In other words, the chariot-squadrons are highly 
effective as far as raging war and battles and imposing local dominance 
are concerned, yet less effective when it comes to controlling and 
policing a large empire. 
It thus becomes necessary for the state authorities to turn towards 
the local population, not only to enlarge its numbers, but to guarantee 
forces of order in situ. That they turn towards nomads rather than the 
sedentary peasant population, is not entirely due to the their adeptness 
for military tasks. It is first of all a matter of the exchange 
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mechanisms that we have exposed above. Thus a state society will 
preferably draw the nomadic component of the population into permanent 
service of the military kind, rather than reduce the basic food-producing 
unit by recruiting peasants from the fields. This is especially so, 
because an agriculturally based economy does not function properly, when 
large parts of the population are away from home [Borowski; 1987: 91. 
Eventually one must again mention that civilized states perceive 
the more constant threat to take root in nomadically and tribally 
controlled regions. Bearing in mind the extensive discussion on nomadic 
military superiority, we can see why it makes sense to employ troops 
accustomed to the territory. Frontiers are also fixed at points where 
often the geography and the environment dictate a nomadic lifestyle, such 
as mountain ranges or desert fringes. It follows that the best frontier 
police available will be of nomadic stock. It is with these circumstances 
in mind that we have to consider nomad auxiliaries as 61ite-troops. 
Finally it must again be said that nomads are often recruited so as to 
protect and defend against themselves. By calling on a tribe to survey a 
territory or a frontier area, the state not only acquires an effective 
police force, but also guarantees for itself peaceful relations with the 
tribe itself. 
Being thus a military force, nomads are immediately entering the 
arena of politics and as their military efforts serve the sedentary 
world, it is the arena of sedentary politics that becomes the new 
playground. Trade, understood in this way, is the exchange of goods from 
the settled world for military and political concessions on the part of 
the nomads. We think that it is under such circumstances that we should 
understand Khazanov's statement: 
However, the sedentary states bordering onto nomads of the 
Eurasian steppe usually regarded trade with nomads as an 
instrument of external politics, a way of applying economic 
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pressure ... 1[1984: 206]1 ... Nevertheless, whenever possible 
sedentary states in the Near East never missed an opportunity 
to use the interests of nomads in trade as a means of 
political pressure. [1984: 208] 
Khazanov reiterates the theme for many regions and many forms of 
nomadism, maintaining that governments in their dealings with nomads were 
never far from political considerations and that often the economic 
aspects were suppressed by political and military interests [1984: 206- 
2091. The Egyptian case cannot have been different. This in itself is not 
surprising, but it is most interesting when we turn to an article 
presented by Liverani on the subject of trade in the Amarna period, in 
which he concludes: 
But everything finds its own place on a global scale, in 
which to make gifts and to reciprocate them (as also to 
refuse them and to put them off) is in function of keeping 
alert certain political relations: ideally in the desired 
way, and, if not in any possible way. [1979: 33] 
it would seem that the Egyptians knew the political impact of gift 
and counter-gift, and used it in their dealings with Syro-Palestinian 
entities. Redford also has noticed the importance of the politics 
surrounding gifts in the Syro-Palestinian region [Redford; 1992: 81-82; cf 
Nalaman; 1981: 174; Strange; 1987: 4]. He has also stressed that the 
Egyptian government of Syria-Palestine was, when for example compared 
with the Assyrian empire, of a very ad hoc nature. There seems to be a 
strong case that Egypt will have looked to engage in a relationship very 
similar to that between the Zagros mountain people and the Achaemenid 
central authorities when dealing with the population inhabiting the 
Palestinian highlands. The politics of presenting gifts indeed would have 
guaranteed the maintenance of law and order in the highlands, as well as 
the acquiescence of their inhabitants, military services without the need 
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to impose costly control, as is the case with tribute paying vassals. The 
latter was only considered viable when handling regions of prime economic 
importance and easily conquerable. For hinterland and mountainous areas 
the former was deemed sufficiente. 
It can again be seen that two different opinions can thus arise, 
one by a strong imperialistic force who has just freed itself from 
dealing with annoying hinterland activities, one by relatively weak petty 
kinglets, who themselves dispose of only very limited military personnel 
to face the threat. As we have seen, even the towns on the plain were 
little more than relatively large villages, the kinglets in fact little 
more than mayors or headmen [Redford; 1992: 268]. Given the reluctance and 
impossibility of imposing urbanization in the highlands, the extent of 
the here existing habitation units must have been even more reduced. In 
the circumstances, an armed group roaming on the outskirts of an 
unfortified village, eventually causing some havoc and even appropriating 
some of its food-produce, can have been interpreted as "taking over a 
citym. Similarly a "city" where food was given voluntarily to such a 
group can be seen as "going over to the lapiru". in reality, however, 
this is not comparable to making a full-scale rebellion. It might well 
form part of a symbiotic relationship between a tribal group and a 
village. Finally loosing territories and cities must be associated with 
little more than the free movement of mobile marauders as well as 
possibly quite peaceful nomadic tribalists within these territories. It 
is with these assumptions in mind that we reiterate a statement by Coote 
and Whitelam: 
it is because of their military expertise that bedouin 
possess political power far outweighing their numbers. It is 
this military role of the pastoral tribe which is important 
for its relation with the state as well as an important 
Istaubli devotes a large section to shasu serving as mercenaries 
[1991: 41ffl. That the tactics of hiring local forces went on in Egyptian 
dominated Palestine can be seen in the extent with which the 26th dynasty 
relied on such forces [Na'aman; 1991: esp. 45-48]. 
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711 tit", 
factor in tribal autonomy. During periods of declining state 
power, often the result of continual warfare, the military 
expertise of some tribes allows them to gain control of 
extensive settled areas often incorporating urban areas. 
[Coote and Whitelam; 1987: 1101 
To a distant and biased onlooker the same movements appear as a 
state of anarchy, the mobile element as barbaric brigands to be chased, 
if not eliminated. Abdi-khepa in this instance is either misinterpreting 
the situation, or to the contrary quite voluntarily sunmons up the 
pretense of reigning anarchy and barbaric conditions in order to see his 
rival in the north hopefully being sacked by Egyptian intervention. 
Furthermore, if aggressive 'apiru activity found actual expression 
in limited raiding occurences, there is no need to hold Lablayu as 
responsible in all instances. Lablayu was only able to muster what 
available armed force there was in Shechem. Described often as a sheikh, 
it is indeed quite possible that he had at his disposal a paramilitary 
sector, which equally possibly could have been made up of the parasocial 
element. There is, however, no need to assume that his troops were any 
more numerous than those of his rivals; in no way could he have been in 
control of swarming hordes of lapiru that he ordered to battle from the 
outskirts of Jerusalem to Meggiddo. In many instances raiding must have 
gone on without his knowledge since he would not have been able to 
control effectively all the highland territory at all times. So-called 
robber-tribes and bandit-groups must have had territories of their own 
sway. Finally Lablayu probably had to rely on the aid of nomadic troops 
and bandit captains in many remote areas of the hinterland where he 
himself dared not trespass. For Lablayu, and most probably Egypt, the 
main aim was to hold aggressive behaviour at bay or at a normal and 
expected degree. Abdi-khepa on the other hand was swift to point to 
political machinations and important coalitions, which he viewed as 
leaving the Pharaoh's lands and cities in the hands of barbaric brigand 
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elements. 
It seems apparent that Abdi-khepa exaggerated the importance of 
lapiru activity. Yet some credit might be given to Abdi-khepa. Though 
intent on extending his own area of jurisdiction, it is possible that he 
honestly thought of himself as a better representative of power than his 
rivals were. His own status might help our understanding on this 
occasion. He insists many times that, unlike the other kinglets, he is an 
Egyptian officer (EA 288: 9-10), and has been put into office by Pharaoh 
himself rather than having inherited his position. This points towards 
him having been somewhat Egyptianized. According to Redford (1992: 270] 
this shows that the Egyptians had more interest in the region around 
Jerusalem than the surrounding areas. This argument is sound if one 
considers that Jerusalem controls the route from the Jordan valley to the 
coastal plain. In our opinion it also explains Abdi-khepa's bitter 
complaints about Lab'ayu's ways of handling the central hill country. To 
an Egyptianized officer it must have been frightening to see the 
surrounding countryside under the control, not of imperial detachments, 
but in the hands of local armed men of unsettled origin and barbaric in 
appearance. The fact that he might have been taught the logistics behind 
employing these mountaineers cannot completely do away with the situation 
that they looked fearsome and of doubtful loyalty. He probably also took 
far too much pride in the fact that he had been officially installed by 
Egypt, instead of simply having inherited his position [Redford; 
1992: 269-2701, to lower himself into accepting the authority of 
hinterland auxiliaries. 
on the other hand, some of his actions, especially the turmoil he 
was to create later, might be the result of his desire to exceed his 
powers of jurisdiction. Not content to control the west-east route from 
his stronghold, he clearly expected-to have at least a say in how things 
were being handled not only in the adjacent northern hill country, but 
also in the Shephelah. It is hard to know if this was part of the 
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erstwhile Egyptian assignment, but he obviously felt responsible for a 
wider area than the immediate lands of Jerusalem. The position of the 
Shephelah towns of Gezer and Lachish might illustrate this point. 
Abdi-khepa complains about these towns as provisioning the lapiru 
forces under Lab'ayu (EA 287: 14-16), whilst Gezer at one stage is even 
seen as sending troops to Milkilu and Suwardatu (EA 290: 8). Yet to put 
all these actions into a context of illegality is to misread the 
situation along Abdi-khepa's lines. For it would be false to assume that 
the city-state kinglets were any less politically aware than the 
Egyptians. They soon must have realized that, in the absence of Egyptian 
intervention and given their own reduced military power, it was sound to 
agree on some kind of arrangement with the hinterland forces. Cities in 
the shephelah, i. e. within easy raiding range, must have sided on some 
occasions with either Lahýlayu or Abdi-khepa, even playing one off against 
the other. It is doubtful indeed that Shephelah kinglets would have 
shared Abdi-khepa's idea of the extent of his responsibilities; they 
might in fact easily have played into Lablayuls hands, especially as an 
Egyptianized officer may not have been to their liking. It should be 
emphasized that even after Milkilu and Suwardatu had been reinstated, 
they never sided with Abdi-khepa and disputed Abdi-khepa's legitimate 
zone of influence. The fact remains that either Abdi-khepa's, maybe well 
intended, but paranoid perception of the occurrences in the neighbouring 
hillcountrY, or his own expansionist views, made him file several 
complaints that received little response from the court which simply did 
not see things with the same eyes. 
The same situation is probably applicable to the plight of other 
kinglets. Themselves military weak, burning with paranoia, they begged 
Egypt to put an end to the threat of apparent anarchy in the mountainous 
hinterland. Egypt's response was rare, in most cases absent; to her the 
situation appeared balanced enough not to endanger her imperialistic 
claims. This balance was to last for a considerable period of time, in 
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fact all through the 18th into the 19th dynasty. We hear of one campaign 
only being alluded to in the Amarna. Letters, as several kinglets prepared 
to receive, provision, or meet the King's army. Again it was most 
probably intended to reach further northwards, and in any case it is very 
doubtful that it ever occurred. This striking lack of campaigning 
expeditions seems to have been the norm till the beginning of the 19th 
dynasty. Such inactivity within Palestine itself cannot be interpreted as 
anything other than the fact that the Egyptians were perfectly happy with 
the state of affairs which prevailed at least from the Amarna period. 
Having argued so far that indeed the representation in the Amarna 
letters does not correspond to the political reality, it is now 
interesting to take a look at the economic exploitation of the highlands 
in this same period. Noteworthy among Briant's realizations for example 
is the degree and manner in which the Zagros mountain tribes exploited 
their territory. Already we have seen how he rejects the description of 
some tribal groupings as troglodytes', preferring to point to the fact 
that these are not individual entities of tribes of hunter-gatherers, but 
part of a vaster ethnos subject to one of various temporary adapatations. 
He furthermore establishes quite early on the importance of pastoralism 
in mountain regions. However he deviates from the classical sources by 
postulating a considerable occupation with agricultural exploitation 
wherever this is deemed possible. As we have seen, the classical sources 
indeed tended to ignore the pastoral mode of existence and there is no 
reason to assume that they did not do the same for the agricultural 
lifestyle. After all, it would defeat the process of civilization if the 
mountain inhabitants were themselves already engaged in the exploitation 
of agricultural resources. Briant arrives at this conclusion not solely 
by reading in between the lines of the classical texts, but by the 
realization of the potential that mountain regions can offer, especially 
9 Briant is supported in this from a more general perspective. In fact 
in his exposure of the troglodyte myth, Hayden quite simply states: "If 
human populations had been restricted to living in caves, they would have 
had little chance of surviving" [1993: 68 & 69]. It reinforces the notion 
that cave-dwelling is but a temporary strategy for survival. 
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when intermontane valleys are taken into consideration. such valleys can 
in fact prove relatively fertile and, provide not only rich grazing 
lands, but are there to be transformed into fields; it is unlikely that 
this would have been missed by the mountain people. 
The question then is whether the situation in Palestine shows the 
same potential possibilities. It can surely be argued that Lablayuls 
realm for example must have survived on other modes of production than 
raiding activities, especially given the limited extent of 'apiru 
activity as it has been described above. It has to be accepted in this 
case that similarly to the classical records, the Amarna. documents not 
only exaggerated the role of brigandage activities, but reported these 
particular occurrences to the detriment of the usual state of affairs. In 
these circumstances and with respect to the relation between 'apiru, sutu 
and shasu as we have established it in the concluding parts of chapter 3, 
it makes perfect sense to look beyond the records in order to postulate 
the existence of more peaceful means of subsistence, such as pastoralism 
along with a limited degree of agriculture. 
our opinion is furthermore substantiated by the fact that the 
highlands were far from being a barren land. The Palestinian highlands 
under the New Kingdom, and this includes the Armana period, similarly 
suffered not a lack of resources, but rather a lack of manpower. This is 
hardly surprising, given the deportations under the early pharaohs of the 
18th dynasty, which particularly affected the hill country [see Thompson; 
1992b: 2051'0. Nonetheless it can be stipulated that by the time of the 
Amarna period the population had already recovered and was able to 
support itself. There can hardly be any doubt that the highlanders took 
advantage of the pastoral potential offered by their countryside. Whether 
"Manpower was apparently in short supply during the period overall; 
many struggles accordingly were not about the control of land or 
territorial disputes, but concerned with the control of the labour force. 
one might well wonder whether some of the "expansionist" policies of some 
highland chiefs, and the hupsu becoming lapiru, should not be interpreted 
as an outcome of the desire to attract a strong enough workforce in order 
implement a fuller exploitation of the highland realms [cf Marfoe; 
1979: 14-151. 
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or not they originated from the prior Middle Bronze IIC period as 
Finkelstein maintains [1988: 343ff; but see Thompson; 1992b: 222], it must 
be considered that groupings, tribal or not, of mountain nomads herding 
sheep and goats, very possibly formed quite an important part of the 
basic population of the Palestinian highlands in the Late Bronze Age. 
The presence of a pastoralist element, nomadic in nature, is more 
often agreed on in scholarship. The conclusions that we have drawn in 
chapter 3 also reinforce such a view. Yet the case is different as far as 
the agricultural sector is concerned. From the archaeological point of 
view everything speaks against important agricultural activities in the 
highlands during the Late Bronze Age. There are but very few settlements, 
which could qualify as peasant villages. The textual evidence 
concentrates on military activities and therefore is not concerned with 
rural agriculture. Yet it is our contention that at least limited 
subsistence agriculture took place in parts of the central highland 
ranges 
The arguments are varied, but extremely important is one fact that 
modern anthropology never fails to stress: the fully or purely nomadic 
society is a very rare phenomenon, if existent at all [Cribb; 1991: 16; 
orme 1981: 262). Nomadic societies can simply not exist without some sort 
of contact with the sedentary world. Whether by including agents of the 
sedentary mode of production among their Own numbers, or through 
arrangements with neighbouring village or city inhabitants, nomads must 
have access to the products of agricultural life (Bates; 1972: 48; Yedid; 
1984: 281. Similarly Khazanov maintains: 
However, a specialized pastoral economy, in contrast to the 
economy of many comparable forms of agriculture, itself 
"Furthermore it is also true that accidents of discovery and the 
strategies of archaeological research have added to this situation. As seen 
in the introduction for too long archaeologists concentrated their research 
on urban sites, trying to uncover large sites mentioned in the Bible. only 
recently have there been made efforts to dig up smaller villages in remote 
areas. 
127 
cannot produce even all the immediate requirements of nomads. 
Nomadism is practically inseparable not only from 
supplementary forms of economic activity, but also from such 
social and political activity which numbers amongst its aims 
the overcoming of economic one-sidedness ... [1984: 70] 
Khazanov does introduce some reservations in that he still regards 
pastoral nomadic economies "conditionally as autonomous economic 
systems", but vividly stresses that nonetheless they are not autarkic 
[1984: 81; but see Klengel; 1977: 167]. Non-autarky is the outcome of 
specialization, in this case the sole occupation with animal husbandry. 
it is the irony of such specialization, however, that it is only possible 
if enough outside agricultural resources are present. Lees and Bates, for 
example, see the origins of specialized pastoral nomadism as rendered 
possible, or even as the result of pressures exerted through "the 
practice of canal irrigation as a technique of agricultural 
intensification" (1974: 1871". Only then was it possible to develop 
symbiotic relationships which rendered both modes of production viable. 
Khazanov sees the development of Eurasian pastoral nomadism as related to 
the emergence of sedentary states in the same area. He insists that it 
was the very existence of these states that provided the necessary 
circumstances for nomadic pastoral specialization to come into being 
[1984: 951. Finally regarding the origins of pastoral nomadism in both the 
Eurasian steppes and the Near East, he concludes "... in both regions 
nomads were linked right from the beginning 
in a complex system of 
peaceful and hostile relations with sedentary states" [Khazanov; 
1984: 1021. Such theories of origins reinforce the point that nomadic 
pastoralist societies are highly dependent on the sedentary and 
agricultural sectors. 
Although some agricultural necessities might in fact have been 
12 The presuppositions of this development are that *the process of 
domestication of plants and animals occurred in conjunction, and that the 
earliest food producers practiced mixed 
farming" (Lees and Bates; 
1974: 1871. Similarly see Garthwaite [1978: 175]. 
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obtained in exchange for the policing activities as well as provision of 
troops undertaken by the hill people or in exchange for their pastoral 
produce or thirdly in raids, one might however wonder if this was 
sufficient to maintain even the reduced highland population. Much of the 
first must have benefited the 61ite more than any other part of the 
populace. The third in a similar manner can only have been to the profit 
of groups reduced in numbers, possibly actual bandit groups, which sought 
to complement their usual modes of food acquisition by raiding. The 
second however, if we are correct in the assumptions drawn previously, 
was minimal in any case, especially when the peasants of the plain 
possessed their own flocks and guaranteed their own pastoral income (cf 
Coote; 1990: 131. In fact, as we have pointed out, the Palestinian 
hinterland remained only partly integrated, as such relatively isolated 
from the adjacent plains. Thus all points towards the fact that the 
highlanders were forced to occupy themselves with the agricultural mode 
of production in some form or another. Prag shows himself most insistent 
on such a point, when analyzing symbiotic relationships between nomads 
and sedentaries in the Levant: 
The balance is a delicate one, depending completely not just 
on climate and seasonal rainfall, but also on contemporary 
politics. Given the right circumstances, many of these 
pastoralists settle on a temporary or a permanent basis to 
cultivate. Indeed Hole (1978,152) believes that no =I 
nomadism includes cultivation. hunting and gathering as well 
as pastoralism, and there is much ethnographic data to 
support this. [Prag; 1985: 83] (emph. added) 
An agricultural sector can also be discerned in the textual 
evidence. One only needs to read in between the lines of the Amarna 
Letters as Briant does for the classical sources. If in fact the 
description of lapiru activity is to be associated with the similar 
records of brigandage concerning the mountain people of the Zagros, it 
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also holds that in reality there was a more complex combination of social 
and productive activities than the single preoccupation with war, raids, 
plunder, and pillage 13 . The argument gains substance from the fact that 
especially in the Samarian hills around Shechem., there are indeed broad 
valleys, with plains beginning to extent further north, a factor which 
influenced settlement of the highlands in ancient times [Rogerson; 
1985: 149; cf Thompson; 1992b: 223]. It is unreasonable to suppose that, 
quite unlike the Zagros mountain dwellers, the Palestinian highlanders 
would have ignored the potential benefits of these valleys. It seems to 
us that all points towards some agricultural exploitation of the valleys, 
albeit to a limited degree"". 
The realization of agricultural exploitation however draws 
alongside it a number of ensuing consequences for lifestyle, habitation, 
and organization among the mountain people. Invariably more permanent 
forms of settlement are connected with agricultural development. Briant 
insists that the Mardians, the Kassites, and the Ouxians all are 
partially engaged in the agricultural mode of existence and live in 
villages in the valleys. In the Palestinian case, however the fact 
remains that so far settlement appears to be virtually absent. However, 
this simply means that although there may not have been an extensive and 
sophisticated sedentary and urbanized society 
in the Late Bronze 
highlands, this does not rule out the exploitation of agriculture in 
consort with pastoralism. This was clearly not a highly sedentary 
culture, but an agro-pastoral mode of existence, within which admittably 
an important part of the population pursued a nomadic existence again 
"it should at this point be noted however that Prag also emphasizes: 
-Semi-sedentary tribes are not necessarily peaceful. " [1985: 831 
14 Knauf holds a similar view, although he is insistent on a view of the 
, apiru as peasant refugees. Nonetheless 
it is interesting to follow up his 
argument: "Gewiss kam es zwischen lapiru-Banden und Nomaden-Sippen zu einer 
Vielzahl friedlicher und unfriedlicher Kontakte als sie sich das gleiche 
Gebiet noch teilten; und die meisten lapiru werden im Bergland das getan 
haben, was sie schon in den Ebenen betrieben hatten: Ackerbau und 
Viehzucht, nur dass sie nicht mehr in Häusern, sondern in Hütten wohnten. 
Dass uns die TeXte die Iapiru in einer Vielzahl anderer Tätigkeiten zeigen, 
nur nicht in dieser, liegt an 
ihrer städtisch-staatlischen Perspektive, für 
die alles, was in den Bergen geschah, sich im gefürchteten (und 
ignoriertem) "Niemandsland» abspielte" [1988: 1091. 
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with a major emphasis on sheep pastoralism. It is no surprise therefore 
that permanent settlements have not been identified archaeologically, 
though it is not altogether easy to speculate how the agricultural and 
pastoral sector divided themselves in the wider highland society. It must 
however have been the case that some form of seminomadism pertained, 
where the same unit either pursued different occupations at different 
times, or where a split unit prevailed. Briant, for example, raises the 
possibility that in fact we are often faced with one unit involving two 
sectors, one nomadic pastoralist, the other sedentary agriculturist. As 
such, one part of the population constantly moves around with its herds, 
the other remains in the villages tilling the fields. As part of one and 
the same unit, however, it is readily concluded that they live in 
symbiotic harmony, one of the components providing in a variety of ways 
for the other. We have thus a situation which seems to translate into 
what we might consider to be a tribal organization with a sedentary 
sector or, at the highest level, an "integrated tribe" [cf Rowton; 
1974: 2; Cribb; 1991: 25-26; Prag; 1985: 83]. 
Under these circumstances, it is possible that in the 
archaeological record evidence for settlement can easily have been 
missed. In a first instance settlement would be relatively dispersed and 
mainly present in intermontane valleys. Added to this, we again are faced 
with accidents of discovery and to some extent inappropriate strategies 
of research. Furthermore, Cribb maintains that "although the artifacts 
and campsites used by nomads need not lie beyond the capacity of modern 
archaeology, there may be no simple means by which these are 
distinguishable from productions of more settled communities- [1991: 651"1. 
His study has shown settlement types that linger on a preciously fine 
distinction between permanent and precarious, especially where the worlds 
of semi-nomadismn and semi-sedentism meet [cf also Orme; 1981: 106-1071. 
it thus becomes perceptible that a wide range of nomadic dwellings exists 
from tent to hut or house. As such, it is for example not always easy to 
is The claim here then is that sedentary forms can at times have been 
missed or mistaken as nomadic. 
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decide whether a hut represents the residence of a sedentary peasant 
rather than a nomadic pastoralist. He also shows that some kinds of 
precarious dwelling forms can in fact be used over a rather extended 
period as semi-permanent settlement. Only after further development do 
such dwelling forms start to betray characteristics of more advanced 
sedentism. The outcome of many of Cribb's descriptions is that 
archaeologically it is quite possible not only to confuse nomadic and 
sedentarary settlements, but also to overlook some settlements of a more 
precarious kind altogether". While archaeology thus clearly prevents us 
from identifying the Late Bronze highland society with a highly developed 
agro-sedentarary culture, it does not speak altogether against the 
presence of smaller dispersed settlements for limited agricultural 
17 
exploitation 
However it is appropriate to point out that the north probably held 
some agricultural advantages over the more southern regions. This would 
especially be the case if settlement and agricultural exploitation did 
indeed take place mostly in the intermontane valleys. In the north these 
are much broader and thus more suitable to these ends. Further south, in 
the Bethel and also the Hebron hills, the economy would have been even 
more heavily dependent on pastoralism. Again the region of the matat 
Ursalim seems to present a somewhat special case. Although pastoralism is 
highly practicable in both the Judean hills and the Judean desert, 
regions such as the wilderness of Judah are most famous as a refuge for 
renegades and bandits of all sorts. Jerusalem itself thus gains its major 
importance from guarding the east-west and north-south routes in a region 
16 Daker mentions "la tente fixe" (1984: 521 and "la hutte d, estivage" 
(1984: 541. He and Yedid also talk of nomads who are "s6dentaires sous la 
tente" [Daker; 1984: 53; Yedid; 1984: 21]. Jarno claims "qu'il existe de 
nombreuses combinaisons fonctionnelles entre la tente et la maison, et 
qu, un seul mot (beit) recouvre de multiples relations entre la tente et les 
constructions en dur" (1984: 198]. 
17 Orme, who insists that agriculture is an important element among 
pastoralists [1981: 2621, also claims: "Whether or not there are permanent 
buildings, occupation sites are frequently permanent, albeit not 
permanently inhabited, ... clearly permanent settlement sites do not exclude 
a pastoral economy anymore than the absence of such sites indicates one" 
(OrMe; 1981: 2611. 
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mainly inhabited by nomadic pastoralists and frequented by marauding 
bandit-groups. No wonder that the Egyptians were a bit more careful in 
choosing the man responsible for imperial presence in order to keep open 
the route to the Jordan valley (Redford; 1992: 270]. With the neighbouring 
Shephelah at hand, there would also have existed less incentive to engage 
in agriculture. Maybe this also accounts for Abdi-khepals stern reaction 
at Gezer and Lachish's support for lapiru groups. It is thus possible to 
point out certain divergence's existing between the northern central 
range and the southern hills dominated by Jerusalem already in Amarna 
times. The far greater agricultural potential of the north must have 
worked to its advantage. It was always more prone to increase its 
autonomy from the surrounding imperialistic presencels. A closer look at 
the socio-political arrangements in the north and the south will 
emphasize this point. It is also important for the ensuing discussion, 
especially for the problem of state formation in the highlands. 
In fact the Amarna archive is the last, if not the sole, direct 
indicator, however imprecise, for the socio-political organization in the 
hill country during the Late Bronze Age. Like Abdi-Asirta of Amurru, 
Lablayu is held by many scholars to have been a sheik, rather than a 
standard Amarna petty kinglet. This complies with the identification of 
, apiru as a nomadic element and the highlands as a pastoralist 
hinterland. Nonetheless, given the discussion of the paramilitary sector 
amongst nomads, it is still possible that his major strike and police 
force probably consisted of bandits. He furthermore had a seat of power 
in the city of Shechem. More so than Abdi-Asirta, Lablayu would thus 
qualify as the prototype of what Rowton qualifies as a "parasocial 
leader", reigning over a "dimorphic chiefdom". Yet as already mentioned, 
his hold on the northern hill country was far from complete. Although 
ultimately the surrounding kinglets held him and his sons responsible for 
all that occurred in the highlands, there must have been within his 
jurisdiction enough free-roaming bandit-groups and non-complying tribal 
and nomadic elements. Indeed the general qualifications of Sa. Gazllapiru 
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and sutulshasu for the inhabitants of the highlands do not give justice 
to the diversity among the entities involved. Thus to view Lablayu as the 
only sheik controlling one tribal entity by means of a highly experienced 
paramilitary 61ite would be misleading. 
Abdi-khepa's sway over the southern part of the hillcountry was 
even less complete. His dominion did not effectively extend into the 
Shephelah where his power was constantly opposed. In the end he must have 
presided over a small, mostly unattractive and sparsely populated region. 
The vaster part of the region, the Judean desert and hill country, must 
have appeared to him as barbaric as its northern neighbours, and the 
shasu-dominated Negev to the south and Transjordan to the east. Abdi- 
khepa more and more appears as a deliberate Egyptian creation: a local 
baron, set up in his stronghold bastion of the Jerusalem saddle to act as 
a buffer against the surrounding autonomous elements, as well as a line 
of protection to the more attractive Shephelah. 
Another interesting question is of how much these forms of control 
and government survived into the following periods, and how much it could 
be affected by a changing political state of affairs. The little textual 
evidence that we have on the subject tends to imply that in principle 
there was a hereditary system. Even the figure of Abdi-Asirta left a 
solid heritage to his sons, Aziru in particular. Similarly the continued 
influence of Lablayuls sons in the northern hill country cannot be 
denied. Finally the very insistence with which Abdi-khepa proclaims that 
he, to the contrary of the other rulers, had been installed by Pharaoh 
himself and had not come to his position by the right of primogeniture, 
points into the same direction. The question, however, remains as to how 
far this extended into the latter period of the Late Bronze Age. The 
intervention of Egypt during the 19th and early 20th dynasties cannot 
have done anything else than displace some of the existing 61ite-figures. 
There is little reason to question the fact that the more permanent 
installation of Egyptian personnel must have done away with the previous 
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local dynasts, be this on the plain in Askalon, or deeper in the 
Shephelah, from Gezer to Lachish. Replacement of some of the dynasties 
could have followed in the aftermath of the Qadesh events. Moreover the 
arrival of the Sea Peoples can only have accelerated this process. The 
extent to which such events took place will be analyzed in the following 
chapters. For now, however, as imperial trouble remained further north on 
the frontier between the Egyptian and Hittite zone of influence, the 
situation within the highlands of Palestine must have remained that of a 
mainly nomadic pastoralist hinterland enclave. 
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Chapter 5 
The highlands as a centre of dissidence and refuge 
After all that has been said so far, one might wonder indeed how 
the Palestinian highlands could come to attract the attention that is 
generally paid to them. our whole study so far has only shown that 
they represented a widely uninteresting hinterland, inhabited by 
people that appeared inferior to the powers of the time. Nonetheless, 
when the political situation is right it is especially such long 
ignored groups that can come to dominate the ebb and flow of political 
power and machinations. A good example of this, illustrating the 
considerable degree of irony sometimes involved in the processes, is 
presented by Minor's treatment of the Isaurian populations. Thus he 
says in his introduction: 
And yet in the midst of the mighty Roman Empire a tiny 
group of tribes defiantly plagued the invincible Romans 
with their outlawry for six hundred years. Despite this 
distinction the history of the Isaurians is cryptic and 
esoteric, even though they ultimately placed a robber- 
chieftain on the imperial throne of East Rome. [Minor 
1979: 117 and passim] 
To a certain extent the situation in Palestine must have 
resembled that of Isauria. Some scholars have indeed come to similar 
conclusions. Let us turn to Halpern for a first general understanding 
of the events: 
In short there is evidence neither of disgruntled peasants 
running amok, nor of compulsive king-killing in the 
Canaanite ecumene. Rather the Amarna. archive documents the 
rise of mountain kingdoms -with bandit traditions and a 
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drive toward primitive capital accumulation- much like the 
one Israel became just before her explosion into the 
Jezreel and the coastal plain. [Halpern; 1983: 63] 
Unfortunately Halpern, like Minor to some extent, appears to 
fall into some of the pitfalls that we have pointed out in the two 
preceding chapters. Most clearly he still shares some of the classical 
assumptions which identify not only mountains as automatically 
impoverished regions, but also that these conditions can be logically 
used to speculate for activities of banditry and brigandage, or what 
he calls "primitive capital accumulation" on part of the mountain 
inhabitants. Common to our standpoint, however, is the importance 
placed on the geographical situation presented by mountainous regions, 
as well as the identification of the main social actors in the lapiru 
groups around the figures of Lablayu and his sons. Yet we differ in 
the socio-political status that is to be attributed to this group, for 
unlike Halpern who concentrates on their bandit-nature, on this 
occasion, we tend to side with Redford who perceptively associates 
their activities with those of "nomadic dissidents"'. It follows that 
the political role played by the mountainous environment is not so 
much an intense opposition to, but an isolation from, the adjacent 
plains. This differentiation does of course not eliminate all aspects 
of aggressiveness, in fact it does not even deny Halpern's assumptions 
per se. Yet it allows us to view the socio-political disposition of 
the highland entities as more than that of mere parasitical existence 
as bandit agglomerations. 
It seems that Halpern, in the anxiety to see clear parallel 
developments between Amurru and the Palestinian highlands [cf 1983: 62, 
781, overlooks that in the Shechem and the Jerusalem case, the Amarna 
Letters do not document the rise of a bandit-kingdom. This might be 
'Except for the use of the term, Redford never fully discusses the idea 
of dissidence, as we have done 
in chapter 4. This is very unfortunate as 
his views on the shasu tend to confirm our own interpretation. 
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the case for Amurru, but in the other two cases we are presented with 
a completed situation rather than with a development. While Lablayu 
and Abdi-khepa are to be seen as established within their territories 
that they control from the two respective central settlements, Abdi- 
Asirta is more actively engaged in an expansionist take-over. 
Thus Redford warns against making general assumptions regarding 
the developments in the Amurrite zone, since he considers this to be a 
particular phenomenon, rather than a model which can be applied to the 
settlement of the Palestinian central highlands [1992: 267]. Admittably 
neither the central range of mainly Ephraim and Manasseh, nor the 
Judean hills, and neither for that matter the hill country of Upper 
and Lower Galilee2, can be said to exactly copy the topographical 
situation of Amurru at the time of the Amarna letters. Especially 
Amurru's very particular political position, as a highly disputed 
region around the river Orontes where not only two but three major 
powers vied for the dominance of the bufferzone of Syria, does not 
have an exact replica in or around Palestine [Redford; 1992: 267, also 
1691. In the end, it is precisely because the major political turmoil 
of the time took place around the area from the river Orontes towards 
Anatolia, that the region of Palestine cannot claim for itself the 
same conditions. At that time Palestine enjoyed a relative calm; its 
major turmoil was still two hundred-fifty years away. 
in fact the relationship as we have established it to exist 
between the Palestinian highlanders and the responsible Egyptian 
authorities does not point towards a state of permanent hostility. 
Beyond this we find a state of affairs that is dictated by the degree 
of autonomy and freedom of action that is left to the hill tribes. It 
would, however, be false to claim a state of absolute harmony. Briant 
is quick to warn us that not all can be put down as being a sole 
'it is a matter of debate whether or not Galilee, and especially upper 
Galilee, should be directly associated with Palestine, or whether it should 
be considered as the hinterland to the Phoenician coastline. See for 
example Thompson [1992: 2581! 
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consequence of conquest and the use of language. He is ready to admit 
that brigandage existed in a variety of ways being performed by a 
number of groups3. This shows, however, that even where relations were 
regulated, hostilities sometimes flared up. We have already alluded to 
this fact. It is here that Briant speaks of "regulated hostility" (= 
hostilit6 r6glement6e) and, thus, introduces fresh categories to be 
recognized on the continuum of peaceful and warlike relations, 
especially as they exist between mountainous and/or nomadic 
populations and adjacent state societies. It is preferable for the 
latter not to take too much notice of minor incidents and skirmishes 
and leave the handling of law and order to the people themselves, thus 
respecting their autonomous status. Nonetheless they are in a position 
to exert enough power to execute drastic punitive actions if things go 
to far. From this point of view the hill people, or at least the 61ite 
who entered the relationship, will try their best to keep hostilities 
under control even if they cannot avoid them completely. When the 
state feels strong, it might well use actions of brigandage as a 
pretext for a punitive expedition, possibly as a display of might. 
However# in the long run, they will prefer to avoid such a response 
given the costs and inability to totally subdue the hill tribes. In 
fact as seen in the previous chapters, the military potential of the 
hill tribes can never really be broken and is quick to revive. 
Things nonetheless were about to change [cf Nalaman; 1981: 185). 
Although textual evidence is scarce, it is generally agreed that Egypt 
came to lose much of its dependencies further north to the Hittites, 
one effect of this being that the frontier moved southward and thus 
ever closer to Palestine. With the frontier came trouble, trouble 
which has to be seen to explain the change within Egypt's policy 
towards Palestine. Some factors can be identified as indicators of the 
changing status of affairs. First of all Egyptians re-engaged in 
extensive campaigning expeditions, culminating in the stand-off at 
3 Again see, for example, the discussion on robber-tribes in the 
preceding chapters. 
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Qadesh under Ramessess II. It apparently continued under Merneptah, 
and it is in his victory stela that a new entity called Israel is 
first mentioned. This turmoil is added to by the arrival of the Sea 
Peoples on the shores of Palestine. Another important feature is the 
appearance of increased settlement in the highland regions. Indeed it 
is probable that this increase in settlement is closely related, if 
not a direct outcome of the change in Egyptian politics, the 
pronounced campaigning activities as well as the troubles created by 
the Sea Peoples. Briefly stated, political troubles had come to 
Palestine, and reactions had to be expected as surely on the plains as 
in the highlands themselves. 
The reasons behind these changes are many fold, but we might 
identify two which seem most important to us. The first was the need 
to fortify Palestine more strongly militarily, while the second was 
that much of the burden of taxation shifted towards Palestine as well. 
Both are not only interlinked, but evidently also dependent on the 
loss of the northern dependencies. 
so far Palestine had functioned much in the role of a go-between 
region [cf Thompson; 1992b: 205-2061. Egypt concentrated for one on the 
timber supply from Phoenicia, and frontier duties were carried out by 
the dependencies close to the buffer zone, although Egypt in the end 
probably lost the gamble with Amurru. Palestine's major involvement in 
military affairs must have been to provide for the passing troops. 
Even in this it was probably called upon only rarely as we see in the 
Armana Letters. Palestine also stood fairly fast in its loyalties, in 
contrast to dependencies such as Ugarit and Amurru. This cannot solely 
be the result of its geographical position, but ultimately shows that 
here there was little reason to be dissatisfied. All this points to 
the fact that for a long time the whole of Palestine stood in a 
privileged position, seldomly bothered by harsh imperial claims on 
either the military or the fiscal plane. This changed dramatically 
140 
with the loss of the northern buffer zones. Not only did campaigning 
restart with unexpected vigour, but Palestine had to undergo increased 
military occupation, as the region itself gained in importance to hold 
off the Hittite challenge. Egypt knew only too well that if Palestine 
fell, she herself would be the next in the firing line [cf Rogerson; 
1985: 2161. 
Palestine, after a long period of relative calm, found herself 
suddenly confronted with the real hazards of imperial domination as 
Egypt tightened her grip on its southern dependencies. Palestine had 
to adapt, and it would be unreasonable to think that adaptation took 
no other form than willing subordination. Berc6ls study [19901 would 
suggest quite the opposite to be true. In fact he claims that the 
passage of armies, the need to garrison and feed them, and added to 
this the troubles that many soldiers provoked, be it by sheer 
misbehaviour and undiscipline or by quite blantly living off the land, 
often were at the base of numerous riots in France'. Similarly it can 
be assumed that much of the Palestinian population did not take well 
to the presence of outside military groups, who showed little respect 
to the lands they were either passing through or to which they were 
assigned. The situation can only have worsened as military occupation 
was supplemented by the ever increasing burden of taxation especially 
as the end of the empire approached. It should 
be within this period 
of intensive Egyptian presence, that we should look for any causes of 
political troubles in Palestine. 
Berc6 insists that it is especially regions, which stood in some 
sort of privileged position, like Palestine under the New Kingdom, 
that developed the most hostile reactions against newly imposed 
authoritarian presence. Like Palestine, such regions and its towns had 
for a long time remained loyal to the crown. In times of war, when the 
4 See especially pages 179-196 in fact entitled "Riots against 
soldiers", which Berc6 starts with the words: "Riots against soldiers are 
an ancient defensive reaction of any co=unity --as ancient indeed as the 
passage of soldiers itself" [1990: 179]. 
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enemy threatened on the frontiers and kindled revolt and insurrection 
inside the realm, they did not change sides, but supported the state. 
For this the state awarded recompensation and granted privileges, 
which mostly translated itself as minimal administrative and fiscal 
state presence. These regions considered such privileges to be their 
right and reacted stubbornly against any new state encroachmentss. They 
thus turned into what Berc6 calls "hotbeds of insurrection" [1990: 
288-305). They resemble Briant's "poches de r6sistance", permanent 
regions of turmoil in one form or another. As such what states and 
empires do create by leaving certain enclaves to enjoy relative 
independence, and accordingly treating them favorably as far as 
taxation is concerned, is regions which quite justifiably come to 
think of themselves as privileged de juro, and therefore ever more 
fiercely resistant to further state encroachment'. 
Turmoil is inherent and frequent as opposition not only to 
outright conquest or expanding state control but to new taxes or the 
imposition of duties. This is what should be called "dissidence" 
rather than revolt or rebellion per se. It does not aspire to 
5There are of course differences to be noted. France deliberately 
granted privileges in the form of tax exemptions and 
limited autonomy to 
cities and regions within the zone of confrontation for support to her 
cause. She ran into trouble when she withdrew such privileges 
in periods of 
peace. Palestine on the other 
hand must be considered to be probably more 
lucky than actually privileged. Again the extent of Egyptian imperial 
claims is here at the heart of the problem. 
We must partially agree with 
Eph'al in that Egypt never really constituted a firm empire as such. If one 
compares furthermore, as Redford 
does, the Egyptian ad hoc regime with 
Assyrian stern stipulations by treaties etc, one must begin to view the 
Egyptian empire as mostly a wide zone of influence from which it could 
expect some tribute. on the northern 
fringes it found itself in constant 
competition, never really able 
to impose itself firmly over a long period 
of time. In the south 
it lacked the time and incentive to bother as its 
main concerns lay with the struggles 
in the north. But the situation 
remains comparable, as 
in both cases the regions in question saw dangers 
arising to a status quo, 
to which it had become accustomed in its 
liberality. If ever rebellion was conservative, it was in these cases which 
fought for the maintenance of the old ways. 
6 Berc6 gives a number of examples before exposing the situation as 
such: "When a rising spread to 
the neighbourhood or the whole inhabited 
area, the usual reason was that 
the community had up till now enjoyed a tax 
exemption, de juro or 
de facto as the case might be, and the residents 
wished to uphold 
it ... Their rebellion also 
had a larger, political meaning. 
People were signalling their refusal to accept the coming of state control 
and the new, terroristic methods of tax raising through which the 
government aimed to 
impose it" [Berc6; 1990: 214]. 
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overthrow systems as such, nor to drive out an exploitative overlord. 
The system or the overlord were never present to such an extent to 
make such a claim. Resistance is mainly put up so that a takeover by 
the overlord is avoided; dissidence is clinging on to one's privileges 
expressed somewhere on the line between autonomy and independence. 
Most interestingly, such regions often were adjoined by or part of a 
mountainous hinterland, such as the Pyrenees, where state encroachment 
had as in our case been resisted most successfully over long periods 
of time (Berc6; 1990: 295 )7. These pockets of resistance offered an all 
too ready refuge to any trouble makers in the wake of unwelcomed new 
state measures. 
The major problem for the historian is that such acts of 
dissidence go relatively unnoticed. It operates within the norms of 
military engagement to be expected within the realm of empire 
structures, as part of what we have described before as "regulated 
hostility". It is often disguised in the literary record under forms 
of brigandage. It does not leave behind a level of destruction and has 
little, if any, impact on the archaeological record. It works to 
maintain the status quo, it brings no major shocks to state systems or 
empires. it is an important aspect of relative independence, and given 
the right conditions, it has the capacity to increase independence 
from state control. Although some of the definitions that we have 
looked up mention occurrences of revolt or rebellion, they are mostly 
insistent on secession and schisre. It is in this light that we view 
7 Already earlier on Berc6 had singled out the Pyrenees: "The people of 
the Pyrenean valleys had similarly found a way to dodge the taxman. They 
had won themselves privileges and exemptions for the simple reason that 
their valleys were impossible to take by storm. In the words of the 
chronicler they held the 
law in contempt, placing their trust in the 
geographical location of their 
district and in the unfair privileges they 
had enjoyed for so long" [Berc6; 1990: 2131. Amongst others are also singled 
out the county of Pardiac within 
the "hilly country of Armagnac" 
[1990: 2101, the "plateau of Millevaches" and the "moorlands of Coutras and 
Montguyon" (1990: 2111, as well as the "highlanders of Lavedann [1990: 182]. 
0 Note the following definition: "(lat. dissidentia, m. s., du v. 
dissidere, 6tre dissident; de dis, pr6f. s6par., et sedere, Catre assis). 
scission, schisme; action ou 6tat de ceux qui s'61oignent de la doctrine ou 
de 11opinion du plus grand nombre sur quelque mati6re. Dissidence 
d, opinions. Il ya des dissidences 
dans le parti. rX rX Dans les Etats 
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occasions of dissidence during the later years of the New Kingdom 
empire. The traditional pocket of resistance of the mountainous 
hinterland attracted dissidents and insurrectionists from the lowlands 
and plains. The outcome however was not open revolt, but attempts by 
the enclaves to secede from the overall imposition of power by the 
central state. 
That Palestine thus reacted with a certain degree of reluctance 
to this fresh Egyptian take over can be assumed. The upheavals 
following the stand off at Qadesh can hardly be interpreted otherwise. 
They show a state of affairs in which even the cities of the plains 
were ready to take their chances, their hopes being kindled as Qadesh 
seriously set into doubt the invincibility of Egypt (Redford; 
1992: 1851. It is difficult to arrange the events into a definite 
chronological sequence. Several interpretations have been given of, 
what might easily be seen as, Egypt's re-conquest of Palestine. 
Although it might be seen as having been achieved under Merneptah 
(singer; 1988], it is harder to speculate when it actually started. 
Seti I's campaigns, however, present a good starting point. We are 
interested particularly in the shasu-troubles that he not only 
encountered, but regarded as important enough to engage in punitive 
counterblows. This interestingly occurs shortly after a period during 
which Egypt had stubbornly refused to give heed to the exhortations of 
the Palestinian city-heads to send punitive expeditions. The question 
is whether lapiru and shasu activity had in fact reached unheard of 
levels demanding Setils presence, or whether Setils presence can serve 
as an explanation for the reappearance of these groups in the records 
of Egyptian campaigns. 
It is not evident that as early as the reign of Seti I the 
degree of potential brigandage or the levels of dissidence associated 
barbaresques, au Maroc, situation d1une tribu qui refuse de se soumettre 
1-autorit6 du sultan (auj. du roi) . Entrer en dissidence. rtrt Par ext., se 
dit de toute scission politique par rapport & un gouvernement 6tabli. 
(Quillet; 1975: 18641 
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with either lapiru or shasu groups could have exceeded that of 
regulated hostility as tolerated for so long in the preceding periods. 
It is difficult to believe that so suddenly it would call for punitive 
measures to be undertaken by the court. It is possible to suggest two 
interpretations. on the one hand, Seti exaggerated the levels of 
hostile activity so as to legitimate the interference in Palestinian 
affairs, or on the other hand, it could again have been little more 
than a display of might as he passed through adjacent territories on 
the way further north. However the fact that only a little later 
Egyptian troops were to be garrisoned permanently within Palestine, a 
procedure next to unheard of earlier, suggests that displays of might 
had to be taken more seriously than the side-expeditions that had been 
going at the time of the original conquests. Now Egypt was here to 
stay. 
Put differently, although there were bandit activities and 
nomadic raids at the time of Seti I, there is little indication that 
they were so intense as to be the cause of Setils campaigns. 
Conversely, it seems more likely that his campaign represented the 
onset of things to come. It was a major cause of more serious 
outbreaks of dissidence, as he took tentative steps towards tightening 
his grip not only on lowland Palestine but on the territories so far 
only under nominal control, particularly the mountainous hinterland. 
While it is hardly possible to determine with complete accuracy 
when occurrences of dissidence became more frequent, it is 
nevertheless reasonable to conclude that occurrences were more a 
result than a cause of the sharp increase of Egyptian military 
involvement around Palestine'. Again if we look at Minor's account of 
the events in Isauria, it is striking that the so-called robber-tribes 
'it would indeed be interesting to see how much space 'apiru and shasu 
activity would occupy in a textual body of this time. Unfortunately the 
absence of such documents too often seems to be forgotten, although some 
authors thankfully keep reminding us: "No Egyptian royal archive other than 
that discovered at Amarna has been found" in [Nalaman; 1981]. 
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reappear in the records as soon as Rome repaid attention to the 
region. Which in other words means to say that Rome's fresh attempts 
at subduing the region not only accounts for the reappearance of the 
tribes in the records, but also their increased hostile reaction. 
Increased shasu and lapiru activity should, according to what has been 
said in the preceding chapters, be interpreted in the same fashion. It 
possibly reached something of a climax in the risings under Ramessess 
Ii, but that same Pharaoh must also have gotten things under relative 
control again [Redford; 1992: 185-186]. Nonetheless continued reaction 
against this exceedingly firm occupation must now be regarded as a 
possible explanation for the campaign recorded in the Merneptah stela, 
"as it again became necessary to secure the international routes in 
Canaan by further annexations to the centrally governed territories" 
[Singer; 1988: 31. 
Merneptah's stela proves highly interesting to us, not because 
it contains the first ever mention of an entity called Israel", but 
because it testifies to an unprecedented step by Egypt in her trying 
to gain greater control of the highlands themselves. Whereas Seti I 
undoubtedly undertook the first steps at reasserting Egypt's power in 
Palestine, Ramessess II perceptibly brought the southern Palestinian 
"This entity has obviously been the subject of a long debate [cf Engel; 
1979; most recently Yoyotte; 1990; Bimson; 1991; also Coote; 1990]. In an 
unpublished article Whitelam. reviews much of this 
literature [1993]. The 
nature of this "Israel", 
however, remains elusive as much for its socio- 
political nature as for 
its precise geographical location [also Edelman; 
1996: 361. Although Edelman, in her recent article, still holds on to the 
valuable piece of 
information that the Merneptah Stele represents, she 
insists that it provides little precise data (1996: 351. She concludes her 
review on the stele with the following commentary: "THe Merneptah Stele 
probably indicates that some sort of entity called 
Israel was present in 
ancient Palestine already at the end of 
the Late Bronze period and had a 
well-established enough presence 
to be considered worth attacking by 
Merneptah. Even the latter statement is presumptuous; a review of 
Sheshonq's subsequent campaign list reveals that small villages are listed 
alongside larger walled towns and cities. 
If the scribe who composed the 
coda section had been working 
from such a detailed list, Israel need not 
have been a significant entity. The scribe might have chosen it among a 
number of options because 
he wanted a population group, a people, to 
balance his city-states, or because he wanted a highland encounter to 
balance the lowland ones. other reasons are equally possible. It might have 
been a major confrontation or a minor skirmish; there are too many unknowns 
for us to second-guess why Israel 
is named" (EDelman; 1996: 361. In any case 
it remains doubtful as to whether this particular entity can be brought 
into a direct relation with biblical Israel. 
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coast under firm control. Under both Pharaohs the trend to establish 
permanent Egyptian garrison-cities became apparent, and by the time of 
Ramessess II many of the cities in coastal southern Palestine had 
become an extension of the "Ways of Horus" formed by Egyptian stations 
[Singer; 1988: 31. For all practical purposes up to this time the limes 
had become reinforced with Egyptian troops establishing garissons and 
stations surrounding the highlands. But with Merneptah the situation 
changes as the Egyptian administrative effort seemingly moved towards 
including highland territory. 
our main attention to the Merneptah stela thus focuses not on 
Israel, but on Gezer and the Shephelah, as they appear to form a 
milestone in the development of control in the hillcountry. Two 
related concepts are important here. Thus first is the applicability 
of Mayerson's perception of the Roman double limes, while the second 
is Shils' ideas about center and periphery" in a society 
(Mayerson; 1988,1990; Shils; 1975]. Both render in their own manner the 
notions of partial exclusion and integration that we consider 
characteristic of the Palestinian mountainous regions. According to 
Shils, the arm of the central authorities grows proportionally weaker 
as one leaves the physical center for the more remote hinterland [cf 
Gamst; 1974: 71. In the case of Palestine, it is reasonable to 
postulate the center of authority to lie within the coastal plains and 
the hinterland to be the central ranges of the hillcountry. once 
again, the Shephelah occupies a position in between, not as centrally 
controlled as the plains, but not as autonomous as the actual 
mountains of the highlands. The Shephelah was more integrated into the 
system than the adjacent higher ranges in the Amarna period. In fact, 
we have mentioned the towns of Gezer and Lachish as part of the limes 
looking onto the mountains. It is therefore interesting to view such a 
limes not as a single line of fortifications, but rather as a frontier 
district, and also to consider dividing it into an inner and an outer 
11 The notion of centre and periphery, especially as it is related to 
"barbarism", has been validated in a recent article [Randsborg; 19921. 
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frontier as Mayerson does. 
Mayerson's concept bears resemblance to that of Shils as his 
division also is partly dependent on a view of decreasing affirmation 
of authority as one goes further away from the actual zone of 
influence of the central authority. It should be noted here that in 
the Roman case it is the inner limes which is furthest away from the 
centre, whereas the outer limes is closer by. In the case of Palestine 
it would appear to be appropriate to posit the highlands within the 
frontier district, with little administrative presence. The notion of 
the hill country as a frontier zone is now well known in biblical 
scholarship. However it has not generally been perceived as an inner 
and outer frontier. It is interesting to consider the foothills of the 
Shephelah as the outer limes, with the highland ranges as the inner 
limes; Transiordan represents lands completely out of the zone of 
Egyptian influence. 
Both districts, however, were granted little Egyptian military 
input, either in terms of military expeditions and even less in terms 
of permanent occupation during the Amarna period. They were, for all 
practical purposes of administration, left in the hands of the local 
dynasts. Merneptah's conquest of Gezer, just on the fringes of the 
foothills, can only have been interpreted in one way by the headmen of 
both the lowlands and the highlands: this was a full military take- 
over as well as an actual "Egyptianizationo of the Shephelah, as it 
had not been experienced before. Singer points out the double 
strategic significance of the conquest of Gezer. It stemmed not only 
from its position as the most important town of the northern Shephelah 
from which the Egyptians could now dominate the area and also protect 
areas further west. As Singer [1988: 1 & passim] points out, the 
"domination of Gezer was also imperative for an attempt to penetrate 
into the central hillcountry". 
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There was thus a double function to the taking of Gezer and the 
installation of more permanent control over the immediately adjacent 
parts of the outer frontier, especially with regard to the more 
distant inner frontier. The Shephelah district could now serve as a 
more effective defense zone against possible raids from the highlands 
proper, the real "barbaric entity". But it also formed a firm base 
from which to launch attacks against the highlands in order to 
integrate them properly for exploitation. Both policies make sense, 
however, especially when recognizing Egypt's needs to consolidate and 
extend what they controlled in the south due to the losses in the 
north. From the point of view of the Palestinian hill-people it was 
beginning to be apparent however that the lowlanders were losing their 
autonomy and that the highlanders were next in line. Rameses III's 
continuation into the hill country with the subjugation of Lachish, 
which dominates the eastern Shephelah, confirmed their fears. However, 
the collapse of the empire brought the Egyptain momentum to a halt. 
Singer iterates a similar view of the events: 
The Egyptian offensive in Canaan was primarily motivated 
by the growing menace from tribal elements who gradually 
settled the central hill country and the northern Negev. 
This'is especially evident in the policies of Merneptah 
and Ramses III, who extended Egyptian jurisdiction as deep 
as the eastern Shephelah, at a considerable distance from 
the main coastal highway. Settling Philistines in Egyptian 
bases along the coast after Ramses III eighth's year was 
another facet of the same policy, intended to establish a 
strong bulwark against the new elements in the hillcountry 
who posed a growing threat to the stability of the 
imperial rule. (Singer; 1988: 6) 
Again at this point it is appropriate to stress that Singer sees 
Egypt as simply responding to a menace whereas we would stress that 
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Egypt was the aggressor. There is a case for suggesting that Egypt 
created the menace from the hill country with more pronounced 
campaigning and military occupation of Palestine under the previous 
pharaohs'2. Thus some of the population that Singer qualifies as "new 
elements from the hillcountry" should be sought among the malcontent 
and disrooted who sought refuge in the highlands from Egyptian 
pressure. Secondly, there is no reason to think that Merneptah's and 
Ramesses III's actions were solely defensive or preventive in nature. 
Rather they were intent to conquer the highlands. It would appear 
natural to us that the highland lords, who had for so long maintained 
a position of autonomy, opposed such a move and consolidated their own 
power to remain in control of the highland regions. These are the 
forces at work that Singer qualifies as "tribal elements". 
Singer also alludes to a new element on the scene, the Sea 
13 
Peoples , and 
how they came to be involved in Palestinian affairs. 
There is little doubt that these groups were a "new" element much more 
so than the dissident forces in the highlands. It is, however, a 
different question as to what extent their power made itself felt. 
From the Egyptian evidence it would appear that the pharaohs, 
especially Merneptah and Ramessess III, dealt rather successfully with 
these new arrivals, beating their coalition with the Libyans in the 
West, holding them off in the East per mare et terram, and finally 
installing them as a mercenary garrison force in southern Palestine 
(Dothan; 1982: 24]. It appears that Egypt always had the upper hand 
against these troublesome migrants and pirates. On the other hand 
12 Ahlstr6m argues in a similar manner to Singer stating that "because of 
the growth of villages in the highlands at the end of the 13th century 
B. C: j Egypt 
found that this territory had also become hostile" [1991a: 29). 
Again it is important to stress that this study rather sees the late 
Egyptian conquest as provoking withdrawal into and hostility from the 
highlands. 
13 He only mentions the Philistines. Here it must be said that much of 
what has been said about the Canaanites also counts for the Philistines. 
The way they are perceived owes more to the literary world of the Hebrew 
Bible than to reality. It seems preferable to continue to use the term Sea 
peoples, although included amongst them are those migrants from the Aegean 
that came by carts over the landroute. 
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however, the Hittite empire, Egypt's strongest opponent for so long, 
had faltered quite rapidly when faced with similar forces from the 
north. It is surprising that while Egypt had never been able to 
achieve a decisive victory over its northern challenger, it should 
have been so successful in her dealings with the Sea Peoples, using 
shock infantry and chariotry, that had practically brought to an end 
Greater Hatti's hegemony in the north. Thus McEvedy is of the opinion 
that: 
In the 1180s, a horde of what the Egyptians called sea- 
peoples' overran Palestine and was only beaten back with 
difficulty from Egypt itself (by Rameses III, first 
pharaoh of the twentieth dynasty). Thwarted but still far 
from impotent, the 'sea-peoples' settled in coastal 
Palestine and lorded it over their neighbours ... [McEvedy; 
1967: 38; cf also Dothan and Dothan; 1992: 27] 
Again the Egyptian records concerning the Sea Peoples must be 
regarded as themselves perpetrated with ideological language. The fact 
that the Sea Peoples are often described as viking-like sea raiders 
[Redford; 1992: 2251, or pirates, is an interesting point since such 
elements as pirates or corsairs are the equivalent of brigands on the 
sea". moreover, it is apparent that many of the ancient empires, such 
as Rome, approached the problem of piracy with the same tactics as the 
brigand problem on land [Flam-Zuckermann; 1970: 456; Clavel-Lev&que; 
1978]. It is thus fair to say that although we can hardly doubt that 
both Merneptah and Ramessess were relatively victorious in battle, 
they did not come fully to terms with these elements. It is possible 
to suggest that behind what Egypt describes as the stationing of Sea 
Peoples as mercenaries, there lay a certain degree of autonomy to the 
pirate enclaves that were springing up in southern coastal Palestine. 
"McEvedy uses the term "barbarian" (1967: 381, repeated by Dothan and 
Dothan who insist that this was the perspective of the Bible [1992: 259]. 
important is here that the Sea Peoples themselves thus resemble a "barbaric 
entity". 
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No wonder that Ramessess III tried to consolidate his power in 
the east, the Shephelah and the highlands. He must have been anxious 
to open new trade routes as he realized the danger to the via maris, 
which must already have suffered from the presence of the seafaring 
pirate elements. It must at this stage, however, not be forgotten, 
that not all the Sea Peoples came by ships. The force that caused the 
demise of the Hittites was rather a migrant force that advanced by 
land from Asia Minor and Anatolia along the coast of Syria and 
Palestine. In fact this group was probably very important for 
importing the Sea Peoples fearsome shock infantry and chariotry. it 
has also become evident that this was no unified invasion, but rather 
a protracted process, and that many of the Sea People over the time 
became extremely assimilated [cf Dothan and Dothan; 1992; Thompson; 
1992b: 269ffl. Nonetheless it is possible, once the groups (or at least 
some of them) united along the southern Palestinian coast, to 
charaterize these new polities as initially foreign pirate enclaves 
that existed and evolved more or less with the agreement of Egypt. To 
what degree and size, and, importantly, what level of centralization 
they developed must however remain another question. 
Yet these upheavals must have had an effect on the actual 
Palestinian population itself. Again it is interesting to see that the 
highlands throughout history often functioned as a refuge from 
approaching pirate elements. No doubt the Sea Peoples' takeover must 
have been met by some hostile reaction, just as the Egyptian 
occupation of the 19th dynasty had been before [cf Ahlstr6m; 1986: 5]. 
But again given the military advantage of the infantry and chariotry 
dominant Sea Peoples, displacement into the hillcountry for refuge and 
dissident resistance proved a more viable option than confrontation on 
the plain where even Egypt had found herself at odds. Egypt's relative 
cooperation with the Sea Peoples can only have emphasized the trend. 
Although the Egyptian-Sea Peoples confrontation had its own 
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destructive effects, the fact remains that once they came to terms 
with each other, the indigenous Palestinians seemed to have lost out 
most. The presence of the Sea Peoples as a mercenary force, "the newly 
hired guardians of the old order" (Dothan and Dothan; 1992: 27], must 
have caused further turmoil among the Palestinians. As seen before, 
such outside police-forces are often the most feared because they can 
be so unscrupulous. It seems reasonable to assume that many sought to 
evade the Sea Peoples' jurisdiction by retreating to the hillcountry 
[Ahlstr6m; 1991a: 20-21]. Ironically enough, viewed in this way, the 
first instances of opposition between the highlands and the coastal 
forces of the Sea Peoples are due partly to the efforts of the 
Palestinians from the plain. 
The question then, however, is how much the central highlands 
were affected by these occurrences, which took place mainly on the 
plain, later reaching the eastern Shephelah, the foothills of the 
hillcountry itself. Again neither Ramessess II or Sety I nor any of 
the following campaigners had been able to annihilate the military 
potential of the highlands or do away with the phenomenon of the rural 
military 61ite that we have described in the previous chapter. Quite 
to the contrary as far as expert military personnel goes, their 
numbers would have swollen. Although the Egyptian onslaughts might 
have disposed of some head members, this could only have profited 
other 61ite members in the wake to take over. As a matter of 
comparison, the displacement of entities on the plain did not prevent 
some cities from rising to unprecedented prosperity, showing that 
there are always those that manage to take advantage of the changing 
situation. Also within the highlands there were those ready to use the 
changing political situation to fulfill their own ambitions. 
Apart from the possible survival of such ambitious elements, 
there is ample reason to believe that the Egyptian policies of the 
19th-20th dynasties would have provoked reactions in the mountains, 
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that, far from leading to the end of existing polities, would have 
seen the rise of more consolidated power structures. In fact nomadic- 
pastoralist populations are inclined to increase not only tendencies 
to agglomerate, but also reliance and dependency on tribal 61ite 
groupings in times of severe dangers of state encroachment. The 
imminent danger presented by the inroads into the Shephelah by 
Merneptah and Ramessess III would have drawn the highland populations 
to organize themselves militarily and politically for purposes of 
defense and resistance. Thus the origin of dissidence was the result 
of Egyptian aggression; in this case, however, it also would appear as 
the cause for intensified organization, even noticeable patterns of 
stratification, among the hill people. 
The strong empire of Egypt in the final phases of the New 
Kingdom period eventually also meant stronger and more unified 
resistance". It organized itself most effectively in those regions 
that already previously had avoided too strong integration. Here units 
formed out of the older inhabitants and new arrivals from the lower 
plains and foothills. In the face of the might of Egypt, ties among 
the Palestinians became stronger. The longtime plain-highland 
dichotomies were forgotten and ethnic and/or tribal links emphasized. 
The aim was to escape the Egyptian grip. Again this was most 
effectively done in the highlands, where these new entities found an 
environment suitable for secession. 
The formation of these highland polities, however, was not so 
"Hayden has noted such a phenomenon [1993: 4591 and Dahl, an adherent of 
the recent science of sociobiology, argues strongly for its omnipresence in 
human nature: "Der innere Zusammenhalt einer Gruppe verfestigt sich, wie 
die Geschichte immer wieder zeigt, mit der Gegenwart von äusseren Gefahren, 
Bedrohungen und Nöten: »In der Not sind alle Menschen Brüderl« Und so 
erschallt denn der Ruf nach »brüderlicher Liebe« auch so selten laut wie 
in Kriegszeiten .... Und welches 
Kapitel der Weltgeschichte wir auch immer 
aufschlagen mögen, der Ruf nach brüderlicher Liebe erschallte immer aus dem 
munde eines von Feinden und Eroberern bedrängten Volkes-eines Volkes, das 
mit der gewonnenen Freiheit 
dann selbst bedrängte und eroberte... W 
(1991: 49-501. Again Berc6 insists that especially the presence Of outside 
soldiers unites the population: "Uprisings against marauding soldiers 
expressed the united will of the community to a greater extent than any 
form of collective violence" [1990: 1861. 
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much the outcome of an altogether newly creative process. It lay at 
first more in the reinforcement of ties already existing between 
previously disparate groups. This development can, however, not be 
limited to the highland regions only, although it is here that more 
concrete forms were taken on. Briant's example of the "Ouxiens de la 
plaine" and the "Ouxiens de la montagne" provides a rough guideline 
[Briant; 1982: 781. Most interesting is the fact that both populations 
are clearly regarded to be of the same ethnic stock. Nonetheless, the 
former came to be an integrated, civilized element. The latter, 
however, remained widely independent, therefore a people of barbaric 
highland brigands. It is not entirely clear with what sort of eyes the 
two elements regarded each other. some Ouxians might indeed have 
shared the concepts of the conquerors and therefore emphasized the 
plain-mountain dichotomy. Others, on the other hand, might have 
preferred to stress the factor that they were after all all Ouxians. 
Finally at times, the general political situation prevailing might 
have changed existent dispositions of numbers of Ouxians 
considerably". 
The case of New Kingdom Palestine was little different. The 
inhabitants of the plain and especially the Shephelah cannot simply be 
viewed to be completely different people with no ties at all. It is 
more inviting to consider the possibility that the political 
arrangements of conquering outsiders divided Palestinians, like the 
Ouxians of our example, more so than any real differences in ethnicity 
and/or lifestyle. Conversely it 
is also true that at most times the 
two groups were little bothered by such divisions. Yet as alluded to 
above, at other times the old links could 
increase in importance [cf 
Kamp and Yoffee; 1980: 89; Salzman; 1980a: 131. The final phase of the 
Egyptian occupation of Palestine was such a period. For many the need 
to distinguish oneself from the 'apiru in the highlands was by the 
16 Salzman and Coote argue that at times forms of organization, like 
tribal ones, simply lie dormant or are latent and inactive, but ready to be 
called upon, as "individuals do not 
loose their affiliations" (Salzman; 
1980a: 13; Coote; 1990: 78; also swidler; 1972: 1151. 
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time of Merneptah and Ramessess III, at the latest, replaced by the 
need to unite against the conmon aggressor. At these times the desire 
to find around oneself fellow Palestinians exceeded the fear 
previously inspired by the perceived presence of barbarians and 
brigands in the hil jS17. 
once again the actual use of the terms of shasu and lapiru 
somehow sharpens the problem. These general terms hide from the 
onlooker the ethnic and tribal agglomerations involved. We seldomly 
find the highlanders designated according to names of peoples or 
tribes (Thompson; 1992b: 211]. More often than not they are either 
equated with other Asiatics, or precisely referred to as lapiru or 
shasu, designations of an appellative rather than an ethnic value. 
Briant also refers to a similar problem in his study. He points out 
that the classical historiographers indeed often identified only the 
major tribe in a given territory. By this, they also conveyed the 
impression that this was the only ethnic unit involved, thus also 
hiding the internal differences still existent in the region [cf 
Brown; 1986: 107, fn. 2]. This is also reminiscent of the situation in 
Palestine, where it is all the more highlighted by the use of general 
appellatives. Again it is worthwhile emphasizing that it is the 
conquerors lack of knowledge of the given region that comes to 
dominate the textual evidence. Yet it also arises from the fact that 
the central authorities mention those elements who are of most use. As 
such, the Persians and later the Greeks speak mainly of tribes or 
people in mountainous regions, such as the Mardians or the Kassites, 
that are given prime importance in their own dealings with the 
political situation. However the importance of one such grouping over 
others is often but the outcome of the central authorities preference 
or need to support a given tribe or people, and more especially its 
61ite, in order to control its mountainous hinterland. 
171t is thus this period, rather than that of the collapse of the 
Empire, that should be seen as providing "the conditions for the growing 
influence of bedouin, and possibly bandits, in conjunction with the 
withdrawal of peasant communities" 
Ccf Coote and Whitelam; 1988: 6). 
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In the Egyptian New Kingdom case, the situation is further 
complicated by the fact that the 61ite-members only are mentioned. The 
populaces themselves are not given an ethnic designation. it is thus 
very hard to see how varied a population in fact lies behind 
expressions of the kind of "Lab'ayu and his 'aPiru, my 'apiru and my 
sutu"18. Briant again notices a similar phenomenon when he points to 
the fact that all the Zagros groupings are indeed in the position to 
make themselves heard by some official representatives. In whatever 
way one is to view this, it shows that some group is responsible, or 
at least thinks of itself as being responsible for decision making at 
a higher level. Conversely it implies the existence of some sort of 
unified entity as well as pointing to a hierarchical structure of that 
entity. Yet as official representatives, this 61ite group at the top 
of the hierarchical level mainly comes into the picture when the unit 
is confronted with some state authority; this is itself reminiscent of 
a situation involving tribal 61ites and central governments. It might 
thus be postulated that units such as the Mardians and the Kassites 
developed 61ites as contact with the state intensified, or even that 
contact with the state aided such formation substantially. On the 
other hand, it must then also be admitted that clustering mountain 
people under these names is part of a convention agreed on mostly by 
the 61ite group and the state itself. 
closer look at so-called tribal organization is here 
appropriate. Cribb and Khazanov insist on the differentiation in 
organization to be made between the "primary" or "A Type" and the "B 
Type" or "secondary coi=unities". The former are residence units 
characterized by fluidity and instability in membership. The latter 
"Interesting is then a statement by Kramer: "This point is relevant to 
an understanding of wethnicity" 
in the early second millennium B. C., 
particularly when one considers that our perceptions of ancient *ethnic" or 
atribal" groups are, as a function of our sources, biased, being filtered 
through the literate representatives of the ruling members of different 
socio-cultural groups, and that the bulk of the epigraphic evidence on 
which "ethnic" identifications are made is preserved in the form of (a 
relatively few) personal names" [Kramer; 1977: 104]. 
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are pasture-holding territorial groups giving major importance to the 
proper allocation of membership amongst them, agnatic descent being 
used as the primary criterion. It follows that membership is 
automatically more stable. Such groups might even take on a "sub- 
ethnic character", and at the level of "tribe" or "sub-tribe", they 
usually form an endogamous unit [Cribb; 1991: 49]. Primary and 
secondary co=unities thus work on different levels, and form 
themselves according to different principles: 
The dichotomy between primary and secondary communities 
marks that point below which some degree of flexibility in 
economic and residential association is essential, and 
above which the emphasis begins to shift to membership and 
territorially linked groups defined in terms of either 
agnatic descent or political allegiance. [Cribb; 1991: 491 
Khazanov gives a similar account of the situation: 
units at the lower levels of segmentation which, first and 
foremost, are connected with social, economic, and more 
narrowly productive needs rely on kin and contractual 
relations. The higher subdivisions, the functions of which 
are primarily socio-political and in part include their 
functions as guarantors or holders of corporative 
proprietary rights to key resources, are based on the 
principle of descent. (1984: 1401 
Underlying such structuring we find that alongside the increase 
of importance and size of the units, there also is the widening of the 
sphere of interest. From necessary economic associations, we move onto 
the political, or socio-political, scene". In the end, segmentary 
19 To which one might add that "Tribal definition tended to be sharpest 
at the top of the tribal pyramid, and 
increasingly attenuated further down" 
(Coote; 1991: 40-411. 
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systems are of a much more ideological nature than has at first been 
assumed. Cribb, above, touches the problem, when maintaining that 
membership is based on "either agnatic descent or political 
allegiance , 211 . Represented so often as the preserver of equality, they 
ultimately are often but the expression of reigning relationships of 
power within the tribe. They seldomly can, and normally do not avoid 
the fact that effective power and leadership becomes vested in one 
particular family and segment. Furthermore they can be seen as being 
used to reinforce, even legitimate this fact [Khazanov; 1984: 141]. 
one can thus see that rivalry and affiliation at the top level 
of the hierarchy are in fact responsible for much of the picture that 
segmental lineages come to reflect. It is here that most of what is 
said to represent agnatic descent groups and lineages is invented from 
the necessities of cognatic relationships, where so-called blood 
relationships are made up from political associations [Marx; 1977: 
355; Thiel; 1980: 16; Khazanov; 1984: 143]. Through the ideal image of 
ancestry and lineal descent shines the reality of power relations at 
the top of the social ladder. Tribal ideology takes its form here. As 
with royal ideology, it seems to be conceived of by those in power for 
those who have none. It is the tribal 61ite who decide on its forms, 
with little considerations other than their own personal interests. 
The average nomad has little say or control over the system. Even 
adherence to that system is decided for him; he is integrated into a 
20 The degree of egalitarianism and the importance of kinship ties in 
nomadic societies have at times been exaggerated. Rowton states that 
Oegalitarian society is little in evidence among the tribes of western 
Asia" [1976c: 243; also Asad; 1979: 421-4221 Black's article is interesting, 
for here he states: "Equality, that is equality of opportunity, among Luri 
tribesmen is a fiction similar to that employed in western European 
democracies to justify, for instance, the blatant differences of quality in 
the educational facilities available to the children of the working class 
and those of the middle class respectively" (Black; 1972: 6171. Cribb shows 
that voluntary associations and patron-client relationships are important 
(1991: 35-36,391 and claims that "the involvement in associations beyond 
the extended family and herding group appear to correlate with degrees of 
inequality in the distribution of wealth and status" [1991: 40]. As often 
these ties are formed to act in a first instance against capital-labour 
imbalances amongst nomads, he goes on to expose a number of responses to 
such imbalances that range from the "egalitarian" over the "cor=ercial" and 
"stratified" to "pastoral feudalism'" [1991: 40-421. 
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system benefiting the preservation of the status quo and keeping him 
in his correct place. 
In a nomadic society such ideology finds its expressions through 
ancestry, genealogies and descent groups. As already pointed out 
several times, these, however, have little to do with reality [Rowton; 
1977: 197; Thiel; 1980: 111. These are but the translation of power 
relations at the top of the society, where the influential families 
give themselves an ancestral right to superiority, and create a web of 
imaginative relations with those who are useful to them in pursuing 
their interests: 
One other function of genealogies is that they legitimize 
social inequality in native models which are already 
heterogeneous ... Frequently 
it is the aristocracy in a 
society which cultivates knowledge of genealogies and 
manipulates them so as to give an ideological basis to 
their ruling positions. [Khazanov; 1984: 142, also 
Garthwaite: 1978: 1861 
This is best seen in the immense flexibility of such systems. 
For, to the contrary of true agnatic and blood relations, the 
relations at the top of a segmental lineage system are not of an 
immutable nature. They change as old rivalries are buried or old 
affiliations break up; briefly said, they vary with the political and 
economical necessities of the leading families. Minor segments or 
subtribes can rise in power, and if and when the time is ripe, be 
integrated into the power stratum. Genealogies are easily changeable, 
and normally reflect little more than the power situation of'a given 
moment in time. Khazanov associates the phenomenon of "genealogical 
amnesia" with this process of assimilation of former outside groups 
(cf 1984: 142,143; cf Swidler; 1972: 116-1171. 
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Finally it has to be emphasized that the presence of a sedentary 
state strongly influences a nomadic community and unavoidably the 
contacts with the sedentary world will start to influence its own 
internal organization on the economic, as well as the political and 
social level. In such a case the adjacent state society will not only 
further the development of an 61ite, but also be highly influential in 
the choice of the potential leader and leading family or segment (cf 
Rowton; 1976c: 147]. Khazanov explains this manifestation: 
In my opinion, from the sociopolitical point of view, 
nomadism is not merely the economic adaptation of pastoral 
society to its habitat. At the same time, neither is it a 
distinct socioeconomic formation, or a distinct mode of 
production. The level of sociopolitical development in 
nomadic societies and corresponding changes in this level 
are very largely determined by the specificity of the 
societies, relations with the outside world, and with the 
individual particularities of the latter [Khazanov; 
1984: 1971 
There seems to be no doubt that nomadic structures experience 
manifold changes when encountering sedentary communities, not the 
least of which arguably is a definite increase in the social 
differentiation amongst the nomads themselves (cf Marx; 1977: 344; 
Khazanov; 1984: 186; see also Rowton; 1976c: 228-2291. Contact with the 
sedentary world means to be drawn into the prevailing politics and 
economics, which will work out to the advantage of one or the other 
nomadic group at the expense of others. This seems to be the natural 
outcome of a symbiotic relationship between sedentary and nomad. 
Whether the nomadic component in such a symbiosis be the dominant, 
inferior, 'or equivalent partner, the impact of the sedentary lifestyle 
will eventually split the nomad camp itself and reinforce the 
differences between dominant and dominated. 
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To some extent the arrangements are meant for little more than 
facilitating a state's contact with and control of a given tribe. 
States need, or at least prefer to deal with tangible entities 
[Ghaffer and Ahmed; 1973: 90]. If in a nomadic and/or highland 
environment such entities are not present they will do their best to 
create not only them, but also a form of 61ite, who can and will be 
held responsible for the activities of this entity (Marx; 1977: 359; 
Irons; 1979: 3711. Briant himself is reluctant to express himself in 
tribal terms, preferring to speak generally of "peuples" or an 
ethnos2'. In the end it has to be admitted that there are groups which 
at the top of the social level are viewed as a tribe, but mainly so by 
the state authorities and the somewhat state dependent tribal 61ite 
[cf Coote; 1991: 411. At the lower levels there is discernible quite a 
degree of autonomy. Yet under certain circumstances, particularly the 
danger of aggression from the outside, here also tribal expressions 
will gain in importance, when it is deemed necessary to face the 
danger as a unit. 
In the New Kingdom case it would thus be appropriate to assume 
that in Lab'ayu, for example, we encounter a sheik who has risen to 
prominence through Egypt's preference of dealing with him and his 
following. In fact, put together with the expositions above taken from 
Briant, all this would point towards two interpretations. Fortunately 
they are not unreconcilable. The Ouxian case clearly points out that 
some of the ethnic relations have a wider spectrum than the textual 
evidence would have us believe. Ethnicities do not follow natural 
geographical boundaries. A people might thus live both in and outside 
the mountainous area. The other cases, however, show that within a 
given mountain-territory more numerous distinct ethnic groups can be 
existing than the textual evidence at first let appear (Briant; 
21ThiS is mainly so, because tribe' has come to represent many 
different things to many different people and the category is "by no means 
agreed upon in the anthropological 
literature" [Kamp and Yoffee; 1980: 88; 
Meyers; 1983: 47,481. 
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1982: 58-59,80; cf Coote; 1991: 42,43]. Thus taken together this 
indicates that also a number of diverging tribal or ethnic groupings 
might have occupied the highlands of Palestine, these were not 
organized along the geographical line of the limes that we have 
identified beforehand. 
It is thus all the more understandable how the late Egyptian 
conquests could possibly have met with unified resistance and how the 
highlands became the centre of that movement of dissidence. The 
highlands were in fact not a mere melting pot of loosely connected 
marauding elements. They are the location of long-standing tribal and 
ethnic affiliations, if, as we assume, the Egyptians did in fact use 
the terms of lapiru and shasulsutu to cover up the little knowledge 
they had about such affiliations in the Palestinian hinterland. 
However it is these same affiliations which took more consolidated 
forms again, as the Egyptians tried to force their way into the 
highlands22. Not only that, but they also facilitated the movement of 
lowland elements into the highlands. In fact these affiliations went 
across the lines imposed by the zones of influence of Egypt. They were 
most at work beyond the limes of civilization, where Egyptian control 
was only nominal. They were also present on this side of the frontier, 
although they might have been lying dormant for long. Ironically 
enough it was Egypt's attempt to extend its frontier that hastened 
their reawakening [cf Price; 1978: 179]. Elements from the plains and 
the foothills joined their fellow tribesmen in the highlands, 
22 A similar case is argued for the Median consolidation by Burney and 
Lang: "The threat of Assyrian expansion into the highlands of Iran by way 
of Mannean territory had provided the spur which in due course brought 
about the political unity of the Medes, a people whose numbers and wide 
domains were sure to make them a major power in the Near East" [1971: 123; 
Brown; 1986: 1091. Kotula similarly views Roman expansion to be the cause of 
the formation of a great coalition of African tribes under Tacfarinas 
(1976: 3441 Finally Knauf gives a corresponding interpretation for the 
situation at Mari: "Beruhen die Konflikte zwischen Städtern und «Nomadenn 
in Mari wirklich auf der okriegerischen Veranlagungn der letzteren, und 
nicht eher darauf, dass der Staat Mari Land kolonialisierte und einer 
intensiven Nutzung zuführte, das die Ziehbauern für ihre extensive 
Landwirtschaft ebenfalls benötigten? Handelt es sich bei den grossen 
Stämmesverbanden der uMari-Nomaden« nicht eher um eine Reaktion auf den 
Druck der umliegenden städtisch-staatlichen Gemeinwesen als um ein 
*nomadisches Naturgesetz? " [1985: 42-43; cf Kamp and Yoffee; 1980: 88). 
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especially as Egypt went on to install herself in the Shephelah23. 
These were the processes of nomadisation and/or tribalisation 
that have been proposed by a number of authors [cf Coote and Whitelam; 
1987]. Yet they took place at the height of Egypt's involvement in 
Palestine, rather than after the collapse of the empire. The collapse 
itself rather provoked a transit period of sedentarisation and 
reorganization. The people involved in this period involved those, or 
the descendants of those, who had previously fled in front of the 
Egyptian onslaught as above. Thus to a limited degree at least we are 
in agreement with a theory of withdrawal at the close of the Bronze 
Age. But it took place earlier, i. e. before the collapse, and also 
took more organized forms. In fact the people involved joined tribally 
structured groupings, to whom, partly, they had belonged before, or by 
whom, again partly, they were accepted and integrated anew. The 
problem then is how much the 61ites of the time had a say. 
The 61ites themselves cannot have changed a lot since the Amarna 
times. Among them there might have been slight variations. Some might 
have been tribalists more heavily reliable on bandits as a military 
element. Some might simply have been bandits in charge of a protection 
racket. Some might have been more strictly dependent on a city than 
others. Both Rowton and Khazanov agree how difficult it is to 
determine and discover such power structures archaeologically. 
Consequently Rowton argues that such forms as a dimorphic state with 
tribal involvement took place more often than is generally assumed 
[Rowton; 1973a: 203; 1973b: 254; see also Cribb; 1991: 261. Khazanov's 
explanation is that the forms of nomadic chiefdoms, even states, often 
are disposable in nature. It can be deduced from this that 61ite forms 
23 Coote's description of the events is similar: "Egyptian rule 
intensified during the 13th and early 12th century, a situation conducive 
to the strengthening of select tribal powers in relation to Egypt rule of 
which Israel was one. As a focal point 
for tribal opposition to city-state 
power, actual and/or structural, Egyptian or Philistine, Israel expanded as 
a highland hinterland power 
during the 12th and 11th century as political 
changes triggered the extension of village settlement under tribal rule" 
(coote; 1991: 431. 
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must have survived in similar fashion to Lablayu, Abdi-khepa, Abdi- 
Asirta and Aziru. There were thus enough rural 61ite-type elements 
with military back-up only too happy to claim responsibility over the 
newcomers. In this task they were aided by the existing affiliations 
described above. If the arriving groups did not walk into total chaos, 
they neither walked into freedom. They merely changed the overlordship 
of the city-state for that of a rural counterpart. The advantage 
however was that they at least escaped from the recently tightening 
grip of Egypt. 
The situation can hardly be equated with a peasant revolt per 
se 24. on the one hand the movement was not socio-politically induced, 
not an opposition between impoverished peasants and rich city-state 
61ites. if anything it was nationally induced, a contrast between 
Asiatic Palestinians and Egyptian occupiers 25 . Secondly it was not a 
revolt as such. Rather it was a process of withdrawal; a long process 
which probably started under Sety I. Thirdly, the term peasant is 
under these circumstances at least too limited a term to be used. 
Among those taking refuge in the highlands would have been displaced 
61ite members, artisans, and merchants, as much as peasants. Thus 
"We repeat again that generally seen revolts and revolutions aren't a 
peasant affair: "Ethnologues et 
historiens de la paysannerie s'accordent 
sur ce point: jusquIA 
la naissance de la soci6t6 industrielle, on observe 
r6bellions, soulovements, s6ditions, 
jacqueries, mais non de r6volutionft 
[Mendras: 1995: 175] (emph. added). 
"The situation was thus similar to the one culminating in the Jewish 
revolt [cf Horsley and Hanson; 
1985; Horsley; 1986; 19811. Yet this also 
serves to stress the 
difference between a revolt and a withdrawal as 
exposed here. occurrences 
leading to the Jewish revolt are described by 
Horsley in these terms: "That is, by creating a vast number of fugitives 
who could not return to their villages and 
towns, they effectively forced 
these peasants to form bands which had to plunder their own former 
territory or other areas simply for subsistence. Other than long-distance 
flight, moreover, these brigand bands now had no alternative but to fight 
back against the Romans --and keen motivation to do so* [Horsley; 1986: 169, 
also: 163,170; 1981: 429-430]. 
The Romans provoked with many retaliations 
against bandits an avalanche of 
hostile peasant reaction [Horsley and 
Hanson; 1985.: 78; Horsley; 1981: 4291. This was dependent, however, on the 
fact that in Roman times the hill country was densely settled. The 
Egyptians could quite simply not have provoked the same, as the hill 
country was largely unpopulated. 
There was simply no need for revolt as 
such; the flight 
into the hill country was as effective and, in the end, a 
less dangerous option [cf Coote and Whitelam; 1987: 40-41,58-591. 
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peasant as a social class can under the circumstances be considered a 
misnomer". Finally, if the term peasant is taken too narrowly, it 
becomes difficult to keep in mind the tribal affiliations at work [cf 
Lemche; 1991: 12; Coote; 1991: 41-42,44]. For often the peasant and the 
tribal world are seen as distinct and sharply segregated. The 
following arguments should rectify this notion. 
First of all it should be mentioned that both desert nomads and 
highland pastoralists seek at least part-time work in the plains and 
the cities [Peters; 1978: 324; Swidler; 1980: 22]. Within the ancient 
world it is especially in the military field that we know of tribal 
nomads and pastoralists to be at the service of the central and city 
authorities. Amongst these elements, members of quite elevated social 
rank and/or economically well off nomads might indeed also be included 
Ccf Rowton; 1973b: 255]. Rowton also says that richer nomads or members 
of the tribal 61ite who settle down often remain influential within 
the tribe [1974: 171. Marx insists on the fact that most nomads who 
seek part-time work in settled areas maintain contacts with the tribe 
so as to keep open the possibility of an eventual return [Marx; 
1984a]. These urban-based nomads would help to facilitate, or even 
instigate, a return to the home-tribes in the highland regions [again 
cf Salzman; 1980a: 13 ]27. 
26 On the general problems of peasants as a class see Shanin [1971: 253], 
Marx [1971: 2311, Wolf [1971; 264-2651. It is in fact highly unlikely that 
peasants identify themselves as a united social class. It is, as we have 
already seen, even difficult to see peasants as a real collective group; 
only recently Mendras has again made that point: "La diversit6 des patois 
et des dialectes de 
i6gion A r6gion, ainsi que leurs variations mineures de 
localit6 en localit6, montre que cette homog6n6it6 culturelle va de pair 
avec une relative autarcie sociale: ce qui est conunun dans une collectivit6 
West pas exactement ce qui est commun dans les voisines. Chaque village a 
sa personnalit6 et ses traits 
distinctifs .... ... : le villageois se sent 
dvautant plus de son village s'il se sent le mgme que ses covillageaois et 
diff6rent des villageois des autres villages. " (Mendras; 1995: 108,113]. 
27 Yedid says: "Certes les b6douins, comme tout un chacun plac6 devant la 
facilit6 de la vie citadine, ont tendance A vouloir slint6grer. Mais la 
d6sertion 6ventuelle se fera du d6sert vers la Ville et non pas vers la 
Terre. Cette d6sertion sera dlailleurs suivie d'un courant contraire de 
retour vers le d6sert en cas d'insucc6s. Les grands caravaniers, riches 
avant de se s6dentariser, en sont un exemple. Ils nlont pas <<tent6 leur 
chance>> A la ville. Ils sly sont install6s, augmentant leurs richesses en 
slint6grant au milieu capitaliste marchand dont avant, ils d6pendaient, et 
en gardant leurs traits b6douins ... Les villes Wont pas attendu le Me 
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Another issue at stake concerns the longstanding assumption that 
nomadic pastoralists are organized in tribes while peasants are not. 
This has been challenged [Cribb; 1991: 26; Salzman; 1980a: 13; Swidler; 
1980: 25 ]28. Indeed peasants or sedentaries are often seen to have 
tribal affiliations even when village based (Cole; 1973: 120]. In the 
Kassite case, for example, Briant stipulates that a village based 
organization is discernible. In fact, he points out a confederation of 
otherwise quite autonomous villages which came together in times of 
danger when they retreat to their refuges in the high mountains as 
well as gathering a common fighting force (1982: 80-81]. It is 
arguable, after what we have said about tribal organization 
beforehand, that such a village confederation is but part of the wider 
ethnic unit itself organized along tribal lines. Knauf also insists: 
Kein nomadisches Erbe ist das Stämmesystem. Stämme sind 
die politische Organisation nicht-urbaner Populationen, 
wenn die Bevölkerungsdichte oder die Häufigkeit und 
Intensität der (nicht immer friedlichen) Interaktionen 
zwischen den Bevölkerungsgruppen eine politische 
Organisation nötig machen. Dass die Stämmebildung auf den 
Prozess der Abwanderung der bauern in das Bergland, auf 
die Gründung ihrer Dörfer und damit auf die "Landnahme 
ohne Wüstenwanderungu zurückgeht, demonstrieren die 
ägyptischen Texte, wenn sie im Laufe des 13. Jahrhunderts 
dazu übergehen Ethnonyme zu gebrauchen, wo sie zuvor nur 
von unspezifierten shasu geredet haben. [Knauf; 1988: 107) 
si&cle pour acqu6rir 
leur charme, et Pattrait qu'elles ont sur les nomades 
ne date pas d, aujourd'hui" 
[1984: 29]. A little earlier he had explained the 
outcome of this double 
flux of sedentarization and nomadization: "Mais ces 
mouvements ont un r6sultat certain: 
les us et les coutumes de la tribu se 
maintiennent, et l1autorit6 
du Cheikh demeure puissante, ne serait-ce que 
pour se garder un abri en cas 
de besoin ou pour slassurer le retour dans la 
tribu nomade si l'on d6cide de reprendre la vie sous la tente" [Yedid; 
1984: 29; also Kamp and Yoffee; 1980: 93,98]. 
29 See also Lemche's discussion on village societies (1985: 170ff]. In 
fact Cribb at some stage maintains in the Near East there are "many tribal 
groupings which involve nomadism only marginally" 
[1991: 541. 
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Again, tribes do not conform to the geographical frontiers, 
neither to the diverging lifestyles that are thus generally imposed by 
the terrain. In our case it means that the peasant villagers of the 
plain were at least in part affiliated to the pastoralist elements in 
the hill country 29 . Again Briant's example of the Ouxians shows that 
those living in the plain were agriculturalists, those in the 
highlands though were shepherds. All the same they were all Ouxians. 
So at least as far as affiliations go, movement into the highlands, as 
well as coherence with the structures there would have been 
encouraged. It seems evident that, if we widen the scope from tribal 
to ethnic affiliations, such differences between sedentaries and 
nomads would be even less important [cf Kamp and Yoffee; 1980: 88,951. 
To get back to the question posed above, it appears that the 
highland 61ites under these circumstances would have had a say over 
the people originating in the plain, if these indeed were tribally or 
ethnically affiliated to the hill people. This is probably the case if 
people were looking for military leadership. Yet equally important was 
the need for sedentary produce, now that the relations with Egypt had 
worsened, and the hill population was swelling. Conversely, the 
prosperity that the Egyptian takeover 
had brought to several 
Palestinian cities and the rise of rich temple estates provided 
increasing opportunities for raiding activities. Basically speaking, 
the best opportunities to appropriate sedentary produce seemed to 
favour military aggression. The time as such was ripe especially for 
military leaders to seize their chances. 
The parasocial leader in particular would have profited from the 
situation. More than others he was able to combine the advantages 
"Furthermore those who were not so affiliated would not necessarily 
have found difficulties in being admitted into a tribal units, as tribal 
processes can also be seen "in 
terms Of the accretion of heterogeneous 
units in response to largely political pressures" (Cribb; 1991: 54; also 
Kamp and Yoffee; 1980: 881. 
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lying in popular discontent and the desire to return to more tribal 
forms of structurisation. Was he not like a sheik, yet also in command 
of a force recruited among the uprooted and discontent? In times like 
these he could furthermore considerably strengthen his paramilitary 
sector with refugees that would otherwise easily have turned to 
banditry. These refugees were on the one hand dependent on sedentary 
produce, on the other out of a job, as most of them previously were 
peasant producers themselves. It is at this point where the political 
goal and economic necessities of the situation ask for common 
solutions that dissidence and brigandage again meet. The political 
goal lies with dissidence, the desire to resist the Egyptian onslaught 
and ultimately secession. However it remains important to provide the 
necessary agricultural goods. This becomes however extremely 
difficult, as Egyptian occupied Palestine, i. e. enemy territory, 
represents the main breadbasket. It is thus important to find a way 
which works across the line of political separation yet economic 
dependence. 
Again the parasocial leader represents the ideal personality to 
provide a possible solution. As the leader of a separate unit, tribal 
or ethnic, he can strive towards political secession". Yet as the 
leader of a paramilitary grouping, recruited among the discontent, he 
is well equipped to guarantee the provision of food. Finally, he 
offers a place in this new society, especially as he needs new 
employees in his ambition to fulfill this latter role. Evidently not 
all leaders were necessarily parasocial leaders of Rowton's type. Yet 
the example shows how people came to be acconunodated in a developing 
consolidation of power that the times generated and necessitated. 
Cribb also mentions the phenomenon of "the creation of tribes or 
confederacies by decree around a nucleus of freshly recruited military 
unitsm [1991: 53-54]. Rowton similarly devotes a long discussion to the 
"Illuminating might here also be Coote's view: "The point of tribal 
organization was to mobilize and rationalize groups in opposition to some 
threat, and the paramount threat was typically the state, or for a state 
ruled by a tribe, other states" 
[Coote; 1991: 401. 
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processes by which parasocial leaders not only attract uprooted 
elements and adventurers, but also use tribal splinter groups to form 
new and powerful tribes of their own [esp. 1977 : 19off]31. 
For the ambitious leader it was to a great extent a question of 
timing, which itself depended on the precarious situation of the 
increasing highland population. A great deal of the occurrences at the 
end of Egyptian hegemony must have depended on the ad hoc adaptations 
that had to be undertaken. one should not forget that if agricultural 
produce was needed, then it would be needed promptly. Under such 
circumstances the aggressive, albeit unstable, manner of procuring 
foodstuffs was preferred. It can fairly be assumed that many 
considered the situation to be only temporarY32 and that they did not 
object to but possibly participated in more aggressive activities. The 
dependency on military experts and leaders generated further 
consolidation. 
Almost immediately, however, the cleverest of the leaders would 
have recognized the fact that a constant supply of sedentary- 
31 This gaining of power by a parasocial leader should be seen as 
operating parallel to the way that tribes can at times form around strong 
leaders. It also shows once more that even elements with no prior tribal 
attachments can be admitted due to the flexibility of the system: "A third 
element is usually involved 
in the form of authority structures centering 
on chiefs which penetrate the secondary 
level and are capable of holding 
together large lineage-based units which recognize no common descent. The 
process by which tribal units crystallize around a central lineage or 
powerful individual seems to 
have been historically common. Such units 
possess a central core organized 
in lineage's, together with a fluctuating 
element which may shift allegiance to rival 
leaders. Such accretions could 
also occur,..., not only through recruitment 
from other tribes, but also by 
attracting non-tribal peasantry. Barth 
(1961, pp. 132-3) recognizes two 
patterns of tribal evolution: the 
first by Way of population growth, 
segmentation and incorporation; the second occurring much more rapidly 
through the aggregation of tribally --and even ethnically-- diverse 
elements around a strong 
leader. The impression of stable lineage-based 
Structures often conveyed as a result of synchronic modes of ethnographic 
inquiry May conceal a system in a constant state of flux. This perceived 
lineage structure is frequently a product of conscious rationalizations by 
tribal leaders or provincial administrators, an edifice of kinship erected 
on the basis of a common political or military purpose (see Barth 1961, 
p. 55) ... n(Cribb; 
1991: 531. 
33 The process is amongst others also dependent on the human disposition 
to opt for short-term solutions. Hayden says: "The tendency to take 
advantage of the immediate situation and worry about the consequences when 
and if they occur 
is also all too human" [1993: 462]. 
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agriculturalist produce was going to be highly advantageous. The most 
powerful among them, i. e. those who already had an important military 
following, could start to invest in some settlement activities". That 
it was the most powerful must be deduced from the fact that they were 
most able to guarantee food supply under temporary conditions, thus 
able to support some of the agriculturalist activities that in the 
short term seemed unproductive. similarly, it would have been easy to 
encourage such activities where they had been practiced before. Again 
the northern highlands would thus have been a preferred area. 
The collapse of Egyptian power, just like the prior increase in 
Egyptian presence, had to be met with fresh adaptations in the 
highlands. The question however is whether it reinforced or weakened 
the trend of consolidation. If the situation that we all have 
witnessed only too recently in Bosnia is anything to go by, it would 
appear that the retreat of a strong outside force, leads to 
fragmentation among the resident population [cf Braudel; 1992: 606]. It 
is arguable that the same happened to some degree in the Palestinian 
highlands as Egypt left a political vacuum. For one, people as easily 
recognize ethnical and tribal differences, as they recognize ethnical 
and tribal links". They thus reinforce or weaken the ties as is suited 
33 Marx exposes a situation where organizers of smuggling in the South 
Sinai invested some of their fortune in establishing villages in 
inaccessible mountain areas. Admittably they served primarily as hideouts 
for smuggling activities, yet also for housing in the winter period. Even 
orchards were planted. The situation 
is obviously not altogether equivalent 
to the ancient Palestinian scenario, but nevertheless worth a mention 
[Marx; 1980: 117-118; 1984b: 1821. 
34 The irony which often dictates the way people come to recognize 
differences is exposed by Weissleder: "The Adal look down upon the Argobba, 
their fellow Muslims, because they are farmers; the Amhara distrust and 
dislike the Argobba, their fellow farmers, because they are Muslims* 
[1978: 2771. The rather humorous account presented by Nigel Barley on his 
anthropological field-research among a people called the Dowayos shows that 
he ran into the same problems. They were themselves despised by other 
people, such as the Dupa, who considered them to be a "debased race of sons 
of dogs" (1983: 341, and the opinion of the neighbouring Fulani was no 
other: "Dowayo were dogs, mere animals. " (1983: 151]. And yet the Dowayo 
have their own to despise; for them that role is fulfilled by the Koma, a 
pagan tribe, whom they consider as especially primitive and ugly 
11983: 1611. All that talk about dogs and ugliness is obviously remindful of 
our discussion of "barbarians", and that 
is why we like to add this conment 
by Barley: "The time had come, if indeed it was not overdue, to move into a 
village. nowayos divide into two sorts. mountains and Plains. Everyone I 
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to the time and situation. The prior conditions had led to 
reinforcement: there was a conmon aggressor, the loss of and desire to 
keep one's autonomy, with it the loss of an appropriate social 
structure, thus the need to adopt the order of the highland societies. 
Finally the will to secede, but the need to eat, directed many 
activities against the powerful and prosperous Egypt, and her 
collaborators of the lowlands. Under these circumstances, some links 
and ties were probably extented to unprecedented degrees; maybe even 
wider tribal confederations formed in order to satisfy the need for 
cohesion in the face of the might of Egypt. 
It has been pointed out that such larger tribal agglomerations 
are however rare and most of the time not of long endurance. They are 
highly dependent on the particular political circumstances, and prone 
to dissolve when the situation changes. When Egypt left, many of the 
necessary premises for the maintenance of such agglomerations 
disappeared with her. Not only did the common enemy disappear, but so 
did an important food provider. With the collapse of Egypt went the 
temple estates and the cities, which had become prosperous under her 
late hegemony, suffered the consequences and many were abandoned. For 
the highland dissidents there was little left to pillage and plunder. 
The highland populations thus again had to undertake serious 
organizational changes, both economically and socio-politically. The 
new circumstances however worked considerably against the 
establishment of large units. They also had an adverse effect on those 
61ite groupings that had profited most from the state of enmity 
between many Palestinians and Egyptian controlled institutions of 
authority, and had vested most of their power in the maintenance of a 
strong military component. 
had spoken to had urged me to live among plains Dowayos - They were less 
barbarous, supplies would be easier, more of them spoke French; I would be 
able to go to church more easily. Mountain Dowayos were savage and 
difficult, they would tell me nothing, they worshipped the Devil" [1983: 45] 
(emph. added). At least, it goes to show that preconceived opinions change 
very slowly- 
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Types such as the parasocial leader suffered severely from the 
fact that food provision through pillage and brigandage had to give 
way to methods, which more heavily than before involved food 
production by the new highlanders themselves". Conversely those who 
had been clever enough to invest in agricultural production earlier on 
held, on the one hand, an initial advantage. Yet, on the other, they 
possibly became easy targets for groups of the first kind, who were 
looking for new sources to profit from, either by raiding them or by 
wanting to set up protection rackets. These circumstances could only 
have added to the turmoil that already existed as units disintegrated. 
To resume, the collapse of the New Kingdom empire had its 
effects on the highlands and its populations. Politically this 
probably involved a reduction in size of tribal and ethnic units, as 
well as a reduction in importance of powerful chiefs and their 61ite 
followers. Economically it meant turning towards production rather 
than appropriation. This in turn meant reinforced sedentarisation, 
which itself developed to be of a dispersed kind. In fact the increase 
in numbers of relatively small, but self-sufficient settlements, was a 
result not only of the collapse of the prosperous urban network of the 
late empire, but equally the disintegration of the tribal forces, 
which themselves had arisen mainly as reaction to this takeover". With 
no urban network and its dependent trade to live off, the highlanders, 
like the plain inhabitants were forced to seek survival in the village 
based economy. If we have thus posited a period of considerable 
nomadisation at the end of the empire, this next period must be viewed 
as characterized by processes of resedentarisation, especially as far 
"Again the situation for Marx's organizers of smuggling in South Sinai 
is comparable [1980: 1181. 
36 The connection between sedentarisation, the demise of tribal 
agglomerations and a move towards self-sufficiency, are also 
illustrated by 
Cribb: "According to our model, phases of sedentarisation should be 
accompanied by a 
decline in specialization between pastoralism and 
cultivation, the merging of nomadic and sedentary sectors within tribal 
units, the weakening of 
tribal organization -though not necessarily its 
disappearance- and the pursuit of pastoralism largely within the framework 
of a mixed agro-pastoral system" 
[Cribb; 1991: 62]. 
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as the highlands themselves are concernedý7. 
These processes of sedentarisation are not a revolutionary novel 
phenomenon. They do not represent sudden changes in ethnic composition 
of the population. They are quite simply part of a set of alternatives 
that predominantly pastoralist and nomadic populations can turn to in 
adverse situations". Nonetheless they can he rather rapid. It has been 
demonstrated that one generation is sufficient to endorse a rather 
inperceptible transformation from fully nomadic to fully sedentary by 
the way of the example of the development of a tent into a semi- 
permanent then a permanent housing [cf Daker: 1984: passim; Jarno; 
1984: esp. 198-200). The development was inperceptible because within a 
few years nomads can cruite slowly become sedentaries. 
Cribb also shows various ways in which nomadic communities, as 
well as individuals can manipulate labour and capital to create a 
greater sector in need to settle down. simply variations in delaying 
or advancing the dates and ages for marriage can lead to the presence 
of a wider sector of small, but non-sufficient families, which will 
find themselves forced to settle down as agriculturalists [1991: 391. 
Richer members can especially decide on the fate of poorer nomads in 
making or not making shepherding contracts available. Conversely those 
who invest in land capital can become inclined to offer jobs in the 
agro-sedentary field, and start to behave like powerful landlords. In 
many ways such processes of adaptation result from creating and 
37 See Salzman: "Over a long span of time, the local history of many 
Middle Eastern areas reflects alternating phases of nomadic and settled 
life and the alternating sedentarisation and nomadisation of the local 
population (Adams 1975, Nissen, 
1972) ." (Salzman; 1980a: 131 Finkelstein and 
PerevolotskY similarly claim about the nomads of the Sinai and Negev: "In 
two periods, sedentarisation resulted from a deterioration of rural and 
urban society in the settled land, 
during which the nomads had to supply 
their own agricultural needs. " (1990: 67,70-71,80] 
30 Swidler has noted that although "nomads are said to be 
characteristically resistant to programs 
designed to encourage settlement", 
a difference should nonetheless 
he made "between forced sedentarisation as 
a political tactic and self-initiated sedentarization as a response to 
local economic and environmental factors" [Swidler; 1980: 21; also Aronson; 
1980: 1781. 
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disposing of a poorer sector by directing it towards sedentarism and 
agriculturalism. The situation in the Palestinian highlands, as 
political and economic collapse were being experienced, can only have 
emphasized such processes. Finally if we are correct in our 
assumptions that many highlanders were recent newcomers originating 
from the more agro-sedentary world of the plain and lowlands, it 
becomes easy to see how a sedentary sector engaged in agriculturalism 
can have developed rather rapidly under the circumstances. Another 
reason that would have furthered sedentarisation is that the arrival 
of the plain people would have swollen the numbers of nomad- 
pastoralists to a certain degree. Such a population growth is often 
seen as destructive to the nomadic option, provoking higher numbers of 
unviable households that need to settle down (Cribb; 1991: 621. 
undoubtedly the period of the 19th and 20th dynasty changed the 
face of Palestine. For all practical purposes this, rather more than 
the efforts of Tuthmosis III or the Pharaohs before him, presented the 
real conquest-cum-occupation of the southern dependencies. The 
attempts to extend the arm of Egypt into the highlands has caught our 
attention. No doubt resistance against the fresh Egyptian measures 
must have caused displacements of refugees and encouraged the 
activities of bandit groups, culminating in a climax of dissidence 
from the highland regions. Egyptian presence in the Shephelah was, in 
our opinion, the cause for this state of affairs rather than the 
result of it. 
The situation never fully stabilized. Coming to terms with the 
harsher Egyptian involvement was one thing, but as soon as this was 
done, the arrival of the Sea Peoples destroyed this new balance. 
Finally, Ramessess III's policies in subduing the eastern Shephelah 
cannot hide the fact that the empire was reaching its end. Some of his 
actions can in fact be interpreted as a last attempt by Egypt to get 
as much as possible economically out of her dependencies. Harsh 
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military occupation and measures of taxation are often the hallmark of 
crumbling states and empires. Resistance from the highlands can only 
have doubled in fierceness. By the time the empire finally collapsed, 
many highland groups had already decided to go their own way. Faced on 
the plains with the old oppressor and a new conqueror, settlement in 
the highlands presented an attractive option. In the end the vacuum 
left by Egypt allowed the extension of two diverging polities: the 
littoral Sea Peoples enclaves that had newly sprung up and the 
entities of the highlands where self-control and autonomy had never 
been lost. 
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Chapter 6 
Bandits and nomads: their potential role within the processes 
of settlement, reorganization and stratification 
This chapter is ultimately about state formation within the 
highlands. Yet we hope to have made it clear, if only by the choice of 
the title, that we are not here talking about something separate from 
what has been discussed before or, even worse, that now something 
dramatically new emerges on the scene. Some authors [cf Coote and 
Whitelam; 1986; 19871 have already moved in this direction. However even 
their works do not stress enough that it is not possible to view the 
history of the Palestinian highlands as being separated into a period of 
the *emergence of Israel" and then a period of "the formation of the 
Monarchy". We hope to remedy to this by including the development of 
settlement and organization, including stratification into one and the 
same chapter. We cannot separate them, because at the heart of the 
formation of polities (in whatever form and size) lies ever increasing 
settlement and/or exploitation of the territory which leads to a need for 
increased organization, but also the fact that increased organization can 
open ways for increasing settlement and/or exploitation of territory. 
Settlement and organization thus go hand in hand; they develop 
simultaneously rather than in sequence and react upon each other. 
We are aided in our enterprise by the fact that our previous 
chapter did not treat settlement per se, but rather activities during 
times of withdrawal. Yet the reader should not be led by this into 
thinking that we are now proposing just another, albeit different, 
classification; i. e. a period of withdrawal and a period of settlement 
and organization. This would in fact be missing the whole point of the 
argument. it is important to stress again that both are part of the same 
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processes, constantly changing as different entities try to extend their 
grip over the highland areas and population. There is a very basic, we 
would like to say natural, continuity between these phenomena that has 
too often been obscured by our concepts of Late Bronze passing into Early 
Iron Age, or worse, Canaanite into Israelite periods. 
Such assumptions must however not influence our renderings of 
events in any way at all; they must in fact be forgotten. It is the same 
people, or at least the descendants thereof, who withdrew and who had to 
face problems of settlement and organization. In any case we have, 
rejected the notion of Israelite as well as that of Canaanite. We have 
spoken of bandits and nomads, peasants and 61ites, as well as 
highlanders, lowlanders and plains people. We will come at some stage to 
speak of military and administrative personnel, merchants and kings. All 
the same, all these people are essentially ancient Palestinians, 
inhabitants of that geographical location we chose to call "Palestine". 
They do not now become something else. They remain Palestinians; we will 
try and describe how they moved and adapted in the face of changing 
conditions. Ultimately some of them will come to organize themselves in 
the form of a kingdom; that kingdom one may call "Israel, the land of 
omriff. Nonetheless it is a kingdom on Palestinian soil created by 
Palestinian folk, thus in the end thoroughly Palestinian itself. 
it is at this point that we encounter many problems in our task. 
Studies of state formation within the Palestinian highlands only appear 
as studies of the Israelite monarchy. For a long time, biblically-based 
ideological views of a newly emergent and highly egalitarian highland 
society dictated the outcomes of any treatment of state development in 
the highlands'. Thus, a concept drawn from the literary world of the 
Bible-dominated historical discussions. Furthermore this concept was seen 
as such a unique and innovative notion that it escaped proper historical 
investigation. As such, for a long period of time, it seems that no-one 
1 The next chapter will treat this particular problem more deeply. 
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was even willing to admit, or at least consider, that these highland 
communities could out of their own will move towards centralization of 
power, thereby rejecting all their society once stood for (cf Martin; 
1989: 95 ]2- Even the most adventurous, like Mendenhall, did not escape the 
well-established notion, that the monarchy was basically an "alien" 
institution. Depicting the fundamental differences between early Israel 
and the surrounding political system, and stressing both the novelty and 
uniqueness of the early Israelite experience, his reconstruction 
parallels that of others: 
The development of the Israelite Monarchy followed the model 
of a typical Syro-Hittite state and introduced a pagination 
into the political and social history of Israel with fateful 
and lasting consequences. (Mendenhall; 1975: 1551 
Whitelam's comment illustrates the state of affairs: 
There could be no better illustration of the lack of progress 
during the last twenty years achieved by text-based studies 
of the history of Israel, i. e. reconstructions depending 
primarily upon the literary sources" [Whitelam; 1986: 48 and 
ff). 
The fact however is that such studies have dominated scholarship 
for so long that it is now difficult to engage in a different method. As 
archaeology had for a long time been guided by such text-based 
interpretations, it has itself suffered from the ensuing implications. 
Not only can we not be altogether sure about the datings, not to speak of 
the assignment of ethnic divergences, that have been applied, but we 
simply miss a good deal of information due to the dominant strategies of 
'Nowadays such ideological explanations for culture change are widely 
rejected from a general point of view [see Hayden; 1993: 4171. 
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archaeological research3. In fact, the concentration on finding the 
remnants of an Israelite kingdom have led most archaeologists to work in 
the highlands themselves, following strategies adopted more or less 
directly from the Bible. Thus the lowlands and the plains have been 
almost completely forgotten. Developments of (re-)settlement and of 
similar polity building in the lower parts of Palestine, as well as in 
Transiordan, are relatively unknown to us. We cannot therefore be 
altogether sure about their impact on the highlands themselves. To put it 
bluntly, archaeologically-speaking we are at a loss and have to start 
from scratch in discussing the interactions between plains, lowlands, and 
highlands in what is generally seen as the Early Iron Age period. 
Nonetheless, a number of studies have been presented that at least 
initiated a movement against the trend of viewing the state as a foreign 
borrowing, best explained by pagination and reversion in the face of the 
Philistine threat. Although the Philistines still figure as a catalyst of 
the eventual institution of the state, as Frick puts it "a necessary but 
not a sufficient cause" [1985: 26], prior to that, causes leading towards 
stratification and centralization that are internal to the highland 
communities have become a central focus of attention. Precedence is thus 
given to a complex and multivariant internal evolution taking place over 
a considerable time-span, as opposed to a uniform external cause leading 
to a sharp break with the previous social arrangements [cf Whitelam; 
1986: 61-62; Frick; 1986: 13; also Lamberg-Karlowsky and Sabloff; 
1979: 2071. 
one of the intermediate stages in such a development is seen in the 
establishment of a chiefdom [cf esp. Flanagan; 1981]. At the head of 
these, we find local strongmen, men who have managed to gain influence 
and authority among their peers to a great extent through the 
machinations involved in the "intensifier-redistributor-warrior" complex 
'What little has been achieved archaeologically will also be treated 
in the final chapter. 
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(cf Harris; 1979: 92; 1978: 71-73]. However, stratification and 
centralization do not evolve solely from the desire of such bigmen to 
impose their authority. Chiefs can only flourish under the right 
conditions, especially as bigger units at their early stages are subject 
to an endemic tendency to fission [Harris; 1979: 101; MUller; 1996: 100]. 
In the highlands of ancient Palestine these tendencies to fission need 
counteracting if the road towards statehood is to he maintained. They are 
effectively counteracted, when the territory of the highlands comes to 
lose its initial advantage, its potential for expansion. Otherwise people 
can simply leave those regions where some power or authority is about to 
be installed or, as Muller puts it: "People have all opportunities to, 
literally, vote with their feet if they feel dissatisfied" [1996: 113; 
also Hagesteiin; 1996: 196]. 
That this kind of circumscription has to occur at some stage is 
dictated by the very nature of the Palestinian highland terrain, 
surrounded by semi-arid steppes and desert fringes. Good arable land is 
limited, many of the areas being more suitable for horticulture and 
animal husbandry. Pressures of demography are easily felt in such areas. 
So, whereas the early settlers took over a marginal area where a low 
population density guaranteed available land for a self-sufficient 
existence, as well as possibilities to expand, population growth 
conversely seriously restricts these possibilities. Soon enough the 
limits of available arable land are reached, and it becomes impossible to 
solve the problem of a constantly growing population by expansion alone 
(cf Harris; 1979: 1021. In order to maintain production and self- 
sufficiency, the highland-population has to revert to the policy of 
intensification, but intensification has its own devastating side- 
effects, such as depletion. 
Eventually, intensification will provide no long time solution to 
further demographic pressures, and parts of the population have to engage 
in the cultivation of more inhospitable areas (Claessen; 1996: 345]. They 
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are likely to face two problems, often both of them together: firstly, 
these new territories are not only ecologically, but also environmentally 
unsuitable; secondly, some of them are just not amenable for cereal 
growing, some not even for animal husbandry; they are the traditional 
zones of horticulture. Surmounting the first obstacle meant an input of 
work and effort in terracing, the hewing of cisterns, and deforestation, 
on a much higher scale than had previously been the case. The second 
ultimately meant specialization, which resulted in a considerable loss of 
self-sufficiency. The first needs major group efforts, the second the 
possibility of exchange; both call for a higher degree of organization'. 
The way of understanding these developments owes a lot to 
Carneiro's theory of circumscription (Hauer; 1986; Whitelam; 1989: 1271'. 
The environmental aspect of the theory has been explained above, but the 
effects are felt even deeper, when a second aspect is also present, that 
is social circumscription. This is also a characteristic attributed to 
the Palestinian highlands. In the lowlands, the highlanders are pressed 
by the newly consolidating and growing powers of the plain!. They are 
also subject to raids from outside nomadic groups. Finally, internal 
environmental circumscription causes confrontations on an ever larger 
4 similar conditions are seen to determine the rise of civilizations. 
Lamberg-Karlowsky and Sabloff conclude: "In reviewing the evidence as 
understood from Egypt, Mesopotamia, and the Indus Valley, it seems clear 
that population increase --- within a geographically circumscribed area 
which was agriculturallY productive when 
irrigated--- played a fundamental 
role in the development. of civilization. An expanding population in turn 
was related to an increasing economic specialization and social 
stratification within the civilizations of Mesopotamia, Egypt, and the 
Indus Valley" (1979: 209]. 
5Irons discusses Carneiro's theory also in a pastoral -nomadic setting 
[1979: 366ffl. 
6 To an extent internal developments in the highlands in fact created 
the threat from the plains. Chaney, after stating that the "Philistines" 
possessed the necessary military skills and weapons to fight in hilly 
terrain, goes on to say: "If they were thus granted a means for the 
conquest of the uplands denied to the 
kings of the Bronze Age, the 
Philistine overlords also enjoyed a newborn incentive. Using the 
technological innovations discussed above, Israel's free holding 
cultivators had for the first time produced 
in the hill country an economic 
population base worth controlling" 
[Chaney; 1986: 66-67; Gottwald; 1986: 88- 
89,941. But again, a closer look at Philistine achievements is needed, 
before drawing any conclusions at this point. 
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scale involving ever larger units. These call not only for higher 
military organization, but disrupt trade and exchange, one of the 
counteracting agents to environmental circumscription itself. In the end, 
pushed to the limit in both the social and the environmental arena, 
highland communities would have had the possibility to move towards 
greater centralization, going through the stages of steadily increasing 
chiefdoms to a centralized state controlling production, trade, and 
defence. 
What we see here at work are the two traditional theories of state- 
formation, albeit in combination. Ewald, having followed the state- 
formation in the Taqali-massif next to the Nile River valley, describes 
the theories as such: 
one body of theory stresses social contract as the basis of 
state formation, arguing that states arise from consensus 
when people try to solve particular problems, usually of 
popu; ation and ecology. other theories stress coercion -- 
either of class exploitation or external conquest- as the 
prime mover for state formation. (Ewald; 1990: 181-182] 
It is not our aim to question the results or indeed the methods of 
such evolutionary theories of state formation [but see MUller 1996: 99]; 
in fact both bandit and nomad groups find an important place within these 
7 
processes . Thus, our first aim 
is to locate the functioning of these 
groups within such a scenario. However, a second question, also treated 
in the following chapter, will address the time-span needed for all these 
processes in order to reach statehood Ecf Shifferd; 1996: 31]. Finally we 
have to see what size and level of organization such a state could at the 
7 Asad makes an interesting point: "A weak state was vulnerable to 
elements other than nomads, and 
in fact the seizure of state power by 
dissidents and adventurers occurred far more often than seizure by nomads- 
[Asad; 1973: 721. 
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very best have reached under the given circumstances*. 
Yet let us for a short moment return to the concept of the so- 
called early egalitarian Israelite society. At first it appears easy to 
see that this period of dispersed settlement, caused as it was by the 
collapse of the urban network and the disintegration of the greater 
agglomerations in the highlands, is often considered as a golden age for 
egalitarianism. It is indeed true that mountain and highland regions do 
tend towards more equality. However it is false to say that this is a 
voluntarily social disposition of the population. It is not the 
population that tends towards egalitarianism. Egalitarianism is rather 
induced by the environment. Even then some reservations as to the 
equality of the highland settlements and its inhabitants must be made. 
Orme for one claims that "every community has at least a minimum level of 
leadership, revealed in the course of the major group activities" 
[1981: 138; Gamst; 1974: 53-54]9. Coote and Whitelam furthermore insist 
that within small scale societies, differentiation's might be small, but 
they are all the more important [1987: 1541. Finally Briant's study of the 
Zagros mountain tribes shows that although they were organized rather 
independently, there nonetheless existed responsible officials [1982: 79]. 
To stipulate that sedentarisation and dispersal, any more than 
nomadisation, would automatically lead to a completely non-ranked society 
would appear to be fallacious. Claessen and Oosten furthermore declare 
S Thus we heed some of the warnings iterated by Claessen and Oosten in 
their introduction to a recent monograph on state formation: "The formation 
of a state not only covers the origin, and the early beginning of a state, 
but also its further development to the more complex structures of a mature 
state .... In all cases 
known, the emergence of states is the result of long 
evolutionary developments; and even 
in the few cases in which secondary or 
successor states ostensibly spring to the 
fore, traditions of state and 
state organization already existed" 
[1996: 1&5]. 
Ocancian warns against viewing peasant communities only as 
Pundifferentiated mass residing in homogeneous communities" [1976: 235], 
p? inting to a developing trend 
in anthropology to focus on the "internal 
differentiation among peasant communities" [1976: 235-236]. Mendras can only 
confirm this opinion: "Mais, en 
fait, sont rares les soci6t6s paysannes 
6galitaires, sauf si la terre est propri6t6 collective. Plus le groupe 
domestique est potentiellement fort, Plus Pin6galit6 est probable... " 
[1995: 87; also 107,117-119) Mendras then further insists that the presence 
of an outside society obviously creates 
inequalities of its own kind 
through the need for intermediaries and the like (1995: 122-157]. 
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the following: 
The assumption of an original state of equality in pre-state 
societies cannot be maintained .... By projecting our own 
values of an egalitarian society into societies preceding the 
formation of states we obscure our understanding of hierarchy 
in pre-state societies and egalitarian principles in states. 
(1996: 121 
Similarly it would be false to believe that such heterogeneous 
highland populations lacked any form of cohesion. As argued above, 
greater tribal or proto-ethnic agglomerations would have risen under the 
late New Kingdom, although broken down again due to its collapse. There 
probably even arose a state of relative socio-political chaos as the sub- 
divisions separated not altogether peacefully. There is a chance that at 
first a number of struggles, be they due to claims of tribal, ethnic or 
territorial nature, had to be resolved before a relative state of peace 
favourable to progress in sedentarisation imposed itself. In fact it is 
"conditions of political stability and security" that can "tip the 
balance against an unstable pastoral adaptation" [Cribb; 1991: 611. It is 
at this point that we posit what Coote and Whitelam often have seen to be 
a stay of conflict between nomadic chiefs and bandit captains realizing 
the need for stability in order to engage some of the population in self- 
sufficient food production (1986: 120,121; 1987: 130-1311. 
A study by Renfrew [1982b] on social development in the aftermath 
of system collapse has caught our attention, as it seems comparatively 
similar to our case. In fact Renfrew traces seven points of development 
[1982b: 114] that we happen to encountered also in the Palestinian 
highlands: 
(a) Emergence of segmentary societies showing analogies with 
those seen centuries or millennia earlier in the 'formative, 
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level in the same area. (Only later do these reach a chiefdom 
or 'florescent I level of development. ) 
(b) Fission of realm to smaller territories, whose boundaries 
may relate to those of earlier polities. 
(c) Possible peripheral survival of some highly organised 
communities still retaining several organisational featurea 
of the collapsed state. 
(d) Survival of religious elements as 'folk' cults and 
beliefs. 
(e) Craft production at local level, with 'peasant' 
imitations of former specialist products (e. g. in pottery). 
(f) Local movements of small population groups resulting from 
the breakdown in order at the collapse of the central 
administration (either with or without some language change), 
leading to destruction of many settlements. 
(g) Rapid subsequent regeneration of chiefdom or even state 
society, partly influenced by the remains of its predecessor. 
[Renfrew; 1982b: 1141 (emph. added) 
We can see points (a), (e) and (f), as they appear in the 
Palestinian scenario. A certain return to nomadism and pastoralism with 
tribal-like organizational features seem to correspond to a Middle-Bronze 
situation. We have seen already that pottery as well as housing culture 
diminished in sophistication and resulted in poorer or "peasant" 
adaptations of earlier forms. Finally the processes of refuge seeking and 
dissidence movements that we have described seem to correspond perfectly 
to point (f). Thus it becomes apparent that the situations in question 
are in fact largely comparable: population movements and reorganization 
after the collapse of a state-system, that had for long dominated the 
scene. Point (d) is also present in the Palestinian case, but will be 
part of a closer analysis in the following chapter. 
The remaining points seem to us to be even further importance. We 
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are interested particularly in the fact, that, although the system by 
itself collapsed, there remained enough elements that survived rather 
unchanged from the pre-collapse period. Renfrew mentions that at first 
processes of fissionning were in operation, something we ourselves have 
posited for the Palestinian case, Larger tribal or proto-ethnic groupings 
which developed in response to the might of Egypt, the common enemy, 
redivide after the period of immediate danger. Rather more interesting is 
the fact that what form of agglomeration remained was highly reminiscent 
of the previous periods. We have emphasized the closeness to "earlier 
periods" and further that "several organizational features" are being re- 
used so-to-speak even in peripheral areas, which in our case would 
obviously be the highland environment. 
The question then to answer is what sort of organizational system 
would survive, and it seems to us that conditions similar to the Armana 
period would be the ideal candidate to fill the vacuum. It would mean 
that after the coalescence of population groups of diverse origins at the 
times of the Egyptian onslaught, we are going back to a situation, where 
certain leaders of bandit, nomad, or other kind retain or regain control 
over certain areas to a degree without controlling either vast 
territories or large numbers of devoted followers on an ethnic or tribal 
basis. Yet certain cities and strongholds could again function as 
dimorphic chiefdoms or similar polities as they did in the times of 
Labayu and Abdhi-Khepa. It is all the more probable that the same cities 
again stood in the centre stage, albeit new names appeared (of which we 
obviously know nothing)'O. 
" Although in general we do not follow the proposers of dramatically 
new chronologies like James and 
Rohl, a look at some of Rohl's assumptions 
deserves a quick note. He is able to link Amarna and Saulide-Davidic times, 
albeit in a quite 
idiosyncratic manner: "In der Neuen Chronologie 
entspricht die Amarnazeit 
der Epoche des Aufstiegs des israelitischen 
Kanigreiches" (1996: 238; also 2331. Nonetheless the comparison that he 
makes between these two periods are 
from a sociological point of view not 
totally invalid, and it is only in combination with these sociological 
assumptions that he can 
deliver the following interpretation based on his 
New ChronologY: "Hier ergibt sich also eine ganz ungewöhnliche Situation. 
Die Bibelwissenschaftler sind zu der Auffassung gelangt, dass die Hebräer 
unter David eine genaue 
(allerdings spätere) Widerspiegelung der 
historischen Amarna-Habiru sind. Das Problem ist, dass nach traditionneller 
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This is of some importance to us, as it shows that the vacuum Egypt 
left need not inmediately have been filled by a strong centralized 
apparatus, but that other arrangements, copied on earlier forms, can have 
survived for some time. Again Renfrew claims at the end of hid 
enumeration: 
All of these features apply to some extent to the aftermath 
of the Aegaean palace civilization of Crete and Mycenean 
Greece, where following the Mycenean collapse the city states 
of the classical Greek world emerged some three or four 
centuries later. (1982b: 1141 
This is the first time we will give notice to the notion of time. 
In fact it is the timespan, which elapsed between the first processes of 
settlement in the highlands and the establishment of a state in the 
highlands that separates us most from earlier interpretations. We simply 
think it took a time longer. This view by Renfrew would confirm our 
opinion. Even given a date of around 1200 B. C. (and this would mean, 
people would start reorganizing and settling immediately) as a Starting 
point of resettlement in the highlands, would bring us into the 9th 
century, rather than the times around 1000 B. C. for the beginning of the 
establishment of more centralized forms of government. The arguments that 
will be presented in the next two chapters should however convince Some 
that the date should even be lower. 
Chronologie David und sein Hebräerhaufen ihre Raubzüge in palästina im 
letzten Jahrzehnt des 11. Jahrhunderts v-Chr. taten. Mendenhall, Greenberg 
und McCarter hatten als Bezugsrahmen nur 
die traditionnelle Chronologie. 
Wenn ihnen die Neue Chronologie zur Verfügung gestanden hätte, wären sie 
wohl zu einer anderen Schlussfolgerung gelangt: Die Amarna-Habiru sind 
Davids Hebräern nicht nur verblüffend ähnlich - sie sind Davids Hebräerlo 
[Rohl; 1996: 2411. of course proceeding in this manner, Rohl can also help 
out in so far as names go: 
"Labayu, der >>Ldwe [Jahwes)<<, Herrscher i1ber 
das Bergland in der Amarnazeit, ist die historische Gestalt, die dem 
Verfasser der Bücher Samuel zum Vorbild für seine Lebensgeschichte Sauls 
diente, des ersten König des Volkes Israel" [Rohl; 1996: 260 also 245, 
248). 
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And yet, it becomes apparent that, although larger organizations 
with widely powerful 61ites had disappeared, the remnant sub-divisions 
were enough to assure the survival not only of conmunities with an 
appropriate social place for every member, but also various forms of a 
rural military 61ite. The units might have become smaller, but it would 
be unreasonable to ignore the potential of such groups. Again the nature 
of the Palestinian highlands dictated such community types. Being 
geographically and environmentally highly disparate, it is not that the 
diverging regions often developed in relative isolation and independence. 
The importance of realizing the "diversity of Palestine", its "regional 
variations" and "complex arrangement of micro-envirorments" has only 
recently been stressed by Whitelam [1993: 16] and it is thus interesting 
to review Ewald's conclusions on a similar environment: 
In this context it becomes clear that the Taqali massif 
worked variations on the common themes of the Nuba hills: 
rich diversity in the physical and human environment, lively 
exchange amongst highland communities, and a wide range of 
specialized leaders. These dynamics worked against political 
centralization. ... on the contrary, indirect evidence 
suggests that no particular leader or elite exercised central 
power. Centralization rarely occurred for any length of time 
in the Nuba hills and, as argued above, the Taqali massif 
shared the physical and human environment of the hills. 
Highlander's own depictions of the Taqali massif depict 
various forms of shared power, whether between ime and woster 
or mbering and Funj elite. Moreover, no single imelwoster or 
mberinglFunj regime ruled the entire Taqali massif. Each of 
the separate hill communities on the massif had its own 
rulers. (Ewald; 1990: 19 and 431 
1' 
"Redford sees the whole region of Palestine as badly adapted for bigger 
and centralized units, and claims: 
"In contrast to Upper Egypt and even the 
Delta, in Palestine the genesis and growth of communities with a manifest 
destiny to control vast tracts of land were impossible. The mountains 
divide the land into circumscribed regions - valley, upland, steppe, coast - 
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Palestine looked much similar, and only in times dominated by the 
need to consolidate, such as under the late Egyptian onslaught, did the 
wider connections between these isolated entities make themselves felt in 
any important manner. The political situation of this particular period 
on the contrary furthered the tendency to fission. Thus minor regions and 
minor tribal units re-emerged all over the highlands. 
Nonetheless this argument does not eliminate the potential of the 
different microcosms, such as for example an intermontane valley; to a) 
work as a unit and b) be dominated by some form of an 61ite grouping. 
Thompson has recently alluded to the fact that, if there was no natural 
tendency within Palestine to centralize, the centrifugal tendencies 
present did not eliminate the maintenance of power within sub-regions, 
where important city-centers "had their primary basis of power in the 
narrow economic associations of their local regions* [Thompson; 
12 
1992b: 3181 
Within the highlands, regions, again especially some of the larger 
intermontane valleys, could easily have existed in relative independence, 
yet develop more or less definitive lines of stratification internal to 
and prevent the development of anything 
beyond a canton. Automatically 
population growth was limited and complexity of government and society 
never achieved anything 
beyond a rudimentary level" [1992: 151. Such 
conclusions seem to 
be validated on a more general plane: "The historian 
Fernand Braudel has hypothesized that areas of geographical uniformity (for 
instance, alluvial plains) lead to centralization and population 
clustering, while areas of geographical 
diversity (such as mountain 
regions) tend to remain 
decentralized" (in Lambe rg-Karl ovs ky and Sabloff; 
1979: 1801. 
12 A little earlier he had already claimed: "In exploring the early 
development of states and protoethnic groups in a region such as Palestine, 
it is important to be aware that centralizing and integrating tendencies 
linked to a rise in prosperity, an expansion of Population, a resurgence in 
regional and international trade, and the military organization of 
subregional powers, are not 
irmediately open to simple linear evolutionary 
growth, even in a situation (as pertained 
from the late twelfth to the late 
tenth century) in which the collapse of the Hittite and especially the 
Egyptian empire left a power vacuum in the region. Quite the contraryl The 
economic structures 
indigenous to Palestine were essentially centrifugal, 
inimical to both political and proto-ethnic consolidation beyond the 
boundaries of very small geographically defined sub-units" [1992b: 316]. 
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themselves. The situation really becomes reminiscent of that of the 
Amarna period. Again it is advisable to look at the importance of tribal 
61ites, bandit paramilitaries, and the power of any potential capital 
cities and/or strategic strongholds. It would appear surprising if some 
of these forms of leadership would not have survived or reappeared. The 
vacuum left by Egypt might have been destructive to the larger tribal or 
ethnic formations, but it must have laid open possibilities for 
strongmen, such as minor chiefs, parasocial leaders, and bandit captains 
to assert themselves on a local or regional basis. The increase in 
settlements presented in any case a fresh potential for the establishment 
of protection rackets. 
Although the Egyptian withdrawal resulted in the breakdown of large 
scale power structures, smaller units with their appropriate forms of 
leadership thus survived. Coote and Whitelam had already noticed a 
similar phenomenon, when they claimed that already at the very beginning 
of the settlement in the highlands there were those who had ambitions 
towards stratification and even centralization [1986: 132; 1987: 149]. The 
proposals above would strengthen such a claim. Yet it still holds that at 
first they did not really intend to work in cooperation with each other, 
but rather fought out their differences. This was so-to-say a period 
where parochial power dominated the scene. The intermontane valleys and 
likewise isolated regions assumed something like a sub-ethnic or sub- 
tribal character with the accent on differences rather than on common 
features. The majority of them fiercely wanted to keep their own 
autonomy, from each other as well as from larger superimposing power 
structures. After a while such circumstances must have led to open 
confrontation. 
it is extremely difficult to qualify these quasi-independent 
microcosmic entities. on the one hand, it is doubtful that the settled 
areas at first progressed beyond the stage of minor chiefdoms. Yet on the 
other, it is difficult to see how much of the role of previous nomadic 
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61ites pertained. Similarly it is not proven that the processes of 
sedentarisation did in fact absorb all bandit groups. It might be that 
the aftermath of the collapse left numbers of roaming veterans and 
dislocated militaries, more expert in warfare than in agriculture. Some 
of them must have been less intent on settling down as farmers 
themselves, than on dominating other highland settlers from mountain 
strongholds, in an extended protection racket, maybe even a small bandit- 
kingdom. 
The fact is that the outcome of the collapse furthered conditions 
in the highlands that, more than under the Egyptian domination, resembled 
Rowton's extensive descriptions. Settlement was not all encompassing; it 
took place in a first instance most extensively in Mannasseh and Ephraim. 
it was especially the cereal areas that were first exploited, and even 
here animal husbandry was combined'with crop growing [Finkelstein; 
1988: 1981. This should not, however, be taken as a firm indicator that 
the settlers all came from a nomadic-pastoralist background. It is rather 
a sign of environmental adaptation in circumstances that needed fast 
solutions to adequate food supply". Displaced peasants from the plain 
would have chosen exactly the same locations and terrains. it highlights 
the need to produce food quickly. It also indicates that it is still 
possible to consider the first attempts of settled life as a transitional 
effort. There was at first maybe no intention to prepare settlements for 
a permanent stay. The first settlements needed no terracing and were 
relatively independent of horticulture, two characteristics that would 
"Whitelam criticizes Finkelstein on this point. He insists: *The 
evidence that Finkelstein puts forward, once the 
distraction of the label 
"Israelite" is removed, adds further weight to this view. As he states 
(1988: 338): "Human material culture is influenced first and foremost by the 
socioeconomic situation and 
by environmental conditions. " The appearance 
and use of pillared buildings, silos, cisterns, terracing, and pottery 
forms such as the collared-rim ware are explicable in terms of the 
topographical and environmental conditions facing the inhabitants of 
highland and marginal settlements in the context of the disruption of local 
and regional economies (see also Dever 
1991: 83-84). The technological 
solutions and expertise displayed 
in the use of cisterns, terracing, or the 
construction of pillared 
buildings militate against the view that the 
population of these sites were nomads 
in the process of sedentarisation 
(coote and Whitelam 1987: 123-4)" [Whitelam; 1993: 20; but compare Fritz; 
1987: 96ffl. 
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point to long-term maintenance and intended permanent settlement [Marfoe; 
1979: 21; Finkelstein; 1989: 52,58-59]. 
This at least suggests that the settlers might well have originated 
from the plains [cf Finkelstein ("other explanation"); 1988: 199-200]. 
They had participated in the withdrawal in face of the late Egyptian 
onslaught of domination and exploitation. At first they also probably 
participated with a dissident attitude in the highlands efforts of 
secession and a more mobile lifestyle of brigandage, whilst still hoping 
to return to the plains after the situation calmed down. But instead of a 
retreat by Egypt, there came a general collapse. Far from being able to 
resume life on the plains, they rapidly had to adapt to sedentarisation 
again, but this time in highland territories. They chose not only lands 
with fast return, but also, while hoping to return to the plains, those 
which required less investment. Yet on the plain the collapse led to the 
consolidation of power of a new urban network under the 
increasingly 
assimilated Sea Peoples who seemed at first 
intent to keep the highlands 
in relative exclusion. There was little space for returning highlanders, 
who were left to develop their own agricultural produce . 
This is not, however, to exclude all pastoralist and nomadic 
highlanders from the process of sedentarisation. Amongst them the poorest 
were most certainly also affected by the collapse, and, if Thompson is 
correct, a considerable period of drought [1992b: 328,334,407]. They 
also would have chosen to settle down. They equally would have chosen 
lands of fast return, and equally would have thought of this as a short- 
term solution. Many nomads only settle down to gain capital to afford a 
new herd and resume a nomadic lifestyle [Cribb; 1991: 61; Viger; 1993: 24]. 
However, even then the presence of an originally sedentary group of 
settlers, especially if tribally or ethnically associated, would be 
extremely helpful". These would be peasant specialists, and as such more 
"Lemche maintains: "Furthermore, without a village culture of peasant 
origin, the nomads would hardly ever 
have been persuaded to settle, at 
least not by their own will and not in any significant number. This last 
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able to find the best territories and also capable of developing the 
necessary techniques to work the new environment. Furthermore, nomads 
prefer to settle down where there are already related kin. In the case of 
the Palestinian highlands, it also would explain why some of the housing 
and pottery techniques bear such striking resemblance to previous 
architectural and ceramic techniques from the plains, while at times 
taking on some characteristics that are often termed nomadic. Nomads and 
earlier inhabitants of the plain simply interacted as they settled down"'. 
Nonetheless the concentration of the initial settlement in certain 
areas leaves enough territory for the nomadic-pastoralist lifestyle to 
persist. Yet it would take on the characteristics of "enclosed nomadism", 
as it would exist around and in between the newly settled areas. 
Similarly it would be dependent on the agricultural produce of these 
settled regions. In this case, there always was an incentive for nomadic- 
pastoralist leaders to exploit the village population, even when and 
where indeed they were not still in charge anyway. Exploitation could, 
however, take many forms, from simple sporadic raiding to outright 
subjugation and integration into a state-like society dominated by an 
originally nomadic 61ite. one might argue that in this case it was the 
sedentaries more than the nomads that were "enclosed*. This is especially 
the case if one presumes that the nomads were militarily superior. In the 
absence of other military specialists, particularly a trained army and 
its chariotry, this would have been the case. 
It would be false, however, to assume that nomadic tribalists 
simply overran the newly established settlements. Neither can one really 
argument may provide a point of contact between my thesis and I. 
Finkelstein's explanation, and it would be wrong to assume that my 
constructions exclude nomadic participation 
in the formation of Israel" 
[Lemche; 1991: 13). 
"Again see the reasoning by Lemche concerning the nomadi camp layout 
of the settlements: "It only 
indicates that the peasants living in the 
Palestinian villages of the Early Iron Age had spread their risk also to 
include some animal husbandry, a fact that should hardly be a surprise to 
anybody when the nature of the terrain 
is considered" [1991: 131. 
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picture a scene in which nomads could organize the highlands in a larger 
confederation, least of all an amphictony. The nomads themselves were not 
at ease with each other, and often tribally distinct. Again it must be 
noted that these differences did not work parallel to the lines of 
peasant-nomad diversification. Moreover, even amongst the new settlers, 
there would have been those who had ambitions of their own, and power and 
capital to fulfill them. Be they richer nomads that had settled down as 
landlords", great and rich families that had come from the plains, or 
simply those who more than others had profited from the potential of the 
environment, the village populations themselves quickly developed their 
own bigmen. In certain instances 61ite formations among sedentary 
populations might have had some advantages. In fact the network of 
redistribution and clientship works much easier among sedentary 
agriculturists than amongst nomadic pastoralists. It is at this point 
that the effects of increasing population problems, dislocation into less 
cultivable areas, as well as developing trade and necessity of 
organization, started to work in favour of those ambitious men, who held 
a certain initial advantage. 
It is also however at this point that the role of bandits grows in 
importance again. In fact bandit groups can figure prominently in a 
network of socio-political relationships that rely heavily on the notion 
of clientship. Hobsbawm. has stressed this factor, when he explains how 
much the power of a given individual or family rests on whether he can 
count *enough swords, guns or votes in the calculus of local politics* 
11969: 791. He goes on to say: 
This is a situation which is ideally suited to banditry. It 
provides a natural demand and political role for bandits, a 
local reservoir of uncommitted amed men who, if they can be 
induced to accept the patronage of some gentleman or magnate, 
"Interesting in this context is a claim by Block concerning phases of 
sedentarisation reiterated by Cribb: "The aim is to be rich in animals 
without pursuing nomadic skills* [1991: 62]. 
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will greatly add to his prestige and may well on a suitable 
occasion add to his fighting or vote-getting force. (What is 
more, the establishment of retainers kept by noblemen provide 
convenient employment for individual bandits, potential or 
actual. ) (1969; 79-801 
The fact is that little by little bandits regain their importance 
as a rural military 61ite. They might start off as little more than 
regulators or vigilantes in the employ of the richer landowning families. 
Yet as their patrons gained in prestige, they developed into more 
important and sizable forms. Instead of regulators, they rapidly became a 
standing paramilitary element in minor chiefdoms. Soon enough the demands 
on them must have exceeded those of policing, and they must have been 
called upon to act as an aggressive force in the expansionist visions of 
their patrons. The role played by bandit groups thus increased with the 
development of bigmen into chiefs, of local village units into bigger 
units such as chiefdoms. As especially social circumscription came to act 
against the fissioning of bigger units, the importance of this expert 
17 
military element must have been consolidated . With the passage of time, 
this apparently initial form of social warfare indeed slowly transformed 
itself into a part of the bureaucratic aspects of the chiefdom polities. 
This movement from prestige or charismatic forms of leadership 
towards more traditional and eventually bureaucratic forms is another 
aspect of chiefdom formation. As charismatic leadership is, however, 
often heavily dependent on the leader's abilities as a military 
performer, it is important for him to guarantee for himself a competent 
military element. Yet it might be a hint also towards the fact that at 
times a strong bandit captain himself can strive and successfully become 
17 one might here note the importance of specialization and then 
promotion for state-formation: "By promotion, Flannery means that an 
institution's role may change from a lower-level, specialized one to a 
higher-level generalized one. An example of promotion is the rise of 
military leaders who initially formed as an arm of the state but 
eventually, in times of stress, were able to promote themselves to 
positions of overall power" [Lamberg-Karlovsky and Sabloff; 1979; 331]. 
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a local leader. Charisma and prestige are in our opinion seriously 
dependent on outward signsle. Chiefs in many societies rely heavily on 
outside signs, such as particular clothing and headgear, sometimes even 
tattooing and other body decorations [Hayden; 1993: 300-301]. Some of 
these outside signs may be the result of an initial advantage such as 
capital. As such, people appear to their peers as charismatic because 
they have the riches to invest in order to parade themselves publicly 
(Orme; 1981: 216]. Especially among nomadic societies charisma appears as 
part of a wider ideological concept, a vital commodity that not only had 
to be acquired, but also manipulated [Allsen; 1996: 116-117]. Here the two 
attributes of charismatic warleader and redistributor come together. 
Maller's recent treatment of chiefdom polities in Cameroon draws similar 
conclusions: 
Such quasi chiefdoms vary in size which expands or retracts 
according to the ascendancy of informal leaders who, like DII 
chiefs, also attempt to attract as many kin and parents as 
they can by their generosity and personal charisma. Such 
leaders are in a very precarious position since the ideology 
is here at the same time egalitarian and competitive; they 
appeared usually in times of war and their position was 
transient: if they were not generous enough, the people they 
attracted would move away, or if a new leader who was thought 
better was at hand, people would abandon their former leader 
and follow the new one. (MUller; 1996: 1121 
"The notion of charisma is one that is subject to much ambiguity. we 
would like to stress that charisma 
is not self-existent, but heavily 
reliant on the feedback by a support group of followers. Similarly for 
example, Dekmejian and Wyszomirsky say 
in their article on charismatic 
leadership in Islam: "in discussing the relative importance and interaction 
of the psychological and social aspects of charismatic authority, he (= 
Weber) emphasized the former, e. g. the leader's possession of a 'gift of 
grace', independent from the social context. Despite this emphasis, 
however, he went on to recognize the need for the social acknowledgment of 
charisma, in the absence of which the 
leader's possession of this 'gift, 
becomes socially insignificant. (As in the works of Davies, Etzioni, 
Friedland, Willner and Willner, Rustow, and others), charisma is treated 
here as a relationship between leader and followers rather than a personal 
attribute of the leader himselfn 
[1972: 194]. 
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Successful bandit captains (who, as we have seen, can be of an 
original nomadic-pastoralist stock) can themselves fulfill many of these 
attributes. They have advantages as far as military expertise goes. Yet 
they also possess far greater riches when compared to the normal peasant 
population [Hobsbawm; 1969: 73]. Finally, but not least importantly, they 
show outward signs not only of freedom but also of superiority. Both 
would leave a poorer, labour-bound, and considerably abused village 
population highly impressed. Hobsbawm has pointed out that bandits love 
to parade their accouterments and arms, "insignia of power" [Orme; 
1981: 209] and often a privilege of an aspiring nobility. They thus carry 
around themselves a certain prestigious aura, which, coupled with 
possession of capital and leadership qualities, might well let them 
appear as charismatic personalities". A bandit leader can as such figure 
as a chief, especially if Hobsbawm is correct in his assumption, that 
many bandit leaders are wanting to achieve status as a rich landlord". 
These developments also have different consequences, especially at 
the early stages of polity formation. In fact, one of the major pools of 
continuing bandit activity results from a reverse process, when landlords 
or bigmen and their followers become bandits: 
Furthermore, the structure of politics in rural societies 
provided another and perhaps an even more formidable 
reinforcement to banditry. For if the dominant families or 
faction protected them, the defeated or opposition groups had 
no recourse except to arms, which meant in extreme cases to 
become band-leaders ... In this way the armed resistance of the 
louts, and the 'ins' of local aristocratic or family 
19 Fearsome looking bandits would indeed make good chiefs for "all 
chiefdoms have two things in common: chiefs who tried to be feared and 
awesome, and followers who wanted their chiefs to be feared and awesome" 
[Hayden; 1993: 2741. 
20 Coote and Whitelam argue similarly when they describe some rulers as 
"established villagers, townsmen", others as "bandits" (1986: 137]. 
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politics, may, at least locally and temporarily, satisfy the 
resentments of the poor against their exploiters, a situation 
not unknown in other kinds of politics. In any case, where 
landowning families fight and feud, make and break family 
alliances, dispute heritage's with arms, the stronger 
accumulating wealth and influence over the broken bones of 
the weaker, the scope for bands of men led by the disgruntled 
losers is naturally very large. [Hobsbawm; 1969: 81-82] 
This illustrates that in the fight for paramount leadership the 
disinherited of one chiefdom, the loosing contenders, easily become the 
bandits of tomorrow. Furthermore, it is testimony to the political 
situation, as well as the important role of bandits within it, as 
discussed above. It shows that morcellement and localization do not 
exclude stratification, even exploitation. It also attests to a rather 
smooth transition between a limited socio-political scene of feuding 
operations between landowning families and the formation of greater 
polities. This shows the difficulties in assuming a definite chronology, 
particularly as far as the arrival onto the scene by bandit groupings is 
concerned. It is not entirely discernible which favours whom most, the 
advent of greater polities, the increase in banditry, or the presence of 
bandits the formation of the polities". Nonetheless the two are 
intimately interconnected. The processes are not only simultaneous, but 
the developments, once engaged, become highly self-engendering. Hobsbawm 
goes on to say: 
The structure of rural politics in the conditions that breed 
banditry therefore has two effects. On the one hand it 
fosters, protects and multiplies bandits, on the other it. 
integrates them into the political system. Admittedly both 
"'Thompson has mentioned a similar problem in his review of Weippert, 
where he claims: "These two perspectives: geographical regionalism and 
chronological ambivalence and fragility, are clearly brought together in 
her discussions of relative chronology" (1992: 165, also 191-193]. 
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these effects are probably more powerful where the central 
state apparatus is absent or ineffective and the regional 
centres are balanced or unstable, as in conditions of 'feudal 
anarchy,, in frontier zones, among a shifting mosaic of petty 
principalities, in the wild back country. (1969: 82] 
That the highlands of Palestine represented such a backward country 
has been seen on many occasions before. Indeed we have qualified it at 
times as hinterland, frontier zone, or even barbaric entity. It might be 
added here that the situation was reinforced with the collapse of Egypt 
as the central authority. Furthermore, this collapse left behind itself 
precisely a mosaic of isolated local, at the most regional polities. As 
these tried to extend their territories of jurisdiction, the situation 
grew steadily unstable. 
However, the nomadic-pastoralist factor has to be added to this 
mosaic. These groupings are dependent on the agricultural produce by the 
sedentary element [Aurenche; 1984: 13; KUrsat-Ahlers; 1996: 136-137,142]. 
They will thus try to procure it for themselves, if necessary by force, 
ultimately by domination. Although some might have simply created their 
own sedentary sector within their own niches, others will have tried to 
subjugate existing sedentary regions. Although some might have been among 
the initial groups to settle as landlords in the agricultural valleys of 
Ephraim and Manasseh, some tried to remain nomadic while trying to 
extract the products from such valleys. Finally, some might from the very 
beginning have arranged symbiotic harmony between themselves and the 
sedentary areas. others, on the other hand, had to conquer or subdue such 
territories. As long as there was a nomadic element present, there were 
thus tensions to be expected. In the end these have to he viewed as the 
nomads' participation in the hunt for protection and domination, and the 
fight for paramount chiefdom. This bears witness not so much to a 
peasant-nomad opposition per se, but rather to the claim by certain 
powerful nomadic groups to engage in the business of appropriation cum 
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exploitation, and eventually of chiefdom come state formation. It is a 
competition between opposing 61ite groups, not so much between peasant 
and nomad. 
It is then interesting to note again the importance of bandits as 
the paramilitary sector within a nomadic society. This is all the more 
so, as the importance of bandits also increases among nomads, as more 
obvious occurrences of 61ite formation become apparent. Despite the 
legitimating efforts produced by ideology and various forms of 
propaganda, it is our belief that any potential 61ite, which is about to 
make any would-be claims to authority and aims to uphold such a 
privileged position, necessitates a certain degree of coercive power 
[Ratnagar; 1996: 1811. In any case, the influence of a military component 
on its society, whatever its form, is hardly deniable: 
But consequences follow for any society from the presence or 
absence of full-time military specialists, from the forms of 
their organization, from the regional distribution of control 
of organized violence, from the advantages and disadvantages 
associated with the use of force, and from the norms 
associated with such use. [Baretta and Markoff; 1978: 5871". 
Schafer-Lichtenberger has shown that it is important for a city- 
state society to either make sure its bulk of peasant population remains 
22 Generally speaking specialists of any sort change the circumstances of 
life for society. This is mainly so because as a non-food producer, they 
have to be nourished, as such the food has to be extracted from the food 
producers, which, ultimately, lies at the very base of the separation into 
dominant and dominated. The military specialist seems to have an extra 
role, as he profits not only from such a situation, but represents the 
force responsible for keeping the system in place, and able to do so 
through the use of violence. Otherwise, most specialists are indeed in some 
way connected with the maintenance of the status quo, playing one part or 
another in the complex machinery of ideology and propaganda: the scribe who 
creates court literature, the priest who gives divine sanction, the artisan 
who creates monumental art, etc. The sedentary world clearly distinguishes 
the peasant as its main food producer. It appears doubtful at first that, 
within a nomadic and pastoralist setting, one single protagonist can be as 
easily isolated as the food producing entity. Or, to reverse the angle of 
the problem, it is difficult to discover any specialists marking themselves 
off in a society where everybody owns and manages animal herds. 
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largely unarmed, or that the 61ite-group possess superior means of war 
and coercion. Thus sedentary 61ites monopolise some of the necessary war 
machinery, in this case the chariotry, to keep the wider populace at bay. 
Interestingly enough, a study by Rosenfeld [1951; also 19651 seems to 
prove this to be the case also among nomads. Among the tribal groupings 
of the Rwala, he follows the slow assuming of military superiority by the 
camel-breeding sub-groups over their sheep raising or handicraft 
performing nomad brothers. The camel has however previously already been 
compared to a specialized weapon. Thus the situation seems to be more 
similar to that of the sedentary state than to one where equally equipped 
nomads face each other. It is thus questionable whether the consequences 
apply for a society where only sheep-nomads are involved. 
Two restrictions must be given to such objection. First of all 
Rosenfeld has pointed out that not all camel-breeding sub-groups reached 
the status of superiority on the military plane. only one of the groups 
in fact had not only the intelligence, but also the time and skill to 
invest more intensely into this previously common advantage. 
Secondly, and here the camel shows similarities with the chariot, 
camel warfare is no easy matter. The handling and maneuvering of both the 
camel and the chariot are in fact hard to acquire and need long and 
specialized training. Thus it is prolonged training, i. e. much time, 
which can transform a normal bedouin into a fully skilled meharist. The 
art of camel-warfare is indeed a full-time occupation. This, however, is 
a luxury equivalent to time-consuming chariot-training. In the end 
someone has to pay for those who are thus unavailable for herding 
duties 33 . 
23 It is, thus, not only the availability of, but also the ability to 
handle the given military means that is important in order to create an 
outstanding paramilitary element. In the case of Berc6's artillery for 
example availability rather than expertise seems to be the main factor. 
Chariots, although much training is needed, are equally if not more 
important because of the monopoly on fabrication and ability to cover their 
cost on behalf of the 61ite-strata. Camels pose a different problem. They 
are more generally available among bedouin than artillery or chariots among 
peasants. Yet in Rosenfeld's case one group managed to monopolize for 
itself the breeding of this military asset. This it did by specialising in 
the military use of the camel in the first place. Which comes to prove that 
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The formation of a military grouping is time-consuming and 
therefore costly. Among sheep-nomads it cannot be different. With the 
absence of any equivalent to a specialized weapon, training would, 
however, be even more important. It goes without saying therefore that it 
is those nomad chiefs or sheikhs with sufficient capital that are most 
24 
likely to engage in such a venture . As such, these groups do form, or 
are formed, in a first instance especially as body-guards. Slaves are 
immensely important in this role. In fact they present several advantages 
over other free followers in the same role. They do not need to be 
substracted from the shepherding labour force, thus at least from one 
point of view they are less costly. Furthermore slaves, like mercenaries, 
are more loyal than free followers. Not only fed, but also maintained in 
such a high position as the armed occupation represents, they are less 
likely to be bought off. In fact they can hardly expect any better 
status, neither are there any ideological attachments of any importance 
that would draw them to another master. Most importantly, as non-kin, 
they are unlikely to pose as much of a danger to their masters as close 
relatives who may wish to usurp the position of power. 
However, the question of the outstanding maintenance costs remains. 
Paradoxically, also amongst nomads, once the trend to form an armed group 
is engaged, it becomes self-engendering. For the best way to maintain 
such a group is to do it at the cost of others, i. e. by raiding and 
pillaging, or even by expanding. The process then becomes essentially 
a trained camel-bedouin surpasses his fellow camel-bedouin in the military 
sphere. on this he can a posteriori base his claims not only to superior 
military but also social status. 
24 But the case is not all that clear-cut. Khazanov [1984] maintains that 
a nomad-pastoralist economy does not provide for such capital investment. 
Although it is agreed that it is possible for some chiefs to arm and 
maintain a number of their followers, the fact that capital is mostly herd- 
capital and that systems of reciprocative self-help exist, renders the 
redistribution system rather less effective than is the case in a sedentary 
agriculturally-based society. The same is true if the troops in question 
are to be made up of slaves rather than free followers. As Khazanov points 
out, slaves have to be armed, fed, and maintained as much as freemen. 
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cyclical, for the very manner in which the armed force is maintained, 
becomes on the other hand the very reason to maintain or even to increase 
such a force'5. Other chiefs and groups will obviously respond leading to 
the need of an increased military cadre 26 . This competitive need also 
again calls for improved expertise. Ultimately the prolonged occupation 
with warfare skills will make such bodyguard-groups, as specialized 
shock-troops, more effective than a levied militia. 
This development of a high level of competition, however, means 
that it is highly advantageous to develop such a cadre in as short a time 
as possible. There is, therefore, a case for employing ready trained 
elements rather than meeting the cost and time of development. If our 
previous assumptions are correct, these should ideally share some of the 
characteristics of slave bodyguards, namely that loyalty which is not 
kin-related. Where else to look however, than to those marauders roaming 
within or adjacent to the territories under one's tribal influence. These 
parasocial elements, bandits, outlaws, and refugees, have made the 
wielding of arms their full-time occupation, and share with the nomads 
knowledge of territory and mobility. They represent a ready and available 
source for recruitment into paid service. And if some of them do indeed 
enter the service of state representatives, there is no reason to assume 
that the same should not be the case in the presence of powerful nomadic 
"Mrsat-Ahlers furthermore claims that a chief might loose his position 
because he stops military activity: "The appearance of centrifugal forces 
always coincided with the cessation of 
the conquest, territorial expansion, 
and therefore with a 
decrease in the redistributive capacity of the ruler 
which implied also a 
loss of charisma, and therefore a decreasing consent 
of his subjects" [1996: 1421. 
26 Again this is even the more so, as chiefs can loose their position, if 
they fail militarily. Hagesteijn, writing on state formation in Southeast 
Asia, says: -in some periods, the legitimacy of rulers depended for a 
considerable part on their achievements 
in warfare. A ruler who was 
successful in war and 
in expanding his territory was considered to be a 
good ruler and had many adherents. 
A less fortunate warrior would tend to 
loose his men, who would look for a new 'winner, " [1996: 196]. Similar 
claims are made by Oosten concerning 
kingdoms in Europe: "A successful war- 
leader would attract warriors from all sides, and so he might succeed in 
conquering new land and settle 
down as an independent ruler ... The new 
kingdoms depended for their existence on the king and his army. If the 
political and military nucleus of 
the kingdom was destroyed the kingdom as 
a whole might vanish" [1996: 
2231. 
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27 
chiefs and sheikhs . 
The arrangement will be advantageous to both parties. We have 
claimed earlier on that bandits prefer to secure for themselves a 
foodbase rather than living on ad hoc raids. It is similarly the case 
that service for a nomadic chief is a more stable occupation than 
permanent marauding and pillaging. And as with state service, a certain 
degree of legitimation and power is thus handed down to the bandit-group. 
Nomadic chiefs on the other hand will win time and reduce their costs, 
while at the same time being assured of a strong military force. Not 
being kin-related not only calls for another kind of loyalty, but brings 
with it a certain degree of ruthlessness vis-A-vis the dominated 
population. 
This is however also one of the reasons for the ease with which 
such outside-groups can be adopted into the tribal system. It would 
indeed be unreasonable not to take into account the possibilities of 
integration for such groupings through the manipulation of genealogies 
and the principle of descent'e. After all, the presence of such a foreign 
element is not easily tolerated. in this instance the flexibility of 
tribal and lineage systems, however, helps to legitimate the place of the 
newly incorporated outsiders, and may even elevate them to quite high 
status, due to their military strength. In this way chiefs and sheikhs in 
need of such a power group, meet the problem of justifying the presence 
of the strong outsiders not only to the whole populace, but especially to 
contenders, often relatives, at the top of the social scale. Ewald 
detected just such a group surrounding the early kings of the Taqali 
massif. A nucleus of armed men, was called "the 70 sons (awlad al-makk)" 
[1990; 51,671. She claims further: 
27 Rowton's description of the mawali is reminiscent of such a situation 
[1976b: 161. 
"cribb alludes to this phenomenon, when he claims: "Mercenaries drawn 
from diverse sources, together with their households and retainers, may be 
offered tribal, status as a reward for loyal service" [1991: 541. 
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When Isma'il died, his son Abakr took command of his fellow 
warriors and became makk around 1800. Abakr wad Ismalil faced 
little opposition. If, as argued above, they were in reality 
clients and slaves, the 70 sons depended directly on their 
leader. They had few family ties or other sources of support 
in the highlands. When Ismalil died, it was in their interest 
to unite behind one of their number and prevent the 
kingship's disappearing altogether or passing to another 
group. Thus Abakr wad Ismalil succeeded to his father's 
office without incident. [Ewald; 1990: 52] 
Ironically, this very same group, once it is integrated, can itself 
progress to become a source of contention to power. The leader of the 
paramilitary sector, perhaps an erstwhile bandit-captain, will enjoy 
considerable backing from such a strong group, if he decides to usurp 
paramount chiefdom". 
Thus, a very complex situation arises where "probably the split 
29 There does as such exist a paradox in the loyalty of such out-of-kin 
militaries. Rosenfeld mentions the following: "A chief apparently may or 
may not be able to depend on his slaves. 'The slaves are the main support 
of the chief: they protect him against sudden attack and execute any order 
he may give. Yet nobody deposes or kills a chief so readily or more 
frequently than his own slaves' (Musil 1928, p. 277) The loyalty of the 
slaves undoubtedly goes in the direction of the power: 'after the power of 
the shammar emir, Eben Rasid, had collapsed in 1906, many of his negroes 
went on to an-Niahri [head chief of the Rwalal (ibid., p. 517)" [Rosenfeld; 
1965: 191, fn. 121. As when states hire bandit groups, there seems to be a 
danger that the whole thing backfires. Ewald shows that in Taqali some 
arrangement reigned, yet violent take-overs nonetheless became frequent: 
"The awlad al-makk agreed on patrilineality, but beyond that rough 
distinction they had not yet worked out complicated or precise rules for 
political life. They refused to define further who should become makk. 
Trying to keep the kingship within their own group, they willingly 
supported patrilineal succession. But they all wanted to become king. 
Therefore, they failed to rank themselves or give any individual or group 
among the awlad al-makk special rights to office. Succession remained 
vague, with room for much competition and rivalry. All awlad al-makk, 
whether sons of previous kings or the current ruler, exercised equal claims 
over the office. Local theory, as stated in the 1970s, maintained that 
highland leaders and members of the ruling elite chose a new king by 
consensus when a makk died. But this never actually happened during most of 
the nineteenth century. After the death of the kingmaker 'Ajlun wad Ismalil 
sometime before 1840, every makk came to office by violence" [Ewald; 
1990; 611. 
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between higher and lower status agrarians was duplicated by a split 
between higher and lower status pastoralistsm (Gottwald; 1986: 100]. 
Nomadic pastoralists are to be seen within these processes as competent 
statebuilders as settled populations. Noteworthy is further the common 
reliance on parasocial elements, often bandits, as military support 
group. It also shows that on the way towards the formation of any sort of 
polity, more than the differences between rich and poor, powerful 
landlords and dominated peasants are at work. As Coote and Whitelam 
claim, "superimposed upon the class-oriented grouping just outlined were 
the subregional clan, tribal, and party alliances endemic to Palestine" 
[1986: 139; cf also Coote; 1990: 83]. 
The complexity of the situation is even strengthened through the 
fact that nomadic 61ites engaged in state-building often tend to adapt 
sedentarary characteristics rather rapidly. Rosenfeld's later study of 
the ascent of Ibn Rashid at Hall in the northern Najd of Arabia is 
enlightening (1965]. It tries to follow the development of a state 
society, within which we find involved the same variety of social actors, 
nomads, bandits, and sedentaries. It also involves similar variations of 
productive exploitation, with fertile oases being opposed to arid desert 
hinterland. Rosenfeld's analysis does not only describe a nomadic 
takeover with imposition of power over the sedentary oasis settlements. 
The main subject of the study is in fact the military composition 
involved. one of Rosenfeld's initial assumptions is important for the 
present study: 
Meanwhile the process of state formation is dependent on the 
development of an exclusive instrument of force, a military, 
which must first of all secure productive means and extract 
surpluses, usually through conquest or the threat of the use 
of force; and, secondly, which must ensure the continued use 
of the productive means within its area of control for the 
benefit of a separate exploiting class: that is to organize 
207 
the population for purposes of control and to secure its own 
continuity against threat of rebellion from within and attack 
from without. No state appears without the appearance of a 
state military alongside it; the type-state can be fairly 
well defined by the type of its military. [1965: 75 ]30 
Noteworthy then is the steady decrease in importance of the kin 
group of the ambitious leader, which comes to be replaced by out-of-kin 
groups as the emerging state takes more definite forms [see also Hayden; 
1993: 389]. Furthermore reliance on the nomadic element becomes less as 
not only the state, but the erstwhile nomadic 61ite adopts more and more 
of a sedentary nature (Bates; 1971: 120; Irons; 1979: 37213'. As such the 
out-of-kin group becomes an 61ite group, a sort of praetorian guard, 
whereas otherwise one relies heavily on the settled population of the 
oasis-town to make up the fighting body. The nomads who had completed the 
conquests at first however, find little space in this make-up, and in 
fact the erstwhile nomadic 61ite stay in power wen marginalisant A leur 
tour, et jusqu'A un certain degr6, leurs anciens contribules, sur 
lesquels ils s'6taient pourtant appuy6s" [Digard; 1976: 270; cf Asad; 
1973: 66,71; Rowton; 1976a: 28]. In fact these fellow tribesmen are now 
again part of a nomadic hinterland to be dominated by those whom they 
subjugated at first. Ironically this is done to the benefit of those who 
"Rosenfeld's emphasis gains support from Hayden: "Chiefs whose 
societies were large and rich enough soon devised ways of establishing a 
constant military force, ever on the alert to ward off raids and ready to 
form the nucleus of a full army in time of war. Military specialists 
undoubtedly proved their worth to the elites and soon became indispensable. 
Moreover --and more important for the evolution of culture to higher levels 
of complexity-- the elites found that these armed agents could enforce 
sanctions against individuals or small groups that might not want to go 
along with their decisions. According to Sanders and Price (1968), it was 
at this moment that the state was 
born" (1993: 387]. 
31interesting is here also Aurenche's view, when he claims: "clest 
particuli6rement vrai de la M6sopotamie et de la Palestine au sens large. 
Leur histoire peut se r6sumer, sur des si6cles et des mill6naires, en un 
cycle aux rythmes vari6s, au cours 
desquels des Populations nomades, qui 
gravitent autour des zones 
fertiles cultivees, sont progressivement 
absorb6es par les s6dentaires auxquelles elles se substituent, b la suite 
de luttes parfois violentes. Devenus s6dentaires, ces groupes sont A leur 
tour menac6s par de nouveaux nomades qui, peu A peu, <<surbaniseront>>, 
donnant ainsi naissance A un nouveau cycle" [1984: 13]. 
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used their nomadic kin to become the masters of the oasis-town. 
Developing trade under the aegis of this stronger apparatus also might 
guarantee the formation of a merchant class, who is ready enough to take 
up arms to keep this trade in their hands own rather than that of the 
surrounding nomads'. It is they that come to represent an essential part 
of the army of the state not only against the nomads, but also in new 
conquests. 
Admittably Rosenfeld's study is one set in a desert environment 
involving desert-bedouin. However a situation in a mountain environment 
involving mountain nomads cannot have been highly different. A strong 
settlement, a strategic stronghold, or a developing town must have 
presented similar attractions to a strong mountain tribe leader. Thus a 
polity of the same form could have taken its roots here. The question 
then, however, is how much of a developed form such a polity took. on the 
one hand, we find here an increasingly professional military and also 
already a merchant class. To a certain degree this points towards a 
highly organized polity with an instrument of coercion and a potential 
trade apparatus. Yet on the other hand, Rosenfeld insists that this 
state-form never was completely in control of its hinterland, and 
constantly had to be aware of the growing power of neighbouring towns. 
Rosenfeld thus says that this state had a "recreativen nature, in that it 
had to reconquer its territories yearly. Its authority was less 
recognized than it was reimposed every year. Ewald expresses herself 
differently, but makes a similar point when assessing the nature of the 
Taqali massif kingdom: 
The Taqali kings gained only limited control over the 
internal affairs of highland communities. Writing of the more 
distant hills, one traveller reported, 'Every mountain has 
its own particular chief who governs his own Country. ' The 
kings failed to establish their own men as lords or vassals 
in the hills. The relations between the local 'particular 
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chiefs' and the Taqali kings thus defined the limits of royal 
authority in the Taqali kingdom. [1990: 74 ]32 
one wonders if under these circumstances it is possible to talk 
about a state per se? On many other levels, Rosenfeld's state, as seen 
above, is characterized by elements, that would suit Rowton's notions of 
a "dimorphic chiefdom" with a "parasocial leader" more than those of a 
full-blown state. Rowton himself ranges it in the class of "small 
dimorphic state which differs from the dimorphic chiefdom only to the 
extent that it is sovereign" (Rowton; 1973a: 204]. It was in fact little 
more than keeping an unsteady control over a territory from the basis of 
a town (cf Rowton; 1973a: 202]. Neither the hinterland, nor the adjacent 
towns were in fact fully integrated into a strong state-apparatus. It 
seems very doubtful in any case to qualify this entity as a monarchy of 
any major importance. Nonetheless we already encounter a heavy reliance 
on trade, developing urbanization and, especially in the military field, 
a steady move towards institutionalization. Thus we can talk of a state 
insofar as a state can be seen to consist of: 
... a 
dominant group ( even if it cannot be rightly called a 
'class') that comes to control the modes of production, trade 
or sources of commodities, using either ideology (ritual and 
religion) 33 or some instrument of coercion (a military/police 
force) or both in order to enhance or buttress its authority 
and safeguard it as well as protect its sources of wealth. 
The borders within which such power, authority or influence 
32 Another case is that of southeast Asia: "Due to difficulties in 
transport and communication the ruler in the capital had only strict 
control over the peasants and their 
leaders in the neighbourhood of his own 
settlement, which sometimes gave rise to usurpation from leaders of 
settlements in the periphery, who were able to patronize a large number of 
peasants ... The kings 
had insufficient control over the activities of the 
elite and their landownership outside the core of the realm. Combined with 
problems Of transportation and relative freedom of the local population 
this favoured the autonomy and strength of the landowners, who occasionally 
threatened the king in the capital.,, [Hagesteiin; 1996: 193-1941. 
33 This particular point will be more directly taken into consideration 
in the following and final chapter. 
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is exercised may or may not be clearly delimited. The 
political organisation that would arise therein would range 
from the simple to the highly centralised or complex [Salim; 
1984: 3] (emph. added) 
In our case, it remains to be seen whether Palestinian highland 
society remained within the range of the smaller and simpler, or whether 
indeed it reached that of the more complex rather rapidly. Sofar, we 
would tend towards the first proposal, especially when taking into 
account Rosenfeld's and Ewald's studies. Salim's definition above leaves 
a wide range as to the simplicity or complexity that such a polity can 
reach. In fact it has recently been argued that the importance of this 
development in Palestine has been highly exaggerated particularly for the 
early stages of the Iron Age. A warning had already been given by Frick: 
*To reach the early state level is one thing; to develop into a fullblown 
or mature state is quite another... " [1986: 21]. In view of what Rosenfeld 
and Ewald say, considerably more attention must be paid to resistance to 
would-be state-builders from the communities they wish to integrate into 
that state. For, although we have seen the role that bandits and nomads 
play, especially as rural military 61ite, i. e. as means of coercion, we 
have not been fully able to determine what level of state-society can be 
reached under these particular environmental and social circumstances. In 
the Taqali massif, for example, the kings experienced some serious 
restrictions as to the use of that means of coercion: 
The warrior-kings exercised only incomplete command over 
armed men in the countryside. In Tumale, for example, every 
man was a soldier. Willing to fight under the warrior-king to 
defend their homes from invaders, these men would also resist 
their own mukuk. The kings did not grasp sufficient coercive 
power to seize rights over land. Their initial limited access 
to land locked the warrior-kings in a cycle in which they 
could not use their soldiers to gain control over land or 
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land to gain control over soldiers. They did not possess 
enough land to support an army consisting solely of 
dependents; their own men --slaves and sons-- formed only the 
61ite nucleus of the fighting force. Relying on free 
highlanders and plainsmen for the remainder of their 
soldiers, the warrior-kings could not take land by force from 
their own levies who lived in defensible highlands or distant 
plains. (Ewald; 1990: 146, cf 186] 
Ewald is insistent that throughout the highlands, the power of 
these kings remained highly limited. They could not really extract 
agricultural surplus from the rest of the highlanders. Moreover these 
highlanders remained as seen above loyal to regional power-holders of 
various kinds. It is thus conceivable that 
in the Palestinian highlands, 
similar problems faced the ambitious state-builders. As seen, the Taqali 
massif shows many similarities to the 
highlands of Palestine, such as 
regional fragmentation, heterogeneous population and geological 
diversity, all characteristics that give rise to centrifugal tendencies. 
As shown, above, we also claim that many regional leaders established 
themselves within diverse microcosms. Just as with their counterparts in 
Taqali, many of them probably resisted the establishment of an overall, 
centralized state. To an extent, even the establishment of a 
kingdom of 
some kind does not totally 
do away with such resistance. Although ready 
to acknowledge the power of such a king in some areas, many leaders still 
put up resistance in others. What can 
be said about Taqali can thus also 
be said about the Palestinian hinterland, namely that "the histories of 
frontier communities reveal the expansion of Political and economic 
systems as incomplete and contested" 
[Ewald; 1990: 188]. 
Again we can trace a certain pattern that is resembling the theory 
of centre and periphery. Dependent on certain environmental 
circumstances, some highlanders more than others could escape the 
jurisdiction of the kings. Again, as seen above, a hinterland seems to 
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reform as soon as a certain city or residence wants to claim royal and 
absolute authority over the neighbouring country. Hall encountered these 
difficulties, and in the Taqali massif things were no different: 
Those (territorial units) enjoying the best natural defenses, 
mainly because of location and topography, also felt royal 
power most lightly. Rulers of these hills claimed the same 
title, makk, as the Taqali king; Taqali people remember these 
leaders as mukuk al-lada ('customary kings'). More vulnerable 
hills became more closely bound to the Taqali king, often 
associated with a royal khashm al-bayt. No independent mukuk 
ruled over these khashm al-bayt territories, but elot Pbig 
men') or shuyukh al-tin (shuyukh of the land) continued to 
supervise community life with little interference from the 
king. Taqali's kings exercised full control over land and 
labor only in their domestic sphere, the system of royal 
compounds, or hayshan. Most of the hayshan lay near the 
center of the kingdom or in the outlying massif of Abu Dom. 
(Ewald; 1990: 74-751 
At this point it seems appropriate to have a short look at 
Niemann, s extensive study on state-building within the Palestinian 
highlands. Like us he sees the Palestinian highlands, especially the 
northern part, as characterized by "geographisch-geomorphologisch 
Differenziertheit" and "eine zentrifugale Tendenz". He consequently asks 
himself "wieweit die dann von den Cmriden eingerichtete Residenz Sa=ri& 
als Herrschaftszentrum überhaupt bis zu den periphären Gruppen des 
Nordreiches wirklich als solches Anerkennung, gefunden hat? " Similarly to 
us he concludes that "je weiter man an die Peripherie geht, desto eher 
sind Zweifel angebracht" [1993; 271, fn. 112). 
Thus he seems to offer conclusions that are in accordance with what 
we know about Hall and Taqali for instance. It follows that, although 
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this chapter has presented a picture of nomads and bandits as 
protagonists of definite importance in the scenario of state-building, 
one major question remains to be resolved, namely whether the so-called 
monarchy of Israel developed as rapidly and became as important, as the 
Biblical Literature would have us believe. Again the picture that Ewald 
and Rosenfeld present, would lead us to believe the opposite. Following 
their arguments, the Palestinian morphology simply shows too many 
centrifugal tendencies to permit the rapid development of a powerful and 
highly centralized state. Again we can quote Niemann: 
Aus dieser Situation ist einerseits die bleibende Existenz 
nichtköniglich organisierter Regionaigliederungen und 
Kleinregionen ( ... ) verständlich, die für das 
Nordreichsgebiet geradezu charakteristisch zu sein scheint; 
anderseits zeigt sich die Herrschaft der Könige des 
Nordreichs vor allem als eine militärische Führungsmacht, die 
neben der ideologischen Stabilisierung und Legitimation des 
Herrschaftsanspruches und der Abgrenzung wie der Integration 
dienende königliche Grenzheiligtümer (Betel und Dan) vor 
allem Grenzfunktionalorte ausbaute; was wiederum ein 
kennzeichen für relativ binnenstrukturschwache chiefdom- 
Herrschaften (und 'primitive Staaten') darstellt. [1993: 271) 
Niemann thus also argues that there is not a particularly efficient 
concentration of power in the hands of a monarchical apparatus. A 
monarchy there might have been, insofar as somebody called himself king 
over a given territory. It is another question how many people indeed 
considered this given man as such, how much he could impose his will on 
them, how far his powers went. Similarly it would be interesting to see, 
how many and what sort of people would oppose his claims to overlordship, * 
what claims of their own they would hold and how strong their own hold on 
distant regions might have been. To these final questions, we hope to 
find a satisfactory answer the final last chapter that deals more 
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directly with the situation in Palestine. 
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Chapter 7 
Polity-Formation: the case of the Palestinian highlands 
Was King Kong big? Yes, compared to a compact car; no, 
compared to the, World Trade Center in New York? In order to 
be understood, phenomena must be captured in scale and 
perspective. [in Lamberg-Karlovsky and Sabloff; 1979: v] 
The Bible shows David as a mighty conqueror, Solomon as a 
magnificent emperor in control of most of Syria-Palestine. The Solomonic 
empire is presented as a Golden Age for Israel, amassing riches from her 
neighbours, building an enormous temple and generally taking center-stage 
in Near Eastern events. But can we take these assumptions at face value? 
Can we really assume that developments in the highlands, once in the hand 
of bandits and nomads, so-called barbarians, can have led to the build-up 
of such an all-encompassing empire? 
Whatever Israel was and however she developed, we can surely not 
speak here of the rising of a new civilization such as the advent of 
summer or Egypt. Things have to be put back into perspective. The 
highlands might have developed a certain degree of centralization and 
kings from the highlands might have intervened in Near Eastern affairs, 
yet they were restricted in their possibilities. We have been talking 
about developing processes all along; the advent of such a revolutionary 
and astonishingly magnificent new force on the stage simply does not 
correspond to the trends that our research has detected. It is important, 
therefore, to subject the traditional, biblically - based picture to 
further scrutiny. 
This chapter will analyze the most recent contributions to the 
problem of state formation 
in'the hill country with a particular interest 
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in the questions of the chronology and size that are assumed for the 
emerging polities. For one, it is to be doubted that the extent of the 
highland entities in the Early Iron Age had reached that of a powerful 
state, let alone a Solomonic empire. Furthermore it has become hard to 
accept the idea of a United Monarchy, centered on Jerusalem, as the 
overall long-term history of Palestine clearly speaks against such a 
development. Already our discussion of the preceding chapters has shown 
that the north and the south were rather disparately organized and, 
during the Amarna period, opposing political forces held sway in the two 
highland districts. For some reason, however, some people continue to 
cling onto the reality of the United Monarchy [cf Frick; 1985: 42]. Let us 
here present an example: 
It is a striking factor of J's history as Davidic propaganda 
that it gives so much attention to the legitimation of 
David's Judahite monarchy in relation to the northern 
hillcountry. Whereas we tend to think of biblical Israel as 
uniformly overlying the general region of Palestine, 
historically the northern and southern hillcountries (Joseph 
and Judah) have typically existed as separate regions that 
have almost always fallen under different rulers or belonged 
to separate administrative districts. The divided kingdoms of 
Israel and Judah represent the norm for Palestine, while 
David's "unification" of these areas represents a historical 
anomaly that was fragile and insecure. [Coote and Ord; 
1989: 1811' 
Again it appears that the main reason to hang on to the notion of a 
united monarchy is the biblical text itself, an unwarranted assumption 
. that 
the books of Samuel and Kings are more historically valid than the 
narrative of the Pentateuch [cf Long; 1994: 271-2721. We have sofar 
'more recently see Thompson on the anomalies that the extension of 
power of both Jerusalem and Samaria represented [1992: 3181. 
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avoided engaging in a discussion about the biblical narratives. Yet, at 
this stage, we find it rather difficult to go on ignoring this material. 
This is not to say that we too view the material in the books of Samuel 
as historically more valid than for example the pentateuchal material. on 
the contrary, the narrative will be mainly viewed as story. Due to our 
insistence on the role of bandits, it is something of this nature which 
we will single out in a first instance, namely the story of David's life 
as an outlaw. We will then try to place it in a more general context of 
the interplay between history and literature. David Gunn has exposed the 
usefulness of such an approach to the Biblical narrative in his monograph 
The Fate of King Saul. We turn to him in defining and justifying the 
limits of our story: 
That is to say, I am defining the literary unit without 
claiming that it necessarily once had a distinct life of its 
own in precisely that form. But I would argue that these 
boundaries are not entirely arbitrary; on the contrary, the 
resultant text could be shown (a) to conform to various 
conventions of story-telling (with, for example, situation, 
complication, resolution and aftermath), (b) to display 
internal coherence, and (c) to be amenable to an empirical 
test of what might constitute the "story of Saul* (namely, 
try it on your friendsl) (Gunn; 1980: 131 
As Gunn does with the story of Saul, we likewise are able to 
isolate the "story of David, the outlaw*, stretching, as we see it, from 
I Samuel 19: 1 to 26: 25. This unit seems to us to meet Gunn's 
requirements. It starts quite logically with David's alienation and 
flight. Saul's jealousy has already been mentioned in the preceding 
chapter 18, but only in chapter 19 
does the decision to kill David force 
to escape and then to flee, i. e. to become an outlaw. The ending of the 
story is put at Chapter 26, because 
it rounds up the episode of David's 
life as an outlaw. In the next chapter he starts a new career as a 
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mercenary in the service of the Philistines, while the text as a whole 
moves onto a much more pronounced international scene. The fact that a 
reconciliation is taking place between David and Saul at the end of 
chapter 26 confirms our belief that this is an appropriate ending for our 
story. In Gunn's words, a resolution is presented for the story, here in 
the form of a blessing, the aftermath being resumed in the latter half of 
the final verse: 
Saul said to David, "God bless you, my son! YOU will succeed 
in everything you do! " So David went on his way, and Saul 
returned home. (I Samuel 26: 25) 
From alienation to reconciliation, from Saul's desire to kill David 
to his blessing David; we believe that hardly any better limits can be 
found for a story like ours. Indeed many a song about a noble robber, 
even that of the most famous, Robin Hood, finish in such reconciliation 
(Hobsbawm; 1969: 441. The end to our story is thus most appropriate. 
Unlike Gunn, however, we find ourselves not so much interested in 
interpretation alone, but also in comparison. David's days as an outlaw 
catch our attention mainly because, on the one hand, they reflect the 
myth of the noble robber as seen in ballad and song (Hobsbawm; 1969: 341. 
Yet, as part of the wider narrative of the Samuel cycle, it also presents 
features of epic poetry, as David and Saul fit the descriptions in 
Jackson's monograph around the epic theme of the conflict between 
intruder-hero and king: 
The pattern of the conflict between settled king and 
intruder-hero is thus essentially a study of transfer of 
power or, in other terms, of the problem of kingship. In none 
of the major classical and medieval epics are we presented 
with a "normal" king, that is, with a king at the peak of his 
physical prowess, fully in control of his kingdom, with no 
problems, actual or potential, in his relations with his 
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subjects or within himself. The sovereign may be powerful 
with a slight flow, or be guilty of a temporary weakness or 
aberration, or he may be weak and totally unworthy of his 
office. The intruder may be (but rarely is) a crude braggart, 
distinguished only by his physical strength and verbal 
pugnacity, but more often he is a powerful warrior of such 
caliber as to be worthy of kingship. [1982: 151 
Finally it is part of a well-established pattern of Near Eastern 
court apologetic (cf McCarter; 1980; Whitelam; 1984]. We are attracted 
foremostly by the parallels between these forms of legendary projections, 
in medieval folklore and epic, and ancient court literature, as well as 
the consequences this realization has for the historical reality behind 
the text. If "the quest for the historical David is primarily exegetical" 
[McCarter; 1986: 1171, or if "bandits belong to remembered history, as 
distinct from the official history of books" [Hobsbawm; 1969: 115], what 
can these parallels tell us about story and history? 
The portrayal of the ideal noble robber includes nine major points 
[Hobsbawm; 1969: 35-36; also Blumenthal; 1998: 61; we shall enumerate them 
here, and see if they find their counterparts in the stOrY of David, the 
outlaw: 
First, the noble robber begins his career of outlawry not by 
crime, but as a victim of injustice, or through being 
persecuted by the authorities for some act which they, but 
not the custom of his people, consider as criminal. 
(Hobsbawm; 1969: 351 
Fewer can be more innocent than David; there is actually no 
concrete act of his part, that could 
have possibly attracted the wrath of 
the given authorities, i. e. Saul. His persecution takes place for no 
other reason than Saul's unprovoked and quickly growing jealousy. 
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Manifold references in the text make sure that David's innocence cannot 
be overlooked: 
Why, then, do you now want to do wrong to an innocent man and 
kill David for no reason at all (I Samuel 19: 5; cf also 20: 1, 
32; 24: 11; 26: 18). 
If there is anything that could explain Saul's attitude, it is 
David's military prowess, a prowess, which he however put at the service 
of that same king Saul, "whose jealousy and groundless suspicion were 
responsible for the alienation of David" [McCarter; 1980: 4991. 
Second, he rights wrongs'. Cidem: 35] 
Third, he takes from the rich to give to the poor'. 
( idem: 3 51 
These two points are taken together. They find no real concrete 
parallels in our story, maybe because of its limitations, centering 
mainly on the actions of the main protagonists. Yet we can deduce from 
the fact that the oppressed flee to David (I Samuel 22: 2), that he in 
fact stands as the hero and avenger of their sufferings. We might, 
however, point to the saving of Keilah (I Samuel 23: 1-5), and David's 
reaction to the killing of the priests. In the latter case there is no 
doubt that David is ready to safeguard those who have suffered at the 
hands of Saul: 
stay with me and don't be afraid. Saul wants to kill both you 
and me, but you will be safe with me. (I Samuel 22: 23) 
Fourth, he 'never kills but in self-defence or just revenge,. 
[idem: 351 
David, the outlaw, simply doesn't kill (quite to the contrary of 
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David, the youth, or David, the Philistine mercenary, or David, the king, 
for that matter). David, in his outlaw days, has amazingly clean hands. 
Not that he is not given the opportunity to kill; twice he can slay Saul, 
twice he restrains himself. The episode with Nabal is a prime example. 
Here David is on the verge of ending the days of Nabal, but the plot 
develops cunningly to see him convinced not to commit such an act. It is 
all the more striking, when David's expression of thankfulness emphasizes 
his deep-down abhorrence of killing, even if it were for revenge: 
Thank god for your good sense and for what you have done 
today in keeping me from the crime of murder and from taking 
my own revenge. (I Samuel 25: 33) 
Fifth, if he survives, he returns to his people as an 
honourable citizen and member of the co=unity. Indeed, he 
never actually leaves the conmunity. [idem: 35] 
This is hard to assess in our story, as the story of David, the 
outlaw, does not end the story of David. Of course David eventually 
becomes king, and you cannot become much more of an honourable citizen. 
Within the scope of our story, we have to settle for less though. The 
fact that Saul and David become reconciled, the repentance of Saul who 
invites David to come back, their parting peacefully, and finally Saul's 
blessing and promises of success to David, whom he calls his son, must, 
however, convince us that David is accepted back into the cor=unity with 
considerable honour: 
Saul said to David, "God bless you, my sonI You will succeed 
in everything you do! (I Samuel 26: 25) 
sixth, he is admired, helped and supported by his people. 
(idem: 351 
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David's relation with the people is all but clear-cut, but, then 
again, maybe not all of the people mentioned should be considered his 
people. Again we have to read admiration into the fact that the destitute 
flee towards him. Town-citizens, or urbanites, do not seem to hold him in 
great esteem; the men of Ziph denounce him twice (I Samuel 23: 19; 26: 1), 
and even the people of Keilah, whom he had saved, are ready to hand him 
over (I Samuel 23: 12). But as we have said, they are not really David's 
people, who would he the Israelites and Judahites, with whom he has no 
trouble. Maybe this urban adversity is also deliberate, as it emphasizes 
the difference between townsmen and the humble outlaw of the wilderness. 
(It, thus, is in accordance with peasant ideology, as well as the idea of 
humble origins in much royal literature. ) However, we can again point to 
the Nabal incident. Here we find David confronted with both a rich 
landowner, Nabal himself (I Samuel 25: 2-3), and the poor, his shepherds 
and servants. it is striking then, that Nabal despises David, a run-away 
slave (I Samuel 25: 10), while the servants speak of him in admiration: 
Yet they were very good to us; they never bothered us, and 
all the time we were with them in the fields, nothing that 
belonged to us was stolen. They protected us day and night 
the whole time we were with them looking after our flocks. 
Samuel 25: 15-16) 
Seventh, he dies invariably and only through treason, since 
no decent member of the community would help the authorities 
against him. (idem: 361 
David, the outlaw does not die, but we still encounter treason. We 
have already mentioned the behaviour of the people of Keilah and Ziph, 
but there is another case, which presents more striking resemblance to 
the traditional figure of a man who betrays a bandit. Doeg, the chief 
herdsman, again an Edomite, not one of David's people, seems to be the 
nasty traitor of our story. He 
it is who tells Saul of David's 
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whereabouts (I Samuel 22: 9); his immorality is furthermore heightened 
when he murders the Lord's priests, an order that Saul's guards had 
formerly refused to obey, probably out of fear of sacrilege (I Samuel 
22: 17). But nothing seems to be holy to Doeg; a foreign priest-murderer 
definitely does not strike us as a decent member of the community: 
So Saul said to Doeg, "You kill them! " - and Doeg killed them' 
all. on that day he killed eighty-five priests who were 
qualified to carry the ephod. (I Samuel 22: 18) 
Eighth, he is -at least in theory- invisible and 
invulnerable. [idem: 36] 
David's invulnerability must be deduced from the simple fact, that 
he does not get injured, killed, and generally always escapes Saul's 
plans. There is no isolated, concrete incident, that demonstrates his 
invulnerability otherwise. The case of his invisibility is much more 
interesting. on both occasions, when David spares Saulos life, his 
invisibility is apparent. The first time it is only mentioned that Saul 
does not notice him, even though he cut off a piece of his robe (I Samuel 
24: 4). The second time it is much more apparent. David is able to creep 
into an enemy's Camp full Of soldiers, do his deeds, and creep out again 
totally unnoticed. Eventually he even mocks Abner, who, like all others, 
never was aware of his presence (I Samuel 26: 7-15). It is not surprising 
that the Lord intervenes on Davidos behalf in this instance, for such 
-magic, which reflects the beneficent interest of the divinities in his 
affairs" is a common characteristic of the deity-robber relationship 
(Hobsbawm; 1969: 431. It is also possible to point to the ephod as a 
divinely magical charm., used by divination to determine further action; 
such amulets and other magical assets are common to many bandit-groups 
[Hobsbawm; 1969: 43-441. With the help of God, David can thus go around 
unnoticed as he wishes; for all practicality, he is invisible: 
224 
So David took the spear and the water jar from just beside 
Saul's head, and he and Abishai left. No one saw it or knew 
what had happened or even woke up -they were all sound 
asleep, because the Lord had sent a heavy sleep on them a112. 
(I Samuel 26: 12) 
Ninth, he is not the enemy of the king or emperor, who is the 
fount of justice, but only the local gentry, clergy or other 
oppressors. [idem: 361 
on the surface it seems that our story would deviate rather 
drastically from this notion. After all the main opponents are Saul, the 
king, and David, the bandit. But, as one looks more Closely, this 
deviation becomes one of the most interesting aspects in our study. It is 
true that David's struggle is with the king, but David is not the enemy 
of the fount of justice. Though Saul pronounces himself the enemy of 
David, and David flees, David's insistence on his innocence not only 
states that he has committed no crime, but quite specifically emphasizes 
the fact that he has committed no crime against Saul. He furthermore 
insists that he does not engage in rebellion against Saul. In fact there 
is little in the text that points to any sort of concrete action of David 
against Saul, as opposed to multiple references Of aWaY from Saul. 
The point is made obvious in the incidents where David spares 
Saul's life. That the author attached major importance to this passage is 
shown by the fact that approximately the same incident is reported 
twice'. Author, or editor, clearly wants to make sure that his point is 
noticed. It is thus all the more interesting to see that only in these 
passages, is Saul called David's enemy, twice by a third party, and twice 
2 The action of sending the bandit's enemies to sleep is actually 
mentioned by Hobsbawm 
[1969: 431 
2 Interestingly, Jason sees such "duplication of narrative elements" 
as characteristic of oral traditions 
(Jason; 1979: 60-611. 
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David refutes the notion almost ir=ediately: 
They said to him, "This is your chance! The Lord has told you 
that he would put your enemy in your power and you could do 
to him whatever you wanted to. " ... But then David's 
conscience began to trouble him, and he said to his men, -may 
the Lord keep me from doing any harm to my master, whom the 
Lord chose as king! I must not harm him in the least, because 
he is the king chosen by the Lord. " (I Samuel 24: 4-5, cf also 
I Samuel 26: 8-11) 
In recognizing in Saul the anointed one, David firmly acknowledges 
him as the fount of justice, and he therefore knows that he cannot 
possibly harm him, lest he provoke chaos, for the king as the fount of 
justice, is what upholds the earthly order. David sees further than just 
the man who pursues him. Within all his troubles, he recognizes that the 
life of the king, despite all appearances, still is what maintains 
justice in the land, and only by keeping the king alive does justice 
stand a chance of being done. one wonders if there can be a stronger 
upholder of justice than this David, who defies his own chances of 
survival, when he protects his pursuer in order to protect the earthly 
fount of justice. David thus never denies Saul as the fount of justice; 
his links with that fount are furthermore emphasized in the story. His 
marriage to Michal, Saul's daughter, and the undeniable bond between 
Jonathan, still the heir and, as such, future fount of justice, and 
David, show that David has little quarrel with the royal line. 
It might then be stated that, within our story, at least David 
never declares Saul to be his enemy, nor is Saul ever denied to be the 
fount of justice. It is, rather, ensured that Saul is to be seen as 
untouchable, and David appears as the sternest proponent of this line of 
thought". The deviation from the image of the noble robber is thus 
Note here the similarity to the epic of Beowulf: "Beowulf the 
poem examines the problem of 
kingship and succession through the life 
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comparatively minor. In the end, it comes down to the great skills of the 
author who, in the one person of Saul, ingeniously combines Robin Hood's 
good King Richard, and evil Sherif f of Nottingham!. Finally it must 
always be kept in mind, that in fact David's struggle is not with the 
real king of Israel, who after all is YHWH Himself. In the scope of the 
wider David story, this surely must be taken into account and also could 
represent a solution to our problem. 
Another way of viewing this schizophrenic attitude of king Saul is 
to see the evil Sheriff represented in the Lord's evil spirit (I Samuel 
19: 9). David's real struggle would then be not with Saul, but with the 
evil spirit that drives Saul to his actions; in which case the deviation 
becomes nearly non-existent, and broadly parallels the Robin Hood cycle: 
of Beowulf the man. It shows that every kingdom needs a ruler who is 
aware of the first duty of a king, the protection of his kingdom 
against intruders. Hrothgar had once had this knowledge and power but 
he had lost it because of an obsession with what we may call the 
material and esthetic aspects of kingship {= Saul and the evil 
spirit). He is fortunate indeed that the intruder-hero Beowulf not 
only carries out the duty of killing Grendel and his mother (= David 
and Goliath), themselves intruders, which he should have fulfilled 
himself, but also that Beowulf is too noble to profit from this 
superiority at Hrothgar's expense {= David spares Saul's life)" 
[Jackson; 1982: 35). Again the Cycle of Guillaume d'Orange carries 
similar ideas: "Louis is a weak king who nevertheless occupies the 
throne and therefore has at his disposal all the attributes of 
kingship, its powers of disposition of land and its demand for 
loyalty. It is kingship, not the king, which possesses these powers 
nd it is to kingship, not the king, that Guillaume devotes his 
loyalty. Louis' behaviour, as a person, is despicable. ... Yet 
Guillaume never fails to recognize the duty he owes. Because Louis is 
king, Guillaume must support him" [Jackson; 1982: 731. 
5 Again here Jackson's comment on the Aeneid is interesting: "The 
actions of Turnus are, 
in fact, inescapable in the epic tradition. 
whenever the intruder-hero does not oppose a strong king and attempt 
to oust him, he will fall foul of a principal warrior or adviser of a 
weak king, with devastating results 
for the kingdom. * [1982: 21]. Bad 
advisors also play a role 
in the Cycle of Guillaume d'Orange [Jackson; 
1982: 731. 
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The king, on the advice of evil counsellors such as the 
Sheriff of Nottingham, pursues the noble outlaw. They fight, 
but the king cannot vanquish him. They meet and the ruler, 
who naturally recognizes the outlaw's virtue, allows him to 
continue his good work, or even takes him into his own 
service. (Hobsbawm; 1969: 441 
Again, Saul's final blessing and promises of success provide a 
close parallel with the Robin Hood cycle. It does indeed represent the 
classical ending to the legend of a noble robber. 
our story can thus rightfully be seen as portraying David as the 
noble robber, as we know such a figure from folkloristic and legendary 
myths. How much does this however tell us about the historical David, or 
of the events described? Is the identification of such a story of any 
use, if we are to detemine the historicity behind the events related? In 
concrete terms, does the character of David, the noble robber shed light 
on the developments that lead to the rise of the Israelite monarchy? 
Unfortunately, the answers to these questions are difficult to 
decide, to say the least. The perception of David as such an idealized 
figure wrapped in the world of legend and myth can in the end only add to 
the obscurity surrounding the actual events and protagonists. Parallels 
like these may be of major interest to the student of ancient literature, 
but to the historian they can be nothing else than the frightful 
realization that he is to be lost 
in the world of the storyteller (cf 
whitelam; 1989: 1261. The task of the historian thus becomes extremely 
difficult; Levenson describes it as such: 
The fact remains, however, that the historian must look 
beyond the literary piece in front of him in his effort to 
recover the historical facts. He must, so to speak, pierce 
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the artistry in order to find the social and political truth 
it clothes. Thus, the biblical scholar feels a constraint 
upon his readings which the critic of more univocally 
aesthetic literature does not. [Levenson; 1978: 121 
In our case far more is at stake than the simple discovery of 
empirical facts behind the veil of idealized accounts. The political 
weaponry, of which such stories can be a part, takes us much further than 
this. Beyond the ideal figure of the noble robber David, it might of 
course still be possible to find David the bandit, although he might 
represent a more awkward personality, less socially aware, and more like 
the bandits that we have described in the preceding chapters. Lemche and 
Thompson mention such a possibility, although they themselves remain 
rather sceptical: 
However, the issue of David's historicity is not merely a 
question of how we read our Bibles. We need to refer here not 
only to recent literary and critical biblical studies since 
the late 1970s, but also to a number of revisionist histories 
of Palestine. None of these studies leaves much room for a 
historical David. Although Jameson-Drake thinks of him as a 
bandit chief in the Judean mountains of the tenth century, 
such a figure is hardly the biblical David. [1994: 171 
The attraction towards such conclusions as Jamieson-Drake puts 
forward cannot be overrated in our case, but therefore do we have to be 
especially careful about our use of this material. We believe that we 
have to look even deeper than the mere peasant idealization of an 
unlikely candidate, and view the literature from the point of view of 
those who have written it, and whom it served most, i. e. the 61ite. 
It has to be stated that bandit-stories are not for peasants alone, 
but, especially in their written form, they are mainly the product of 
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those in power. There is little doubt that intellectuals of many sorts 
are mostly responsible for the survival of bandit-traditions [Hobsbawm; 
1969: 114]; in some cases, they may be responsible for the development of 
such ideal notions [Koliopoulos; 1989: 196]. Shaw points to the frequency 
with which bandit tales appear in the popular literature of the upper 
classes [Shaw; 1984: 44]. "The sad truth is probably that the heroes of 
remote times survive because they are not onl_v the heroes of the 
peasants" [Hobsbawm; 1969: 111). The fact is that bandit tales are written 
down, often because they serve the political propaganda of the upper- 
classes6. That this can be a rather rapid process is illustrated by the 
following findings by Blumenthal: 
Schon am Schauplatz seines Todes haben die Strassenhändler ein 
reges Geschäft mit Berichten und Geschichten über seine 
räuberischen Heldentaten betrieben. Berühmte Literaten wie Daniel 
Defoe (Autor des »Robinson Crusoe«) haben ihn bereits ausführlich 
interviewt, und die Zeitungen haben täglich seine Bekenntnisse 
veröffentlicht. Mehr noch: Auf Geheiss des Königs Georg I. hat der 
Maler sir James Thornhill den jungen Kriminellen in seiner 
Todeszelle liebevoll porträtiert ... Ein Räuber wird zum Helden. Doch 
Gsomething similar is mentioned in Rolleston's conclusion to his 
study on Celtic myth and legend, where he says: "Folklore may 
sometimes represent degraded mythology, and sometimes mythology in the 
making. In either case, it is its special characteristic that it 
belongs to and issues from a class whose daily life lies close to the 
earth, toilers in the field and 
in the forest, who render with simple 
directness, in tales or charms, their impressions of natural or 
supernatural forces with which their own 
lives are environed. 
Mythology, in the proper sense of the word, appears only where the 
intellect and the imagination have reached a point of development 
above that which is ordinarily possible to the peasant mind -- when 
men have begun to co-ordinate their scattered 
impressions and have 
felt the impulse to shape them into poetic creations embodying 
universal ideas. It is not, of course, pretended that a hard-and-fast 
line can always be drawn between mythology and folklore; still, the 
distinction seems to me a valid one, and I have tried to observe it in 
these pages" (1985 (1911): 4181. 
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Jack Sheppard ist da kein Sonderfall* [1998: 61 
There can be little doubt that the literature of I Samuel 19-26 is 
the product of an intellectual 61ite. one can deduce this in the first 
instance from the simple fact that they are in written form, within a 
society where only a very small proportion of the population were 
literate. The literature was thus available only to those few who could 
read, or, alternatively, to those who could afford to have them either 
read or performed in front of them [Whitelam; 1984: 62,68; 1986b: 168]. 
Peasants would obviously fall into neither category. The story is 
furthermore set within the scope of court apology, which is primarily 
addressed to the 61ite, where it either legitimizes the seizure of a 
throne and further dynastic claims, or, on the other hand, warns against 
usurpation and the overthrow of the existing dynasty [McCarter; 1980: 495; 
Whitelam; 1984: 62]. Shaw also points to the fact that bandit tales often 
appear in the context or aftermath of throne-seizure [1984: 48]. The 
function of bandit stories, as Shaw sees it, then becomes extremely 
interesting when viewed in relation with court apologetic: 
... there 
is a moral ambiguity about the tales themselves; 
they serve the purposes of both popular and upper-class 
concerns. The dominant theme in them, ..., is less that of 
rebellion and opposition than of reform and remodelling of 
society to fit an ideal pattern already imparted by its 
dominant class structure. [Shaw; 1984: 491 (emph. added) 
Jackson's study on the major epics gives a similar explanation of 
the social role of this literature: 
The deciding factor in the Greek situation is the nature of 
kingship itself. It is, as Nestor says, to be respected and 
cherished - because support of it and respect for it are the 
only factors which hold off chaos. But in return the king has 
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duties and he must discharge them well or pay the penalty. 
C 1982: 1151 
Thus it seems that the main aim of a bandit-story is not that of 
describing opposition and rebellion, but reaffirming an established 
institution like kingship itself. After all a bandit is often seen as the 
protector of orphans and widow, whose protection also imparts on kings in 
state-societies. It is thus easy to see how, he who looks like the 
representative of the little folk, can come to defend the values of the 
superiors. Nonetheless it would be interesting to see whether the story 
of the outlaw David can be seen as having existed in isolation from the 
rest of the court apologetic. Although we do not know if the Ancient Near 
7 East featured bandit-tales per Se, or if they appeared solely in the 
7 interesting in this context is Blumenthal's claim that: "Manche 
Forscher glauben übrigens, dass Robin Haod die späte Abwandlung eines 
uralten Mythos war: der des Tricksters, einer sagengestalt, die nur 
Schabernack im sinne hat. Seine Aufgabe in dieser Welt war es nämlich, 
die Vornehmen zu veräppeln. Nicht von ungefähr findet man den 
Trickster in den Legenden vieler Kulturkreise. Till Eulenspiegel ist 
ein Beispiel, ebenso wie Loki 
in den germanischen Mythen und Hermes 
bei den Griechen" [1998: 9]. This connection with the divine and 
mythological world has caught our attention 
(especially keeping in 
mind the DWD-David question, that will 
be treated later in this 
chapter), as Bott6ro seems to 
identify such a trickster figure in the 
Mesopotamian god Ea/Enki, as he appears in the story of Atrahasis: 
"Mais Ea, jaloux de la survie de son oeuvre et pourtant incapable de 
s, opposer de front 
A la volont6 du d6tenteur du pouvoir, agit a sa 
mani6re: Par ruse" [Bott6ro: 
1987: 4371. we also can detect the them of 
hero and king theme, as it is against the wishes of Enlil the high god 
and king, but struck with 
"fureur aveugle" (1987: 438]. As the eldest 
known version of this story has been dated arund the time of 1650 B. C. 
(Bott6ro; 1987: 435], it can obviously provide a model to a trickster- 
bandit story. Furthermore, we cannot escape the notion that the 
trickster somehow figures in our particular court literature, when an 
article by Hagan 
identifies the motif of deception in eighteen 
instances only in the "Succession Narrative" [Hagan; 19791. 
interesting is also his comment: "Though deception becomes a theme in 
its own right, it is also a function of the larger theme of fidelity 
and infidelity which 
in the ancient Near Eastern world defines 
especially the relationship 
between the king and his men" [Hagan; 
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context of court apologetic, the question begs whether one can be seen as 
preceding or influencing the other. Finally, if so, how and why do they 
appear together? 
In view of our preceding analysis, we firmly believe there is a 
possibility that a story of David the noble robber might well have 
existed as a separate story. Apart from the fact that we have been able 
to isolate it with relative ease in the preceding pages, we are struck by 
one detail, namely David's amazingly clean hands in his time as an 
outlaw. For this same man has, only in the preceding chapter, been 
praised as the slayer of tens of thousands (I Samuel 18: 7-8). His most 
outstanding claim for fame is the killing of Goliath (I Samuel 17: 50). It 
becomes even more striking, when we see that, as soon as the noble robber 
cycle is ended, he returns to killing (I Samuel 27: 11). Only a little 
later are we reminded of the praises in honour of his deeds on the 
killing fields (I Samuel 29: 5). This is all the more amazing, as, within 
epic literature, such behaviour does not stand in the way of being 
considered a good king: 
This same sense, that only a strong king can prevent chaos, 
is even more marked in the Odyssey. Nowhere is any attempt 
made to show that Odysseus is morally superior. He lies, 
cheats, steals, and even kills without provocation. He is 
bent on acquiring and keeping material goods, and in later 
works with a stronger sense of what was morally 'proper,, his 
reputation is bad. [Jackson; 1982: 1161 
it thus seems amazing that in the chapters 19-26 every effort is 
made not to associate David with slaughter. No doubt, it was also the aim 
of court apologetic to describe David as 
just and benevolent, and not as 
an indiscriminate butcher. Nor can we overlook the deliberate irony in 
the sparing of Saul, the anointed one, when the reader already knows that 
1979: 305). 
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David has been appointed king, and its strong underlying message to any 
would-be usurperso. However it raises doubt that all the non-killing 
being confined to what we have defined as the bandit-tale is merely 
coincidental. We would rather say that a popular bandit-tale, possibly 
oral in origin, was used to address the concerns of the upper-classes; as 
seen above, Shaw claims that bandit tales are often used in this manner. 
The genius involved in such an effort can hardly be overrated; it 
intelligently introduced popular folklore into what was mainly court 
literature of the apologetic kind. 
The outcome is that the degree of complexity, which surrounds the 
creation of the literature of the books of Samuel, is again heavily 
emphasized. other stories have been isolated within the court apologetic. 
Jason provides a good example. He has isolated and then identified the 
episode with Goliath as a "romantic epic", also at first embodied in 
folklore [Jason; 1979; see also Jackson; 1982: 29,35,721. Such use of 
traditional folkloric material interacting with upper-class concerns, 
however, adds a further dimension to the problem. For the more we become 
aware of dealing with folk-heroes, re-used so-to-speak by the 61ite, the 
more we must admit to the difficulty in finding historicity behind the 
literature'. 
Eventua, lly the whole question as to the date of the books of Samuel 
comes to the centre of the debate yet again. In comparison to other 
Jackson's conment on the relationship between Achilles and 
Agamemnon in the Iliad shows an interesting counterpart: "it is 
Achilles' conduct, not Agamemnon's, which sets a standard of kingly 
behaviour and shows what should happen in a stable society" (1982: 131. 
' During our analysis of the text we have spoken about different 
Davids in different stories. Davies' argument is similar, when he 
says: "Even within the text, the David of 1 Samuel is not the David of 
2 Samuel, literary speaking. These are two characters, created by 
(probably) different authors. How can it be Possible for an historian 
to conflate them or choose between them with any degree of assurance 
or justification? " (1992: 121 
234 
V 
biblical material, the books of Samuel have enjoyed an image of being 
relatively reliable historical sources. They are not to be taken at face 
value, but there seems to he a firm belief that they include some 
historical truth [Miller and Hayes; 1986: 129], and that at least some of 
the material is mostly contemporary with the events, i. e. Davidic or 
Solomonic. This line of thinking easily manages to incorporate court 
apologetic. Such an interpretation can see the facts reported as 
empirical facts, some even publicly known, but arranged so as to justify 
the usurpation by David, legitimize the ascent of Solomon, etc. Hence the 
process of exegesis permitting the discovery of the real history behind 
the scribal effort. 
However text analysis and conclusions presented above, call into 
question such a process, and with it the date given to the apologetic 
material. If our findings are correct, David, the outlaw (as well as the 
David of David and Goliath according to Jason's findings), can be seen as 
a hero of song and ballad, who somehow found his way into the propaganda 
literature of the upper-classes. Finally the David of the full Samuel 
cycle can be identified with the epic figure of the intruder-hero Ecf 
Jackson; 19821". The consequences that ensue from this realization, 
especially as far as dating is concerned, are made clear by this 
statement by Hobsbawm: 
The bandit myth is also comprehensible in highly urbanized 
to A further case can be made when we compare this story of the 
outlaw David, son-in-law of Saul, who after 
having lived in the 
wilderness and/or in enemy territory, creates a rival monarchy to that 
of the Saulides in the south 
based on Jerusalem, to these claims made 
by Kochakova concerning Yoruba folklore: "As a rule, the legendary 
hero of the local people is either a son of a ruler abandoning his 
home land with a group of supporters who, after long wanderings in the 
bush, founds a new city-state, according to the Pattern of his home 
town, somewhere in the back-woods, or a brave and courageous hunter 
who fearlessly paves the path 
in the wild forest and becomes the 
founder of a village which will become the nucleus of a future townu 
[1996: 511. 
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countries which still possess a few empty spaces of loutback, 
or 'west' to remind them of a sometimes imaginary heroic 
past, and to provide a concrete locus for nostalgia, a symbol 
of ancient and lost virtue, a spiritual Indian territory for 
which, like Huckleberry Finn, man can imagine himself 
, lightning out' when the constraints of civilization become 
too much for him. (Hobsbawm; 1969: 1121 (empd. added) 
If the heroic past is indeed but imaginary, this leaves us with 
little support to the view that the material in the books of Samuel 
necessarily has to be contemporary with the events described. They might 
as well have been conceived by much later societies. Levenson says that 
the social and political truth the artistry clothes might be far removed; 
they could be much further removed than he would have us believe. 
The fact that we are dealing with court apologetic should not 
hinder our conclusions. Hoffner stresses that there exists a "tradition 
of royal apologies in the Hittite kingdom or even a loose literary form" 
[1975: 501. The point is that anyone could have copied the form; if the 
alleged scribe of David or Solomon could 
have, so could a later scribe. A 
comparison can be drawn, if we consider the new debate surrounding the 
historicity of the biblical writings about Solomon's building programme. 
Doubts have arisen whether such a building programme ever took place 
under Solomon, and there are several scholars who now believe that this 
was not the case. The programme took place under later kings, yet the 
Bible attributes it to Solomon [Garbini; 1988: 30-311. Interestingly the 
royal building programme 
is the physical equivalent to the sort of royal 
propaganda, that literature such as court apologetic propound [Meyers; 
1983a: 175; Whitelam; 1986; 1989a]. 
For the moment we are mostly interested in Miller's treatment of 
the use of royal hyperbole in the texts 11991a]. He establishes that it 
is in fact an exaggeration traditional to Ancient Near Eastern language. 
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As such, however, its use in the biblical text does not point to the 
veracity of the accounts, but rather to the fact that the later scribes 
have ingeniously introduced it to their description of Solomon's alleged 
building programme, by copying this tendency to written exaggeration. We 
hold exactly the same argument concerning court apologetic. Scribes of a 
rather late date can easily have been inspired by this common form of 
court literature. 
It is difficult to see what the purposes of the later powerholders 
and their scribes were in attributing such stories to David, if they were 
not true; but then again, why should they have attributed the building 
programme to solomon, if he was not responsible for it? Maybe there is 
just some deep desire for dynasties to lay their origins with just and 
humble heroes, maybe they used them to justify some claims of their own. 
maybe the answer lies with the moment in time in which, according to 
Jackson, occurs the genesis of the epic theme of hero and king: times of 
social turmoil: 
More important, perhaps, is the fact that epics spring from 
violent social disturbance, when patterns of civilization of 
long-standing are being challenged or overturned -- the 
troubled period after the collapse of the Cretan 
Thalassocracy, the Germanic invasions of Western Europe, the 
clash between Muslim and Christian. [1982: 2-3] ... The 
conflict between ruler and hero is often as much a conflict 
of values as of personalities and seems to be an essential 
theme of epic poetry. The reason is not far to seek. Epic 
themes spring from turmoil, and one of the characteristics of 
turmoil is the intrusion of the outsider into a settled, 
established culture, an outsider who often proves more 
powerful than the ruler to whose court he comes and who must 
be placated or, if necessary, suppressed, if he is not to 
dominate the court into which he intrudes. [1982: 41 
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Of course traditionnally the Early Iron Age is seen as a time of 
multiple changes and turmoil, and among the "significant changes in the 
socio-political realm" one could easily count "the introduction of 
kingship and the move to statehood" as it would be Obound to have 
profound reverberations throughout the whole of society producing major 
structural transformations" (Whitelam; 1989: 1201. Yet it must also be 
admitted that Palestine witnessed numbers of occasions that can equally 
be seen as times of social turmoil and cultural change. The Damascene 
threat, the Assyrian onslaught and the fall of Samaria, the Babylonian 
danger and the sacking of Jerusalem, finally the exile and the 
repopulation of the highlands later under the Persians, are all valid 
candidates for the composition of epic literature. Are they not times 
where established systems crumble, or where something new has to be 
imposed and also justified? Jackson makes an interesting observation: 
There can be little doubt that one of the most common 
characters in the "period of turmoil" is the exile from one's 
own culture... Both population pressure at home and the 
break-up of a tribe under foreign pressure produced the most 
characteristic of epic heroes, the exile ... The exile 
inevitably finds himself in conflict with the ruling 
establishment. He is from a different culture, younger than 
the ruler, and ambitious to establish himself in his new 
environment. It is this conflict, which originates in 
historical circumstances, that provides the motivation of all 
Western epics, even though the hero may not be in an exact 
sense an exile. [1982: 5-7] 
Given this, one might in fact wonder whether the exile or the 
relocation of various people, be they returning exiles or not, would not 
be the most appropriate time of composition for the Samuel literature. 
For this incoming population needed legitimation, especially if they were 
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to superimpose themselves, their culture and society, on those who were 
already in the land. Is it not possible that intruder-hero and ruler 
could symbolically stand for the incoming and the already present 
population? The responsible scribes furthermore would have done so by 
drawing on the figures of folk heroes and using literary traditions well 
known to them. This suggests that the exegetical effort as proposed by 
McCarter, Levenson and Whitelam needs revising and deepening. There is 
little historicity to be read into the story of David the outlaw; in fact 
there is little reason to hold onto a historical outlaw named David, any 
more than there is any reason to hold onto David, the slayer of Goliath. 
After all, "no real original Robin Hood has ever been identified beyond 
dispute" [Hobsbawm; 1969: 109; Blumenthal; 1997: 81. 
Which leaves us with David, the king, a king, who like his heir 
solomon appears in no other epigraphic evidence than the Bible. A king 
whose kingdom, like the empire of his son, does not get a single mention 
by his contemporaries. A king who left it to his son to build the all- 
important temple, a temple which until now has eluded discovery. The fact 
is that what we know about David stems from the stories in the Bible, and 
as we have viewed them, they are the creation of popular folklore welded 
into political propaganda. Lemche and Thompson state their position as 
such: 
To compare the Bible's stories about David with early Iron 
Age Palestine is like comparing the story of Gilgamesh with 
Bronze Age Uruk, Homer with ancient Mycenae, or, indeed, 
Arthur with medieval England, or even Wagner's Siegfried with 
a Germany of the Middle Ages. It is not only that one lacks 
evidence for understanding these stories as accurate accounts 
of the nation's past, but that stories and history have 
always dealt with quite different kinds of worlds. That is as 
true of ancient stories as of modern ones. Whether we are 
dealing with Homer, the Bible or mediaeval epic, the quest 
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for a historical heroic age must fall short. Not only is such 
a period always cast in a time before history begins, but the 
very characteristics of verisimilitude, authenticity and 
plausibility mark the tradition more as fictional than 
historical. [1994: 18-191"' 
so far the possibility is still there, that a scribe of an early 
monarchy has conceived the literature of the books of Samuel, by 
skilfully identifying a king David with heroes of popular folk stories, 
which he has woven into the wider scope of court apologetic. Yet one must 
admit that, in view of our analysis and new evidence surrounding Solomon, 
not only the date of the material, but also the persons of David and 
Solomon become highly conspicuous. 
However, the recent discovery (21 July 1993) at Tel Dan of a stele 
As the phrase goes, any resemblance to real or actual persons 
may be purely coincidental. There is no way in which history 
automatically reveals itself in a biblical text; there are no literary 
criteria for believing David to be more historical than Joshua, Joshua 
more historical than Abraham, and Abraham more historical than Adam. 
[Davies, 1992: 12, also 31]. In his earlier monograph, Lemche already 
says: "I shall not continue this discussion at any greater length, and 
will instead merely state my own view, namely that when we encounter 
an oral tradition (which 
in connection with the OT always means that 
we find it in written form, which 
is, in other words, against its 
nature) we cannot count on the accuracy of other elements in the 
tradition than the main plot. For example, in connection with the Ehud 
narrative in Jdg 3,12-30 we should 
ignore the details, including such 
names as Ehud and Eglon, or even, for that matter, Israel and Moab" 
(Lemche; 1985: 3831. Note also what Jackson has to say about epic 
poetry in general: "In view of much that 
has been written about oral- 
formulaic poetry, it is not belaboring the obvious to stress that we 
have no record of the oral form of any of the great epics. The epics 
which we possess in manuscript form may 
be many times removed from 
their oral antecedents and may well have undergone substantial 
revision in their written form, no matter 
how many traces of oral- 
formulaic poetry may still be noted in them* [1982: 4-51. It is 
interesting that Lemche and Thompson refer to some of the epic works 
also included in Jackson's 
book. 
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mentioning a "House of David". The discovery of and the stele itself were 
rather rapidly described in an article in the Israel Exploration Uournal 
by the excavators themselves [Biran and Naveh; 19931. The two scholars 
here offer their own interpretation of the stele as far as dating and 
translation are concerned. They confidently date the stele to the mid- 
ninth century B. C., although they indicate that "this date should not be 
taken as definite and it might fall within a range of some decades 
earlier or later" [Biran and Naveh; 1993: 95]. All in all, they do not 
consider a date later than the end of the ninth century B. C., thus 
roughly 150-200 years at the most from the supposed reign of David. 
it is interesting to note that they warn that it is not possible to 
"draw definite conclusions", given "the nature of the biblical sources on 
the one hand and the fragmentary state of the Dan inscription on the 
other" (Biran and Naveh; 1993: 98). Some, however, were quick to do so, 
and soon it was claimed that what had, in the end, been discovered at Tel 
Dan was an irrefutable proof of the historical existence of David, his 
lineage, as well as a monarchical state under their control [cf Shanks; 
1994; Rainey; 1994; Lemaire; 1994]. Shanks is illustrative of the 
tendency to have "'David' found at Dan": 
There Avraham Biran and his team of archaeologists found a 
remarkable inscription from the ninth century B. C. E. that 
refers both to the "House of David" and to the "King of 
Israel". This is the first time that the name David has been 
found in any ancient inscription outside the Bible. That the 
inscription refers not only to a "David" but to the House of 
David, the dynasty of the great Israelite king, is even more 
remarkable. (Shanks; 1994: 26] 
His following claims are echoed by those of Lemaire, who says: 
The inscription easily establishes the importance of Israel 
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and Judah on the international scene at this time - no doubt 
to the chagrin of those modern scholars who maintain that 
nothing in the Bible before the Babylonian exile can lay 
claim to any historical accuracy. [Lemaire; 1994: 31-32] 
These modern scholars, called "Biblical minimizers" by Shanks 
[1994: 26) or the "deconstructionist school" by Rainey (1994: 47], are 
dismissed as a "circle of dilletantes" [Rainey; 1994: 47). In fact, 
however, one might wonder if these scholars can really be as quickly and 
safely ignored as Rainey would have it [1994: 47]. 
Lemche and Thompson, in a joint article, have seen in some of the 
above mentioned literature on the Tel Dan stele a "return to the worst 
abuses of the biblical archaeological movement of the 1930s-1960so 
[Lemche and Thompson; 1994: 3]. They take a much more critical stance, 
seeking for alternative interpretations of the stele. 
Two points are at stake in their approach. First the question of 
dating is addressed. Indeed, they find the date given by Biran and Naveh 
as inaccurate, even given an error of a couple of decades that these two 
scholars were willing to acknowledge. Lemche and Thompson would date the 
stele about 100-150 years 
later than was originally done. A somewhat 
later article by Thompson alone still holds the same view, and it is 
claimed that archaeologically, there 
is little indication that the stele 
should precede the late eighth century B. C. 
[Thompson; 1995: 60; Lemche 
and Thompson; 1994: 7; see also Cryer; 
1994: 5]. 
Furthermore, Lemche and Thompson also rely on the analysis of the 
epigraphical and linguistic evidence presented by Cryer (1994; also 
19951. Here again it seems that a later date than it was at first 
thought, can be assigned to the stele [Cryer; 1994: 41. In his analysis, 
cryer is first concerned with the actual writing, the examination of 
which leads him to claim the following: 
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In all, the script of the inscription contains features known 
from the early 10th down to the 7th centuries in the ambits 
of Phoenicia and Syria-Palestine. It must be emphasized that 
the few 7th-century features could easily be the results of 
innovation or even be simply idioms peculiar to a single 
scribe. However, the horizon of many of the letters extends 
unproblematically to the 8th c., and there is no reason 
whatsoever, as far as the epigraphy is concerned, to rule out 
that century. [Cryer; 1994: 8-9] 
Cryer then turns his attention to the orthography and the language 
of the stele. He here comes to the conclusion that the language used 
represents a kind of "Mischsprache or a genuine local pidgin consisting 
of Phoenician, Aramaic, and 'Canaanite' elements" (Cryer; 1994: 11]. He 
further claims that certain phenomena of the language, such as the 
frequent use of the dot-spot for separating words, make it very difficult 
to hold on to an early date [Cryer; 1994: 131. Again he reaches the 
conclusion that an 8th-7th century date would be more appropriate 
(1994: 12-13; also Thompson; 1995: 611. In a more recent article Cryer 
maintains his position, advocating a date of around 750 B. C. 11996: 61. 
Yet the dating of the stele is not the only matter of debate. Far 
more iinportance is the question of whether the wording bytdwd should in 
fact be read "House of David", as referring to that famous biblical king 
and his kingly lineage. Lemche and Thompson concluded: 
In the light of the archaeological evidence from the Tel Dan 
inscription, our understanding of the biblical David, and the 
relationship between the biblical and the history and society 
of the ancient world of its context, has been ir=ensely 
enriched. Not only do we have no historical-archaeological 
context for a king David in history as the ruler Of either a 
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state of Judah or of a United Monarchy centred in Jerusalem 
in the period that biblical archaeologists like to refer to 
as the time of David', and not only do we have overwhelming 
literary reasons to understand the David stories as 
reflecting romantic fictions of the 'Golden Age' of Israel, 
but we now have concrete extra-biblical evidence supporting 
the eponymic and metaphorical character of both David and the 
House of David, as reflections of an ideology that understood 
Yahweh's relationship to LTudaism. as eternal, centered in the 
13yt Dwd or temple of Jerusalem. [Lemche and Thompson; 
1994: 211 
In fact, quite rapidly after Biran's and Naveh's publication, 
people came to doubt that the stele really alludes to a historical David. 
Consequently, it has been argued, the dwd had to stand for something 
else. A first attempt, by Knauf, de Pury and R6mer, saw dwd being 
rendered as a deity Dod Nworshipped by the Aramaic inhabitants of Dan in 
the ninth century BCEO [in Barstad; 1995: 493]. Barstad, however, claims 
that "there is little evidence to support the existence of a deity Dod" 
[Barstad; 1995: 497]. A not altogether dissimilar interpretation of the 
word dwd yet seems to carry more weight, or at least, find more support 
among biblical scholars. This argument maintains, that while dwd might 
not refer to a deity as such, 
it nonetheless has been used as a divine 
epithet with the meaning of *Beloved" [Davies; 1994a: 55; 1994b: 23; Ben 
Zvi; 1994: 30; Cryer; 1994: 17; 1995: 52; Lemche and Thompson; 1994: 11,14- 
15; Thompson; 1995: 61; cf Barstad; 1995: 493-497]. 
These conclusions were arrived at, as the reading of bytdwcl as 
-House of David" presented some difficulties. For in the stele bytdwd is 
not separated by the coimon dot-stop as a round divider. This, however, 
is always done, when the "House of David" is referred to in the Hebrew 
Bible. Furthermore, within the stele itself, this would be a single 
occurence of scripta continua in the text [Cryer; 1994: 13; Davies; 
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1994a: 54; Lemche and Thompson; 1994: 8]. Thompson thus argues: 
Although it is linguistically possible to translate the 
inscription's-bytdwd as a reference to a "house of David", 
that we have only a single word (and not byt. dwd, as in the 
bible) goes against such a translation and suggests that we 
have here a place name, such as the comparable biblical 
Bethel, perhaps somewhere in northern Palestine, that can and 
perhaps should be translated: "temple of (the deity) DWDO 
[Thompson; 1995: 61] 
The theory that we have to do with a place name, possibly a temple 
or holy place, has received the support of several scholars such as 
Lemche and Thompson [1994: 12-15], Davies [1994a: 54,1994b: 231, as Ben Zvi 
[1994: 28]. They actually find support for this interpretation in 
Lemaire's article on the Mesha stele (19941, where "the context of the 
preceding lines contains a number of Bits; that is 'temples, of various 
gods. " Thus the conclusion "that bytdwd here is also the name of a 
temple" [Lemche and Thompson; 1994: 12; see also Ben Zvi; 1994: 301. 
Such arguments, if sustainable, undermine the assumption that the Tel 
Dan stela offers proof for the existence of a historical David, king of 
Judah. Rather has it "thrown light both on an ancient Palestinian divine 
name, the cult of the deity of question, and, of course, the invention of 
the ancient king" [Davies; 1994b: 241. Lemche and Thompson, for their 
part, are quite sure that "we now have concrete extra-biblical evidence 
supporting the eponymic and metaphorical character of both David and the 
House of David" [1994: 21]. David thus becomes a so-called heros eponymos 
or eponYmous ancestor [1994: 21-22]. To this we might add Cryer's corrment: 
in this connexion it should go without saying that a lineage 
name is not based on history, meaning that it is, for the 
purposes of organising the internal solidarity of a given 
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lineage, irrelevant whether "David" or any other eponymous 
ancestor ever existed. What is important is the usefulness of 
the ancestor-convention for organising the personnel 
essential to the lineage by providing members of the lineage 
with a handy system of identification. [1994: 18] 
We here seem to encounter a similar usefulness of genealogical 
flexibility to that seen with nomadic tribal arrangements. Linking 
oneself to David provides identity for oneself and one's society, yet the 
historicity of this ancestor is of little importance". As we understand 
it, an ancient divine epithet has been over the years transformed into a 
personal name, and that name has been attached to a founder-king who led 
the society in the Golden Age. How is such process possible, and is it 
possible at all? Would not human nature, the honest search of truth, 
forbid the creation, invention, of such an ancestor"? 
To answer this we would like to turn again to the monograph by 
Ewald, who has analysed the process of state formation in the Greater 
Nile Valley between 1700 and 1885 A. D.. As we have seen she concentrates 
her work on the highlanders of Taqali, a part of the Nuba Hill Massif. 
interestingly there remain some written traditions concerning the 
formation of a Muslim monarchy within these highlands. Ewald states: 
"Kochakova speaks of similar habits among Yoruba Polities, where 
there was ample use of artificial lines of kinship (1996: 58-59]. Many 
other societies show similar ventures. 
The Scythians used such a 
genetic legend, where 
"through the incorporation of the highest 
deities in their line of ancestors , the Scythian central power 
obviously achieved the state of 
divine kings" (KiArsat-Ahlers: 
1996: 138; also Claessen; 1996: 342; Claessen and Oosten; 1996b: 385- 
3871. 
13 Davies poses the same question : "Do we wonder whether we are 
dealing with a literary construct as we confront Saul, David and 
Solomon, Jeroboam, Jehu, Hezekiah and Josiah? We have certainly been 
given good reason to think so 
in the first two cases? " (1992: 291 
246 
Centralizing political institutions began to form only in the 
late eighteenth-century. This statement apparently 
contradicts the image of a centuries-old Taqali kingdom 
presented in certain primary written and oral sources. Both 
the Funj Chronicle and the Tabaqat, a history of Sinnar's 
kings and a biographical dictionary of Muslim holymen, 
respectively, note that seventeenth-century warriors or 
holymen encountered sultans or mukuk in Taqali. In the 1930s, 
Taqali people themselves asserted that their royal dynasty 
extended back through the uninterrupted, though not 
undisputed, reigns of 17 kings to the immigrant-founder, 
muhanumd al-Rubatabi. Today they repeat that kinglist, adding 
that their kingdom originated about the same time as the 
Sinnar sultanate. [1990: 151 
Another of Ewald's statements is even more interesting: 
No nineteenth-century evidence about Taqali's history 
mentions the immi grant - founder who begins the kinglist or the 
five kings who supposedly succeeded him. ..., I argue that 
Taqali people probably composed the kinglist in the early 
twentieth century, viewing their own past from the 
perspective of their current historical knowledge and 
political interest. [1990: 161 
one cannot deny the similarity between this statement and those 
made by biblical scholars who speak of *retrojection of contemporary 
problems into the past" and claim that "the 
biblical authors tell the 
readers stories that are situated 
in the past but relate to their 
problems in the sixth century BCE" 
[Smelik; 1992: 21-221". We may, 
"Van Bakel follows a similar line when he discusses myths in 
relation with stateformation on 
Hawaii. In fact he says: *First inyths 
present the ideas of a people, rather 
than give an objective 
historical account. Myths may change 
in the course of time, as and 
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therefore be dealing with similar developments in the invention of the 
eponomynous ancestor-hero David and the creation of the Wise Stranger 
Muhamad al-Rubatabi; both seem to be born out of the processes of history 
reconstruction undertaken by the populations, or rather an 61ite. 
Furthermore these are not the only examples of such processes. 
According to van Bakel the same has happened on Hawaii. He also is able 
to trace the beginnnings of kingship back to mythical founders whose 
historical existence, af ter analysis, "cannot be ascertained beyond a 
great deal of doubt" [1996: 332]. Rather, like us, van Bakel insists on 
the legitimizing effects that the creation of such myths usually have. 
Thus he affirms that these myths were written down only at the time when 
a certain Kamehameha, historically an usurper, emerged as king. He then 
goes on to say: 
So the thought cannot be dismissed that the myths such as 
related in this article were created, or adapted, during 
Kamehameha's own lifetime, to legitimize his extraordinary 
achievements. Anthropological literature abounds with 
examples of new myths created and within a short period of 
time accepted as knowledge from time immemorial in order to 
incorporate in societal tradition new and hitherto 
unexperienced and even contradictory events (Vansina 1973: 78- 
79). So our Paao, Pili and Umi's myths may be relatively 
when the narrators change their views of the past, but also when other 
people start telling the myths, citing from memory and answering the 
questions relevant to the audience at that time. Second, at a specific 
moment in time these myths were recorded -- but who were the people 
who first heard the stories? To what extent can they be expected to 
have recorded the myths exactly as they were told? It seems not too 
far fetched to think than at least --consciously or unconsciously- 
some of their own ideological convictions were included in the native 
myths" (1996: 3221. 
"Umi is a particularly interesting personality in relation to 
David. Let us note the following "Umi was at least partly of a dubious 
ancestry, but when he arrived at the royal court, he was accepted by 
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recent creations and may have no connection with any 
historical time or event at all (cf - De Josselin de Jong 
1977,1980). The thought cannot be dismissed that their sole 
reason for existence was to provide legitimation for 
Kamehameha's kingship and nothing else. [1996: 3311 
It is therefore, interesting to note the historical situation that 
Taqali highlanders were experiencing, when the story of the Wise Stranger 
began to be created. Ewald states that there existed a situation where 
"large numbers of highlanders had been taken from the hills and then come 
back again. An entire generation had been born in Omdurman, the Gezira, 
and the eastern Sudan" [1990; 1291. Thus there prevails a situation that 
can only be described as one of returning home after exile. It is also 
interesting to note that the actual story around Rubatabi needed only 
little time to become the accepted version of the founding story of the 
Taqali kingdom. Ewald's description is of interest: 
The makk and his family presented themselves to the 
Condominium as heirs not only of a historical tradition of 
kingship but also of Islamic kingship. In the 1930s, they 
related their founding story to an assistant district 
the king as his son ... Hakau remained envious and treated Umi harshly. 
Therefore Umi decided to go into exile ... Kakau proved to be a bad king 
and umi was invited to revolt. After a successful revolt LImi Was 
generally acknowledged as the new king and rewarded those who had 
helped him in gaining kingship by giving them high governmental 
functions" [1996: 3271. Van Bakel talks about an ideology Of usurpation 
(1996: 3251, which we find close enough to the Hero and King-theme. 
According to him of the three figures it is precisely Umi that remains 
the least historically findable. Let us also cite van Bakel an this: 
-When these myths were created or adapted during the reign of 
Kamehameha, the Umi myth on its own already might have done the trick. 
There was no need for other myths to legitimize the conduct of 
I<amehameha. So, the Paao and Pili myths may represent older 
traditions, while the Umi myth is a relatively recent one. Still, one 
cannot dismiss the possibility that perhaps all three myths are of 
relatively recent origin" (1996: 
332]. 
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commissioner who showed particular in the history of the 
kingdom. According to this story a wandering Muslim faqih, 
sometimes said to be from the Rubatab Reach in the northern 
Sudanese Nile Valley, had founded their kingdom. More than 40 
years later, Makk Adam's family and entourage repeated that 
story with some elaborations and very few variations. By this 
time, everyone presented the hero as Rubatabi. [1990: 1361 
Thus in a very little time the Taqali 61ite rewrote their history 
so as to fit their new political situation, in which it was considered 
advantageous to link up with Arab ancestorship. Ewald states: 
Taqali people composed this founding story in the years after 
the Mahdiyya .... no evidence indicates that highlanders either 
told the Muhammad al-Rubatabi story or claimed a northern 
river valley origin for their mukuk until after the 
Mahdiyya ... New claims of origins 
began to appear in the 
changing post-Mahdiyya political situation .... As the Taqali 
kingdom became more integrated into the administrative and 
commercial systems of the northern and central Anglo-Egyptian 
Sudan, claims of Arab origins began to emerge more 
clearly .... The Muhammad al-Rubatabi story 
brought Taqali's 
history into line with other Islamic kingdoms in the greater 
Sudanese Nile valley. The Taqali kingdom now stood in rank 
with the great precolonial sultanates, Sinnar and Dar Fur. 
The Muslim kings of Taqali now even rivalled the sultans of 
Sinnar in antiquity, having supposedly come to power in the 
sixteenth century. (1990: 136-138] 
Although we do not want to claim that we have now found the key to 
the secret of the composition of the Samuel-books, we raight suggest a 
scenario, build on our analysis 
in comparison with the Taqali material. 
In the post-exilic period, 61ite-members composed a story that accorded et 
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long tradition of kingship to a territory that now was the Persian 
province of Yehud; as such they justified the Political Unification of 
the diverse people inhabiting the region [cf Davies; 1992: 116,1301". 
They used for their story David, a personal name won from an ancient 
divine epithet, as eponymous ancestor to whom they attached several 
popular traditions, such as a prototypal noble robber story, which they 
wove into strong political language as part of a court apologetic, a 
17 
literary form to which they were accustomed [cf Davies; 1992: 1221 . 
"This would be a dating in accordance with Davies, who says: "The 
literature itself was at least largely compiled into its present form, 
and at most almost entirely written, at a time 
later than this 
, biblical period', during the rule of the Persians and then the 
Hellenistic monarchies" (1992: 24]. See also especially Davies, chapter 
entitled "The Social Context of the Biblical Israelu 
[1992: 75-931 
which he sums up with the following words: "But the society which 
these writings claim to describe is in no sense an Israel, 
historically speaking. It is a Persian province with the name of Yehud 
or Yeduhah (Judah) - It 
is reconstituted on the territory of the 
erstwhile kingdom of Judah, and 
it enshrines the cult of the God 
Yahweh. The connection between this society and Israel is this: the 
scribal class of this new society creates an 
identity and heritage for 
itself in Palestine, an identity expressed in a vigorous and 
remarkably coherent 
(all things considered) literary corpus. That 
identity is given the name 'Israel' (which now exists alongside 
Judah). The society itself, or more accurately, parts Of that society, 
will transform itself 
in the direction of becoming the 'Israel* of its 
own creation as 
it accepts that Israel's presumed history as its own, 
accepts its constitution, 
beliefs and habits as its own, and begins to 
incarnate that identity* [1992: 92-93] 
ý1 
17 Again, a look at Rolleston's treatment of Celtic myth, and 
especially the Arthurian saga, 
is interesting: * ... The Welsh exiles 
who colonised part of Brittany about 
the sixth century must have 
brought with them many stories of the historical Arthur. They must 
also have brought 
legends of the Celtic deity Artaius, a god to whom 
altars have been found 
in France. These personnages ultimately blended 
into one, even as in Ireland the Christian St. Brigit blended with the 
pagan goddess Brigindo. 
We thus get a mythical figure combining 
something of the exaltation of a god with a 
definite habitation on 
earth and a place 
in history. An Arthur saga thus arose, which in its 
Breton (though not in its Welsh) form was greatly enriched by material 
drawn in from legends of Charlemagne and his peers, while both in 
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Chronologically, the case of Taqali shows that even if we go back 
to the inythical period of the founding of the kingdom by Muhannuad al- 
Rubatabi, we lie within a timespan of at most 300 years that separates 
the invented founder-figure with the acceptance of his story into 
history. Saul and David's struggle over the kingship are separated by 
approximately 500 years from the period after the exile. The Tel Dan 
stela may be separated by as much as 200 years from the supposed time of 
David. It took the Taqali people considerably less time to accept the 
legendary founder-figure as historical. Thus it is at least possible that 
the Palestinian highlanders came to accept a similarly invented founder- 
figure just as the Taqali highlanders have done". 
of course this can be no more than a tentative effort to explain 
the complex processes which lie behind the composition of biblical 
material. It is by no means clear when the transformation of David into a 
personal name took place exactly, or where exactly the different folk 
Brittany and in Wales it became a centre round which clustered a mass 
of floating legendary matter relating to various Celtic personages, 
human and divine" [1985 (1911): 342]. 
is Ewald describes events as such: "During the diaspora of the 
Mahdiyya, Taqali people had gained new knowledge of other parts of the 
greater Sudanese Nile valley. People in many parts of the Sudan told 
stories depicting how a Muslim 
immigrant, or Wise Stranger, had come 
to an area, civilized the people, and founded a new Political regime. 
Although he was neither the founder of a kingdom nor even clearly a 
Muslim, a Wise Stranger appeared in a narrative told by the Tumale 
youth Djalo in the 1830s. Living 
in the river valley during the 
mahdiyya or meeting northern river valley immigrants to Taqali after 
the Mahdiyya, Taqali probably heard other Wise Stranger stories. 
Already familiar with the motif of the Wise Stranger, these stories 
rang true to them. They elaborated their own Wise Stranger story, 
telling how a Muslim stranger had converted highlanders to Islam and 
founded a dynasty of kings" [Ewald; 1990: 1381. There is no reason why 
scribes of a late period should not 
have used material such as 
standard court apologetic to make up their David in the Palestinian 
case in a similar manner. 
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traditions came from. Other times of turmoil could very Possibly have led 
to the composition of much of the material. Davies yet sounds rather sure 
in his conclusions: 
The truth about the society of Yehud is this, then: it is an 
erstwhile Babylonian province shorn of its ruling class and 
governed by Babylonians, now becoming a Persian province and 
receiving a new population transplanted by the Persians with 
funds to build a Temple and the City of Jerusalem. This 
society is constituted by fundamental contradiction: its 
61ite is aware of its alien origin and culture, but its 
raison d'&tre implies indigenization: the Persians want the 
immigrants to accept the new lands as their own ... But in 
their writings these immigrants set about establishing claims 
in no small measure. [1992: 1171"' 
At the very least our exposure shows that it is possible to date 
the composition of the Books of Samuel to a later period, and that within 
"We would like to make a short note at this Point. Raising the 
date to the Persian period also creates a totally new outlook on the 
advent of monotheism. We would like to point out here that this will 
constitute our next project. In mind we have a thorough analysis of 
the influence of Persian religious thought on the development of 
monotheistic Yahwism, especially if the historical processes we 
propose are considered as accurate. We are confirmed in the value of 
such a study amongst others 
by the following statement: "Toutefois les 
juifs n16taient pas les seuls A adorer un Dieu universel et 6thique. 
13eaucOuP Plus A lest, sur les hauts plateaux dIlran, deux peuples 
apparent6s, les M&des et les Perses, 
6taient peu A peu pass6s du 
paganisme A une croyance en une seule 
divinit6 suprt-me incarnant le 
Principe du bien en lutte perp6tuelle contre les forces du mal. 
L'apparition de cette religion est associ6e au prophbte 
Zoroastre.... il semblerait que le zoroastrianisme connut son apog6e 
aux VIe et Ve si6cles avant J. -C. Pendant longtemps, les M6des et les 
Perses avaient chacun de leur c6t6, poursuivi leur qu8te d1un Dieu. 
Les bouleversements du VIe si6cle les rapproch6rent. Les r6percussions 
s, en feraient sentir 
dans le monde entier des si6cles duranto [Lewis; 
1997: 371. 
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it was created the figure of the eponymous ancestor, David, who need not 
have an exact historical counterpart20 . As such it seems that neither the 
biblical material nor the evidence from Tel Dan takes us any further as 
far as the historical events around the Palestinian highlands in the 
Early Iron Age are concerned. We now have to turn to further evidence 
from the available epigraphic and archaeological material. 
As already alluded to, some major changes have manifested 
themselves in the study of the emergence, and also the extent of the 
state, and some have indeed come seriously to doubt the existence of 
anything resembling a Solomonic empire [Davies; 1992: 67,691. Solomon 
himself has been qualified as little more than a "local king" rather than 
an "international potentate" (Miller; 1991a: 28 and passim, in reply to 
Millard; 1991; Jamieson-Drake; 1991: 143; Davies; 1992: 691. Jamieson-Drake 
emphasizes his suspicions as to the achievements of David and Solomon: 
The evidence provided in this study, and the technical 
definition of chiefdom' as it appears in the sociological 
literature, seem to indicate that this term may be the one 
I most applicable 
to the level of administrative control 
present in 10th-century Judah. (Jamieson-Drake; 1991: 144] 
This all points to "the tenuous hold on existence the period of 
ýI the United Monarchy has" [Thompson; 1991: 911. The argument presented in 
the previous chapter relating to the parcelling out of the hill country, 
as well as Rosenfeld's findings and Ewald's conclusions, would help to 
substantiate such a view. Finally all argumentation in favour of an early 
20 Claims similar to those made here as well as those of Ewald in 
particular are presented 
by Shifferd, who analyses the ideological 
background of state-societies in pre-colonial West-Africa. Especially 
interesting is her treatment of the Yoruba Polities where it is 
claimed that kingship goes 
back to a mythical founder Oduduwa, himself 
a son of the High God 
Olodumare. Here we thus also f ind at link between 
kingship and divinity (see Shifferd 1996: esp. 31-32; also Kochakova; 
1996: 53-54; Hicks; 1996: 2671 . 
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strong and united monarchy suffers heavily, precisely on the textual and 
epigraphic side, from the absence first of all of David and Solomon, and 
further their respective kingdom and empire, from any of our contemporary 
evidence (except, of course, for the above seen Tel Dan stela) [Garbini; 
1988: 17; Miller; 1991a: 30; Davies; 1992: 67; Lemche; 1994: 65]. 
on the archaeological side, it is especially the total absence of 
the Solomonic temple that still bewilders scholars, all the more so 
because we know of the importance that the temple and other public 
constructions hold in ancient state structures [cf Ahlstr8m; 1982; 
Meyers; 1983a; Whitelam; 1989a: 133-1341". Again, Hall itself possessed 
something resembling an acropolis (and even then her Power was limited) 
[Rosenfeld; 1965: 1851. in fact whereas the preceding chapter has given 
much importance to the military factor in state formation, this chapter 
will focus briefly on the ideological sphere as it is linked to early 
efforts of centralization of power". Whitelam states the following: 
21 This was not only the case for the Ancient Near East, but for 
many societies. The Aztecs offer an 
interesting parallel: "In ancient 
Mexico, what defined a settlement as a city (altepetl) was the fact 
that it was the political, economic, and ceremonial centre of the 
polity. Its heart was the 'ceremonial precinct', where the principal 
state institutions were 
headquartered. This was designed to be a place 
of impressive grandeur, with 
its temples atop tall pyramids, stone 
palaces raised on platforms, all adorned with awe-inspiring but 
rnysterious art work" 
[Hicks; 1996: 2631. 
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22 Thus following the argumentation presented by Claessen and 
oosten: ousually the evolution of the state was mainly connected with 
economic, military , or political 
developments. Recent research has 
emphasized the importance of 
ideology in the process Of state 
formation .... The necessity to relate 
the theoretical debate on the 
development of the early state and that on ideology became obvious as 
more and more scholars argued that 
ideology was of crucial importance 
not only in relation to the emergence, 
but also in relation to the 
fall of early states' (1996: 1-21. An article by Kochakova in the same 
raonograph makes these claims sounding rather familiar to our line of 
thought: "As for the king, the ruler of a town, he was the incarnation 
of the concept of 'kingship', a concept 
broader than that of the 
, king', which was associated with the regulation of Peace and order. 
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States could only survive if they attained legitimacy, often 
through the manipulation of religious symbols, since reliance 
upon coercion and force would destroy the very relationships 
upon which the ruling elite depended for their wealth and 
power. [1989: 1211 
His Position is Paralleled by anthropologists who specialize in the 
field of state formation, when they claim: 
There must exist an ideology, which explains and justifies a 
hierarchical administrative organization and socio-political 
inequality. if such an ideology does not exist, or emerges 
the formation of a state becomes difficult, or even outright 
impossible. [Claessen and Oosten; 1996: 51 
Part of these religious or ideological symbols are, amongst others, 
a certain amount Of 
ideological literature portraying the "Israelite 
kings ... as possessing qualities and characteristics 
that set them apart 
from ordinary mortals" (Whitelam; 1989: 135], as well as the Temple and 
its cult, which is "repeated in the various shrines of the major urban 
centres of the kingdom, 
legitimated the king's role in the political and 
The king was in the centre Of regulated peace, 
he was supposed to 
guarantee the 
harmonic interaction between the social and cosmic 
forces. The outward manifestation of this 
idea was the palace, the 
sacred centre of 
the town surrounded by walls, the place where the 
Inost important 
decisions concerning town life were taken and where 
esoteric rituals were performed 
in a narrow circle of initiated 
people" (1996: 
51). The fact that we might be dealing with a society 
that had nomadic or at 
least semi-nomadic antecedents does not change 
anything at the situation. 
In fact Mrsat-Ahlers states: "The 
integrating role of a legitimizing 
ideology in the emergence and 
development of the early nomadic states was crucial due to two 
peculiar characteristics. ... 
The centrifugal forces remained too 
strong ... the relatively 
high homogeneity of the products based on 
live-stock" [1996: 1361. 
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economic ordering of the state" [Whitelam; 1989: 1341. Thus what was 
really needed was a religious legitimation of centralized power in the 
form of the king, and along with it of the whole concept of the state or 
the nation [cf van der Toorn; 1996: 266]. Niemann has devoted a full 
chapter to this phenomenon, but his results are mostly negative, as he 
talks of a "landesweit geringe bzw. fehlende k8nigliche 
kultorganisatorische Engagement in Juda" (1993: 2021. According to him, 
the cult was not being used as one of the means of domination 
(Herrschaftsmittel) [1993: 2071. He also speaks against the concept of a 
centrally, or royally, administered national cult or religion, which 
would have found acceptance among the larger populace [1993: 2341. He 
summarizes his position as follows: 
Insofern erscheint mir das Reden von einer "Offiziellen" 
Religion auf jeden Fall bis Josia, wahrscheinlich aber bis 
zum Ende der monarchischen Zeit, schlicht unangemessen. Eine 
offizielle Religion (oder auch Staatsreligion, 
Nationalreligion) hat es in der Realität in der gesamten 
Königszeit m. E. nicht nachweisbar gegeben, dem Ansprach nicht 
bis josia. [Niemann; 1993: 238] 
It follows that in the absence of such a national cult, people must 
have held onto other manifestations of the divine power. These 
manifestations could have taken on various forms, such as the veneration 
of localized deities, but also ancestor worship, and even magic rites. it 
is difficult today to determine exactly in what forms and to what extent 
such kind of worship and belief operated in ancient Palestine. Van der 
Toorn believes that 'family religion, shared some of the same 
characteristics in Babylonia, Syria and Israel (sic. ) . Predominant 
amongst them were precisely "the cult of the ancestors and the devotion 
to a local god" [1996: 4,181]. Rogerson holds that magical practices were 
engaged in widely (1989: 17,25]. Jeffers, too, agrees with Rogerson and 
van der Toorn. Firstly she 
insists that magic and divination formed an 
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integral part of the religious history of the society that came to be 
known as Israel [1996: 1,25]. Secondly she is also of the opinion that 
this society shared a religious heritage with the surrounding world, i. e. 
Babylonian, Assyria, and Syria foremostly [1996: 81. In fact, she speaks 
of a (northwest)-semitic mentality holding common beliefs in the religio- 
magical sphere [1996: 14,16,144; van der Toorn; 1996: 206,234-2351. 
Reviewing the work of Robert Smith, Jeffers goes on to say: 
Indeed the old superstitions of Israel were of the general 
semitic type and therefore closely akin to Canaanite usages. 
According to this scholar, although there were a number of 
practices borrowed from the Canaanites the syncretism would 
not have gone on so freely if there had not been a stratum of 
common religious ideas underlying both faiths, and derived 
from an original semitic tradition.... Moreover, prdctices 
forbidden by the deuteronomist writer were viewed as quite 
legitimate in older times. (1996 : 
9]23 
It is thus very reasonable to assume that the Palestinian 
highlanders of the Early Iron Age were engaged in local deities and 
ancestor worship, as well as the processes of divination and magic and 
13 Of similar interest is the statement by Jeffers, who Says in the 
preface to her monograph Magic and 
Divination in Ancient 281estinn and 
. 
Vý: " This study stems from my firm belief that there is more to 
raagic and divination 
in the Old Testament than meets the eye. Indeed 
the few verses in Dt 18: 9ff. that purport to dismiss the whole subject 
as'theologicallY preposterous make use of a vast, Nhome-grown" 
I vocabulary -- a vocabulary of specialists which 
is by no means limited 
to foreign practices and practitioners. It betrays the curious reader 
a rich knowledge of who's who 
in magic and divination" (1996: prefacel 
It is also important to note that as far as the Passing of time is 
concerned, similar deductions can 
be made: "The forms of family 
religion in second millennium 
Syria and Palestine persist virtually 
unchanged in the first millennium ... The 
designation of the family god 
as 
, the 'god' or lord, of the 'house, remained in use down to the 
Hellenistic and Roman periods" (van der Toorn; 1996: 176-177). 
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the like. This is very interesting as such habits can stand in the way of 
state formation. Not only do they work against the establishment of a 
centrally orientated religion that serves to legitimize central 
institutions, but in the words of van der Toorn, they also "manifest the 
wish to preserve one's cultural identity" , "reinforce local identity" 
and have "a strongly localist orientation" (1996: 374-375, see also 87-88, 
147,1771". Thus not only does the absence of a national religion suggest 
the absence of state institutions, but, it appears, local manifestations 
of the divine attached people to their own local environments and opposed 
the formation of bigger entities with conmon cultural identities. Niemann 
has seen the role of local religion in a very similar way. Even for the 
time of Josiah, he is able to claim the following: 
Die beharrende Rolle der persönlichen Frömmigkeit und der 
bisher nicht beachteten Ortsfrömmigkeit bildete für die Ebene 
der Gesamtvolksfrömmigkeit nicht nur eine Möglichkeit der 
Abfederung der Härte der josianischen Zentralisation- 
(sforderung); ihre traditionelle beharrende Existenz lässt 
auch Zweifel an der Realität der landesweiten Durchführung 
der Zentralisation bzw. der (schnellen) Durchführbarkeit 
berechtigt erscheinen. [1993: 245] 
Clearly those local manifestations indeed worked against any 
centralising efforts. If Niemann 
is correct and if these processes were 
"Van der Toorn says further: "The cohabitation of state religion 
and family religion 
in one nation was a source of conflicts. Many of 
these were intimately connected with the Opposition against the 
n-Lonarchy. The transformation of a segmentary society 
into a state had 
not abolished the sentiments of 
local independence, of which the cult 
of the clan god was 
the ritual expression. With its emphasis on 
genealogical and 
local identity, materializing in the ancestral 
inheritance (nahala), family-religion fostered anti-royalist feelings 
among the Israelite population" 
[1996: 316-317]. Similarly Muller can 
speak of ideological 
factors able to prevent rather than lead to the 
apparition of the early state 
in the case of D11 chiefdoms in Cameroon 
(1996: 991. 
259 
still going on in the time of Josiah, one has to wonder how much ef f ect 
local religion would have had in an earlier period. More Precisely, how 
much opposition to the formation of the state can we expect from local 
religious institutions? Shifferd, for example, emphasizes the role of 
what she calls counter- ideol ogi es in the history of the Yoruba kingship 
[1996: 39, also 301. Again, the situation in Taqali provides a very 
interesting parallel. Ewald thinks that in the Taqali highlands, the 
wielders of local religious power used their control of the divine or the 
supernatural to compromise the establishment of a strong monarchy: 
13ut this does not mean that the kings enjoyed equal success 
in using local beliefs to establish hegemony over 
highlanders. Local sources of ideological power, like local 
land and labor, remained contested. Speaking with the voices 
of spirits and performing rituals for rainfall, highland 
leaders attested their autonomy from the kings. Highlanders 
may even have tried to use local religion to control the 
kings. Struggles over ideological power took place in the 
context of power struggle in general. (Ewald; 1990: 81" 
25 This sounds very similar to van der Toorn's comment on the 
hillcountry of Palestine: "Until the emergence of the state, Israelite 
society had been segmentary, and 
Israelite religion had been locally 
diversified. Family religion protected and reinforced the identity of 
the lineages and their title to their 
inheritance. It was primarily 
the, interests of the landed gentry to maintain this tradition over the 
national religion which claimed all 
the land to be 'Yahweh's 
heritage'( ... ), which amounted 
to saying that it was national 
property. The 
landed gentry consisted of the old Israelite families 
who, owned much of the 
land and formed a kind of nobility- [1996: 301). 
Another case is that presented 
by Kidrsat-Ahlers. Due to its 
raonotheistic tendency, 
it is all the more interesting for this study: 
-Eliade asserts that Turkic Religion was composed of two diverging 
branches, 'the popular' one was centered on shamanism, tOtemism, and a 
vigorous polytheism, 
'the imperial, one was antishamanic, antitotemist 
and had monotheistic 
tendencies in its advocacy of the supremacy of 
Tengri ... It seems 
that the kagans systematically undermined and 
gradually abolished 
local totemist beliefs and the power in favour of 
the religious centre, gradually 
depriving the local tribal 61ite of 
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As such, it is more than probable that local holders of religious 
offices in the Palestinian highlands would have acted against 
centralizing efforts, using their power to frighten, threaten, and 
control others among them [cf van der Toorn; 1996: 318-320]. Jealous of 
that power, they reinforced rather than dismantled local systems of 
belief and control, thus stressing the autonomous identity of the 
different micro- environment entities within the highlands. All this, 
would have hampered the efforts made by some to move towards centralized 
institutions for religion as well as for administration. 
Ewald mentions that in Taqali those holding Political Power had to 
share their power with different religious leaders (1990: 61]. In fact, 
she maintains that "spirit mediums probably gained Power because people 
faced forces from beyond their communities - including their own king" 
[1990: 1811'6. She then insists on the influence of Islam in the later 
religious power. In short, the processual centralization of 
administrative and political power 
has to go hand in hand with the 
ideological centralization of the religious power in an early state- 
[1996: 146; similar Kurtz; 1996: 286 and van Bakel; 1996: 324-3251 The 
question put by Claessen and Oosten simply 
is: "Why should the mass of 
the population in an early state accept an ideological system which 
contradicts their own 
interests? " [1996: 15]. 
2'Interestingly similar points have already been made about the 
situation in Early Iron Age Palestine: 'One form of opposition to 
kingship stemmed from groups and individuals who had the most to lose 
from the structural transformations. The formation Of the state meant 
in r, eality the transfer of sovereignty over arable land to the king. 
It gave rise to a complex situation in which there were competing 
chiefdoms, local notables and various rural groups and village 
communities attempting to protect their arable land and its produce 
from the claims of the ruling urban elite. The strength of resistance 
to the social and political transformations which kingship entails may 
appear to decrease over time 
but often continues in peripheral areas 
or underground movements to erupt 
in periodic popular protests against 
the exploitation and oppression of monarchic rule" [Whitelam; 
igs9: 1211. 
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period of the Mahdiyya. It brought about a profound change among the 
Taqali highlanders, who now started to view local religious 
manifestations, especially highland beliefs and rituals, as less 
worthwhile or quasi incompatible with true religion, i. e. Islam, the 
religion of their kings (1990: 130, also 181]. But again it is interesting 
to note that this only happened after the highlanders had experienced a 
-kind of exile, during which they had come under 
heavy outside influence: 
Many highland leaders died or disappeared, and others, like 
Jayli, replaced them. By force, the Mahdiyya had broken the 
strong residential bonds tying Taqali people to particular 
places in the massif .... Uprooted from the shrines that were 
central to highland religion, they had come into close and 
I violent contact with 
a militant Muslim theocracy. [1990: 1291 
Thus there is ample reason to belief that in the Palestinian 
highlands too, people such as spirit-mediums or similar magicians, tried 
everything to hold on to 
their own power. This again had negative effects 
upon any would-be state-building, where, as seen above, the 
ideological 
idiom needed to create a common cultural 
identity was lacking. As we see 
it, such important literary material, as 
*court apologetic", was absent 
at early times. Furthermore 
there was no temple, and on top of that, the 
remaining of the earliest monumental works 
found in localities such as 
Gezer, Megiddo, or Hazor 
do not firmly attest that one single and central 
government was 
in fact responsible for their being build (Ahlstrdm; 
1991b: 139; Davies; 1992: 68]. However, this also would be one of the first 
things to attend to by any state administration. Whitelam equates the 
need for such 
buildings with that for a temple and some sort of 
ideological literature: 
The great monumental buildings, palace-temple complexes, 
fortifications and public buildings, which characterized 
early states, were an important means of reinforcing and 
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manifesting the social differentiations upon which royal 
power depended. These structures, which required a massive 
investment of state resources, displayed the authority, 
security, and permanence of royal rule. [1989: 133] 
others have attributed the same importance to architectural efforts 
in other societies. Allsen insists that even among the nomadic Turkic and 
Mongolian states much was invested in such ventures in order to build a 
"proper capital" with an "appropriate ancestral shrine", as well as 
"numerous religious establishments" [1996: 128-129] and KUrsat-Ahlers 
claims the same to be true for the Scythian empire [1996: 1391. However, 
the interpretation of many of the architectural findings of the so-called 
early monarchic period in highland Palestine has seen many alterations. 
Na-aman has noted: 
A lack of firm anchor points for the dating of Iron I 
archaeological assemblages in the Land of Israel. The number 
of strata accurately dated to historical events of the 11th- 
10th centuries B. C. E. is minimal. Thus, the assigning of 
strata to the reigns of either Saul, David or Solomon is 
usually based on circumstantial evidence? 
'. [Na'aman; 1992: 83; 
but compare Ahlstr6m; 1991b: 135ff] 
of late, there has developed a growing tendency to look very 
critically at such circumstantial evidence, and 
thus an inclination 
towards ascribing a lower chronology, when 
looking for indications for 
intensive state formation (Knauf; 1991: 39; compare Wightman; 1990: 8-10, - 
Dever; 1991: 1051. Again as seen above, none of the most famous 
architectural remains 
in Gezer, Meggiddo, and Hazor necessarily point to 
one particular or sole 
builder (Ahlstr6m; 1991b: 139]. They might be the 
"Whitelam. had already given a warning: "The comparative study of 
israelite monumental architecture and 
the economic significance of the 
royal cult is only 
in its infancy and hopefully will provide further 
insights into the 
dynamics of monarchic society* [1989: 1341. 
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outcome of the building activities of separate state bodies, consequently 
minor in nature. Niemann argues that it is by no means sure that "die 
schutz- und Befestigungsbauten jedenfalls k6niglich-salomonisch, nicht 
aber lokal veranlasst sind, falls und soweit sie derm in die Salomozeit 
geh6ren" (1993: 9812'. Under these conditions, Jamieson-Drake could only 
stress that the evidence available seriously speaks against the concept 
of, a state important enough for the redaction of the biblical literature 
in the Early iron Age [1991; also Knauf; 1985: 361. Niemann's extensive 
study offers the following conclusion: 
Die Fortentwicklung Judas und (Nord-)Israels von 
,I vorstaatlichen 
zu staatlich organisierten Gesellschaft 
schah demzufolge später als die nicht historisch- ge 
soziokulturelle, sondern primär theologische Intentionen 
übermittelnde biblische Darstellung auf den ersten Blick 
erkennen lässt ... Mir scheint von 
den Ergebnissen der 
vorliegenden Arbeit her, 
dass, entsprechend gegenwärtiger 
soziologischer, kulturanthropologischer und ethnogaphischer 
Untersuchungen, für das Südreich Juda erst ab Ussia, für das 
Nordreich Israel ab Omri, von einem Staat gesprochen werden 
kann. [1993: 281-1821 
Thus not only have we here indications for a later advent of 
centralization, 
but also with Niemann the tendency to view the North and 
"In a footnote he further comments on 
the gates of these cities: 
-Nicht gesichert 
ist demnach nicht nur die Zuweisung aller solcher 
Tore , zur Zeit Salomos; es 
ist auch nicht ausgeschlossen, dass es sich 
um ein Phänomen, ein 
Element der Architektur-Entwickliung speziell der 
E JIA-Zeit (ca. looo-900 v. 
Chr. ), also ein Element eines Epochenstils 
handelt, so dass die Torkomplexe nicht 
notwendig alle auf einen 
staatlich-königlichen 
Auftraggeber zurückgehen müssen, sondern 
vielleicht auf einen 
Impuls der Architekturentwicklung der 
palästinischen 
Küstenebene ( ... ), also von philistäischen Baumeistern 
auch in 
lokalen Auftrag ausgeführt worden sein könnenu (Niemann; 1993: 
97- 98; fn. 435). 
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the South as "two substantially different types of regions" (Thompson; 
_1992b: 
3131, which have come to be seen to an extended degree as separate 
entities (cf Davies; 1992: 66ff]. In fact, in the very early stages of the 
development of the highland polities, there was, according to some 
scholars, a difference in the manner of settlement and the origin of the 
settlers between Benjamin and Judah on the one side, and Ephraim and 
Mannasseh on the other [Thompson; 1992a: 13; 1992b: 288, also 334-335 and 
407ff; Davies; 1992: 69]. Consequently, the talk is now also of separate 
kingdoms or states, whose coming into existence has to be seen as, 
although not unrelated, relatively autonomous. Thus Knauf maintains that 
warchaeolOgicallY speaking there are no indications of statehood being 
achieved before the 9th century BCE in Israel and the 8th century BCE in 
Judah --so much for King Solomon 
in all his splendor" [1991: 391. 
Causes probably lie, as Coote and Whitelam have it, with the desire 
of the most powerful and richest, to reduce the cost of warfare and 
defense and to assure uninterrupted trade [cf Thompson; 1992b: 408-4091. 
It is doubtful, however, that the degree of trade that undoubtedly 
developed, was at first important enough to create a strong and highly 
centralized apparatus. Again, in the case of Hall, trade was involved at 
a reasonable level (Rosenfeld; 
1965: 184ff], yet the state still appears 
as a rather weak institution. 
With the institution of a centralized state 
and an adequate bureaucracy, 
it would have been Possible indeed to 
shuffle the costs and duties of maintaining a war-machine onto the 
general populace, and to 
facilitate interregional trade. When exactly 
however the time was ripe for such measures is next to impossible to 
define. Yet there are, as demonstrated above, indications that it was 
later rather than sooner. 
Trade, and accumulation of wealth, is in fact a third important 
factor for the establishment of state polities [see KUrsat-Ahlers; 
1996: 1421. it helps to establish necessary contacts and also dependencies 
between certain subregions that have specialized in certain Products. It 
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furthermore puts some in an advantageous position, as their control of 
trade routes permits them to impose their will in a number of ways. 
Finally it provides the necessary funds to uphold a strong military 
sector, as well as those that finance ideological architecture and the 
maintenance of specialists such as scribes and priests. All this again is 
very helpful in the buildup towards a state society. Haselgrove has 
analyzed the situation in Belgic Gaul within the expanding Roman empire. 
She has not forgotten the importance of the "manipulation of ideological 
constructs", but also insisted on the presence of military and commercial 
factors: 
The increase in warfare and external trade made possible an 
unprecedented cycle of wealth accumulation for successful 
groups in conjunction with their demographic and territorial 
expansion. In many cases, some of these may originally have 
been among the lower ranking groups of the elite, which 
suddenly found themselves in a geographical situation that 
left them far better placed to gain access to the new sources 
of wealth offered by external trade and thus to elevate their 
status within the tribal hierarchy in contrast to previously 
higher-ranked groups which suddenly found themselves 
possessed of advantages that no longer counted. With time, 
however, of necessity a limited number of successful groups 
emerged as powerful and wealthy, able to control territories 
of a far greater scale than would heve been possible under 
the earlier conditions of competition. (Haselgrove; 1987: 1101 
Some of the argumentation presented by Thompson also gains support 
from such claims. He is insistent on viewing the Iron I period an an 
extended period of transition, with a return to prosperity only in the 
Iron II period (Thompson; 1992b: 236). This longer time-span would indood 
allow for a more intense development of extra-regional trade, fostering 
economic and political coherence among the central highland populations 
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[Thompson; 1992b: 232,4081. For it is to be doubted that the early 
periods of the Iron Age would have offered a scenario involving the 
necessary interregional trade. We can notice in the argumentation above 
that it is especially external trade that led to the necessary 
competition, but also wealth accumulation and the ensuing advantages for 
some that gave rise to state formations. Where, however, would that sort 
of trade come from in the Early Iron Age I, when people were only just 
adapting to the situation after the Egyptian collapse? 
The most likely candidate would obviously be the Philistines. Yet 
there are certain difficulties in simply making such an assumption. For 
what is known about the Philistines also stems for the most directly from 
the Bible. As we have said in the previous chapter, little archaeological 
research has concentrated on the plains, but was aimed at the highlands 
themselves. It thus becomes extremely difficult to know what sort of 
polity came to dominate the coastal plains during the Early Iron Age, if 
that polity was of enough grandeur to influence the highlands in a major 
way. Finally it is again nearly impossible to date the advent of strong 
polities among the inhabitants of the plains. Simply to take over the 
biblical image of a strong Philistine Pentapolis around 1000 B. C. would 
not aid the aim of this study. 
The fact that the Philistines were but a part of a wider 
agglomeration of people that have become known as Sea-Peoples already 
stands against an all too ready cohesion amongst themselves. It is 
doubtful that they formed a united front as rapidly as the Bible puts it. 
They themselves, like the highlanders, probably had their differences to 
fight out. Secondly their numbers were probably rather limited so that 
they did not replace the existing population, but mainly had to impose 
themselves as rulers. Finally they themselves assimilated rather rapidly 
to their environment and the local populace, so that at any rate it 
becomes very difficult to recognize something like a biblical 
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Philistine". 
Thus the picture we have of the "Philistine" has changed over 
recent years, and it is therefore also plausible that their Unity and 
political force has been exaggerated in earlier interpretations. Although 
it is not deniable that some of the cities reached considerable 
prosperity in the years between 1200 and 1000 B. C., after reflection, it 
remains to be shown that this was sufficient to become the catalyst that 
led to the formation of an important state in the highlands. Finally, 
although the relative strength of some of those cities outside the 
highlands might have drawn some of the hillpeople, especially those 
situated along the borders towards the lowlands, to form alliances 
against them, or, for that matter, with them, temporally and 
geographically speaking the situation seem rather badly adapted to 
provoke early centralization within the highlands: 
Ekron, caught between Philistia and Israel/Judah entered a 
270 year decline. Presumably so did Cath, which was 
eventually to disappear from the textual record. On the other 
hand, the cities of the coast flourished and became important 
conduits for international trade. The flourishing of sites 
along the Besor Brook, far removed from Israel and Judah, 
during the tenth century may also be indicative of the 
2'Ehrlich summarises the situation as follows: *It would hence 
appear that the Philistines of foreign (or "Philistine 0 origin) wero 
the minority in Philistia. Just as the origins of Israel in Iron Age I 
are shrouded in mystery and we are unable to pinpoint the changeover 
from a "Canaanite* consciousness to an "Israelite* one on the basis of 
isolated cultural phenomena, so too in the case of the contemporaneous 
inhabitants of the coastal regions of Canaan, Many cultural influences 
were at work in a variegated population to which the namo "Philintinoo 
was given --similarly to Israel-- pars pro toto, possibly by the late 
eleventh century B. C. E., ironically a time in which the distinctive 
material culture traditionally associated with the Philistinou wan 
waning* [1996: 12-131. 
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political situation. The leading Philistine cities until the 
time of the Assyrian conquest were to be the coastal sites, 
which served as vital outlets for both landbased and maritime 
international trade. However, they were never to reestablish 
any grandiose plans of expansion, let alone empire. (Ehrlich; 
1996: 561 
It is in fact questionable whether the presence of a few strong 
cities would have provoked centralization on a grand scale within the 
highlands. As those cities closest to the highlands were lost or 
destroyed around the end of the eleventh-beginning of the tenth 
centuries, a destruction that can be attributed to Egyptian campaigning 
by pharaoh Siamun as much as to opposition from highland forces [Ehrlich; 
1996: 51-56], their influence cannot have been that important over a very 
long period of time. Those that remained, however, were the furthest 
removed from the highlands, and again their influence can be considered 
as minimal. As it has become impossible to delineate clearly a strong 
Philistine Pentapolis, it also becomes impossible to assume for certain 
that the threat or the trade from the plains was sufficient enough to 
engage the highlands in state formation. Interesting is also the 
historical research into one of these major coastal cities Ashdod, 
especially as it becomes apparent that that city was still developing 
even at later stages: 
Ashdod enjoyed an unprecedented prosperity for nearly two 
centuries after Solomon. The Philistine *renaissance" at 
Ashdod during this time was entirely absent from biblical 
accounts of this period, but it was cor=ensurato with 
contemporaneaous international development. ... 
And, indeed, toward the end of the eighth century D. C., the 
people of Ashdod fortified their city again. The city had 
apparently recovered from Uzziah's attack. It was then that 
Ashdod reached its greatest stage of expansion. The city 
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itself was enormous. (Dothan and Dothan; 1992: 184-1861 
Similar developments are believed to have happened in the coastal 
cities of Ashkelon and Gaza [Ehrlich; 1996: 68]. Again this also shows at 
least that the highland polities were in no way strong or United enough 
to be able to confront those very coastal cities. At the best the 
highlanders held at bay the development of nearby cities such as Ekron 
and Gath (if these cities were then stopped in their development by the 
highlanders, and not simply themselves by lack of trade Possibilities). 
Ekron would, however, revive at some stage. Yet this was exactly at the 
time of the pax assyriaca [Ehrlich; 1996: 68). Thus already the influence 
of Assyria makes itself felt not only within the highlands, but also 
within the cities of the plains and the coasts. 
All this pushes us to lower the dating of the advent of a state 
polity in the highlands. The influence of outside powers would then have 
to be taken into account to a greater degree than has been the case with 
a traditional chronology. By the time of Cmri, it is Possible to consider 
a higher consolidation of power among the polities of the plain around 
these erstwhile, but probably now highly assimilated Sea Peoples. The 
struggle with Phoenicia and Damascus was also becoming more intensified 
[Thompson; 1992b: 4081. Finally there was the increasing threat by the 
ascending imperialistic power from Assyria. 
The importance that Thompson attaches to Assyrian influence can be 
detected in his claim that "even the term "proto-othnics is first 
appropriate for the political units that from the ninth century on 
respond to the expansion of the Assyrian empire west and southwestward" 
(Thompson; 1992b: 3061. In fact the Assyrian threat provided the wholo of 
Palestine, plains and highlands, with something they were missing for a 
long while, a strong outside enemy, who fostered ethnic coherence. 
Hagestejn has emphasized the importance of *the vision of 'the onamyo 
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... as the identity of a 'state identity, often depends on a 'we/they, 
distinction" (1996: 198). The same insistence on *we-identifications" is 
expressed by Mrsat-Ahlers, discussing centralization among nomadic 
societies of the Eurasian steppes [1996: 137]. Thus slowly there would 
have appeared a sort of proto-ethnicity among northerners, who had come 
from a highly heterogenous background (Thompson; 1992b: 327,3351. Thus he 
maintains that at Samaria *the establishment of a political base of power 
is logically prior to the actual building of a city" [1992b: 408). 
It is then again possible to view the highlanders as reacting to 
forces within the wider political arena3o. In the late New Kingdom period 
similar processes had provoked the consolidation of power among dissident 
highlanders and their ethnically or tribally affiliated plains-people. 
Now as a more densely settled territory, the hill country saw the rise of 
a state of the type of an agrarian monarchy, the national state of the 
highlanders. Thus, while Thompson in no way denies the importance of the 
more intensive development of especially horticulture, its implications 
for the development of trade and ensuing steps towards centralization, 
he, nonetheless, stresses the impact of Assyrian policies on Palestinian 
affairs [1992b: 3161. 
Similar developments had in fact led to the formation of the state 
in the Taqali highlands. Ewald often stresses the importance of outside 
influences. Shifferd says something similar about the Yoruba polities, 
claimimg that "the idea of 'Yoruba-nesso, at sense Of common culture or 
peoplehood, is a rather late development in their history, stemming from 
the anti-colonial movement of the early twentieth century* (1996: 32; see 
also Kochakova; 1996: 48-49). In Palestine such influence intensified oven 
30 One of the criticisms on Coote and Whitelam by Woippert and 
weippert was in fact adass sie mit ihrer im wesentlichen mit 
innerpalästinischen Faktoren rechnenden Erklärung der Z«", taatonbildung 
von ihrer sonst vertretenen Prämisse abweichen, derzufolge nich 
Palästinas Geschicke nicht im Land selbst entscheiden sondern von 
aussen bestimmt werden... 1 [Weippert and Weippert; 1991: 379) 
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further as Samaria became a vassal of Assyria under Tiglath-Pileser II, 
and her territory was integrated into the Assyrian provincial system even 
before the fall of Samaria herself [Davies; 1992: 671. 
Such assumptions are validated when the sparse epigraphic evidence 
that is available is taken into account. Admittedly the earliest evidence 
we have is that of the records pertaining to Pharaoh Sheshonq's campaign 
to Palestine, yet it provides mostly negative evidence: 
Neither Judah nor Israel, and neither Jerusalem nor any 
viable capital of the central hills inyite Shoshenq's 
attention in his efforts to enforce Palestine's political and 
economic subordination to Egypt. Jerusalem is a small 
highland town at the time, and the existence of an Israel or 
a Judah at such an early date is unsupported by what is known 
of Palestine of the time. The evidence drawn from the 
archaeological and textual data we have certainly argues 
against the assertion of any transregional political 
structures in the highlands, and precludes any coherent sense 
of a unity of the population during the Iron I or early Iron 
II periods, prior to the building of Samaria. (Thompson; 
1992b: 3071 
The fact that Sheshonq largely bypassed the southern highland 
territory, while he plundered cities in and bordering the northern 
territories, although not mentioning Israel as such, has now reached a 
certain consensus [see Na'aman; 1992; Davies; 1992: 68]. All in all it is 
thus arguable that the territory of Judah in particular remained 
economically and politically fairly uninteresting to outside powers. At 
the same time, it again points towards the fact that the northern parts 
were somewhat ahead of the southern hill country. This perception is 
confirmed when we turn to the remaining evidence. 
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Except for one reference given by Mesha king of Moab (c. 840 B. C. ), 
which mentions not only Israel, but also her king Omri, the evidence all 
comes from precisely an Assyrian background. While Ashurbanipal (883-859 
B. C. ) still does not refer to any kingdom of Israel, scholars have 
detected such an entity on the "Kurkh stele" of Shalmaneser III, on the 
"Black obelisk", the records of Adad-nirari III's expedition to Palestine 
(803 B. C. ) as well as his "Rimah Stele", and finally it is seen to be 
mentioned by Tiglath-Pileser 111 (743-732 B. C. ) and Sargon II [Davies; 
1992: 66-671. Yet even then this evidence is not at all clear, for, as 
Davies notices, "indeed, apart from the one reference to Jehu" by 
Shalmaneser III, the regular Assyrian name for Israel is 'House of cmril 
or land of Omril. The only capital city mentioned 
is Samaria" [Davies; 
1992: 671. Consequently this strengthens the argument that state-formation 
culminated to a great extent 
in the building of Samaria, most probably 
under some form of Omride dynasty [cf Thompson; 1991: 89; 1992b: 313]. This 
again allows for more time for state-formation to take place. Jamieson- 
Drake has pointed out "it is somewhat surprising that Israel should pass 
through the chiefdom' phase so rapidly" [Jamieson-Drake; 1991: 1431. This 
scenario would provide an answer to this problem. 
There remains the question of Judah and Jerusalem. We have already 
seen that the concept of a united monarchy 
is unlikely. How much, 
however, did this northern state come to influence the southern 
hillranges? It has already been argued that at times the south came under 
some kind of weak hegemony from 
her northern neighbour. Thompson argues 
that "chronologically, we can expect that the political development of 
31 This realization led Davies to the following remark: "I might 
pose the question whether, 
in the absence of the biblical literature, 
historians would refer to this Palestinian kingdom as 'Israel' at all, 
rather than Omri-land' (and we would wonder who Omri wasi); even 
in 
the biblical literature, the names 'Ephraim' and 'Samaria' are 
frequent alternatives. 'Israel' is a name which predominates only as a 
result of a later preference, and may not 
have been the name by which 
the state was Most commonly known during its existence" (Davies; 
1992: 67, fn. 9; cf Miller; 1991b: 94). 
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, Terusalem as a regional state, controlling the Judean highlands, lagged 
substantially behind the consolidation of the central highlands further 
north" [1992b: 2911, and that the basis of power was "never great before 
well into the seventh-century" [f992b: 291]. It is doubtful that a state 
of dependency existed as such between the north and the south, with Judah 
coming under the hegemony of Samaria. Yet it is generally agreed that, 
until her fall, Samaria was the more developed and thus the stronger 
element [Davies; 1992: 69; also Miller and Hayes; 1986: 222]". 
Finkelstein noticed that settlement in the southern hillcountry was 
later and less extensive. He claimed that it spread from the centers of 
Mannasseh and Ephraim into the south and Judah. Admittedly the southern 
part of the hill country is far less suitable for settlement than the 
neighbouring northern territories. It was far more nomadic-pastoralist in 
character, as well as functioning as a refuge for brigand elements. it is 
also possible that the intensified settlement that took place in the 
north gradually pushed out its nomadic population. This process 
intensified itself as stronger polities formed. We have seen that even 
when formerly nomadic, a state 61ite will diminish the role of further 
nomadic elements by either settling them forcibly or recreating a 
hinterland. Thompson denies such an idea of the south simply becoming the 
receiver of the overflow of population growth in the north. Nonetheless 
we believe that the influence of the north must have manipulated the ways 
in which population organization and polity formation took place in 
Judah. The establishment of a monarchy in the northern hill country would 
have called for some form of reaction in the south. Thompson after all 
also argues for a chronological confluence between the developments in 
the north and a reaction in the south: 
The great expansion of settlement in Judaea during the course 
of Iron II also corresponds chronologically well with the 
"As such, in the Hebrew Bible, "we get an 'up-side down' history 
of the kingdom of Israel" [Ahlstr8m; 1991b: 131]. 
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floruit of new settlement in the central hills to the north, 
and the controlled centralization of Political power in 
Samaria. The confluence of these elements suggests that it 
was only later, in the course of this Iron II period, that 
the demographic basis for the Iron Age regional hegemony of 
jerusalem first developed as the expanding cash crop 
economies of herding and horticulture drew the Judean 
highlands into an increasing dependence on the major trade 
centers for their markets. Efforts to control these trade 
goods, in turn encouraged LTerusalem to compete with the 
southern towns of the Judean region: most immediately with 
Hebron and the large towns of the Shephelah, such as Lachish, 
as the central market for the southern highlands. [Thompson; 
1992b: 290-2911 
Unlike Samaria, the national capital, Thompson views Jerusalem as 
coming to power as the center of a city-state. Jerusalem did not become 
the capital of the nation of Judah, but managed to extend its control 
over the territory of Judah [Thompson, 1992b: 291-292, see also 407-412, 
esp. 4111. This account is paralleled by that of Jamieson-Drake, who also 
sees Jerusalem as developing into a primary center (1991: 137-138]. Given 
the nomad-brigand history of the territory, it is again tempting to view 
a scenario similar to the one presented for Hall by Rosenfeld (19651. 
Jerusalem, with the strong arm of a parasocial leader and/or sheikh and 
his aid of expert fighters, maybe exiled nomads and brigands from the 
north, could have extended its control over the surrounding territories 
and tried to monopolize trade. Then the erstwhile nomadic, but now city 
61ite, could have reinforced settlement to higher degrees, even if it 
meant forcibly settling their prior nomad kin. 
That the territory of Judah was environmentally limited and 
socially circumscribed by more or less hostile groups can only have 
intensified and accelerated the processes once they began. That 
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settlement had already reached seriously high levels in the north can 
only have added to these factors. The Possibilities of withdrawal were 
thereby reduced in the case of Judah; in fact the development of a 
centralized state in the north had added to the impaction of the south. 
Nonetheless, Jerusalem could extend as a center, also because the region 
was becoming more dependent on such a center for organizing the 
developing trade [Thompson; 1992b: 291]. However, at first its overall 
influence remained limited. Other potential centers maintained not only 
an independent, but also a competitive role over an extended period. 
Furthermore "Jerusalem's dominance over the Judean highlands (to say 
nothing of control over the Northern lVegev or the Shephelah, both of 
which boasted towns easily comparable and perhaps superior to Jerusalem) 
seems best dated at the earliest from the destruction of Lachish at the 
turn of the century" (Thompson; 1992b: 2921. According to Thompson there 
is little warrant to suppose that successful consolidation of the 
southern highlands was achieved by Jerusalem [1992b: 292]. When it did, it 
was furthermore aided by Assyria, which eliminated its strongest 
contender, Lachish (also Jamieson-Drake; 1991: 146]. 
Little can be said as to the exact extent of the southern polity, 
yet it is probable that Jamieson-Drake is to be followed with his claim 
"that Jerusalem began to function as the primary center of a 'state, (in 
the technical sense) only in the 8th century, and then on a relatively 
small scale, for a state" [1991; 1421. In fact Jamieson-Drake argues that 
even 8th-7th century Jerusalem lacked some of the characteristic traits 
of a state, showing only limited evidence for interregional trade and 
skilled artisanship (1991: 138-1391. From what has been said above, it 
also can be deduced that, although Samaria might have enjoyed a peak of 
power in the Omride period, at the time Judah reached any higher degrees 
of organization, she (Samaria). already had Assyria breathing down her 
neck. Consequently it is plausible that Judah never reached the level of 
a highly developed agrarian state monarchy of independent status, before 
Samaria had already fallen. At which time Judah became little more than at 
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buffer state between Assyria and a resurgent Egypt[Thompson; 1992b: 333]. 
Thompson reaffirms the role of Assyria in the process, when he claims 
that the states of Israel and Judah, regional in nature, "eventually 
emerged during Iron II as part of the new order of the Assyrian empire" 
[1992b: 3241. In the end, both Samaria and Judah, but especially Judah, 
enjoyed too short a period of independence to develop into powerful 
states, let alone forces of imperial might [Thompson; 1992b: 412]. The 
Palestinian highlands became, once again, relatively unimportant pawns in 
the political game of the greater powers. Again the conclusions drawn by 
Ewald for the Taqali highlands seem to suit the Palestinian highland 
scenario rather perfectly: 
The state formed when warriors and their retinues organized 
themselves into a ruling elite which gained various kinds of 
material support from its subjects. The warrior-kings won 
preferential access to long-distance exchange. Their access 
to land and labor, however, remained limited. Thus state 
formation remained a disputed and unfinished building 
process; disputed because highlanders only unequivocally 
supported their rulers; unfinished because rulers and their 
subjects continued to contend over the structure of their 
political edifice until outside forces brought their work to 
an abrupt end. [Ewald; 1990: 81 
Thus any potential polity at an early date can only be conceived of 
in minor terms, which would point to the fact that even when settlement 
had increased dramatically and the first signs of stratification appeareci 
in the Palestinian highlands, much of the hill country still was 
controlled by separate chiefdoms and/or relatively minor state-like 
polities. In fact too many factors are indeed standing in the way of 
early and complex state formation in the case of the Palestinian 
highlands. The diversity of the environment in favours centrifugality; 
the population strong ethnic bonds between the populations. Both 
277 
political chiefs, and religious leaders would have opposed 
centralization, especially as we have seen that there is little evidence 
of a national ideology. There were no outside powers that could have 
slightly influenced trade or stood as the enemy in order to foster ethnic 
coherence among the highlanders. Archaeologically speaking, nothing 
indicates for certain that a state with a major building plan was at work 
in early times. Finally, epigraphically, the kingdoms and their kings 
find mention only later than would have been thought. In the end, there 
appears to be too many factors opposing centralization, and little 
evidence of the presence of a highly centralized and strong state to 
believe in the existence of such a polity. Claessen and Oosten's warning 
concerning the advent of state formation reflects this position rather 
closely: 
As the emergence of complex socio-political systems requires 
a positive feedback between a number of factors, it will come 
as no surprise that only in a few cases such a development 
came to be realized; many societies never reached the level 
of the chiefdom, and even fewer became early 
states .... Whatever the 
impediments, early states did emerge. 
They developed from an incipient form into the typical early 
state, and then, gradually, early states made place for 
mature states. Though this process of growing complexity can 
be documented for several cases, the majority of early 
states, however, never reached this level of development. In 
most cases, development stagnated, and the state in question 
declined and collapsed, or was incorporated in stronger, or 
more developed political organizations. [Claessen and Oosten; 
1996: 61 
Again, this is not to say that there existed no state at all. Most 
certainly regions and sub-regions came under the hegemony of strong men, 
who most probably started to call themselves kings. We do not want to say 
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that the highlands remained a highly decentralized country, where every 
single village was independent and tribes roamed in absolute freedom. 
What we contend is that there rapidly developed an overall highly 
centralized, organized and bureaucratized full blown state, an empire 
under David and Solomon. We think that state formation on such a scale 
simply encountered too many difficulties to make it possible. This is not 
even to say that no-one at the time thought of such a thing. There might 
even well have been someone proclaiming himself king of a vast territory 
and why not the whole highlands. It is another thing to say that this was 
effectively so, that local contenders did not contest his claims, that 
the very mass of the peasants accepted this as so, that it was possible 
for this man to make his claims true, and even that people actually knew 
of his claims. Again the situation in Taqali is a good example to look 
at. We tend to view the situation as it existed around the so-called 
Davidic-Solomonic Age as closely reminding us of the Armana period, petty 
kings in petty strives. 
it is arguable indeed that most of such minor Polities were 
controlled from a major settlement, where a market and a merchant class 
developed. As Coote and Whitelam have said those situated along newly 
emerging trade routes would have an initial advantage [1987: 155-1561. As 
a state they would however remain dependent on reconquering their 
territory year in, year out. Like Hall many of the earliest polities in 
the Palestinian hillcountry must have been "recreative". As a state they 
were endangered not only by rival polities, but also their dependent, but 
growing sub-settlements, and the ever-remaining hinterland". To keep all 
these elements at bay, it was necessary to impose authority by regular 
raids, just as empires do upon larger territories with their campaigns. 
Again, the previous chapter has shown that the role of bandits and 
33 Hayden also noticed the vulnerability of early states to "the 
dangers of attack by the armies of other cities or by marauding 
nomads" (1993: 4161. 
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nomads never seriously diminished in these circumstances. They were ever- 
present threats from the hinterland, and a potential reservoir of 
recruits for any would-be usurpers. Even where, as is the case for Hall, 
they themselves had conquered and imposed an albeit limited state 
apparatus, there soon redeveloped a hinterland with its nomadic forces 
and its bands of pillaging marauders. To a great extent the erstwhile 
nomadic 61ite provoked this situation. It soon took on sedentary 
characteristics and alienated itself from its previous nomadic kin. It 
not only disfavoured the nomads, but forced them back into the 
hinterland, and probably even tried to undo their lifestyle by forcing 
them to settle. In due time, these same forces could re-emerge as a 
definite menace. 
it is hard to qualify such polities. One might call them nomadic 
states, when, like Hall, they were conquered and set up by nomads. Yet it 
is equally true that they remained essentially sedentary in nature, as 
even the nomadic leaders adopted the settled lifestyle. Due to the role 
played by bandit groups as a military force, even when led by a sheikh, 
one might characterize them as bandit-kingdoms. But also then the 
transformation from bandit into professional soldier soon leaves us in 
the same position. Where the nomadic 61ite settles down and their 
parasocial warriors become an institution of bodyguards, we are faced 
with the end-result of an essentially sedentary polity. It is tempting to 
compare this end-result to a city-state, and this is to some extent the 
way to view the situation in the Palestinian highlands till the advent of 
samaria, a mosaic of competing city-based states of a limited character 
[cf Thompson; 1992b: 3071'4. 
34 one might also note that Rowton himself claimed that there are 
common characteristics to be seen between a dimorphic chiefdom and a 
city-state, and that they have "a similar potential for growth" 
[1974: 17]. The overall situation could be compared to that exposed by 
Salzman for Baluchistan: "The hakom (dynastic rulers) were associated 
with centers of irrigation cultivation and thus with shahri (sedentary 
cultivators), although their rule depended to some extent upon 
collusion with baluch (nomadic tribesmen). Some baluch groups were 
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intimately associated with hakom, and thus involved in a feudallike 
organization; other baluch tribes were quite independent ... The 
political units within which these categories of people reside and 
interact are tribal territories, or oasis centers, or limited regional 
areas tied together by recognition of a certain hakom. Between such 
units, and sometimes within them, there was frequent armed struggle of 
various types: raiding for goods, boundary maintenance, imperialistic 
expansion" [Salzman; 1980b: 97; cf also Pastner; 1978: 250-253]. In the 
end it might all again come down to a matter of definition between 
chiefdom and states: "The latter are, so to speak, evolved chiefdoms 
that have the capacity of averting fissions and reduplication among 
their members, the chiefdom having no such ability but possessing 
nevertheless a centralized political authority based on a hereditary 
aristocracy backed by priests, the ruler being one of them and often 
the chiefpriest" [Muller; 1996: 100]. It is clear that to make a 
difference is not easy at all, when such chiefdoms can have 
populations running into the thousands (Muller; 1996: 100). of further 
interest might be a warning given by Muller in the same article: *But 
to focus on such singular cases --and their accumulation thereof-- may 
leave the impression that the evolution into early state is a natural 
trend in chiefdoms. However this is merely an impressionistic view 
which is even more reinforced when looking at the literature on 
chiefdoms. One cannot fail to notice that there are a number of cases 
where an important factor is never taken into consideration: a 
chiefdom is more often than not found in what I may call a congeries 
of similar chiefdoms which are simply juxtaposed or, at best, loosely 
federated either politically or ritually" [1996: 991. 
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Conclusion 
This book is about order and disorder in society, their 
constant presence, overlap, and blend. When times seem peaceful, a 
substantial amount of active unrest perdures --- more than is 
thought. The opposite is also true; order is rarely as pervasive as 
it seems. order and disorder are created by humans to serve their 
needs and ambitions. order serves one group and disorder another. As 
peace does not often equal progress for everyone, some employ 
disorder to advance. Order can encroach on liberty, so it is 
resisted. People also use order or 
disorder, or both, to protect 
their interests. Some who induce disorder may eventually join the 
order they sought to disrupt, which 
is where they wanted to be all 
along. others, such as successful revolutionaries, may establish a 
new system of their own, but 
it will always have its challengers. In 
this persistently unsettled environment, 
individuals can shift from 
compliance to dissent and return to order with unsuspected ease. 
[Vanderwood; 1981: xil 
This study has made one point extremely clear. That as 
historians and anthropologists, we tend to work with terminologies 
that often convey far too restricted notions. Ancient scribes and 
modern scholars are often 
limited by the uses and abuses of language. 
Frequently involuntarily, we find ourselves restricted by our own 
choices of subject, models, and 
desires to render our findings in 
written form. To do so we 
have to use a vocabulary that often conveys 
upon others notions that we 
did not ourselves have in mind, and 
equally often what was 
important to us is missed by others. 
Especially on the socio-political scene, it is the case that sooner 
or later, we are be forced to 
decide for one term or another for the 
groups and occurrences that we are wanting to describe. Thus at some 
stage we will posit a centre and a periphery onto a given society, 
choose to qualify some groups as 
bandits, nomads, peasants, etc., and 
finally characterise the Political mood as peaceful, rebellious, 
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revolutionary, and likewise. This is to convey upon the reader a 
somewhat general idea about what we thought was going on. Yet often 
the subtleties start to get lost, and eventually heavily distorted 
pictures emerge. 
At the very start of the study, as well as throughout, we have 
alluded to the difficulties in trying to qualify groupings. These 
difficulties are no less when we come to describe the socio-political 
circumstances during the Late Bronze-Iron Age transition. In the 
first instance, this transition is a modern concept, that was not 
qualified or even perceived as such by its contemporaries. The people 
of the time did not know about the fact that they were leaving one 
defined period to enter a new one. To them the terms of Late Bronze 
and Early Iron meant nothing. Moreover the importance of both Bronze 
and Iron have been heavily challenged not only in their importance 
for the transition, but also generally as distinguishing qualifiers 
between the two periods. 
As such, it indeed becomes difficult even to speak of something 
like the "emergence of Israel". There was nothing new emerging, only 
old populations and dispositions, social groups and modes of life 
taking modified forms. To describe the processes more correctly, it 
would be appropriate to talk of the transformation of the Palestinian 
highlands. Yet the realisation of this does not eliminate all the 
problems in describing the processes and developments. Despite the 
progress which has been made on this point, it is still common, as 
Gnuse's review shows, to reach out for qualifications that in the end 
restrict the full forces at work. The difficulties lie not as much 
with finding the right model for the occurrences in the transition 
period. it rather has become important to list a number of caveats in 
order to keep the reader aware of not loosing sight of the subtleties 
involved. 
This is not to deny the validity of models and analogies. it is 
not the veracity of models that are in question, but it is the 
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terminology and vocabulary that often become too restrictive in 
transmitting the ideas. Terminology leaves less space for variations 
than real life. It is arguable that since the classical period of 
biblical history writing, with the conquest and infiltration models, 
even since Mendenhall's attempt to apply a sociological model, 
biblical scholars have rendered reconstruction's of far more complex 
forms. Nonetheless, often the complexity is overlooked in favour of 
concentrating on one or a few main points, that come to characterise 
the model. Thus to use such terminology as withdrawal, indigenous 
settlement, or peaceful, internal transformation 
does not in fact 
eliminate this problem. By using these particular notions, other 
important factors tend to be ignored. 
The solution however is not to do away with such 
qualifications, since this would undermine the process of 
understanding, but to point out clearly the aims of the study and the 
difficulties of interpretation. This study has been an attempt to 
draw attention to the variations in political power, be this in 
adherence or opposition to the central 
instance of authority. This 
has taken the form of relating how changes on a wider socio-Poll'tical 
arena can change the directions 
in development taken by small scale 
social groups within a limited environment. 
The attempt to analyse a selection of social agents, rather 
than ethnic entities per se, represents an advantage. Indeed they do 
not tend to appear suddenly on the scene 
like the Sea Peoples (or as 
it had been long postulated, the Israelites), or suddenly disappear 
from the scene like the Egyptian or Hittite empires. The social 
agents are always there, in some form or another, albeit not always 
the same persons. They are thus far more suited to discuss as part of 
a period of transition and transformation. Indeed when approached 
from this perspective the whole outlook changes. Instead of 
discussing how earlier Canaanites became Israelites, it is now 
possible to discuss how one and the same Palestinians adapted 
themselves to ever-changing political circumstances. The occurrences 
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surrounding the settlement of the highland territories are thus no 
longer a unique event, but a link in a long chain of socio-political 
strategies at the disposal of the Palestinian population(s). They are 
but one part in the wider context and can only be viewed with 
reference to what happened before and what was to happen later. 
Nonetheless, it remains impossible to avoid referring to the 
transition period as an isolated point of interest. In this case it 
proves equally impossible not to qualify the period with reference to 
a political mood and disposition of some kind or the other. At this 
point it should be stressed again that there is now a tendency to 
move away from models such as the conquest and revolt model that 
insist on the more violent side of the events. As such, it is to some 
extent variations of the more peaceful 
infiltration model that have 
come to dominate the scene of biblical scholarship. Gnuse has 
accordingly used the term "peaceful transition period". 
As with other such qualifications there exists the danger that 
such a notion of "peaceful transition" 
is carried too far by the 
reader or generalised to a point where 
it comes to dominate the whole 
outlook. The relativity 
involved when it is claimed that a certain 
period is peaceful must 
be emphasised. This problem has been 
encountered in Briant's concept of 
hostilit6 r6glement6e and the 
differences discussed above between occurrences of brigandage and 
dissidence or revolt and secession. The Amarna. period cannot be 
viewed as effectively a period of permanent 
hostility nor the Late 
Bronze-Iron Age transition as a period of peasant revolt. 
Following Briant, it has been necessary to warn against taking 
all records as merely the outcome of the 
language of conquest or the 
ideologically inclined perceptions of sedentary state societies. it 
has been seen that the sedentary societies in question exaggerate the 
violence of hinterland populations and that they overstate the 
backwardness of nomads and mountaineers in order to justify and 
legitimate their own desires of conquest and domination. On the other 
285 
hand, it would be wrong to assume that mountains and highlands 
represent a paradise on earth, Populated with law-abiding and peace- 
loving shepherds and villagers. This romantic image is no closer to 
reality than the previous picture of barbarism. The reality is 
probably to be found somewhere in between. It is important, 
therefore, to have a clear understanding of what it means to call the 
Late Bronze-Iron Age transition 'peaceful,. 
Peaceful at this point, briefly stated, means that violence did 
not exceed expected norms, that occurrences were nothing particularly 
out of the ordinary. It has not been denied that there were active 
bandits, that nomads lead intertribal disputes, that marauding armed 
bands made the highlands somewhat less secure, nor that at times 
raiding into the lowlands and plains occurred. Yet the Egyptian New 
Kingdom empire was little concerned by such events. They were simply 
drawbacks that the bureaucracy at the Pharaonic court considered to 
be the natural outcome of being in control of a vast territory. Where 
the hinterland was not prosperous, it was simply better to concede a 
certain freedom of action and autonomy so that large-scale violent 
encounters were avoided. That the outcome of this was that minor 
skirmishes had to be largely ignored, so that the hinterland people 
felt confident in the guarantee of their autonomy, was probably as 
obvious to the Pharaonic court as it was later to be to the 
Assyrians, the Achaemenids, and the Romans. As long as the empire was 
not disturbed to any great extent in its functioning, there was 
little reason to be alarmed by minor upheavals. 
To say that the transition was peaceful, thus is to say that it 
was not violent enough so as to cause major upheavals. It was in no 
instance intense enough to threaten the stability of the empire. As 
we have seen, the most dramatic increase in violence that Palestine 
experienced was a reaction to (as opposed to a cause of) the late 
Egyptian takeover, coupled with the invasion of the Sea Peoples. Even 
then it was to a great extent aimed at maintaining autonomy, and 
consequently Came to be concentrated in the highlands. Here 
286 
resistance was easiest and a situation of quasi-independence had 
always reigned. Over this period of Egyptian reinforcement and 
expansion by the Sea Peoples, the highland dissidents were most 
likely joined by refugees from the plains and lowlands. Though 
resistance on the plains might at times have reached more or less 
violent levels, it is again not to be viewed as a major revolutionary 
event. It must be rated with what has to be expected when an outside 
force decides to establish itself more firmly; local, at most 
regional upheavals and minor riots, that resulted in little 
ostensible change, but were likely to increase the number of people 
taking to the mountains. 
This situation is not to be equated with a vast and unified 
revolt on the part of the plains people, 
least of all a peasant 
revolt against the city-state regents. At the most some of the city- 
state 61ite-members themselves organised a 
desperate attempt to ward 
off Egyptian hegemony and/or the Sea Peoples' 
invasion. They were, at 
any rate, doomed to failure. Egypt took over, reinforced military and 
administrative personnel, and, after 
initial confrontation, allowed 
the Sea Peoples to install themselves largely along the coast. Yet 
the main attraction of interest to us must remain the highlands 
themselves. Admittedly here instances of violence increased to some 
extent, as the highland people fiercely resisted Egyptian claims. 
After a long period of relative calm, they decided to hang on to an 
independence which had existed de facto, and which they considered to 
be de juro. 
But this kind of violence also has to be put into perspective. 
It remained to a large degree a form of dissidence, in fact, 
defensive rather than aggressive. The aim was to resist Egyptian 
conquest, rather than to overthrow Egypt per se. Again this is a 
situation to be expected when empires try to impose themselves in 
previously autonomous hinterland which they had left in the charge of 
local representatives and chieftains. It does not, however, translate 
itself into massive attacks launched by hordes of barbaric warriors. 
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To a great extent, it restricts itself to fighting off the conqueror, 
although intensified occurrences of short-lived hit and run attacks, 
as well as raids of the pillaging kind must be expected. As we have 
pointed out, it consists mainly in holding on to one's perceived 
rights, in conserving the traditional order of things. As such, these 
occurrences by themselves cannot have lead to a major break in the 
configuration of the Late Bronze political scene. 
Nonetheless a certain political aim can be detected. Resistance 
should in the end also be equated with a desire for secession, as if 
the attack on their autonomy had incited the hillcountry populations 
to push for independence. As we have seen, ethnic and tribal 
agglomerations would have been becoming more important in this 
period. It is possible that like Amurru, the Palestinian hill country 
was on its way to constitute an independent state-like entity, or 
several, as the degree of unification remains 
in doubt. The fact is 
that to secede, i. e. to separate itself from the overarching arm of 
Egypt, all that the hill people had to do was to hang onto, at the 
most re-emphasise the long-standing relations of power, as they had 
existed during most of the New Kingdom period. So far, little new 
emerged on the Palestinian scene. To a great extent, and coupled with 
a realignment also by the people from the plains and the lowlands 
away from the political might of the Egyptian suzerain to that of the 
highland chieftains, all that happened was an emphasis of the 
highland area to rights of self-rule. 
That the collapse of the empire aided the highlanders on their 
way to independence must be taken for granted. It is not as evident 
that it helped to transform the hill country into a state-like 
entity, least of all a full-blown state. It might well be the case 
that Amurru took the step towards statehood with a dynasty so 
quickly, because it remained surrounded by Egyptian and Hittite 
provinces, a sort of no-man's land between opposing empires. But as 
we have suggested, the collapse of the empire left the Palestinian 
hinterland in a totally different situation. The withdrawal of Egypt 
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meant that the one factor that had provided unity, however little it 
might have been, to the dissidents in the highlands had disappeared. 
The collapse also provoked the ruin of cities and temple estates and 
disrupted trade thus seriously reducing the possibilities of plunder 
and raids. These conditions were not altogether favourable to the 
formation of more important polities, such as early states, in the 
hinterland. 
it is preferable to see the collapse of the empire as 
destructive to the trends of consolidation that had manifested 
themselves during the reigns of the later Pharaohs. on the one hand, 
surely, the vacuum left by Egypt worked in favour of those who made 
political claims of their own, such as tribal sheikhs and parasocial 
groups. Yet, on the other, this was not yet a time for ambitious 
statebuilders. Unlike Abdi-Asirtals expansionist tendencies, 
centrifugal forces would have worked against the fast development of 
state-polities of greater importance. Not withstanding, chiefdoms, 
even smaller bandit-kingdoms, remained in existence. The trend would 
have been to disperse not only people, but also political power. Only 
as population growth increased and land became less available, did 
tendencies towards stratification and centralisation evolve and 
initiate a move towards a more organised polity. Even then there is a 
case for arguing that the polities never developed to be an important 
state, least of all a united kingdom or major Solomonic empire. 
Again it is emphasised that we do not witness unified and 
large-scale movements that led to the replacement of an old picture 
by a totally new one. Rather, it is the development of different 
social, seemingly unimportant, groups reacting to a changing 
political environment. The evolution of these groupings was favoured 
by the fact that for long they had to a large extent been ignored, 
thus left alone to go their own ways. In the context of changes on 
the wider socio-political arena, they also transformed and realigned 
themselves. Even though it might be said that this changed the 
political configuration of Palestine, the movements by themselves are 
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not to be held responsible for the overthrow of either the petty 
city-state system or the Egyptian empire. It cannot be stressed 
enough that they are the outcome, not the cause of events on the 
higher political sphere. 
It is therefore not necessary to invoke such interpretations as 
a large scale conquest or a major peasant revolt to account for the 
changed face of ancient Palestine in the Early Iron Age. Such one- 
time and unified happenings are here replaced by a slow evolution 
that saw movements being dispersed temporarily as well as 
geographically. Even during the late takeover, we d6 not posit a 
unified anti-Egyptian protest. Even then actions were to a certain 
extent isolated, of diverging nature, some more and some less 
violent. There was definitely no unified violent uprising, leaving 
behind itself widespread death and destruction. Archaeology thus 
leaves an equally elusive picture. Though destruction's can be 
considered to have happened, it is possible to credit different 
entities with the responsibility. on the one hand the Egyptian 
takeover itself might have engineered such destruction's, secondly 
the invasion of the sea Peoples must be considered a likely 
candidate, while, finally, Palestinian reaction cannot be wholly 
ruled out. But again it is the isolation, and to some extent, the 
relative unimportance of such events that have to be emphasised. 
There is no unique factor that could be said to be responsible, as 
there is no unique cause. 
Thus it is possible at this point to determine the place of 
this study within recent scholarship. In the first instance, it shows 
that it is possible to approach the question of the history of 
Palestine-Israel from a different angle. It shows that it is possible 
to give an account of a history, albeit tentative, of Palestinian 
populations which is not dependent upon the arrival of the Israelites 
and their writings. Admittedly, it is in this case less possible to 
pin down a historical event as such. Rather the task lies in 
following potential lines of development especially on the socio- 
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political sphere. But this is in accordance with the new trends that 
insist on slow evolutionary schemes. In fact, the study shows that it 
is more plausible to follow the continuum of an evolution when 
studying social agents rather than nations. 
In the end the fruits of a study such as this are basically 
twofold. On the one hand they provide a framework within which to 
work. They thus can serve as a tool for future research into the 
history of Palestine. This is especially so because on the other hand 
they prove extremely adaptable to new findings. Hopefully, the future 
will yield new archaeological discoveries and new epigraphic 
evidence. A study like this will be important in order to set the new 
findings within a proper socio-political context, giving credit to 
whole population groups rather than concentrating on a few figures, 
such as kings and princes. of course this picture can only be 
improved if more studies of this kind appear, concentrating an other 
agents. It is our belief that the availability of enough studies of 
this kind would enable us to narrow down the history of Palestine far 
more effectively than by starting with texts that present a number of 
different histories, or interpretations of history. Furthermore, if 
enough of these studies are available, they will ultimately help 
elucidate each other. At some stage 
it will then hopefully be 
possible for historians to pin down with an increased degree of 
exactitude the developments that occurred around the end of the Late 
Bronze and the beginning of the Early Iron age in Palestine. 
At the beginning of the study we challenged the dominance of 
the Bible in historical research. We have hopefully shown that it is 
possible to engage in history writing without reliance on this 
extraordinary body of texts. The relation between Bible and history 
has accordingly changed rather considerably in our outlook. The Bible 
will, in the future, have to be seen in relation to a socio- 
historical account rather than determining it. It will be the 
sociology and history of Palestine that will have to be looked at 
first, while only then will it be Possible to address questions such 
291 
as why, when, and how the biblical texts took shape. These processes 
will be slow and difficult of course, but nonetheless a necessary 
path to follow in future biblical scholarship. Ultimately one might 
be led to follow the propositions of a recent monograph, that make it 
very hard to conceive of anything like a traditional "Israelite" 
history or the existence of the vast majority of the Hebrew Bible 
before the Persian period [cf Davies; 1992]. 
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